Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Gunwerks sought to expand its business by constructing a new manufacturing facility in Cody, Wyoming, a project involving public funds and coordinated through Forward Cody Wyoming, Inc. Forward Cody retained Plan One Architects and Sletten Construction of Wyoming, Inc. as the project's designer and general contractor, respectively. Sletten hired various subcontractors, including Big Horn Glass, Inc. (BHG), to perform specific tasks. After completion, Gunwerks alleged numerous construction defects in the facility, including issues with concrete, finishes, HVAC, siding, drainage, ceiling heights, door and window flashings, and the shooting tunnel. Gunwerks sued Forward Cody, Plan One, and Sletten for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.Sletten responded to Gunwerks’s lawsuit by filing a third-party complaint against its subcontractors, including BHG. Sletten claimed that, should it be found liable to Gunwerks, subcontractors responsible for any deficient work should indemnify it for those damages. Sletten did not specifically admit or allege deficiencies in BHG’s work but sought to preserve its right to recovery if any subcontractor was found at fault. Approximately ten months after Sletten’s third-party complaint, BHG moved for summary judgment in the District Court of Park County, arguing that Sletten had not presented evidence showing BHG caused any of the alleged damages. The district court granted summary judgment for BHG, finding that Sletten had not countered BHG’s prima facie showing with disputed facts, relying instead on speculation.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the district court’s summary judgment ruling de novo, applying the same standard as the lower court and viewing the record most favorably to Sletten. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that Sletten failed to present admissible, competent evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact regarding BHG’s liability for any alleged defects. The court found Sletten’s evidence speculative and conclusory, insufficient to defeat summary judgment. The disposition was affirmed. View "Sletten Construction of Wyoming, Inc. v. Big Horn Glass, Inc." on Justia Law

Twenty-three landowners brought suit against Gold Bess Shooting Club, LLC and Caulder Construction, LLC, alleging nuisance due to noise, environmental, and safety concerns from a shooting range established on Caulder’s property in Woodstock, New Hampshire. Gold Bess registered as an LLC and leased land from Caulder, constructing the range and opening it to the public in October 2020. Prior to its opening, the New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services notified the defendants of alleged violations of state wetlands and terrain alteration statutes. The plaintiffs amended their complaint to add noise-related nuisance claims after Woodstock enacted a noise ordinance in April 2021.The Grafton County Superior Court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the plaintiffs’ noise-related nuisance claims, finding the shooting range immune under RSA 159-B:1 and RSA 159-B:2, which provide protection from civil liability related to noise for shooting ranges compliant with noise ordinances in effect when the range was established, constructed, or began operations. The court denied plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment and rejected their argument that alleged environmental law violations precluded immunity under RSA chapter 159-B. The court also granted summary judgment for the defendants on constitutional equal protection claims, and subsequently allowed the plaintiffs to voluntarily discontinue their remaining claims.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the statutory interpretation of RSA 159-B:1 and RSA 159-B:2 de novo. It held that these statutes require compliance only with noise ordinances, not with other laws such as wetlands or terrain alteration statutes. The court further determined that the shooting range “began operations” prior to the enactment of Woodstock’s noise ordinance, thereby qualifying for immunity from noise-related legal claims under the statutes. The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Martell v. Gold Bess Shooting Club, LLC" on Justia Law

A Nebraska limited liability company owned by Michael Perkins hired RMR Building Group, LLC, managed and solely owned by Robert M. Ryan II, as a general contractor to redevelop a shopping center. Their contract used a cost-plus billing arrangement, where Perkins paid RMR in advance for specific construction costs, including a substantial sum for HVAC equipment and RMR’s fee. RMR deposited the funds into its general operating account but did not pay for the HVAC equipment; instead, it used the money to cover other business obligations. Perkins terminated the contract after RMR failed to provide proof of payment for the equipment and then sued RMR and Ryan for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, conversion, and fraudulent misrepresentation, also seeking to pierce the corporate veil and hold Ryan personally liable.The District Court for Douglas County found that RMR breached the contract and was liable under theories of money had and received and unjust enrichment, but not for conversion or fraudulent misrepresentation. The court declined to disregard RMR’s corporate entity, finding no sufficient evidence that Ryan diverted funds for personal use or that RMR was a mere facade for Ryan’s dealings. Perkins appealed these findings.The Nebraska Court of Appeals reversed in part, concluding that the corporate veil should be pierced and Ryan held jointly and severally liable for the misappropriated funds, relying on factors from United States Nat. Bank of Omaha v. Rupe. On further review, the Nebraska Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, holding that the evidence did not establish by a preponderance that RMR’s entity should be disregarded, nor did it support fraud or conversion claims against Ryan. The Supreme Court remanded with direction to affirm the district court’s judgment. View "Perkins v. RMR Building Group" on Justia Law

