Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Rebecca Eisenberg, a director of the Santa Clara Valley Water District, was permitted to review two confidential investigation reports at the District’s facility in January 2024. These reports, prepared by outside counsel, addressed allegations of misconduct by Eisenberg and complaints she raised against staff. The District explicitly instructed Board members not to remove the reports from the premises. Eisenberg nevertheless left the facility with the reports, later admitting her actions at Board meetings. After repeated requests for their return and a formal censure by the Board, Eisenberg refused to return the reports.The District filed suit in Santa Clara County Superior Court, asserting claims including conversion and seeking prejudgment recovery of the reports. It successfully moved for a writ of possession and a turnover order, which Eisenberg temporarily stayed by posting a statutory undertaking. The District then sought a mandatory preliminary injunction compelling the return of the reports. Eisenberg opposed this, arguing that the claim and delivery law’s remedy (the writ of possession, now stayed) precluded further injunctive relief and that the District did not meet the requirements for an injunction.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the trial court’s order granting the preliminary injunction. The appellate court held that Code of Civil Procedure section 516.050 expressly permits a party to seek injunctive relief for possession of personal property, even after pursuing relief under the claim and delivery law. The court further found no abuse of discretion: the District demonstrated a likelihood of prevailing on its conversion claim and showed that the harm to the District from denial of the injunction outweighed any harm to Eisenberg. The appellate court affirmed the order granting the preliminary injunction, requiring Eisenberg to return the confidential reports. View "Santa Clara Valley Water Dist. v. Eisenberg" on Justia Law

Joel Ward performed construction work for Bishop Construction, LLC and its sole member, Ren Bishop, in Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming, with an agreed hourly wage and travel compensation. Despite keeping detailed records of his hours, Ward was not paid for work completed between 2017 and 2019, leading him to pursue payment through legal action. The dispute centered on whether Ward should be classified as an employee or an independent contractor and whether he was required to register as a contractor under Idaho law.The case was first heard in the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of Idaho, Bonneville County. After a bench trial, and based on the parties’ stipulation that Ward was an independent contractor, the court dismissed his wage claims, leaving only breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims. The district court initially awarded Ward full damages for breach of contract. However, after Bishop raised the issue of contractor registration under the Idaho Contractor Registration Act (ICRA) in post-trial motions, the court amended its findings, limited contract damages to out-of-state work, awarded unjust enrichment damages for Idaho work, and granted costs and attorney fees.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed whether Ward was required to register as a contractor under ICRA and whether the contract was illegal. The Court held that Bishop failed to meet his burden to prove Ward was required to register under ICRA, as the record did not establish Ward’s status as a contractor for those purposes. The Supreme Court vacated the district court’s amended judgment and remanded with instructions to reinstate its original findings and amended judgment, including the previously awarded attorney fees and costs. The Court also awarded Ward attorney fees and costs on appeal as the prevailing party. View "Ward v. Bishop Construction" on Justia Law

This case concerns a dispute among siblings regarding the partition of farmland in Grant County, North Dakota, originally owned by their parents. After the parents conveyed the land to their children as tenants in common, reserving life estates, four siblings transferred their interests into a family trust in 2017, leaving Bryan Tischmak as the sole sibling outside the trust. In 2022, the trust entered into an agreement for rock, sand, and gravel extraction on portions of the property. Bryan initiated a partition action in 2023, seeking division of the land and an accounting of income.The District Court of Grant County, South Central Judicial District, presided over a bench trial, during which the parties stipulated to the appointment of a referee to recommend partition options. Bryan advocated for an option that would award him sections including the family homeplace, but the court adopted a different recommendation (Recommendation 5), granting him the S1/2 of Section 33 and the NW1/4 of Section 34, and ordering the trust to pay him a sum based on the property’s value and his share of land income. The court later corrected a clerical mistake that had mistakenly awarded Bryan all of Section 33 instead of the S1/2, and denied Bryan's motions to alter or amend the judgment.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed whether the district court abused its discretion in adopting the referee’s recommendation, correcting clerical errors, and calculating Bryan’s share of income and expenses. The Supreme Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion and that its findings were not clearly erroneous. However, the Supreme Court modified the judgment to require the trust to reimburse Bryan $2,417.20 for certain trust-exclusive expenses. The judgment was otherwise affirmed as modified. View "Tischmak v. Theurer" on Justia Law

