Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

William H. Tatum Jr. was convicted of bank fraud and had a $15,284,348 restitution judgment against him. He owned a 50% membership interest in Tatum Land and Cattle Company, LLC (TLCC). Upon his death in 2018, his estate, including his TLCC interest, was left to his wife, Betsy Gay Roberts-Tatum. Betsy died in 2020, and her son, Zachary I. Haynie, became the executor of her estate. Darrell Tatum, William’s grandson, was appointed executor of William’s estate. The United States, Peoples Bank, and John Deere Financial filed claims against William’s estate.The Tippah County Chancery Court admitted William’s will to probate and appointed Gay as executrix. After Gay’s death, Darrell was appointed as successor executor. Darrell petitioned for the public sale of William’s TLCC interest to satisfy estate debts. Zach opposed, seeking to enforce the TLCC operating agreement’s buyout provision. The chancellor ordered the public sale, which resulted in Joe Tatum purchasing the interest for $675,000. Zach objected, arguing the sale price was inadequate and sought relief, including assignment of the promissory note and deed of trust from Peoples Bank.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case. The court found that any additional funds recovered from the estate would go to the United States due to the restitution judgment, rendering Zach’s claims moot. The court dismissed the appeal as moot, noting that a decision would not benefit Zach practically since the United States would claim any additional funds. The court affirmed the chancellor’s decisions, including the public sale and denial of Zach’s motions. View "In The Matter of The Estate Tatum" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over a parcel of land situated at the border of adjoining properties in Owings Mills, Maryland. Dr. Sharon Saunders owns one property, while Steven and Ellen Gilman own the neighboring property. The Gilmans claimed ownership of the disputed land through adverse possession, having maintained and used the land for several decades. In 2018, the Gilmans constructed a fence on the disputed property, prompting Dr. Saunders to commission a property survey and subsequently file a lawsuit to establish the boundary line and seek damages for trespass and other tort claims.The Circuit Court for Baltimore County ruled in favor of the Gilmans, declaring them the absolute owners of the disputed property by adverse possession. The court ordered the Gilmans to prepare and file an amended deed and plat reflecting their ownership. Dr. Saunders appealed the decision, but the Appellate Court dismissed the appeal, stating that the order was not a final judgment and did not fall under any exceptions allowing for an interlocutory appeal.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case to determine whether the Appellate Court erred in its decision. The Supreme Court held that the Circuit Court's order declaring the Gilmans as owners by adverse possession and directing the preparation of a deed was immediately appealable under Maryland Code, Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article §§ 12-303(1) and 12-303(3)(v). The Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court's dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings to address the merits of Dr. Saunders's appeal. View "Saunders v. Gilman" on Justia Law

New Star General Contractors, Inc. (New Star) filed a lawsuit to enforce its construction lien on twelve condo units in a large development in Grand County after the developer, Sage Creek at Moab, LLC (Sage Creek), failed to pay for New Star’s construction work. The units’ owners, Dumar, LLC, and Duane Shaw (collectively, Dumar), challenged the lien on multiple grounds. The district court ruled in favor of New Star, allowing it to enforce its lien. Dumar appealed the decision.The Seventh District Court, Grand County, initially heard the case and ruled that New Star could enforce its lien. The court found that New Star’s preliminary notices were sufficient and that the lien was valid despite New Star’s failure to allocate expenses between the units and the common areas. The court also concluded that Dumar was responsible for the full amount of the lien, which included the costs of constructing Building C and its common areas. Dumar’s excessive lien claim was dismissed, and the court awarded attorney fees to New Star.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah reviewed the case. The court held that New Star’s second preliminary notices, which were specific to Building C, substantially complied with the Construction Lien Statute despite not listing the correct parcel numbers. The court declined to analyze the first preliminary notices. The court also held that New Star’s failure to allocate expenses between the units and the common areas did not invalidate the lien. However, the court found that the district court erred in calculating the amount owed under the lien by treating Dumar as owning all the common areas of Building C, rather than only its ownership share in the development. The court remanded the case for the district court to determine the correct amount Dumar owes based on its ownership share.Additionally, the Supreme Court vacated the district court’s order dismissing Dumar’s excessive lien claim and the attorney fee award for New Star. The court directed the district court to reconsider both issues on remand. View "New Star General Contractors, Inc. v. Dumar" on Justia Law

