Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

In 2014, Casey Moyer entered into an agreement with Doug Lasher Construction, Inc. for the construction and purchase of a new home, which was substantially completed in November 2014. Over the next six-and-a-half years, Moyer repeatedly informed Lasher Construction about issues with the home, particularly water leakage, and received assurances that the issues would be fixed. However, the problems persisted, and Moyer and Caitlin Bower filed suit against Lasher Construction in November 2021, alleging breach of contract and violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act.The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of Idaho granted summary judgment in favor of Lasher Construction, ruling that all claims were time-barred under Idaho Code sections 5-241(b) and 5-216, which require that claims arising out of a contract for the construction of real property be brought within five years of the final completion of construction. The court also found that the Idaho Consumer Protection Act claims were time-barred under the two-year statute of limitations provided by Idaho Code section 48-619. The court rejected the homeowners' arguments for equitable estoppel and the repair doctrine, concluding that they failed to show that Lasher Construction prevented them from pursuing their claims within the statutory period.The Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the district court's decision. The court reaffirmed that the repair doctrine is not available in Idaho and upheld the district court's conclusion that the homeowners failed to establish the elements of equitable estoppel. The court also agreed that the text messages and the July 2, 2021, response to the NORA demand did not constitute enforceable independent contracts. Lasher Construction was awarded attorney fees and costs on appeal as the prevailing party. View "Moyer v. Lasher Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

Tony Heath and Melissa Lish, neighbors in Chubbuck, Idaho, had a dispute after Heath parked two vehicles near Lish’s driveway. Lish, after Heath refused to move the vehicles, obtained a no parking sign from Denny’s Wrecker and had the vehicles towed. Denny’s refused to release the vehicles without payment. Heath sued Lish and Denny’s for civil trespass and conversion. The magistrate court granted summary judgment in favor of Lish and Denny’s and awarded attorney fees to Denny’s. Heath appealed, and the district court affirmed the magistrate court’s decisions.The Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decision regarding Denny’s summary judgment, holding that Denny’s actions were lawful under Idaho Code section 49-1806(1) and that Denny’s reasonably relied on Lish’s representations. The court found that Denny’s had no duty to verify the property line beyond Lish’s information and that Heath’s vehicles were towed lawfully. The court also affirmed the district court’s decision to reduce Denny’s attorney fee award, finding that the magistrate court did not need to address every factor in writing.However, the court reversed the district court’s decision regarding Lish’s summary judgment. The court found that genuine issues of material fact existed concerning whether there was boundary by acquiescence or boundary by agreement. The court noted that the declarations from previous property owners and the removal of part of the driveway by Lish’s husband raised questions about the boundary’s location and whether there was an agreement or acquiescence. The court remanded the case for further proceedings on Heath’s trespass and conversion claims against Lish.The court declined to award attorney fees on appeal to any party, noting that the issues raised were not pursued frivolously or without foundation. View "Heath v. Denny's Wrecker Service, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner Maryanne McCabe lived with her long-time romantic partner, David Burrows, in a New York City cooperative building. Upon Burrows' death, he bequeathed his unit to McCabe. She sought to acquire his lease and shares under a lease provision allowing automatic transfer to a shareholder's "spouse." The cooperative board did not recognize McCabe as a spouse but offered to consider her under a clause for family members. McCabe argued that the board's refusal violated the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL) prohibition against marital status discrimination.The Supreme Court denied McCabe's petition, stating that the denial was not due to her being unmarried but because she was not married to Burrows, which did not constitute marital status discrimination. The court also found that McCabe had not proven she was a family member or financially responsible. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court's decision on the same grounds.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The Court held that the term "marital status" under the NYCHRL refers to the legal condition of being single, married, legally separated, divorced, or widowed, and does not extend to individuals in long-term romantic relationships who are not legally married or in a registered domestic partnership. The Court concluded that the cooperative board's actions did not constitute marital status discrimination under the NYCHRL, the New York State Human Rights Law, or federal law. The Court also deferred to the board's decision to reject McCabe's application based on her financial representations. View "Matter of McCabe v. 511 W. 232nd Owners Corp." on Justia Law

