Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The Vermont Agency of Transportation (AOT) proposed a project to reconstruct the interchange between Interstate 89 and U.S. Routes 2 and 7 in Colchester, Vermont, into a Diverging Diamond Interchange (DDI). Timberlake Associates, LLP, the landowner of a gas station at the southeast corner of the interchange, contested the necessity of the land takings required for the project. Timberlake argued that AOT did not fulfill its pre-suit obligation to negotiate and that the trial court erred in its determination of necessity.The Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division, held a four-day evidentiary hearing and concluded that Timberlake failed to demonstrate bad faith or abuse of discretion by AOT. The court found that AOT had satisfied its burden of demonstrating the necessity of taking Timberlake’s property to the extent proposed. Timberlake appealed the decision, arguing that AOT did not adequately consider the statutory factors of necessity and failed to negotiate in good faith.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The Court found that AOT presented sufficient evidence showing it considered the statutory factors, including the adequacy of other property and locations, the effect on the landowner’s convenience, and the environmental impacts. The Court also determined that AOT’s selection of the DDI design was justified based on its superior performance in increasing capacity, reducing congestion, and improving safety compared to other alternatives. Additionally, the Court concluded that AOT made reasonable efforts to negotiate with Timberlake before filing suit, as required by statute.The Vermont Supreme Court held that the trial court acted within its discretion in determining the necessity of the takings and that AOT fulfilled its pre-suit obligation to negotiate. The decision of the lower court was affirmed. View "Agency of Transportation v. Timberlake Associates, LLC" on Justia Law

Steven Fustolo purchased a rental investment unit in Boston, Massachusetts, in 2009, taking out a mortgage with Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) as nominee for Union Capital Mortgage Business Trust. The mortgage was reassigned six times, and Fustolo defaulted on the loan. He sought a declaratory judgment that the current holders, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation as Trustee of SCRT 2019-2 (the Trust) and Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (SPS), had no right to foreclose because they did not validly hold the mortgage or the accompanying promissory note. Fustolo also claimed defamation, slander of title, unfair business practices, violation of Massachusetts's Debt Collection Act, and a violation of Regulation X of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) by SPS.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed Fustolo's claims, except for one count challenging the adequacy of a notice letter, which was later settled. The court found that the Trust validly held both the mortgage and the note, and that Fustolo's state law claims hinged on the incorrect assertion that the Trust did not have the right to foreclose. The court also dismissed the RESPA claim, stating that Fustolo failed to specify which provision of RESPA was violated and that SPS had responded to his notice of error.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal. The appellate court held that the Trust validly held the mortgage and the note, as the note was indorsed in blank and in the Trust's possession. The court also found that MERS had the authority to assign the mortgage despite Union Capital's dissolution. Additionally, the court ruled that Fustolo's RESPA claim failed because challenges to the merits of a servicer's evaluation of a loss mitigation application do not relate to the servicing of the loan and are not covered errors under RESPA. View "Fustolo v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc." on Justia Law

Casa Mira Homeowners Association (Casa Mira) applied for a coastal development permit to construct a 257-foot seawall to protect a condominium complex, sewer line, apartment building, and a segment of the Coastal Trail in Half Moon Bay from erosion. The California Coastal Commission (Commission) denied the permit for the condominiums and sewer line, built in 1984, but approved a 50-foot seawall for the apartment building, built in 1972, and suggested relocating the Coastal Trail inland as a feasible alternative to armoring.The San Mateo County Superior Court granted Casa Mira's petition for a writ of mandate, concluding that the term "existing structures" in the California Coastal Act referred to structures existing at the time of the seawall application, thus entitling the condominiums and sewer line to protection. The court also found insufficient evidence to support the Commission's decision to relocate the Coastal Trail instead of constructing the seawall.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that "existing structures" in the context of the Coastal Act refers to structures that existed before the Act's effective date of January 1, 1977. Consequently, the condominiums and sewer line, built in 1984, were not entitled to shoreline armoring. The court reversed the trial court's judgment on this point.However, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's finding that the Commission's decision to relocate the Coastal Trail was not supported by substantial evidence. The court noted that the Commission's revised staff report lacked a detailed factual basis and explanation for rejecting the original staff recommendation, which found no viable location for rerouting the trail while maintaining its aesthetic and recreational value. Thus, the judgment was affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Casa Mira Homeowners Assn. v. California Coastal Commission" on Justia Law

