Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Mable Hrynchuk named Bryan Kenton as the sole beneficiary of her estate, which included her residential property. After her death, the homeowner’s association foreclosed on the property and sold it to Saticoy Bay LLC Series 3580 Lost Hills. Kenton, through his attorney-in-fact, Foreclosure Recovery Services, sought to redeem the property as a successor in interest. Saticoy Bay refused, asserting that Kenton was not the successor in interest and had no rights of redemption under Nevada law.The Eighth Judicial District Court of Clark County granted summary judgment in favor of Foreclosure Recovery Services, holding that Kenton was the successor in interest and had the right to redeem the property. Saticoy Bay appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that a will beneficiary is immediately vested with a beneficial interest in devised property upon the testator’s death and is therefore the testator’s successor in interest for the purposes of NRS 116.31166. The court concluded that Kenton, as the sole beneficiary of Hrynchuk’s will, was her successor in interest and had the right to redeem the property. The court also determined that Foreclosure Recovery Services provided all necessary documentation to Saticoy Bay to establish its right to act on behalf of Kenton in redeeming the property. View "Saticoy Bay LLC Series 3580 Lost Hills v. Foreclosure Recovery Services, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendants discovered that a parcel of land near their property was seemingly omitted from the plaintiff's deed. They arranged for the heirs of a previous owner to deed that parcel to them without confirming the heirs' ownership or consulting the plaintiff, who used the parcel. After recording their deed, defendants informed the plaintiff that they owned the parcel and asked her to remove her belongings. The plaintiff sued for deed reformation and slander of title.The Superior Court, Windham Unit, Civil Division, granted the plaintiff's claim for deed reformation on summary judgment and concluded that Mr. Kolodziej slandered the plaintiff's title after a bench trial. Defendants appealed the decision.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decisions. The court held that the plaintiff had a transferrable ownership interest capable of disparagement, as the reformed deed related back to the original deed. The court found that the defendants published a false statement by recording a deed that falsely claimed ownership of the disputed parcel. The court also concluded that Mr. Kolodziej acted with malice by recklessly disregarding the plaintiff's potential claim to the property. Finally, the court determined that the plaintiff's legal expenses incurred in clearing the cloud on her title constituted special damages necessary to sustain her slander-of-title claim. The court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment on the deed reformation and the ruling on the slander-of-title claim, including the award of attorney's fees to the plaintiff. View "Massucco v. Kolodziej" on Justia Law

In 2001, Alphonse Fletcher, Jr. acquired property associated with two apartment units in a residential cooperative corporation controlled by The Dakota, Inc. In 2008, JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. approved a loan to Fletcher, secured by his rights in the property. Fletcher, Chase, and The Dakota entered into an agreement recognizing The Dakota's priority to proceeds from any sale or subletting of Fletcher's apartments. In 2011, Fletcher sued The Dakota for racial discrimination, and The Dakota counterclaimed for legal fees and costs based on Fletcher's proprietary lease.The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to The Dakota in the Fletcher action and awarded attorneys' fees and costs. While this action was pending, Kasowitz, Benson, Torres & Friedman, LLP initiated a CPLR 5225 proceeding against Chase, The Dakota, and Fletcher to seize and sell Fletcher's apartments to satisfy a judgment for unpaid legal fees. The Dakota claimed a superior interest in Fletcher's property based on the fee judgment, while Chase argued that The Dakota's lien was not superior and that the lease provision authorizing attorneys' fees was either inapplicable or unconscionable.The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to The Dakota, and the Appellate Division affirmed, stating that Chase's contentions were an impermissible collateral attack on The Dakota's judgment. Chase moved for leave to appeal and to intervene and vacate the judgment in the Fletcher action. The Supreme Court denied Chase's motion, but the Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.The New York Court of Appeals held that Chase, as a nonparty to the original action, was not barred from challenging the fee award in a separate proceeding. The court concluded that Chase was not required to intervene in the Fletcher action to protect its interests and that doing so would violate Chase's due process rights. The order of the Appellate Division was reversed, and the matter was remitted for further proceedings. View "Matter of Kasowitz, Benson, Torres & Friedman, LLP v JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiff's multi-unit apartment building in Staten Island was damaged by fire on August 4, 2014. At the time, she had an insurance policy with Tower Insurance Company of New York, which required any legal action to be brought within two years of the damage and stipulated that replacement costs would only be paid if repairs were made as soon as reasonably possible. Restoration was completed in July 2020, and her claim was denied on September 1, 2020. Plaintiff filed a lawsuit on August 4, 2020, seeking full replacement value and coverage for lost business income, alleging that Tower/AmTrust's bad faith conduct delayed the restoration process.The Supreme Court granted the Tower/AmTrust defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint, citing the policy's two-year suit limitation provision. The court found that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that she attempted to repair the property within the two-year period or took any action to protect her rights as the limitation period expired. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal, holding that the plaintiff did not allege that she reasonably attempted to repair the property within the two-year period but was unable to do so. Consequently, the claims against the broker defendants were also dismissed as the plaintiff's failure to recover was due to her own actions.The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's order. The court held that the plaintiff did not raise an issue as to whether the suit limitation provision was unreasonable under the circumstances. The plaintiff's allegations were deemed conclusory and lacked specific details about the extent of the damage or efforts to complete repairs within the two-year period. The court concluded that the Tower/AmTrust defendants' motion to dismiss was properly granted, and the claims against the broker defendants were also correctly dismissed. View "Farage v Associated Insurance Management Corp." on Justia Law

