Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

A property owner, Gary Binning, purchased land in Wyoming that was subject to a conservation easement held by The Nature Conservancy (TNC). This easement restricted the types of structures that could be built on the property, allowing only one single-family residential structure per parcel. Binning sought to build a guest house in addition to a main house, but TNC denied his request, citing the easement’s terms. This dispute led to litigation, and the Wyoming Supreme Court ultimately ruled that the easement did not permit construction of any guest house or secondary residential structure.Following this decision, Binning met with TNC’s Wyoming state director, Hayley Mortimer, who, according to Binning, suggested during an informal lunch meeting that he could build a structure accommodating overnight guests as long as it was not called a “guest house” and did not include a kitchen. Binning later sought approval for new building plans, but TNC rejected them, and Mortimer’s subsequent written communication did not confirm any such oral promise. Binning then filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming, asserting a claim of promissory estoppel based on Mortimer’s alleged statements.The district court granted summary judgment in favor of TNC, finding that Binning failed to establish the required elements of promissory estoppel under Wyoming law: a clear and definite promise, reasonable reliance, and that enforcement was necessary to avoid injustice. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit agreed, holding that Mortimer’s alleged statements were not sufficiently clear and definite to constitute a promise, any reliance by Binning was unreasonable under the circumstances, and no injustice would result from refusing enforcement. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Four B Properties v. The Nature Conservancy" on Justia Law

The case centers on a real estate transaction involving Ernest and Martha Anderson, who agreed to sell their property to Noah Messinger and Brandy Chaplin. The property was subject to a “first right of purchase” covenant held by Wyoming Fall Creek, LLC (WFC), which owned the neighboring lot. After the Andersons and Messinger entered into a purchase agreement, WFC expressed an interest in exercising its purchase right but ultimately did not finalize an agreement with the Andersons within the specified period. The Andersons and Messinger extended their closing date multiple times as they awaited resolution regarding WFC’s position. Eventually, the Andersons unilaterally terminated the contract with Messinger, citing his failure to close, and continued negotiations with WFC, which never resulted in a sale.The District Court of Teton County first reviewed the matter. It found that WFC had not timely exercised its first right of purchase, declared the Andersons’ termination of the contract with Messinger unjustified, and ordered specific performance of the purchase agreement. The court also found that WFC tortiously interfered with Messinger’s contractual rights and awarded Messinger attorney fees and costs, holding the Andersons and WFC jointly and severally liable for some of those fees, and WFC solely liable for the remainder. WFC’s actions were also deemed willful and wanton, justifying an award of punitive damages in the form of attorney fees.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the appeals. It affirmed the district court’s findings, holding that the Andersons breached the purchase agreement by terminating it without justification, and specific performance was properly ordered. The Supreme Court also upheld the finding that WFC intentionally and improperly interfered with Messinger’s contract. Finally, it concluded that the punitive damages award, including attorney fees against WFC, was not unconstitutional. The district court’s judgment was affirmed in all respects. View "Wyoming Fall Creek, LLC v. Anderson" on Justia Law

A group of three major construction firms formed a joint venture to undertake Florida’s largest infrastructure project: the reconstruction and expansion of a major interstate. The venture’s contractual and financial structure was complicated, involving a public-private partnership in which a concessionaire entity financed the project, hired the joint venture to perform the actual construction, and would gain long-term maintenance rights. One member of the joint venture, aware of mounting losses, proposed a strategy for the venture to attempt to exit the project or use the threat of termination as leverage in negotiations. This strategy relied on a contested interpretation of the contract and was opposed by the other members, who considered it dangerously speculative and likely to cause greater harm.As losses increased, the dissenting member stopped contributing required capital to the joint venture, accusing the managing partner of breaching its fiduciary duties by refusing to pursue the proposed termination strategy, and alleging a conflict of interest due to overlapping ownership between the managing partner and the concessionaire. The other members responded by contributing additional funds to keep the project solvent and countersued for breach of contract and indemnity.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida held a bench trial and found that the managing partner had not breached any fiduciary duty or acted with gross negligence. The court also found that the dissenting member had materially breached the joint venture agreement by refusing to pay its share of capital calls, and ordered it to reimburse the other members, including prejudgment interest and attorneys’ fees.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that the managing partner had acted in the best interest of the joint venture by not pursuing the proposed termination, and that there was no actionable conflict of interest under Florida partnership law. The court also concluded that the dissenting member’s failure to fund was a material breach, entitling the other members to indemnification and statutory prejudgment interest. View "The Lane Construction Corporation v. Skanska USA Civil Southeast, Inc." on Justia Law