Eleven individuals residing in the Town of Rockport, Massachusetts, challenged the creation of a new zoning overlay district that would allow high-density, multi-family housing near a commuter rail station. Some plaintiffs live adjacent to or within the boundaries of the affected overlay district. The plaintiffs argued that the adoption of the district should have required a two-thirds vote at the town meeting under state law, rather than the simple majority used, and alleged that the new zoning would negatively impact their property values and personal expectations regarding their property.After the Town held the vote and adopted the overlay district, the plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on both state statutory and federal constitutional grounds. The Town moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing the plaintiffs lacked standing. In response, the plaintiffs provided additional details in their briefing but did not amend their complaint to allege specific individualized harm. The District Court dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, finding the plaintiffs had failed to allege sufficient facts to establish standing, and that neither legislative nor abutter standing applied.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that the plaintiffs had not adequately demonstrated a concrete and particularized injury-in-fact as required by Article III. General, conclusory allegations about diminished property values and expectations were insufficient. The court also found that statutory “abutter” standing and legislative standing theories did not confer standing in federal court for these claims. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack of standing and subject-matter jurisdiction. View "Kolackovsky v. Town of Rockport" on Justia Law

Several descendants and heirs of Edith Little each own separate parcels of real property in Teton County, Idaho, which were divided and conveyed to Edith’s three children after dissolution of a family partnership in 1993. The deeds for these parcels included restrictive language limiting the owners’ ability to sell, trade, convey, or encumber the properties during their lifetimes or the lifetimes of their living heirs, except that conveyances were allowed only to their siblings, nephews, and nieces—not to their own spouses, children, or grandchildren. Despite the restrictions, over the years, owners conveyed their parcels to spouses and lineal descendants.Plaintiffs, who are current owners of two of the parcels, brought suit in the Seventh Judicial District Court of Teton County seeking to quiet title and obtain a declaratory judgment that the deed restrictions were unreasonable restraints on alienation and void as against public policy. The defendants, also family members, argued the restrictions were enforceable. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, concluding the Idaho statutes had abrogated the common law rule against unreasonable restraints on alienation and upholding the restrictions.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The Idaho Supreme Court held that the common law rule against unreasonable restraints on alienation remains in effect in Idaho and was not abrogated by Idaho Code sections 55-111 or 55-111A. The Court further determined that the restrictions in these deeds are unreasonable because they do not effectively preserve the properties within the immediate family and unduly hinder the owners’ ability to use or benefit from their land. The Supreme Court vacated the district court’s judgment, reversed its summary judgment order, and remanded the case for further proceedings. Costs were awarded to the plaintiffs as the prevailing party. View "Smallwood v. Little" on Justia Law

The dispute centers around an attempted annexation by the City of North Charleston of a one-acre parcel located near Highway 61 and the Ashley River. This parcel, purchased by North Charleston in 2017, is situated on the southwest side of Highway 61 and separated from both the highway and North Charleston’s existing city limits by a narrow strip of land owned by the National Trust for Historic Preservation. That narrow strip has been part of the City of Charleston since its annexation in 2005. The annexation ordinance at issue included 62 square feet of the National Trust’s strip—land within Charleston’s city limits—in its property description.The National Trust and the City of Charleston challenged the validity of North Charleston’s annexation ordinance, arguing that the parcel was not “adjacent” to North Charleston’s existing city limits as required by section 5-3-100 of the South Carolina Code. The Circuit Court for Charleston County dismissed the lawsuit, holding that neither the National Trust nor Charleston had standing to contest the annexation, but also found in the alternative that, if standing existed, the annexation was invalid because the parcel was not adjacent to North Charleston’s city limits. On appeal, the South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal for lack of standing and declined to reach the merits of the annexation’s validity.The Supreme Court of South Carolina granted review and held that both the National Trust and the City of Charleston had standing to challenge the annexation. The Court further affirmed the circuit court’s alternative ruling that North Charleston’s annexation was invalid because the parcel was not “adjacent” to its city limits, as required under state law. Thus, the decision of the court of appeals was reversed in part and affirmed in part. View "National Trust for Historic Preservation v. City of North Charleston" on Justia Law

The case concerns a 52.77-acre property in Tioga County, Pennsylvania, owned by an individual who repeatedly failed to pay real estate taxes. The county tax claim bureau conducted an upset tax sale after years of delinquency, selling the property for $83,000—about 18% of its appraised fair market value according to the owner. The owner objected to the sale, arguing both that the statutory notice requirements were not met and that the property was sold for a grossly inadequate price, raising procedural due process and substantive due process arguments.The Tioga County Court of Common Pleas held a hearing, credited the testimony of county officials over the owner, and found that all statutory notice and posting requirements were satisfied. The trial court determined there was no defect in the process and rejected the owner's challenge regarding the allegedly low sale price, finding no legal basis for setting aside the sale on that ground. The Commonwealth Court affirmed, agreeing that the statutory requirements were met and that, under Pennsylvania law, mere inadequacy of price does not justify setting aside a tax sale absent irregularities in the sale process.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed whether the lower courts erred in permitting the sale at 18% of market value. The court held that, under the Real Estate Tax Sale Law, a challenge to an upset tax sale based solely on the alleged inadequacy of the sale price is not permitted unless there is an irregularity or illegality in the sale proceedings themselves. The court found no such irregularities here, affirmed the lower courts’ factual findings and legal conclusions, and held that the statutory scheme precludes equitable relief based solely on the sale price. The order of the Commonwealth Court was affirmed. View "In re: Upset Sale TCB Tioga County" on Justia Law

