Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

A landowner sought to confirm that a conveyance occurring before March 4, 1972, created separate parcels under the Subdivision Map Act. The property in question was described in a 1944 deed as Lot 18, Lot 17, and a portion of Lot 16 on an antiquated subdivision map. The landowner argued that this conveyance created three separate parcels, including Lot 18, and sought a certificate of compliance to confirm Lot 18 as a separate legal parcel.The Alameda County Superior Court denied the landowner's petition for a writ of mandate to compel the City of Oakland to issue the certificate. The landowner appealed, and the First Appellate District, Division One, reversed the trial court's decision, concluding that Lot 18 was a separate parcel entitled to the conclusive presumption of legality under section 66412.6(a) of the Subdivision Map Act.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeal's judgment. The court held that the phrase "division of land" in section 66412.6(a) should be interpreted in light of the Act’s general definition of "subdivision" in section 66424. The court concluded that a conveyance does not create multiple parcels merely by referring separately to lots of the contiguous property being conveyed. Since Lot 18 was always conveyed together with contiguous land and never separately, it was not created as a separate parcel under the Act. Therefore, the landowner was not entitled to a certificate of compliance for Lot 18 as a separate legal parcel. View "Cox v. City of Oakland" on Justia Law

Christine Berger and Brian Repnow were in a decade-long relationship but never married. During their relationship, they accumulated various properties and businesses. In August 2021, Berger filed a lawsuit seeking partition, conversion, promissory estoppel, and unjust enrichment, requesting an equitable division of their accumulated real and personal property or monetary damages. Repnow claimed sole ownership of the properties and requested denial of Berger's claims.The District Court of Mercer, South Central Judicial District, held a two-day bench trial in October 2023. The court granted Berger's partition claim for the Expansion Drive property, awarding her sole ownership, and determined that the other properties and vehicles were solely owned by Repnow. The court also granted Berger's unjust enrichment claim, awarding her $64,000 for her contributions to Repnow's properties, and denied the claims of conversion and promissory estoppel. The court awarded the Dream Girls Boutique business to Repnow and Powerhouse Nutrition to Berger.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's finding that the parties intended to share ownership of the Expansion Drive property and the award of Powerhouse Nutrition to Berger. However, it reversed the decision to award 100% of the Expansion Drive property to Berger, stating that the district court should have considered the parties' respective ownership interests and made an equitable division. The court also found that the district court failed to complete the unjust enrichment analysis and adequately explain the $64,000 award.The North Dakota Supreme Court remanded the case for the district court to determine the parties' respective ownership interests in the Expansion Drive property and make an award consistent with those interests. The court also instructed the district court to complete the unjust enrichment analysis and provide a clear explanation for the $64,000 award if necessary. View "Berger v. Repnow" on Justia Law