Rajiv Sangha (landlord) rented a house to Jeremy Keen and Racheal Lomas (tenant) in 2021. In November 2023, the tenant stopped paying rent. In April 2024, the landlord served a 14-day notice to pay rent or vacate, but the tenant did not respond. In May 2024, the landlord commenced an unlawful detainer action, serving the tenant with a summons and complaint. The tenant faxed a written notice of appearance to the landlord, indicating their intention to be present at any court case or appearance. Despite this, the landlord moved for a default judgment due to the tenant's failure to file an answer by the specified date. The trial court granted the default judgment and issued a writ of restitution.The tenant received the motion for default and notice of hearing but was allegedly informed by the King County Superior Court Clerk’s Office that they did not need to attend the hearing. In July 2024, the trial court found the tenant in default for lack of answer and issued the default judgment and writ of restitution. The tenant retained counsel and moved to vacate the default judgment and quash the writ, arguing that default for an appearing tenant violated their statutory right to counsel and contradicted the statutory summons language requiring a show cause hearing. The trial court denied the motion, agreeing with the landlord that the Civil Rules required an answer and that the landlord had complied with statutory notice requirements.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case. The court held that RCW 59.18.365(3) precludes a default judgment against a tenant who appears but does not submit a written answer in an unlawful detainer action. The tenant’s written notice of appearance constituted a response to the summons, and the trial court erred in entering a default judgment based on the tenant’s failure to answer. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s entry of default and remanded the case for further proceedings. The landlord's request for appellate attorney fees was denied. View "Sangha v. Keen" on Justia Law

Sokunthim Nou appeals from a divorce judgment entered by the District Court in which the court allocated property between her and Rotanak Huot and awarded shared parental rights and responsibilities and shared residency of their children. Sokunthim challenges the court’s property determinations on multiple grounds, but does not contest the custody determination. The court found that all the parties’ assets were marital because they were acquired during the marriage and through significant effort by both parties. The court allocated just over half of the net value of the parties’ properties to Sokunthim and the remainder to Rotanak. The court also found Sokunthim’s income to be $435,598, based largely on Rotanak’s testimony about Punky’s LLC’s daily sales.The District Court held a trial with both parties represented by counsel and interpreters present. The court heard testimony from the parties, a real estate broker, Sokunthim’s accountant, and her father. The court entered a comprehensive divorce judgment, determining that all the parties’ assets were marital and allocating them accordingly. The court’s judgment awarded Panyah LLC to Rotanak and implicitly awarded Punky’s LLC to Sokunthim. Sokunthim filed motions for additional findings of fact and conclusions of law and for a new trial, which the court denied.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and found that the trial court’s determination of Sokunthim’s income was unsupported by the evidence. The court’s finding as to her income may have influenced other financial aspects of the judgment. Therefore, the Supreme Judicial Court vacated the division of property and child support award and remanded for further proceedings. The judgment was affirmed in all other respects. View "Nou v. Huot" on Justia Law

Peter Farina has lived at the Victor Howell House, a group home for low-income individuals, since 1989. In 2000, the Janet Keenan Housing Corporation (JKHC), a non-profit, purchased the property to maintain it as affordable housing. Recently, JKHC attempted to sell the house to a private third party, leading to two tracks of litigation. The District of Columbia sued JKHC to halt the sale, arguing it violated JKHC’s charitable purposes. As the District and JKHC neared a settlement allowing the sale, Farina sought to intervene but was denied. Farina then filed his own lawsuit, claiming his rights under the Tenant Opportunity to Purchase Act (TOPA) and the Uniform Trust Code (UTC) were being violated.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia denied Farina’s motion to intervene in the District’s case, citing untimeliness and lack of standing. The court approved the settlement between the District and JKHC, which allowed the sale to proceed. In Farina’s separate lawsuit, the court ruled against him, stating his TOPA rights were extinguished by the court-approved settlement and that he lacked standing to bring his UTC claim.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The court held that Farina’s TOPA rights were not extinguished by the settlement, as the sale was an arm’s-length transaction and not exempt under TOPA. Farina must be given the opportunity to purchase the property under TOPA. However, the court agreed with the lower court that Farina lacked standing to bring his UTC claim, as he was neither a settlor nor a special interest beneficiary of JKHC. The court affirmed the judgment in the District’s case but vacated the judgment in Farina’s case, remanding it for further proceedings to afford Farina his TOPA rights. View "Farina v. Janet Keenan Housing Corporation" on Justia Law

Norfolk Southern Railway Company challenged the constitutionality of Code § 56-16.3, which allows broadband service providers to install fiber optic cables across railroad property. The statute, enacted in 2023, aims to promote broadband expansion in Virginia. Cox Communications filed applications to install fiber optic cables under Norfolk Southern’s tracks, which Norfolk Southern did not initially oppose. However, a dispute arose over the license fees, leading Cox to proceed without a licensing agreement, prompting Norfolk Southern to seek relief from the State Corporation Commission (the “Commission”).The Commission rejected Norfolk Southern’s arguments without a hearing, finding the claims insufficient to establish undue hardship. Norfolk Southern appealed to the Supreme Court of Virginia, which stayed the Commission’s judgment during the appeal.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case de novo, focusing on whether Code § 56-16.3 violated Article I, Section 11 of the Virginia Constitution. The court emphasized that eminent domain statutes must be strictly construed and that the burden of proving public use lies with the condemnor. The court found that Code § 56-16.3 did not reference public use and allowed a private company to take property for financial gain, which is not a public use under the Virginia Constitution.The court held that the application of Code § 56-16.3 in this case constituted a taking of Norfolk Southern’s property for a nonpublic use, violating the Virginia Constitution. Consequently, the court reversed the Commission’s judgment and remanded the case for entry of judgment in favor of Norfolk Southern. View "Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. SCC" on Justia Law