The case involves improvements made by Robin and Phyllis Gelinas to their condominium unit, which expanded into the limited common area. Plaintiffs Anthony and Rosemarie Moda and Anthony and Olga Alba sued the defendants, Fernwood at Winnipesaukee Condominium Association and the Gelinases, seeking a declaratory judgment, costs and attorney’s fees, and a permanent injunction. The plaintiffs appealed, and the defendants cross-appealed, a decision of the Superior Court granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants.The Superior Court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, denied the plaintiffs' cross-motion, and denied the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration. The court also awarded attorney’s fees to the defendants. The plaintiffs challenged the trial court’s conclusion that provisions of the Fernwood declaration of condominium waived the requirements of RSA 356-B:19, I concerning the assignment and reassignment of limited common area.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and determined that the trial court erred in its interpretation. The court found that the Fernwood declaration did not expressly provide a waiver from the requirement of RSA 356-B:19, I. The court concluded that the Gelinases' expansion into the limited common area required compliance with RSA 356-B:19, I, which necessitates the consent of all adversely affected unit owners. The court also disagreed with the trial court's finding that all unit owners were adversely affected as a matter of law.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire vacated the trial court’s grant of summary judgment and the award of attorney’s fees to the defendants, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Moda v. Fernwood at Winnipesaukee Condo. Ass'n" on Justia Law

Gordon Clark, acting on his own behalf and as the executor of his late wife’s estate, filed a lawsuit against Wells Fargo, Santander Bank, and other defendants, alleging various tort claims and violations of federal law related to the foreclosure of his wife’s home. The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut ordered Clark to obtain outside counsel to represent the estate, as it had other beneficiaries and creditors besides Clark.The district court reviewed the probate records and concluded that Clark, a pro se litigant, could not represent the estate due to the presence of other beneficiaries and creditors, including Santander Bank. The court directed Clark to retain counsel for the estate by a specific date, failing which his claims on behalf of the estate would be dismissed. Clark’s motion for reconsideration was granted, but the court adhered to its decision. Clark’s second motion for reconsideration was denied, leading him to appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that it had jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine to review the district court’s rulings denying an estate representative’s motion to proceed pro se. The standard of review for such decisions was determined to be de novo, as they involve the application of law to the facts of a given dispute. Applying de novo review, the court concluded that the district court did not err in denying Clark’s motion to proceed pro se, as the estate had other beneficiaries and creditors. Consequently, the Second Circuit affirmed the orders of the district court. View "Clark v. Santander Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Several landowners owned a tract of land near the intersection of a highway and Interstate 35. The Iowa Department of Transportation (DOT) planned to modernize the interchange and condemned a strip of the landowners' property. The landowners anticipated being able to install a commercial entrance to the highway based on prior discussions with the DOT. However, the DOT's formal notice of condemnation indicated that all rights of direct access to the highway would be taken. The landowners filed actions challenging the condemnation after being informed that commercial access would not be allowed.The Iowa District Court for Story County dismissed the landowners' actions as untimely, citing the thirty-day deadline for challenging the exercise of eminent domain authority under Iowa Code section 6A.24(1). The landowners also delayed filing their notice of appeal in the district court, which was filed fifty-seven days after the dismissal order, although it was served on the DOT within twenty-two days.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the delay in filing the notice of appeal was not fatal, as the thirty-five days from service to actual filing was deemed a reasonable time under Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.101(4). However, the court found that the landowners' challenge to the condemnation was untimely under Iowa Code section 6A.24(1), which requires actions to be commenced within thirty days after service of notice of assessment. The court held that this statute is the exclusive method for challenging the exercise of eminent domain authority and does not allow for exceptions or the application of a discovery rule. Consequently, the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the landowners' case. View "Brendeland v. Iowa Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