Interfaith Sanctuary Housing Services, Inc. (IFS) applied for a conditional use permit (CUP) to operate a large-scale low-barrier shelter home in Northwest Boise. The Planning and Zoning Commission (PZC) initially denied the application, citing concerns about compatibility with the neighborhood, undue burden on public facilities, adverse effects on nearby properties, and insufficient information on mitigating adverse impacts. IFS appealed to the Boise City Council, which reversed the PZC’s decision and granted the CUP, imposing 30 conditions of approval. The Veterans Park Neighborhood Association, Inc. (VPNA) sought reconsideration, which was denied, and then petitioned the district court for judicial review.The district court upheld the City Council’s decision, finding no error in the Council’s actions. VPNA appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court, arguing that the City Council’s decision was arbitrary and capricious, based on unlawful procedure, and that the Council’s reasoned statement was inadequate under the Local Land Use Planning Act (LLUPA).The Idaho Supreme Court found that the City Council’s decision was arbitrary and capricious and based on unlawful procedure because the PZC’s determination that the CUP could not be conditioned into compliance with the CUP criteria was not an error. The Court also found that the City Council’s reasoned statement was conclusory and failed to adequately resolve pertinent factual disputes, thus violating LLUPA and depriving VPNA of due process. The Court concluded that VPNA demonstrated a prejudice to its substantial rights.The Idaho Supreme Court reversed the district court’s decision and remanded the case with instructions to invalidate the City Council’s approval of the CUP. VPNA was awarded costs but not attorney fees on appeal. View "Veterans Park Neighborhood Association, Inc. v. City of Boise" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Brian L. Sheehy, as trustee, sued Chicago Title Insurance Company over a dispute involving an easement on his property. Plaintiff designated an attorney, who had previously represented the defendant, as an expert witness to testify about the defendant's handling of the claim. The defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude this expert, arguing that the State Bar Rules of Professional Conduct prohibited the attorney from testifying adversely to the defendant. The trial court granted the motion to exclude the expert.Plaintiff then filed a petition for a writ of mandate with the Court of Appeal, which was summarily denied. Concurrently, plaintiff appealed the trial court's ruling, citing Brand v. 20th Century Insurance Company/21st Century Insurance Company (2004) for the proposition that the order was appealable. The Court of Appeal stayed the preparation of the record, considered dismissing the appeal, and requested briefing from the parties. A hearing was subsequently held.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, dismissed the appeal. The court held that it only has jurisdiction over direct appeals from appealable orders or judgments. The court emphasized that, in ordinary civil cases, appeals are generally only permitted from final judgments to prevent piecemeal disposition and multiple appeals. The court distinguished between orders on motions to disqualify counsel, which are appealable, and orders on motions in limine, which are not. The court disagreed with the precedent set in Brand, concluding that orders on motions in limine are not appealable as they are not final collateral orders or injunctions. The court decided that such orders should be reviewed only by writ petition or by appeal from the final judgment. View "Sheehy v. Chicago Title Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Michael and Rebecca McIntosh owned a mobile home park in Madisonville, Kentucky. In 2020, a tenant complained about mold and mildew in one of the mobile homes. The City of Madisonville inspected the home and found it unsafe, condemning it and giving the McIntoshes 30 days to submit repair plans. The McIntoshes disputed the condemnation, claiming they made necessary repairs and attempted to contact city officials multiple times without success. The City demolished the mobile home a month later.The McIntoshes pursued a § 1983 action, alleging due process violations. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City, leading the McIntoshes to appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that while the City provided adequate notice of the condemnation, it failed to provide the McIntoshes with a pre-demolition hearing, as required by due process. The court noted that the City’s Code promised a hearing before a Local Appeals Board, which did not exist. The court also found that informal opportunities for a hearing were not adequately communicated to the McIntoshes. However, the court upheld the district court’s decision on the substantive due process claim, stating that the City’s actions did not rise to the level of conscience-shocking behavior. The court reversed the district court’s summary judgment on the procedural due process claim and affirmed the decision on the substantive due process claim, remanding the case for further proceedings on the procedural due process claim. View "McIntosh v. City of Madisonville" on Justia Law

Manuel and Melissa Rose purchased property from the F & M Martino Family Trust, with Fred and Michelle Martino acting as trustees. The warranty deed did not reference a previously recorded Boundary Line Agreement (BLA) that established a barbed wire fence as the boundary between the Roses' property and the neighboring property owned by Donald and Marylee Meliza. The Melizas later obtained a survey showing the fence was on the Roses' property and filed a quiet title action for the disputed strip of land. The Roses sought defense from the Martinos, who refused, leading the Roses to file a third-party action for breach of warranty of title and breach of the covenant of seisin.The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Martinos, finding that the BLA was a "matter of record" and thus excluded from the warranty deed. The court also denied the Martinos' request for attorney fees. The Roses appealed the summary judgment decision, and the Martinos cross-appealed the denial of attorney fees.The Supreme Court of Idaho reversed the district court's summary judgment decision, holding that the warranty deed's language was clear and unambiguous and did not exclude the BLA. The court found that the Martinos breached the covenant of seisin by not owning the entire property described in the deed and breached the warranty of title by failing to defend the Roses in the quiet title action. The court affirmed the district court's decision to deny attorney fees to the Martinos, as the case did not involve a commercial transaction and the warranty deed did not contain an attorney fee provision. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. The Roses were awarded costs on appeal. View "Rose v. Martino" on Justia Law