In 2014, due to severe drought conditions, the United States Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) was unable to meet its water delivery obligations to both the Exchange Contractors and the Friant Contractors under the Central Valley Project (CVP). Reclamation prioritized delivering water to the Exchange Contractors, including water from the San Joaquin River, which resulted in a near-zero allocation to the Friant Contractors. The Friant Contractors and individual growers sued the United States, alleging breach of contract and takings without just compensation.The United States Court of Federal Claims dismissed the Friant Growers' breach of contract claims for lack of standing and dismissed the takings claims for lack of a property interest. The court granted summary judgment to the government on the Friant Contractors' breach of contract claims, concluding that the Exchange Contractors' rights under the Exchange Contract were superior and that Reclamation's actions were not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the Exchange Contract allowed Reclamation to deliver San Joaquin River water to the Exchange Contractors when necessary, and that the government did not breach the Friant Contract by doing so. The court also found that the government was immune from liability under the Friant Contract because its actions were not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. Finally, the court affirmed the dismissal of the takings claims, concluding that the Friant Contractors and Growers did not have a property interest in the water delivered by Reclamation under California law. View "CITY OF FRESNO v. US " on Justia Law

Majestic Asset Management, LLC, Wintech Development, Inc., Hai Huang, and Jen Huang owned and operated a golf course within a gated community governed by The Colony at California Oaks Homeowners Association. The owners had obligations to maintain the golf course and surrounding areas, secured by a performance deed of trust (PDOT). After failing to meet these obligations, the Association sought judicial enforcement, leading to a foreclosure decree and valuation of the PDOT.The Superior Court of Riverside County initially ruled in favor of the Association, finding the owners in breach of their maintenance obligations and issuing a permanent injunction. When the owners failed to comply, the court appointed a receiver to manage the golf course. After the receiver's efforts proved insufficient, the Association moved for foreclosure. The trial court valued the PDOT at $2,748,434.37, including the cost to repair the golf course and management fees, and ordered foreclosure.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court's decision to use the cost of repair ($2,503,500) as the value of the PDOT but found the inclusion of management fees ($244,934.37) inappropriate. The court modified the foreclosure decree to reflect the correct value of $2,503,500. The court also upheld the ruling that the owners would remain bound by the maintenance obligations if they paid the PDOT's value to retain the property, ensuring the Association's right to performance as long as the owners held the golf course.The court concluded that the foreclosure decree was equitable and did not violate foreclosure law or the one form of action rule. The Association was awarded costs and reasonable attorney fees incurred on appeal. View "Majestic Asset Management, LLC v. The Colony at California Homeowners Assn." on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Mill Road Realty Associates, LLC, Morris Maglioli, and William L. Ricci, Jr., d/b/a Wright’s Auto Parts, operated a junkyard in Foster, Rhode Island. They violated the conditions of their municipal license and continued operations despite a cease-and-desist letter from the Town’s zoning officer. Their municipal license expired, leading to the nonrenewal of their state license. Despite this, they continued operations without either license from 2018 to 2021. The Town issued another cease-and-desist letter in September 2021 and imposed a $100-per-day fine. The plaintiffs appealed to the zoning board of review, which denied their appeal. They then sought judicial review in Superior Court, alleging arbitrary, capricious, and tortious conduct by the defendants and seeking declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief.The Superior Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ action under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, citing the plaintiffs' failure to notify the attorney general of their constitutional claims as required by G.L. 1956 § 9-30-11. The trial justice dismissed the case sua sponte at the start of the hearing without allowing the parties to present evidence or argument on the issue of compliance with § 9-30-11.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the trial justice erred by not providing the plaintiffs an opportunity to present evidence or argument on the issue of compliance with § 9-30-11 before dismissing the case. The Supreme Court vacated the order and judgment of the Superior Court and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the trial justice to allow the parties to present evidence on the issue of compliance with § 9-30-11 and the grounds for their initial motions. View "Mill Road Realty Associates, LLC v. Town of Foster" on Justia Law

