Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Habdab, LLC filed a complaint for declaratory judgment in the circuit court of Lake County against the County of Lake and the Village of Mundelein, seeking to invalidate certain fees imposed under an intergovernmental agreement (IGA). Habdab claimed the fees violated the Road Improvement Impact Fee Law (Impact Fee Law) and sought to avoid paying unconstitutional road improvement impact fees. Both parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The circuit court denied Habdab's motion and granted summary judgment in favor of the County. The appellate court affirmed the circuit court's decision.The appellate court held that the fees imposed under the IGA did not constitute "road improvement impact fees" under the Impact Fee Law because they were not conditioned on the issuance of a building permit or a certificate of occupancy. The court also found that the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions did not apply, as there was an essential nexus and rough proportionality between the fees and the legitimate state interest of preventing traffic congestion.The Supreme Court of Illinois reviewed the case and affirmed the appellate court's judgment. The court held that the IGA fees did not fall under the definition of "road improvement impact fees" as per the Impact Fee Law, which specifically applies to fees imposed as a condition to the issuance of a building permit or certificate of occupancy. The court also agreed that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine did not apply, as there was a legitimate state interest in minimizing traffic congestion and a rough proportionality between the fees and the impact of the proposed development. View "Habdab, LLC v. County of Lake" on Justia Law

Three petitioners sought to quiet title in mineral rights for parcels of real property in McKenzie and Williams Counties, North Dakota. They argued that the state relinquished any claim to these mineral rights when a specific chapter of the North Dakota Century Code became effective in 2017. The petitioners claimed that the state abandoned the minerals, leaving them "up for grabs," and that they claimed the minerals by filing the lawsuit.In the McKenzie County District Court, the petitioners attempted service of process by publication on "unknown persons." Wesley and Barbara Lindvig answered, claiming ownership of the mineral rights. The petitioners' motions to strike the Lindvigs' answer and for default judgment were denied. The court granted the Lindvigs' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and awarded attorney’s fees, concluding the petitioners' action was frivolous. The petitioners appealed.In the Williams County District Court, the petitioners filed a similar lawsuit. Wesley and Barbara Lindvig, along with Kenneth and Mary Schmidt, answered and moved to dismiss on several grounds, including non-compliance with procedural rules and lack of ownership by the petitioners. The court granted the motion to dismiss and awarded attorney’s fees, finding the petition frivolous. The petitioners appealed.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the cases and affirmed the dismissals, holding that the petitioners had no interest in the disputed minerals and could not maintain a quiet title action. The court also affirmed the award of attorney’s fees to the Schmidts in the Williams County case. However, it reversed the award of attorney’s fees to the Lindvigs in both cases and remanded for further findings on whether the Lindvigs owned mineral interests subject to the petitioners' claims. View "Nelson v. Lindvig" on Justia Law

Three petitioners sought to quiet title in mineral rights for parcels of land in McKenzie and Williams Counties, North Dakota. They argued that the state relinquished any claim to these mineral rights when a specific chapter of the North Dakota Century Code became effective in 2017. The petitioners claimed that the state abandoned the minerals, making them available for claim, and that they had claimed them by filing the lawsuit.In the McKenzie County case, the petitioners attempted service by publication on unknown persons. Wesley and Barbara Lindvig answered, claiming ownership of the mineral rights. The petitioners' motions to strike the Lindvigs' answer and for default judgment were denied. The district court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim and awarded attorney’s fees to the Lindvigs, concluding the action was frivolous. The petitioners appealed.In the Williams County case, the petitioners made similar claims. Wesley and Barbara Lindvig, along with Kenneth and Mary Schmidt, answered and moved to dismiss on several grounds, including improper service and lack of ownership by the petitioners. The district court granted the motion to dismiss and awarded attorney’s fees, finding the petition frivolous. The petitioners appealed.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the cases and affirmed the dismissals, holding that the petitioners had no interest in the disputed minerals and could not maintain a quiet title action. The court also affirmed the award of attorney’s fees to the Schmidts in the Williams County case. However, it reversed the award of attorney’s fees to the Lindvigs in both cases, remanding for further findings on whether the Lindvigs had a connection to the disputed mineral interests. View "Nelson v. Persons Unknown" on Justia Law