Landowners Nicole Ritchie and Elisabeth McIntee, in collaboration with the Brewster River Mountain Bike Club, replaced an old footbridge on their property in Underhill, Vermont, with a new bridge to provide access to a recreational trail network. The new bridge was larger and more secure than the old one, and a ramp was added to connect it to the existing trail. Neighbors David Demarest and Jeff Moulton contested the improvements, arguing that they violated the town's zoning regulations.The Town of Underhill Developmental Review Board granted a retroactive conditional-use permit and variance for the bridge and ramp. The neighbors appealed to the Environmental Division, which found that the bridge's installation caused minimal land disturbance and was used for recreational purposes by the landowners and the public. The Environmental Division voided the permit, ruling that the bridge was a de minimis recreational use of private property and not subject to zoning regulations.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Environmental Division's decision. The Court held that the bridge constituted a de minimis recreational use of private property, as it involved minimal land disturbance, had a small footprint, posed minimal health and safety risks, and was used for recreational purposes. The Court concluded that the bridge was outside the scope of the town's zoning ordinance and did not address the neighbors' other arguments regarding the permit and the Club's standing. View "In re Brewster River Mountain Bike Club, Inc. Conditional Use Application" on Justia Law

In 2017, the Franklin County Board of Supervisors undertook a project to deepen and widen the drainage ditch known as Drainage District No. 48 (DD48). The project affected several landowners, who sought damages for the reconstruction. The district court ruled that the Board had not abandoned the original right-of-way easement from 1906, limiting right-of-way damages to the expanded areas beyond the original boundaries. The court also awarded severance damages for the diminution in value of the remaining property due to the inability to traverse the ditch with farming equipment. Additionally, the court ordered the conveyance of a 4.01-acre landlocked parcel to the Board, with compensation for its full value.The Iowa District Court for Franklin County ruled in favor of the landowners, awarding both right-of-way and severance damages. The court of appeals affirmed the damages awards but reversed the order to convey the 4.01-acre parcel, remanding for further proceedings. The Board sought further review to determine the entitlement to severance damages.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the Board held a permanent right-of-way easement for the drainage ditch, which had not been abandoned. Therefore, the landowners were only entitled to right-of-way damages for the expanded areas beyond the original boundaries. The court held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to severance damages for the diminution in value of their remaining property, except for the 4.01-acre parcel that became landlocked in 2017. The court affirmed the district court’s award for the landlocked parcel but reversed the severance damages for the other properties. The case was remanded for entry of a damages award consistent with the appraisal committee’s initial calculation. The Board was not entitled to a deed for the 4.01-acre parcel. View "Abbas v. Franklin County Board of Supervisors" on Justia Law

Phillip and Jodi Peterson hired Brandon Coverdell Construction, Inc. (BCC) to perform work on their home following a hailstorm. The Petersons were dissatisfied with the quality of BCC's work, while BCC was unhappy with the Petersons' partial payment. Both parties accused each other of breaching their written agreement and filed lawsuits in the county court. The county court ruled in favor of BCC, finding that the Petersons committed the first material breach.The Petersons appealed to the District Court for Douglas County but failed to file a statement of errors. They obtained a continuance to amend the bill of exceptions in the county court. The district court eventually found that the county court had committed plain error by entering judgment in favor of BCC, concluding that the written agreement was an unenforceable illusory contract. BCC then appealed to the Nebraska Supreme Court.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in considering the supplemental bill of exceptions, which was not properly part of the record. The Supreme Court also determined that the county court did not commit plain error. The county court's decision to focus on the issues presented by the parties, rather than the enforceability of the contract, did not result in damage to the integrity, reputation, or fairness of the judicial process. Consequently, the Nebraska Supreme Court reversed the district court's order and remanded the case with directions to affirm the county court's judgment. View "Peterson v. Brandon Coverdell Constr." on Justia Law

Danny Fox, an active-duty servicemember, purchased a property in Norfolk, Virginia, in 2015. The City of Norfolk determined the property was unsafe and uninhabitable, repeatedly notifying Fox of building code violations. Despite these notices, Fox did not make the necessary repairs. In December 2018, the city demolished the house, deeming it a public nuisance. Fox subsequently sued the city, claiming inverse condemnation, among other things, arguing the property was not a nuisance and that the city's actions were pretextual to increase its tax base.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted summary judgment in favor of the city. The court held that Fox's federal constitutional claims were barred by the statute of limitations. It also ruled that Fox's inverse condemnation claim failed because, whether or not the property was a nuisance, he could not demonstrate the city's public use requirement. The court found no evidence to support Fox's claim that the city's actions were pretextual.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that Fox's inverse condemnation claim failed regardless of whether the property was a nuisance. If the property was a nuisance, the city had the authority to abate it without compensation. If it was not a nuisance, Fox could not show a public use, a necessary element for an inverse condemnation claim. The court also found that Fox provided no evidence to support his pretext argument. Thus, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the city. View "D.A. Realestate Investment, LLC v. City of Norfolk" on Justia Law