Two tenants rented a duplex in Iowa City and became frustrated by frequent showings of their rental unit by their landlord to prospective tenants for the next lease period. Although their lease allowed the landlord to enter with the tenants’ consent and required at least twenty-four hours’ notice, the landlord sometimes entered outside a scheduled window and, on a few occasions, without prior notice. The tenants objected to showings without notice and occasionally refused entry. They eventually filed a small claims action, alleging multiple instances of common law trespass and seeking damages and attorney fees.A magistrate in the Iowa District Court for Johnson County found that four trespasses occurred—two on the same day and two on separate days—and awarded damages equaling three days’ rent, but denied attorney fees, reasoning that the relevant statute only applied to rental deposit disputes. The district court affirmed most of the magistrate’s decision, slightly increasing the damages to three and a half days’ rent to account for the second trespass on the same day, but likewise denied attorney fees.On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that consent, whether express or implied, negates trespass, and that the tenants’ actions reasonably led the landlord to believe entry was permitted for the contested showings. The court found no basis for additional trespass findings. It also concluded that the district court’s damages award was supported by the record and that Iowa Code section 562A.12(8) authorizes attorney fees only in rental deposit disputes, not in common law trespass actions. Thus, the denial of attorney fees was affirmed. View "Butter v. Midwest Property Management IC, LLC" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs in this case are trustees who own a property in Kīhei, Maui, which they use as a vacation home for personal use. In 2021, Maui County reclassified their property as a “short-term rental” based solely on zoning, not actual use, resulting in a higher property tax rate. The plaintiffs paid the assessed taxes but did not utilize the administrative appeals process available through the Maui County Board of Review. Instead, they filed a class action in the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit, seeking a refund and alleging that the County’s collection of the higher taxes was unconstitutional, violated due process, and resulted in unjust enrichment.The Circuit Court of the Second Circuit granted the County’s motion to dismiss, finding it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The court determined that under Hawai‘i Revised Statutes chapter 232 and Maui County Code chapter 3.48, the proper procedure for contesting real property tax assessments—including constitutional challenges—requires first appealing to the County Board of Review and, if necessary, then to the Tax Appeal Court. Because the plaintiffs bypassed these required steps and missed the statutory deadline to appeal, the court dismissed the case with prejudice.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal. The Supreme Court held that the Tax Appeal Court has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals regarding real property tax assessments, including those raising constitutional issues, and found that the plaintiffs’ claims were time-barred due to their failure to timely pursue the established administrative remedies. As a result, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Piezko v. County of Maui" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs in this case acquired two parcels of property in Montana in 1991 and 2004, respectively. Both properties are subject to a 1962 easement their predecessors-in-interest granted to the United States for part of Robbins Gulch Road, which traverses their land before entering the Bitterroot National Forest. The easement was originally intended for timber harvesting activities, but over the decades, the public used the road to access the National Forest. The plaintiffs became concerned that public use of the easement interfered with their enjoyment of their property and, in 2018, brought suit against the United States seeking to quiet title, arguing the easement did not authorize general public access and that the Forest Service had failed to limit and patrol such use.After extensive discovery, the United States District Court for the District of Montana dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims as time-barred under the Quiet Title Act’s twelve-year statute of limitations. The plaintiffs appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, also upholding the conclusion that the statute of limitations was jurisdictional. The Supreme Court, however, reversed on the jurisdictional question, holding that the Quiet Title Act’s statute of limitations is a non-jurisdictional claims-processing rule, but did not disturb the lower courts’ findings regarding timeliness. On remand, the district court again granted summary judgment to the government, applying the law of the case doctrine and finding plaintiffs’ claims untimely. Plaintiffs appealed once more.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. It held that the district court did not err in applying the law of the case doctrine, and, after a de novo review, concluded that the long history of public use of the easement put plaintiffs on notice well before the limitations period, rendering their 2018 claims untimely. The court also rejected plaintiffs’ equitable estoppel argument due to a lack of government affirmative misconduct and found that both claims accrued simultaneously. The district court’s judgment was affirmed. View "WILKINS V. USA" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over possession and damages related to a residential property in Malibu. In 2019, the plaintiff filed an unlawful detainer action against several defendants, including the defendant, seeking possession of the property and damages. The defendant responded with an answer denying several key allegations, including the plaintiff’s ownership of the property and the claimed fair rental value. The plaintiff later obtained leave to file a first amended complaint, which reclassified the action and asserted new causes of action but relied on the same underlying facts as the original complaint. The defendant did not file a new answer to this amended complaint.The Los Angeles County Superior Court entered a default against the defendant after he failed to answer the amended complaint and subsequently entered a default judgment awarding significant damages. The defendant moved multiple times to set aside the default judgment. The court eventually denied his postjudgment motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d), which allows courts to set aside void judgments. The defendant timely appealed these orders.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed whether the original answer sufficed to controvert the first amended complaint’s allegations and precluded entry of default. The appellate court held that because the defendant’s original answer denied essential factual allegations that remained central to the amended complaint—including ownership and valuation—the default judgment was improper. The court found that a defendant’s original answer stands as a response to reasserted facts in an amended complaint, and default cannot be entered on allegations previously denied. The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment and the trial court’s order denying the motion to set aside default, remanding with instructions to vacate the default and default judgment. View "Ammari v. Ammari" on Justia Law