Gerald Lorbiecki, a steamfitter, was diagnosed with and later died from mesothelioma, a disease caused by asbestos exposure. He alleged that part of his exposure occurred while working at Pabst Brewing Company’s brewery in the mid-1970s, where he was employed by an independent contractor. The facility contained extensive asbestos-insulated piping, and Lorbiecki and other workers removed and replaced this insulation using methods that generated airborne asbestos dust. Evidence showed that Pabst was aware of the presence and dangers of asbestos during this period but did not undertake abatement or enforce protective measures.The Milwaukee County Circuit Court, after dismissing Lorbiecki’s common-law negligence claim, allowed his claim under Wisconsin’s safe-place statute to proceed. At trial, a jury found Pabst liable under the statute for failing to provide a safe workplace, awarded compensatory and punitive damages, and apportioned liability among Pabst and several non-party companies. The court entered judgment for Lorbiecki against Pabst, applying statutory caps to certain damages and including a portion of liability attributed to another company based on the non-delegable duty under the safe-place statute.On appeal, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals largely affirmed the trial court’s rulings. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reviewed the case and held that Pabst could be liable under the safe-place statute to an employee of an independent contractor, as the statute imposes a heightened, non-delegable duty of care that supersedes common-law limitations. The Court also found sufficient evidence to allow the jury to consider punitive damages. However, it ruled that the statutory cap on punitive damages applies only to the compensatory damages recoverable from the sole remaining defendant, Pabst, and not to the total compensatory damages found by the jury. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals. View "Estate of Lorbiecki v. Pabst Brewing Company" on Justia Law

Two former tenants sued the owner and manager of a residential apartment complex, alleging that they were charged unlawful rental application fees and excessive lock change fees, in violation of the Massachusetts security deposit statute and consumer protection laws. They sought to represent a statewide class of similarly situated tenants. After contentious discovery, the Superior Court sanctioned the defendants, precluding them from contesting certain liability facts. The court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs on the security deposit claims but denied summary judgment on the consumer protection claims. Before trial, the parties reached a proposed class action settlement that established a fund for class members, with unclaimed funds to be distributed partly to charities and partly returned to the defendants.The Superior Court, after scrutiny and required revisions, approved the settlement. The court capped the amount of unclaimed funds that could revert to the defendants and required that a portion go to designated charities. However, the Massachusetts IOLTA Committee, a nonparty potentially entitled to notice under Mass. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(3), was not notified prior to settlement approval. After final approval and claims processing, the committee received notice for the first time and objected to the final distribution of unclaimed funds, arguing that the lack of timely notice violated the rule and that final judgment should be set aside. The motion judge agreed there was a violation but declined to vacate the settlement, finding no prejudice.On direct appellate review, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the IOLTA Committee had standing to appeal the denial of its procedural right to notice and an opportunity to be heard on the disposition of residual funds, but lacked standing to challenge the overall fairness or structure of the settlement. Assuming a violation of the rule occurred, the Court found no prejudice because the committee ultimately received the opportunity to be heard before judgment entered. The judgment was affirmed. View "Ortins v. Lincoln Property Company" on Justia Law

A county board created a port authority in 2003 to encourage economic development, administering a business park on contaminated land formerly operated by a lumber company. In 2022, the port authority entered into agreements with a private company to clean up and potentially develop the property, culminating in the sale of 105 acres for $1.6 million, with a credit for cleanup costs. The plaintiff alleged that between May 2022 and April 2025, the port authority failed to provide adequate public notice of its meetings or opportunities for public participation regarding the land transactions, in violation of Montana’s open meeting and right to participate laws.The Nineteenth Judicial District Court, Lincoln County, reviewed a motion for a preliminary injunction, which sought to halt any actions pursuant to the port authority’s decisions during the contested period and to void the land sale and related contracts. The District Court denied the injunction, reasoning that the relief sought would not merely enforce open meeting laws but would invalidate completed transactions and disrupt the property’s new ownership and development. The court found that the plaintiff had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits, particularly given the significant passage of time and changes to the property. The court did not resolve contested factual issues about notice or participation, nor did it make any final rulings on the underlying claims.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the District Court manifestly abused its discretion in denying the preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the District Court did not abuse its discretion because the plaintiff failed to establish all required elements for preliminary injunctive relief. The Supreme Court emphasized that the lower court had not decided the merits of the open meeting law claims and left those questions for future proceedings. View "Torgison v. Lincoln County" on Justia Law

The case involves a series of petitions filed by a state agency seeking to enter privately owned properties to conduct environmental, cultural, and geological investigations related to a potential water conveyance project in the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta. The agency pursued these entries under California’s precondemnation entry statutes, which allow entities with eminent domain authority to access property for studies necessary to determine suitability for public projects, before initiating formal condemnation proceedings. The landowners opposed these entries, arguing that, under specific provisions of the Water Code, the agency could not conduct such activities unless the project was fully authorized and funded.The Superior Court of San Joaquin County coordinated the various petitions and, after hearings, ultimately granted the agency’s requests to enter property and conduct the proposed activities. The trial court expressly found that the agency had eminent domain authority, did not need to initiate a classic condemnation action for these precondemnation activities, and was not required to comply with the project approval and funding prerequisites set forth in the Water Code. The landowners appealed these orders, maintaining their position that the agency’s authority was limited by the Water Code’s project approval requirements.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the appeal. The appellate court held that the Water Code’s project approval and funding requirements apply only to formal condemnation proceedings and not to precondemnation entry and testing activities authorized by the precondemnation entry statutes. The court relied on the California Supreme Court’s decision in Property Reserve, Inc. v. Superior Court, which established that these statutes provide a constitutionally valid process for temporary entry and testing, regardless of whether such activities amount to a taking. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s order granting the agency entry to perform the investigative activities. View "Dept. of Water Resources Cases" on Justia Law