The case involves Andris Pukke, Peter Baker, and John Usher, who were found liable for violations of the Federal Trade Commission Act, the Telemarketing Sales Rule, and a permanent injunction from a prior fraud case. They were involved in a real estate scam, selling lots in a development called "Sanctuary Belize" through deceptive practices. The district court issued an equitable monetary judgment of $120.2 million for consumer redress, imposed an asset freeze, and appointed a receiver.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland found the defendants liable after a bench trial and issued permanent injunctions against them. The court also held them in contempt for violating a prior judgment in a related case, ordering them to pay the same $120.2 million in consumer redress. The defendants appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, except for vacating the monetary judgment to the extent it relied on FTC Act Section 13(b).The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision to maintain the receivership and asset freeze. The court held that the receivership and asset freeze were necessary to effectuate the injunctive relief and ensure that the defendants did not continue to profit from their deceptive practices. The court also found that the contempt judgment supported maintaining the receivership and asset freeze until the judgment was satisfied. The court emphasized the defendants' history of deceptive conduct and the need for a professional receiver to manage and distribute the assets to defrauded consumers. The judgment was affirmed. View "Federal Trade Commission v. Pukke" on Justia Law

Chris Welsh, representing CAL SD, LLC, entered into a purchase agreement with Interwest Leasing, LLC to buy commercial real estate, with a $30,000 earnest money deposit. Welsh passed away before closing, and CAL SD refused to close. Interwest sold the property to another buyer for the same price but did not return the earnest money. CAL SD filed a declaratory judgment action to recover the deposit, claiming the agreement was void due to their inability to obtain financing.The Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit in Pennington County, South Dakota, treated the declaratory judgment as a breach of contract action and set it for a jury trial. The jury found in favor of CAL SD, and the court ordered the return of the earnest money deposit. Interwest appealed, arguing the action was equitable and should not have been decided by a jury, and also claimed the court gave erroneous jury instructions.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. The court held that the declaratory judgment action was legal, not equitable, because it sought to enforce contractual rights under the purchase agreement, which was void if financing was not obtained. The court affirmed the lower court's decision to submit the case to a jury for a binding verdict, as the issue was whether CAL SD breached the contract by failing to secure financing. The court concluded that the jury's determination that CAL SD was unable to obtain financing rendered the purchase agreement void, entitling CAL SD to the return of the earnest money deposit. View "Cal SD, LLC v. Interwest Leasing, LLC" on Justia Law

Sarah Staab purchased a condominium unit at a foreclosure sale conducted by the condominium association to recover unpaid fees. She later challenged two Superior Court orders that ruled the sale of the unit to her was barred by the Federal Foreclosure Bar, 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(3), and thus void, and granted summary judgment to Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. on its claims for judicial foreclosure, declaratory judgment, and quiet title. Staab did not contest that the property was encumbered by a deed of trust owned by the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) and the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and serviced by Wells Fargo, nor did she dispute the application of the Federal Foreclosure Bar. Instead, she raised three procedural arguments.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia initially ruled in favor of Wells Fargo, determining that the bank's claims were timely, the foreclosure and sale of the property to Staab were void under the Federal Foreclosure Bar, and the condominium association was not an indispensable party. Staab argued that the court applied the incorrect statute of limitations, abused its discretion by allowing Wells Fargo to amend its complaint years after filing, and erred by not joining the condominium association as an indispensable party.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. The court held that Wells Fargo's initial action for judicial foreclosure was timely and that the additional facts and arguments raised in the amended complaint were in direct response to Staab's affirmative defense. The court also concluded that any error in granting Wells Fargo leave to amend its complaint was harmless, as the bank could have raised the same arguments at the summary judgment stage. Finally, the court determined that the condominium association was not an essential party under Super. Ct. Civ. R. 19(a)(1), as the court could grant complete relief without its involvement. View "Staab v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

The case involves a partition action concerning two properties in Charlestown, Rhode Island, owned by Peter Karasuk, Lee Karasuk Ingley, and Sandra Karasuk Puchalski as joint tenants with a right of survivorship. The properties were inherited from their mother’s estate in 2017. After failed negotiations to sell the properties to Puchalski, Karasuk and Ingley filed a partition action on May 3, 2021. Numerous continuances were granted due to Puchalski's complaints of hearing impairment. Despite accommodations, Puchalski expressed dissatisfaction and failed to appear at several hearings.The Superior Court dismissed Puchalski’s appeals, approved the commissioner’s petition for instructions, and quashed a statement she filed in the Town of Charlestown Land Evidence Records. Puchalski appealed these decisions. The Superior Court had granted plaintiffs' motion to sell the properties, appointed a commissioner, and issued a temporary restraining order against Puchalski. Puchalski failed to appear at critical hearings, leading to the dismissal of her appeals.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that Puchalski received adequate notice of the motions and hearings. The court determined that the orders appealed from were interlocutory and not subject to review under the exceptions to the final-judgment rule. The court affirmed the Superior Court’s decisions, including the dismissal of Puchalski’s appeals and the orders related to the partition and sale of the properties. The court emphasized that Puchalski’s continued attempts to delay the proceedings were unavailing and that the matter should proceed to finality. View "Karasuk v. Puchalski" on Justia Law