South Branch Solar, L.L.C. sought approval to build a 130-megawatt solar-powered electric generation facility in Hancock County, Ohio, on approximately 700 acres of agricultural land. The project included solar panels, related equipment, and infrastructure. Local government officials and residents had varied reactions, with some supporting the facility for its economic and environmental benefits and others expressing concerns about impacts on land use, aesthetics, property values, wildlife, and local drainage systems. Travis Bohn, who lives near the project site, opposed the project and intervened in the proceedings.The Ohio Power Siting Board reviewed South Branch’s application, which included environmental studies and mitigation plans. After a public hearing and extensive opportunity for public input, the board staff recommended approval subject to 50 conditions. A joint stipulation was agreed to by South Branch, the board staff, the county commissioners, and the Ohio Farm Bureau Federation, but not by Bohn. Following an adjudicatory hearing, the Board issued an order granting the certificate. Bohn unsuccessfully sought rehearing, arguing that the Board misapplied statutory criteria, failed to require adequate wildlife and flood analysis, and improperly weighed local opposition and economic impacts.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the Board’s order using a standard that allows reversal only if the order was unlawful or unreasonable. The court held that the Board’s determinations under R.C. 4906.10(A)(2), (A)(3), and (A)(6)—concerning environmental impact, minimum adverse impact, and public interest—were supported by sufficient probative evidence and complied with statutory and regulatory requirements. The court found no reversible error in the Board’s approval of South Branch’s application and affirmed the order granting the certificate. View "In re Application of S. Branch Solar, L.L.C." on Justia Law

A restaurant operated by PFPCO.’s Noble Pie Parlor leased space in the El Cortez Hotel in Reno, Nevada, which was owned by El Cortez Reno Holdings, LLC. After initially peaceful relations, the parties’ relationship deteriorated due to disputes over property maintenance and incidents such as a gas leak and a stolen camera. Tensions escalated when El Cortez locked Noble Pie out, resulting in litigation that ended largely in Noble Pie’s favor, with the judgment affirmed on appeal. Later, Noble Pie permanently closed its restaurant, prompting El Cortez to allege breach of the lease’s agreed-use provision and file a new complaint. Noble Pie moved to dismiss; the district court granted the motion but allowed El Cortez to amend its complaint. After further procedural exchanges, El Cortez filed an amended complaint, and Noble Pie again moved to dismiss.The Second Judicial District Court, Washoe County, presided by Judge Egan K. Walker, reviewed El Cortez’s late opposition to the motion to dismiss and its request for an extension of time. El Cortez’s request, based on “professional courtesy,” was submitted just before the deadline. The district court denied the extension, finding no good cause for the delay and noting El Cortez’s pattern of tardiness in filings. The court treated El Cortez’s failure to timely oppose the motion as an admission under DCR 13(3), granted the motion to dismiss with prejudice, denied leave to further amend, and awarded attorney fees to Noble Pie as the prevailing party under the lease.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Nevada considered whether the district court abused its discretion in denying the extension, granting the motion to dismiss, refusing leave to amend, and awarding attorney fees. The Supreme Court of Nevada held that the district court did not abuse its discretion or err in any of these rulings and affirmed the judgment, emphasizing the importance of adhering to procedural rules in litigation. View "El Cortez Reno Holdings, LLC v. PFPCO.'s Noble Pie Parlor" on Justia Law

Two couples entered into a written agreement for the sale and purchase of a condominium in Idaho, using a standard real estate contract form. The property was identified by its street address, unit number, and condominium name. After agreeing to terms and signing the contract, the sellers informed the buyers that they no longer wished to sell. The buyers, who had already paid earnest money, secured financing, and prepared for closing, sought to enforce the agreement. The sellers refused to proceed, claiming the contract was unenforceable due to an inadequate property description under the statute of frauds and asserting the parties had mutually rescinded the agreement.The case was first heard in the District Court of the First Judicial District, Bonner County. The court denied both parties’ motions for summary judgment on the statute of frauds and specific performance, finding factual disputes. After a bench trial, the district court ruled that the property description in the contract was sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds. At a subsequent jury trial, the jury found that the contract was valid, had not been rescinded or abandoned, and that the sellers breached it, awarding the buyers damages. The district court, however, granted the sellers’ motion for partial summary judgment, finding the remedy of specific performance unavailable because the buyers had not tendered the full purchase price at closing.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed that the contract’s property description satisfied statutory requirements and thus dismissed the sellers’ statute of frauds defense. The court held that the district court erred in denying specific performance solely for failure to tender the full purchase price, especially since the sellers’ conduct prevented completion. The Idaho Supreme Court reversed the denial of specific performance and remanded for the district court to consider equitable factors. The court also affirmed the award of attorney fees to the buyers and awarded them costs and fees on appeal. View "McLaughlin v. Moore" on Justia Law