The case involves the City of Lava Hot Springs, which regulates short-term rentals based on whether they are occupied by an owner or manager. Non-owner-occupied short-term rentals are prohibited in residential zones and only allowed in commercial zones. John and Michelle Taylor applied for a business license to operate a non-owner-occupied short-term rental in a residential zone, but the City denied their application. The Taylors, along with the Idaho Association of Realtors, sued the City, claiming that its regulations violated the Short-term Rental and Vacation Rental Act, which limits municipal regulations on short-term rentals.The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City, finding that the City's regulations did not have the express or practical effect of prohibiting short-term rentals and were permissible under the health, safety, and welfare exception in the Act. The court concluded that because at least one type of short-term rental (owner-occupied) was allowed in residential zones, the City had not violated the Act. The Taylors and the Realtors appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The Court held that the City's ordinance, which prohibited non-owner-occupied short-term rentals in residential zones, violated the Short-term Rental and Vacation Rental Act. The Act prohibits any city ordinance that has the express or practical effect of prohibiting short-term rentals. The Court found that the City's ordinance amounted to a prohibition rather than a regulation and thus invalidated the ordinance. The Court awarded costs on appeal to the Petitioners but did not grant attorney fees to either party. View "Idaho Association of Realtors, Inc. v. City of Lava Hot Springs" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Boyang Song and Travis McCune, own a unit at The 903 condominium complex in Providence, Rhode Island. They filed a lawsuit against Evan Lemoine and Stephen Rodio, the president and secretary of The 903 Condominium Owner’s Association, respectively. The dispute arose when the defendants failed to include the plaintiffs' specific agenda items in a special-meeting petition regarding gas metering and billing issues at the complex. The plaintiffs sought to address the malfunctioning gas timers and the board's decision to switch to a ratio utility billing system, which they argued conflicted with the complex’s governing documents and the Rhode Island Condominium Act.The Superior Court consolidated the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction with a trial on the merits. After a three-day nonjury trial, the Superior Court found in favor of the defendants. The trial justice determined that the notice of the special meeting sent by the board was insufficient but concluded that the plaintiffs' proposed meeting notice was improper because it did not set forth valid transactable business within the association’s authority. The court found for the defendants on count I of the verified complaint and later entered judgment in favor of the defendants on all counts of the plaintiffs' complaint, while dismissing the defendants' counterclaims.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and vacated the part of the Superior Court's judgment finding in favor of the defendants. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs had satisfied their obligation to obtain the requisite number of signatures for the special meeting and that their proposed notice complied with the statutory requirements. The court found that the trial justice overstepped by evaluating the merits of the plaintiffs' motions individually and granting relief not sought by the parties. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "Song v. Lemoine" on Justia Law

Saul Arellano, a roofer, was injured while working on a construction project for Sunrise Homes, Inc. He fell from a roof without fall protection equipment and sustained multiple injuries. Arellano received worker’s compensation benefits through Sunrise Homes after it was discovered that his direct employer did not carry worker’s compensation insurance. Subsequently, Arellano filed negligence and negligence per se claims against Sunrise Homes, arguing that his injuries fell under the “unprovoked physical aggression” exception to Idaho’s worker’s compensation exclusive remedy rule.The District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, Madison County, granted summary judgment in favor of Sunrise Homes. The court concluded that Arellano failed to provide clear and convincing evidence that his claims fell within the statutory exception to the exclusive remedy rule. Specifically, the court found no genuine issues of material fact that Sunrise Homes knew injury or death was substantially likely to occur due to the lack of fall protection equipment.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that the district court erred in applying the “clear and convincing” evidentiary standard at the summary judgment stage. However, upon de novo review, the Supreme Court found that Arellano did not raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding Sunrise Homes’ knowledge that injury was substantially likely to occur. The court also rejected Arellano’s arguments that the 2020 amendments to Idaho Code section 72-209(3) codified a more lenient standard or reduced the burden of proof for plaintiffs. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order granting summary judgment to Sunrise Homes and awarded costs on appeal to Sunrise Homes. View "Arellano v. Sunrise Homes, Inc." on Justia Law