Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Danielle Nygaard purchased a home in Fargo, North Dakota, with United Savings Credit Union as the mortgagee. Scott Volker recorded a quitclaim deed purporting to transfer the property from Nygaard to himself and initiated eviction proceedings against Nygaard. Volker claimed this action was based on a loan agreement in which he personally guaranteed a loan from Joseph Svobodny to Nygaard, and that Nygaard failed to repay the loan. Nygaard denied executing the quitclaim deed or the loan agreement, asserting the $40,000 was a gift. She brought a quiet title action against Volker, later amending her complaint to include Svobodny and the Credit Union, and alleged fraud, slander of title, and abuse of process.The District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District, presided by Judge Reid A. Brady, managed the case. Nygaard sought discovery of Volker’s electronic devices and accounts, suspecting document alteration. Volker resisted discovery and his attorney withdrew, citing ethical concerns after Volker instructed him not to disclose material subject to the court order. The court issued orders compelling discovery and warned of sanctions for noncompliance. Volker repeatedly failed to comply, leading the court to strike his and Svobodny’s pleadings. Nygaard moved for default judgment and was awarded title to the property, damages, and substantial attorney’s fees. The court also imposed Rule 11 sanctions on Volker for presenting pleadings lacking evidentiary support.On appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota, Volker challenged the findings of forgery, the sanctions, and the default judgment. The Supreme Court held that Volker failed to timely respond or preserve his arguments regarding sanctions and forgery. Importantly, Volker did not move to vacate the default judgment under Rule 60(b), limiting appellate review to irregularities on the face of the judgment, none of which were found. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment and all associated orders. View "Nygaard v. Volker" on Justia Law

Two individuals, who were in a long-term romantic relationship but never married, jointly purchased a piece of real property in Idaho. Both names were listed on the purchase and sale agreement and the warranty deed, but there was no specification of their respective ownership interests. After their relationship ended, one party attempted to transfer her interest in the property to a nonprofit and then reacquired it. The other party, who had paid all taxes, utilities, and expenses for the property, sought to quiet title in his name or, alternatively, to partition the property in kind, awarding him the entirety. The parties disputed whether ownership was equal or if one party had sole ownership.The District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, Bonneville County, initially denied both parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, finding genuine disputes of material fact regarding ownership interests. After the Idaho Supreme Court issued Demoney-Hendrickson v. Larsen, which established a rebuttable presumption of equal ownership when a deed lists two names without specifying interests, the district court granted summary judgment to the defendant, concluding she had a 50% interest and ordering partition by sale. The court also determined the plaintiff had waived any claim for contribution because he had not pleaded it and awarded attorney fees to the defendant under Idaho Code section 12-121.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case. It held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the defendant on the partition claim. The Supreme Court clarified that the plaintiff had provided sufficient evidence to establish a genuine dispute of material fact regarding the parties’ intent about their ownership shares, which should have precluded summary judgment. The court also clarified that a co-tenant listed on a deed can possess a 0% ownership interest, contrary to the district court’s conclusion. However, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s determination that the plaintiff had waived any claim for contribution. The Supreme Court reversed the grant of summary judgment on ownership, the denial of reconsideration, and the award of attorney fees, remanding for further proceedings. View "Bedell v. Parsons" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on a property in Sioux Falls owned by Charles and Heather Gustafson, located near the intersection of 41st Street and Carolyn Avenue. The State of South Dakota initiated a condemnation action in 2020 to acquire portions of the Gustafsons’ property for the reconstruction of the Interstate 29 and 41st Street interchange. As part of the project, the State permanently closed the intersection of 41st Street and Carolyn Avenue, eliminating the most direct access route from 41st Street to the Gustafsons’ property. The Gustafsons asserted that this closure significantly impaired access to their property, diminishing its value, particularly for high-traffic commercial uses.The Second Judicial Circuit Court reviewed the case after the Gustafsons argued that the loss of access was compensable. Following a court trial, the circuit court found the Gustafsons had a special right of access to 41st Street through the Carolyn Avenue intersection, that the closure caused a substantial impairment unique to their property, and that the injury was peculiar, not merely shared by the general public. The court therefore ruled that the change in access was compensable and the Gustafsons were entitled to seek just compensation for this loss. The State appealed, challenging these conclusions.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reversed the circuit court’s decision. It held that the Gustafsons did not retain a special right of access to 41st Street or the Carolyn Avenue intersection, as their predecessors had relinquished such rights in a 1958 agreement. The Court further determined that the closure did not substantially impair the Gustafsons’ reasonable access to the general road system, and any inconvenience or increased travel distance was shared by the public at large, not unique to their property. As a result, the closure was not compensable. View "Dept. of Transportation v. Gustafson" on Justia Law