A nonprofit organization challenged the validity of the City of La Habra’s February 2023 revision to its housing element, arguing that the modifications were adopted by the City Manager rather than the City Council and without additional public hearings. The housing element, part of the city’s general plan, is subject to periodic revision and state review. In this instance, after several public meetings and hearings on earlier drafts, the City Council adopted the housing element in September 2022 and authorized the City Manager to make further technical or clerical changes necessary for state certification. The City Manager subsequently approved additional revisions in February 2023, which were submitted to and certified by the Department of Housing and Community Development.In the Superior Court of Orange County, the nonprofit filed a petition for writ of mandate, seeking to prohibit the City from treating the February 2023 version as validly adopted. The court denied the petition, finding that the City had met public participation requirements through hearings on prior drafts and online posting of the revised element. The trial court also ruled that the City Council validly delegated authority to the City Manager for minor revisions and determined that any procedural errors were harmless, as required by Government Code section 65010, subdivision (b).The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the judgment. The court held that additional public hearings were not required for the February 2023 modifications since they constituted part of the ongoing revision and certification process, rather than a distinct amendment. It further held that the City Council’s delegation of authority to the City Manager was valid and consistent with local law. Finally, the court found no prejudicial error or substantial harm resulted from the process used, upholding the presumption of validity following state certification. The judgment was affirmed. View "Californians for Homeownership v. City of La Habra" on Justia Law

Diamond Sands Apartments, LLC owns and operates a 360-unit apartment complex in Las Vegas, Nevada, where units are leased for long-term stays under agreements prohibiting unauthorized subletting. Clark County received numerous complaints regarding short-term rentals in certain units, which included disturbances such as loud parties. The County investigated and verified that some units were being rented for short-term stays through Airbnb. After notifying Diamond Sands of the violations and conducting follow-up inspections, the County issued two administrative citations assessing $2,000 fines for each violation, as permitted under its ordinance, which prohibits unauthorized short-term rentals and allows for fines between $1,000 and $10,000 per violation.Diamond Sands filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada, raising facial and as-applied challenges to the County’s ordinance under the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause. The company sought declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that the ordinance unconstitutionally penalized property owners for short-term rental activity conducted by tenants. The district court denied Diamond Sands’ motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that the fines were not grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the violations and that Diamond Sands had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the denial of the preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion and underlying legal issues de novo. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion, finding that Diamond Sands bore some culpability due to its knowledge and failure to prevent ongoing violations. The fines imposed were at the low end of the authorized range, and the ordinance aimed to deter harm to residents. The court also determined that Diamond Sands had not shown the ordinance was unconstitutional in every application. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the preliminary injunction. View "DIAMOND SANDS APARTMENTS, LLC V. CLARK COUNTY NEVADA" on Justia Law

The case concerns a challenge to the rezoning of 145 acres of farmland in Canyon County, Idaho for light industrial use. The property owners, the Judith A. Gross Trust and Douglas Gross, sought the rezoning to facilitate future industrial development. The Canyon County Development Services Department and Planning and Zoning Commission recommended approval, and the Canyon County Board of County Commissioners ultimately approved the rezoning with conditions, including restrictions on certain uses. Three local businessmen and their agricultural business objected, arguing the rezoning would harm their agribusiness interests by reducing available farmland and impacting crop isolation.After the Board declined to reconsider its approval, the petitioners filed for judicial review in the District Court of the Third Judicial District of Idaho, Canyon County. They claimed standing as “affected persons” under the Local Land Use Planning Act (LLUPA), asserting concrete adverse impacts on their businesses. The district court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioners failed to establish “constitutional” standing under the traditional three-part test—injury in fact, causation, and redressability—and declined to consider whether the petitioners met LLUPA’s “affected person” standard.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the district court’s decision. It held that the applicable standing inquiry for judicial review under LLUPA is the “affected person” standard set forth in Idaho Code section 67-6521, rather than the traditional federal three-part test. The Court clarified that Idaho’s standing doctrine is a “self-imposed constraint” and subject to legislative definition. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s denial of the petition for review and remanded for consideration of standing under the LLUPA standard. Attorney fees were denied, but costs were awarded to the petitioners. View "Crookham v. County of Canyon" on Justia Law