A worker employed by an independent subcontractor was injured while performing rebar reinforcement work on a pedestrian bridge construction project. The subcontractor had been hired by a construction company serving as the turnkey contractor for the project. The worker fell while climbing rebar, claiming muddy conditions contributed to his injury. Central to the dispute was whether the construction company could be held liable under California law for the worker’s injuries, given the company’s role in preparing the worksite and its ongoing involvement in certain site safety measures.In the Superior Court of San Mateo County, the construction company sought summary judgment, arguing it was not liable under the Privette doctrine, which generally holds that a hirer of an independent contractor is not liable for injuries to the contractor’s employees. The trial court granted summary judgment, finding that the doctrine applied and that the worker had not raised a triable issue of fact showing an exception to the doctrine. The worker argued that the construction company owed him a nondelegable duty under Cal-OSHA regulations and that the company had not actually delegated workplace safety responsibilities to the subcontractor. He also contended that the “retained control” exception to the Privette doctrine applied because the construction company exercised control over site safety in a manner that affirmatively contributed to his injury.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The court held that the Privette doctrine’s presumption of delegation applied, including to duties imposed by Cal-OSHA regulations, and that there was no evidence the construction company affirmatively contributed to the worker’s injury or interfered with the subcontractor’s means and methods. The court concluded that neither the nondelegable duty argument nor the retained control exception applied, and it affirmed summary judgment in favor of the construction company. View "Cordero v. Ghilotti Construction Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Seventeen property owners in Burlington sought a declaratory judgment that the city’s newly adopted ordinances regulating short-term rentals did not apply to their twenty-two nonowner-occupied properties, arguing that these uses were preexisting and nonconforming, and thus exempt from the new regulations. The city’s ordinances, passed in 2022, imposed significant restrictions on short-term rentals, including prohibiting most nonhost-occupied rentals and establishing new definitions and requirements. The property owners asserted that the ordinances threatened their ability to continue operating their properties as short-term rentals.Previously, these owners brought a similar action in the Civil Division of the Vermont Superior Court, seeking a declaration that their properties were legally permitted nonconforming uses. The Civil Division dismissed their claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, finding that issues of nonconforming use arose under Chapter 117 of Title 24, over which the Environmental Division had exclusive jurisdiction. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed that dismissal in a prior case—32 Intervale, LLC v. City of Burlington—concluding that the Civil Division properly declined jurisdiction.While that earlier appeal was pending, the owners filed a new declaratory judgment action in the Environmental Division. The city moved to dismiss, arguing that the claim was not ripe and that the Environmental Division lacked jurisdiction because the ordinance at issue was not enacted under the zoning statutes. The Environmental Division agreed, concluding that the owners’ claims were premature, involved factual issues inappropriate for declaratory relief, and should first be addressed through the statutory appeals process.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the Environmental Division’s dismissal. The Court held that a declaratory judgment was inappropriate because the owners’ claims were not ripe: no enforcement action was imminent, and the factual questions about each property’s status required more concrete controversy. The owners were not left without remedy, as they could pursue administrative determinations or appeals if enforcement occurred. View "32 Intervale, LLC v. City of Burlington" on Justia Law

An employee of a plumbing subcontractor was injured when a trench collapsed at a residential construction site, resulting in serious physical and emotional harm. The employee had been directed by his supervisor to enter a trench that did not comply with OSHA safety regulations. The general contractor for the project was not present at the site and only learned of the accident months later, after an OSHA investigation. The subcontractor, not the general contractor, was responsible for the trenching work and the day-to-day safety of its employees.After receiving workers’ compensation and settling gross negligence claims against his co-employees, the injured worker proceeded to trial solely on a negligence claim against the general contractor. The Iowa District Court for Polk County denied the general contractor’s motions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict, allowing the case to go to a jury, which found the general contractor liable and awarded substantial compensatory and punitive damages.The Supreme Court of Iowa reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision. The court held that, as a general rule, a general contractor does not owe a duty of care to the employees of an independent contractor. The court found that neither the “retained control” nor “peculiar risk” exceptions to this rule applied. The general contractor did not retain operative control over the subcontractor’s work, either by contract or by conduct, and residential trenching work is not inherently or peculiarly dangerous as a matter of law under Iowa precedent. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that the general contractor was entitled to judgment notwithstanding the verdict and reversed the lower court’s ruling. View "Kono v. D.R. Horton, Inc." on Justia Law