Virginia Electric and Power Company sought certificates of public convenience and necessity to construct two high-voltage overhead transmission line projects in Loudoun County, including the Aspen-Golden and Apollo-Twin Creeks Projects. The Aspen-Golden Project involved approximately nine miles of transmission lines, some running beside Route 7 in the Lansdowne community. VEPCO evaluated several routes and preferred Route 1AA, asserting it minimized adverse impacts. The Apollo-Twin Creeks Project involved about 1.9 miles of transmission lines, some collocated with the Aspen-Golden lines, to serve data centers. VEPCO proposed overhead construction for both projects due to feasibility concerns with underground alternatives.The State Corporation Commission consolidated the applications for review. Loudoun County and Lansdowne Conservancy objected to overhead lines along Route 7, arguing for underground construction to protect scenic and historic assets, including Belmont Manor. They submitted an Updated Hybrid Proposal for partial underground construction, but VEPCO and Commission staff questioned its feasibility, cost, and engineering challenges. After public hearings and detailed testimony, the hearing examiner recommended approval of overhead construction along Route 1AA, finding underground options infeasible within required timelines and statutory criteria, and noting the proposal’s analytical deficiencies.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the Commission’s final orders, affirming the Commission’s approval of the CPCNs. The Court held that the Commission properly verified the need for the Aspen-Golden Project, reasonably rejected underground construction due to cost, engineering challenges, and timing, and gave due consideration to the local comprehensive plan and scenic easement. The Court concluded that the Commission’s decisions minimized adverse impacts to the extent reasonably practicable and found no abuse of discretion in declining to impose additional mitigation conditions or in approving the Apollo-Twin Creeks Project. The judgments were affirmed. View "Lansdowne Conservancy v. SCC" on Justia Law

A purchaser of a home paid off an existing mortgage at closing, which triggered a statutory obligation for the lender to record a release of the mortgage within 90 days. The lender failed to record the release by the deadline, recording it 22 days late. The statute at issue provides that if a lender does not timely record the release, the borrower and current owner may seek $250 in statutory damages. After the lender’s late recordation, the owner filed suit seeking those damages and, in addition, sought to represent a class of similarly situated individuals whose lenders had not timely recorded mortgage releases.The dispute was initially removed to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, but that court remanded the case to state court for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas denied the lender’s motion for summary judgment, finding the owner had standing, and granted the owner’s motion to certify a class. At that time, an amendment to the statute barring class actions for such statutory damages had been enacted but not yet effective, so the trial court applied the prior version. The First District Court of Appeals affirmed, finding the owner had statutory standing and that the amended statute did not apply retroactively to bar the class.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and held that the statute confers standing consistent with the Ohio Constitution, allowing the owner’s individual claim for statutory damages. However, the court further held that the 2023 amendment, which bars class-wide recovery of statutory damages for violations occurring in 2020, is remedial and applies retroactively to this case. The court found that the lower courts erred by not applying the amended statute and by certifying the class. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed in part and reversed in part, remanding with instructions to decertify the class. View "Voss v. Quicken Loans, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Carlton Stevens mortgaged several adjacent plots of land in St. Croix in 1997 to secure a loan, but eventually defaulted on the payments and died in 2011. Banco Popular, the original mortgagee, assigned its rights to DLJ Mortgage Capital. In 2018, DLJ initiated a foreclosure action in the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands against Stevens’s heirs, the IRS (which held expired tax liens), and other subordinate lienholders. DLJ sought debt recovery, foreclosure, quiet title, and reformation of the mortgage to correct a scrivener’s error omitting a plot (20-BC). The IRS removed the case to the District Court of the Virgin Islands, where it was dismissed as a party after the tax liens were found expired. The heirs initially failed to appear, resulting in defaults, but later filed an answer with numerous affirmative defenses, and the defaults were vacated by stipulation.DLJ moved for summary judgment on the debt and foreclosure claims, but the heirs did not respond. Subsequently, the District Court asked DLJ for evidence supporting reformation, and gave the heirs an opportunity to object. The heirs submitted a brief opposition on equitable grounds but provided no evidence. The District Court granted summary judgment against the heirs and an appearing lienholder, default judgment against others, and reformed the mortgage to include plot 20-BC, finding its omission a mutual mistake.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the summary judgment de novo and the mutual mistake finding for clear error. The Third Circuit held that a party forfeits affirmative defenses not raised in opposition to summary judgment, even if previously pled in an answer, and found no extraordinary circumstances to address the forfeited arguments. The Court also concluded that the District Court’s finding of mutual mistake warranting reformation was not clearly erroneous, and affirmed the District Court’s summary judgment and reformation order. View "DLJ Mortgage Capital Inc v. Stevens" on Justia Law

Two homeowners brought suit against their homeowners' association and its board members, claiming improper use of dues, unlawful sale of a storage unit, failure to hold proper meetings, and allowance of illegal activities on the premises. The plaintiffs communicated concerns to the board and demanded relevant documents, but ultimately filed a lawsuit soon after sending a demand that the board bring suit against certain directors. They later amended the petition to add an additional defendant. The board had responded to some allegations, including rescinding the contested sale and scheduling meetings, but plaintiffs argued the board failed to investigate or act in good faith.The Oklahoma County District Court granted summary judgment to all defendants. The court found that plaintiffs’ affidavits lacked evidentiary support and that the brief interval between the plaintiffs’ pre-suit demand and the filing of the lawsuit did not allow the board enough time to investigate and make a good faith decision. The district court also determined that plaintiffs had failed to meet their burden of proving the board breached fiduciary duties and did not make a pre-suit demand regarding one defendant. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed, holding that the demand requirement was not met and that the business judgment rule protected the board's decisions.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma granted certiorari and reviewed the case de novo. The Court vacated the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals but affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Court held that plaintiffs’ pre-suit demand did not provide a reasonable time for the board to investigate, as required for a shareholder derivative claim. The Court also found plaintiffs failed to rebut the business judgment rule and did not provide material facts warranting trial. Thus, summary judgment for defendants was affirmed. View "HOWARD v. THE BARRINGTON HOMEOWNERS" on Justia Law