JHVS Group, LLC and its members, Jasanjot Singh and Harshana Kaur, purchased a 66.4-acre pistachio orchard from Shawn Slate and Dina Slate for approximately $2.6 million. The Slates agreed to carry a loan for $1,889,600, and JHVS made a $700,000 down payment. The agreement included provisions for interest payments and additional payments coinciding with expected crop payments. JHVS alleged that the Slates and their brokers, Randy Hayer and SVN Executive Commercial Advisors, misrepresented material facts about the property, including water rights and the value of the 2022 crop. JHVS claimed the actual value of the crop was significantly lower than represented, and they fell behind on payments, leading the Slates to record a notice of default.JHVS filed a lawsuit in the Superior Court of Madera County, raising seven causes of action, including breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, intentional fraud, negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract, rescission based on fraud or mutual mistake, and injunctive relief to stop the foreclosure process. JHVS filed a motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent the foreclosure sale, arguing that the Slates and Hayer had lied about water restrictions and misrepresented the crop's value. The trial court granted the preliminary injunction after the defendants did not appear or file a response.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case and found that the trial court lacked fundamental jurisdiction over the Slates because they were never served with the summons and complaint. The appellate court determined that the trial court's order was void as to the Slates due to the lack of proper service and reversed the preliminary injunction order with respect to the Slates. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's opinion. View "JHVS Group, LLC v. Slate" on Justia Law

A tract of land was platted into a subdivision for single-family residential use, with restrictions recorded by the original owner. A subsequent purchaser, Ananda LLC, acquired the subdivision and attempted to develop it contrary to the restrictions. When these plans failed, Ananda transferred some lots to Nithyananda Dhyanapeetam of St. Louis and the remaining lots to Fogarty Farms LLC, which also received an assignment of developer rights. The case centers on whether developer rights were transferred and if the subdivision's restrictions were abandoned.The Circuit Court of Jefferson County found that developer rights were transferred from the original owner to Ananda and then to Fogarty Farms. The court held that the restrictions were not abandoned and that the property owners association created under the restrictions was valid. The court also invalidated a transfer of common ground and awarded attorney fees to the property owners association.The Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court's judgment. The court held that the totality of circumstances demonstrated the intent to transfer developer rights from Essex to Ananda and then to Fogarty Farms. The court also found that the restrictions were not abandoned, as there were no widespread violations indicating an intent to abandon the plan. The court upheld the circuit court's decision that the lake lot remained common ground, as removing it would be unjust given Nithyananda's reliance on its status. Finally, the court affirmed the award of attorney fees to the property owners association, finding no abuse of discretion in the amount awarded. View "Millstone Property Owners Association vs. Dhyanapeetam" on Justia Law

Ginger Collins, acting on behalf of her mother Jean Mace, sought to invalidate the sale of Jean’s home, which was sold by her sister Judy Mace without Ginger’s knowledge. Jean and her husband had transferred the property to Judy, who lived with them and acted as their caretaker. After Jean was moved to an assisted living facility and Judy was diagnosed with cancer, Judy created a revocable trust and transferred the property to it. Shortly before her death, Judy sold the property to Deborah and Raymond Luther. Ginger, believing the property was held in trust for Jean’s benefit, filed suit to evict the Luthers and invalidate the sale.The District Court of the First Judicial District, Boundary County, granted partial summary judgment in favor of Scott Mace (Judy’s cousin and trustee) and the Luthers, dismissing Ginger’s resulting trust claim. The court ruled that the deed transferring the property to Judy was unambiguous and that extrinsic evidence was inadmissible to establish a resulting trust. Ginger’s motion for reconsideration was denied, and the court also denied Scott Mace’s request for attorney fees under the Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act (TEDRA).The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and held that the district court erred in excluding extrinsic evidence to support Ginger’s resulting trust claim. The court emphasized that extrinsic evidence is admissible to establish a resulting trust, as it can reveal the parties’ intent. The Supreme Court vacated the district court’s judgment, reversed the grant of partial summary judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court declined to address the public policy argument and denied attorney fees on appeal for both parties. View "Mace v. Luther" on Justia Law