Aksal Group, LLC filed an application with the Minot City Planning Department in July 2023 to vacate the Kyle’s Addition plat and approve a preliminary plat for the Citizens Alley Addition, a new three-lot subdivision. The Kyle’s Addition plat, recorded in 1995, included a single block with a 24-foot public access easement. RMM Properties, which owns adjacent property, objected, arguing that Aksal Group needed their consent to vacate the public alley and that half of the alley would revert to them as the adjacent property owner.The Minot Planning Commission approved Aksal Group’s application under N.D.C.C. § 40-50.1-16, and the Minot City Council subsequently passed a resolution in September 2023 to vacate the Kyle’s Addition plat and approve the preliminary plat for the Citizens Alley Addition. RMM Properties appealed this decision to the District Court of Ward County, North Central Judicial District, which affirmed Minot’s decision.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that N.D.C.C. § 40-50.1-16 was the appropriate statute governing Aksal Group’s application. The court found that Minot’s decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable and was supported by substantial evidence. The court also determined that the Kyle’s Addition plat dedicated a public access easement, not a fee title, and that the procedures under N.D.C.C. § 40-50.1-16 were correctly applied. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order, upholding Minot’s decision to vacate the Kyle’s Addition plat and approve the preliminary plat for the Citizens Alley Addition. View "RMM Properties v. City of Minot" on Justia Law

Northstar Center, LLC filed a lawsuit against Lukenbill Family Partnership, LLLP, and Tundra Properties, LLC, alleging breach of contract and intentional interference with contract. Lukenbill had initially agreed to sell a 120-acre parcel to Templeton Enterprises, LLC, which later assigned its rights to Northstar. However, Lukenbill sold the property to Tundra instead. Northstar claimed Lukenbill breached their agreement, and Tundra intentionally interfered with the contract. Lukenbill sought indemnification from Tundra, and Tundra counterclaimed for breach of warranty deed against Lukenbill.The District Court of Williams County granted summary judgment in favor of Northstar on its breach of contract and intentional interference claims, and in favor of Lukenbill on its indemnification claim against Tundra. The court denied Tundra’s summary judgment motion on its breach of warranty claim against Lukenbill, concluding Tundra did not adequately brief the issue.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for Northstar on its breach of contract and intentional interference claims, as genuine issues of material fact existed. The court also found that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for Lukenbill on its indemnification claim against Tundra. However, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Tundra’s breach of warranty claim against Lukenbill, as Tundra did not challenge the dismissal on the grounds that it could not maintain the claim without a certificate of authority to transact business in North Dakota.The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Northstar Center v. Lukenbill Family Partnership" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the title of a condominium unit that was foreclosed upon twice by different lien holders. Wonder Twins Holdings, LLC purchased the property at the first foreclosure sale conducted by the condominium association to recover unpaid assessments. Later, 450101 DC Housing Trust purchased the property at a second foreclosure sale conducted by the mortgage lender. The Superior Court granted summary judgment to DC Housing Trust, ruling that the mortgage had been recorded earlier than the Trustee’s Deed received by Wonder Twins.The Superior Court's decision was based on the premise that the mortgage had priority over the condominium association's lien. The court did not consider the super-priority lien created by D.C. Code § 42-1903.13(a)(2), which gives the condominium association a priority lien for the most recent six months of unpaid assessments. The court also noted that the foreclosure sale was advertised as subject to any prior liens, which it interpreted as preserving the mortgage lender's priority.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and reaffirmed its previous holdings that the most recent six months of unpaid condominium assessments constitute a super-priority lien. This lien, when foreclosed upon, extinguishes any deed of trust, regardless of the terms of the sale. However, the court also recognized that a 2017 amendment to the Condominium Act requires that if a condominium association forecloses on more than the six-month super-priority lien, the first deed of trust must be preserved.The Court of Appeals found that the record did not clarify whether the condominium association foreclosed only on its super-priority lien or on a split lien. Therefore, it reversed the Superior Court's grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the exact nature of the foreclosure and the resulting priority of the liens. View "Wonder Twins Holdings, LLC v. 450101 DC Housing Trust" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between Ohio Edison Company and the Corder family over the use of herbicides on property subject to easements held by Ohio Edison. The easements, granted in 1948, allow Ohio Edison to maintain electrical transmission lines and to trim, cut, and remove trees, limbs, underbrush, or other obstructions that may interfere with or endanger their infrastructure.Initially, the trial court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, believing it fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio. The Seventh District Court of Appeals reversed this decision, holding that the trial court had jurisdiction and remanded the case to resolve the ambiguity in the easements. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's jurisdictional ruling but vacated its analysis of the easements, remanding the case to the trial court.On remand, the trial court granted summary judgment to the Corders, holding that the easements did not permit the use of herbicides. The Seventh District Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, finding the easements ambiguous and concluding that they did not authorize the use of herbicides.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and determined that the easements unambiguously grant Ohio Edison the right to remove vegetation and other obstructions. The court held that the term "remove" includes the use of herbicides, as the easements do not restrict the methods of removal. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's judgment and remanded the case to the trial court to issue an entry awarding summary judgment to Ohio Edison. View "Corder v. Ohio Edison Co." on Justia Law