A steel subcontractor was hired to perform work for a university construction project and entered into a subcontract with the general contractor. The general contractor began defaulting on payments, prompting the subcontractor to notify the surety insurance company, which had issued a payment bond guaranteeing payment for labor, materials, and equipment. The surety made partial payment but disputed the remaining amount. The subcontractor then demanded arbitration against the contractor, with the surety notified and invited to participate. The contractor filed for bankruptcy and did not defend in arbitration, nor did the surety participate. The arbitrator awarded the subcontractor damages, including attorneys’ fees and interest, and the award was confirmed in court. The subcontractor sought to enforce the arbitration award against the surety, including attorneys’ fees and prejudgment interest, and also brought a bad faith claim under Pennsylvania’s insurance statute.The Centre County Court of Common Pleas initially excluded evidence of the arbitration award against the surety at trial and ruled the surety was not liable for attorneys’ fees or bad faith damages. A jury found for the subcontractor on the underlying debt, and the court awarded prejudgment interest at the statutory rate. Both parties appealed. The Superior Court held the arbitration award was binding and conclusive against the surety, who had notice and opportunity to participate, and affirmed liability for attorneys’ fees related to pursuing the contractor in arbitration. The court rejected the bad faith claim, holding the statute did not apply to surety bonds, and confirmed the statutory interest rate.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed in all respects. It held that Pennsylvania’s insurance bad faith statute does not apply to surety bonds, based on statutory language. The court also held that the surety is bound by the arbitration award against its principal, and is liable for attorneys’ fees incurred in arbitration and prejudgment interest at the statutory rate. View "Eastern Steel v. Int Fidelity Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The dispute centers on a property comprising eight parcels totaling roughly 140 acres in Tinicum Township, Delaware County, owned by several parties collectively referred to as the Hendersons. The City of Philadelphia sought to condemn the property for airport expansion and eventually filed formal declarations of taking. The Hendersons alleged that the City’s actions rendered their property worthless, prompting appointment of a board of viewers who conducted hearings and ultimately issued a report awarding damages exceeding $139 million. The City contested the viewers’ findings, particularly challenging the standard and analysis used to determine the property’s highest and best use, and sought a jury trial de novo.Upon appeal, the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas addressed the City’s objections. The court declined to remand the matter to the viewers, finding such a step unnecessary given the impending de novo jury trial. It determined that questions regarding the highest and best use were mixed questions of fact and law, appropriate for resolution at trial, and overruled the City’s objections on this issue. The court made preliminary determinations to guide pre-trial discovery and did not expressly confirm, modify, or change the viewers’ report.The City appealed to the Commonwealth Court, which quashed the appeal, concluding the trial court’s order was not a final, appealable order under the Eminent Domain Code. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Middle District, reviewed the matter and held that the trial court’s order constituted only preliminary determinations and did not confirm, modify, or change the viewers' report. Thus, it was not a final order subject to immediate appellate review. The Supreme Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court’s decision to quash the appeal and remanded the case for further proceedings in the trial court. View "In Re: Condemn by City of Phila. Airport Bus. Ctr." on Justia Law

Soscia Holdings, LLC operated the Flat River Reservoir Dam in Rhode Island. In July 2022, the Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management (DEM), acting under state law, ordered Soscia to reduce the Dam’s water flow to maintain specific water levels in Johnson’s Pond. Soscia was later assessed monetary penalties by DEM for alleged violations of the permitting statute. During these proceedings, the Town of Coventry condemned the Dam and Johnson’s Pond, paying Soscia just compensation for the property.The case was first reviewed by the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island. This court dismissed all claims against the State of Rhode Island and DEM based on Eleventh Amendment immunity. The court also dismissed the § 1983 individual capacity claims against two DEM officials on the grounds of qualified immunity, and rejected Soscia’s claim under the Rhode Island Constitution. However, the court allowed § 1983 official capacity claims for prospective injunctive relief against the DEM officials to proceed. After Soscia amended its complaint, the district court ultimately dismissed the remaining federal constitutional claims and declined to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the appeal. Soscia argued that it continued to face ongoing enforcement actions and monetary penalties, and thus maintained a property interest and the right to seek injunctive and declaratory relief. The First Circuit found that the district court’s opinions thoroughly and correctly explained why Soscia’s federal claims failed to state a plausible claim for relief, and that new arguments raised on appeal were either waived or did not meet the standard for plain error review. The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Soscia Holdings, LLC v. Rhode Island" on Justia Law