The United States Army Corps of Engineers partnered with the City of Dallas on the Dallas Floodway Extension (DFE) project, which began in 1999. Plaintiffs Timpy Ondrusek and Barbara Ann Ondrusek Wolfe own property that Dallas attempted to condemn for the DFE. They sued the Corps and the City in federal district court, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), claiming the Corps failed to prepare a supplemental environmental impact statement (SEIS) to account for new information, violating the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Clean Water Act (CWA).The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas dismissed the claims, determining the case was not justiciable. The court found the plaintiffs had not shown Article III standing and dismissed the complaint without prejudice. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, but the district court again concluded the case was not justiciable, noting the levee design phase was only 35 percent complete, and dismissed the case as unripe without prejudice, denying leave to amend.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found the claims against the Army Corps of Engineers were ripe for decision, as the Corps' failure to comply with NEPA presented a present controversy. The court determined the plaintiffs had standing, as they alleged a concrete and particularized risk of environmental harm to their property due to the Corps' failure to prepare an SEIS. The court reversed the district court's dismissal of the suit with respect to the Army Corps of Engineers, affirmed the dismissal with respect to the City of Dallas, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ondrusek v. United States Army Corps of Engineers" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between the developers of an aviation-centric community and the homeowners' association regarding the transfer and use of special declarant rights associated with a unique lot. The developers sold the lot to new owners, but the deed did not clearly convey the special declarant rights, and the homeowners' association was not informed about the transfer of these rights. The new owners sought a declaratory judgment that they held the special declarant rights, allowing them to bypass the association's oversight for construction, rent aircraft facilities to non-lot owners, and permit those non-lot owners to use the airstrip. The association argued otherwise and also contended that the lot owners must make tiedowns available to other community members.The Superior Court of Alaska granted summary judgment in favor of the association, ruling that the new owners did not obtain the special declarant rights, that construction on the lot required the association's approval, that the lot owners must make tiedowns available to other members, and that only lot owners could use the airstrip and aircraft facilities. The court also awarded attorney's fees to the association.The Supreme Court of Alaska reviewed the case and found that the statutory warranty deed was ambiguous regarding the transfer of the special declarant rights. The court reversed the summary judgment on this issue and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether the new owners obtained the special declarant rights. The court affirmed the requirement for the lot owners to make tiedowns available to other members but reversed the determination that only lot owners could use the airstrip and aircraft facilities, finding the declaration ambiguous on this point. The court vacated the award of attorney's fees and remanded for a new prevailing party determination. View "Meyers v. Sky Ranch, Inc." on Justia Law

A developer, Schooldev East, LLC, proposed to build a charter school in the Town of Wake Forest and applied for major subdivision and site plan permits. The proposed site was a 35-acre parcel within a larger tract of land. The developer's plans included constructing a multi-use path to provide pedestrian and bicycle access to nearby areas. The Town's planning board and board of commissioners (BOC) held hearings and ultimately denied the applications, citing non-compliance with the Town's Unified Development Ordinance (UDO) requirements for pedestrian and bicycle connectivity to surrounding residential areas.The Superior Court of Wake County affirmed the BOC's decision, concluding that the developer failed to demonstrate compliance with the UDO and that the Town's requirements were not preempted by state law. The Court of Appeals, in a divided decision, also affirmed the Superior Court's ruling, agreeing that the developer did not meet its burden of production to show entitlement to the permits.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and determined that the UDO provision in question was unclear regarding whether it required connectivity to all surrounding residential areas. The Court held that any ambiguity in land use ordinances should be resolved in favor of the free use of property. The Court concluded that the developer had presented competent, material, and substantial evidence of compliance with the UDO by proposing a multi-use path that provided access to a public park and a future residential subdivision. As no evidence was presented in opposition, the BOC had no basis to deny the applications. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case with instructions for the Town to approve the developer's applications. View "Schooldev East, LLC v. Town of Wake Forest" on Justia Law

In 2020, Wagonhound Land & Livestock, LLC purchased the 14,000-acre Tomahawk Ranch in Converse County, Wyoming. Shortly after, Wagonhound filed an action to quiet title to approximately forty acres that Boot Ranch, LLC had occupied and used since at least 1984. Boot Ranch counterclaimed for adverse possession of the property. The district court found that Boot Ranch had made a prima facie showing of adverse possession but concluded that Wagonhound had rebutted this claim by proving the existence of a fence of convenience and neighborly accommodation, thus quieting title in Wagonhound’s favor.The District Court of Converse County held a four-day bench trial and found that Boot Ranch had continuously used the disputed property for grazing, recreation, hunting, and fishing since at least 1984. However, the court concluded that the fence partially enclosing the property was a fence of convenience and that the use of the property was a result of neighborly accommodation. Consequently, the court ruled that Boot Ranch’s use was permissive, defeating its adverse possession claim. Boot Ranch appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the case and found that the evidence did not support the district court’s findings that the fence was one of convenience or that the use of the property was a neighborly accommodation. The court noted that there was no evidence of a convenience served by the fence and that the actions of removing trespassing cattle indicated assertions of exclusive ownership rather than permissive use. The Supreme Court of Wyoming reversed the district court’s decision and remanded the case for entry of an order quieting title to the disputed property in favor of Boot Ranch. View "Boot Ranch, LLC v. Wagonhound Land & Livestock Co., LLC" on Justia Law