The case involves the Parrot Ditch Company (PDC) and its four water rights in the Jefferson River. PDC delivers water to its shareholders through the Parrot Ditch, which runs parallel to the Jefferson River in Basin 41G. The ditch was constructed in 1895, and PDC was organized in 1916 to manage and distribute water through the ditch. PDC issued shares that correspond to water entitlements, and the company stopped issuing shares in 1981. Two of the water rights were litigated in 1926 in the Carney case, which established shareholders' interests in PDC and referenced priority dates and volumes for two water rights.The Montana Water Court issued a Temporary Preliminary Decree in 1989, which included abstracts for PDC's four water rights. PDC objected to the place of use for one of the rights in 1990 and later requested amendments to the flow rate and irrigated acreage. The Water Court adopted various recommendations over the years, ultimately increasing the place of use to 6,710.78 acres. In 2018, the Water Court issued a Preliminary Decree, and PDC objected, seeking a larger service area and other corrections. Objectors (AMD) also raised objections to various elements of PDC's water rights.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Water Court's decisions. The Court held that PDC failed to provide sufficient evidence to support a larger service area beyond 6,710.78 acres. The Court also found that the Carney decision did not adjudicate water rights and that AMD provided sufficient evidence to overcome the prima facie status of PDC's claims regarding the Townsend and Methodist rights. Finally, the Court upheld the Water Court's modification of the Nolte flow rate to 100 cfs, based on the lack of notice to affected water users when PDC requested the amendment in 1997. View "Parrot Ditch v. Ashcraft" on Justia Law

In 2018, Robert Spoklie purchased land neighboring the property of the Paul Phillip Bardos and Mary L. Bardos Revocable Trust (Bardos) near Kalispell, Montana. Spoklie divided his land into smaller parcels for residential development and entered into an Easement Agreement with Bardos, granting mutual easements for access. Spoklie's easement allowed him to use a 60-foot-wide path through Bardos's property for ingress, egress, and utility installation. Spoklie used this easement to transport construction equipment, sometimes parking it temporarily within the easement boundaries, which Bardos contested.The Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County, denied Bardos's request for a preliminary injunction and later granted summary judgment in favor of Spoklie. The court found that Spoklie's activities, including temporary parking and unloading of construction equipment within the easement, were within the scope of the easement agreement. Bardos appealed, arguing that material facts were in dispute and that Spoklie's actions constituted trespass and nuisance.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's decision. The court held that the easement's language allowed for temporary parking and unloading of construction equipment as reasonably necessary for ingress and egress. The court also found that Spoklie's actions did not constitute trespass or nuisance since they were within the scope of the easement. Additionally, the court noted that the issue of Spoklie's proposed mailbox structure was not ripe for adjudication as no substantial steps had been taken toward its construction. The court concluded that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that the District Court correctly applied the law. View "Bardos Revocable Trust v. Spoklie" on Justia Law

TCR, LLC, a Wyoming limited liability corporation, filed a lawsuit against Teton County, Idaho, after the County refused to record a Condominium Plat for property within a planned unit development (PUD) owned by TCR. TCR sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming the lot had already been approved for condominium development, and also alleged breach of a 1996 settlement agreement between the County and TCR’s predecessor. The district court granted TCR’s motion for summary judgment on the declaratory and injunctive relief claim, ordering the County to record the Condominium Plat, but granted the County’s motion for summary judgment on the breach of contract claim.The district court found that the County had previously approved amendments to the PUD Plat in 2018 and 2019, allowing TCR to build sixteen standalone condominiums on Lot 12B. The County’s refusal to record the Condominium Plat was based on an alleged site plan from 1995, which the district court found inadmissible. The district court concluded that the County had no legal basis to refuse the recording and enjoined the County from preventing TCR’s attempts to record the Plat.The Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the district court’s decision to grant TCR’s claim for declaratory and injunctive relief, holding that the County had no valid reason to refuse the recording. However, the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the County on the breach of contract claim, finding that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the County breached the 1996 Settlement Agreement. The case was remanded for further proceedings on this issue.The Supreme Court also found that the district court erred in denying TCR’s second motion to enforce, which sought to compel the County to issue building permits after the Condominium Plat was recorded. The Court awarded TCR its attorney fees and costs on appeal, concluding that the County acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. View "TCR, LLC v. Teton County" on Justia Law