A landowner in Hardin County, Iowa, refused to allow a surveyor for a pipeline developer to enter his private property. The developer, Summit Carbon Solutions, LLC, sought access under Iowa Code section 479B.15, which governs hazardous liquid pipelines. The district court ordered the landowner to allow the surveyor temporary access, rejecting the landowner’s claims that the statute was unconstitutional under the “takings” clauses of the U.S. and Iowa Constitutions and that carbon dioxide in a supercritical state is not a “hazardous liquid.”The Iowa District Court for Hardin County ruled that the statute was facially constitutional and that Summit was a “pipeline company” with access rights under section 479B.15. The court found that Summit had provided proper statutory notice to the landowner and that the landowner’s claim of having a tenant who did not receive notice was not credible. The court granted Summit’s request for injunctive relief to compel access for surveying.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that section 479B.15 is a lawful pre-existing limitation on the landowner’s title, consistent with longstanding background restrictions on property rights, and does not constitute a taking under the Federal or Iowa Constitutions. The court also held that supercritical carbon dioxide is a “hazardous liquid” within the meaning of section 479B.2, making Summit a pipeline company with access rights under the statute. The court found that Summit had complied with the statutory notice requirements and that no additional showing of irreparable harm was required for the injunction. The judgment and injunctive relief granted by the district court were affirmed. View "Summit Carbon Solutions, LLC v. Kasischke" on Justia Law

Graphite Construction Group, Inc. (Graphite) was hired by Des Moines Area Community College (DMACC) in 2019 for a construction project. DMACC withheld 5% of each payment as retainage, amounting to about $510,000 by January 2022. Graphite requested the release of the retainage, but the project was not yet completed. A dispute arose between Graphite and a subcontractor, Metro Concrete, Inc. (Metro), over unpaid services. Metro filed a claim, and Graphite filed a bond for twice the amount of Metro’s claim, demanding the release of the retainage.The Iowa District Court for Polk County denied Graphite’s motion to compel the release of the retainage, stating that under Iowa Code chapter 573, retainage could not be released before the project’s completion and final acceptance. The court also denied Graphite’s request for attorney fees, as Graphite had not prevailed on its retainage claim.The Iowa Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s decision, ordering the release of the retainage to Graphite but denied Graphite’s request for attorney fees. DMACC sought further review from the Iowa Supreme Court.The Iowa Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals' decision and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Supreme Court held that under Iowa Code chapter 573, retainage could not be released before the project’s completion and final acceptance, and the statutory exceptions did not apply in this case. The court also upheld the denial of attorney fees to Graphite, as they were not the prevailing party. View "Rochon Corporation of Iowa, Inc. v. Des Moines Area Community College" on Justia Law

In May 2022, Jerry & John Woods Construction, Inc. ("Woods Construction") entered into a contract with John David Jordan and Carol S. Jordan to construct a house and a metal building. Woods Construction claimed the Jordans failed to pay for the work performed, leading the company to sue them in the Dallas Circuit Court for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The Jordans moved to dismiss or for summary judgment, arguing that Woods Construction's lack of a required residential-home-builder's license barred the company from bringing civil claims. They also filed counterclaims alleging improper and negligent work by Woods Construction.The Dallas Circuit Court denied the Jordans' motion to dismiss but later granted their motion for summary judgment, finding that Woods Construction, as an unlicensed residential home builder, was barred from enforcing the construction contract under § 34-14A-14(d) of the Alabama Code. The court also declared Woods Construction's "Notice of Lis Pendens/Lien" null and void. The court certified its judgment as final under Rule 54(b), despite the Jordans' counterclaims remaining pending.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and determined that the Rule 54(b) certification was improper. The court noted that the claims and counterclaims were closely intertwined, as both concerned the same contract and construction work. Additionally, the resolution of the Jordans' counterclaims could potentially moot Woods Construction's claims. Therefore, the court concluded that the circuit court exceeded its discretion in certifying the judgment as final and dismissed the appeal for lack of a final judgment. View "Jerry & John Woods Construction, Inc. v. Jordan" on Justia Law