Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

In 2020, Cody Sturzenbecher and his mother, Judy Sturzenbecher, entered into a series of transactions with Sioux County Ranch, LLC (Sioux County) related to the purchase of their family farm from a trust. Judy bought the farm using a loan from Sioux County, then sold the property to Sioux County, which leased it to Cody. The lease included an option for Cody to purchase the property. Cody defaulted on the lease, leading Sioux County to terminate the lease and list the property for sale.The Sturzenbechers sought declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that Judy’s conveyance of the farm to Sioux County created an equitable mortgage rather than an absolute sale. The Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit in Turner County, South Dakota, granted the Sturzenbechers’ request for a preliminary injunction and denied Sioux County’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. Sioux County appealed both decisions.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decisions. The court concluded that the arrangement between the Sturzenbechers and Sioux County was intended as a financing agreement rather than an absolute sale. The court found that the agreements between the parties were unambiguous but unenforceable as an absolute sale due to public policy favoring a mortgagor’s right of redemption. The court held that the Sturzenbechers were likely to succeed on their equitable mortgage claim and that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction. The court also affirmed the denial of Sioux County’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that the Sturzenbechers had pled sufficient facts to support their claim. View "Sturzenbecher v. Sioux County Ranch" on Justia Law

The defendant, Clough, Harbour & Associates LLP (CHA), agreed to design a new athletic field for the plaintiff, Trustees of Boston University (university). The contract included an express indemnification provision, which required CHA to indemnify the university for any expenses resulting from CHA's negligent design. A defect in CHA's design caused the university to incur expenses to fix the field. The university demanded indemnification from CHA, which CHA refused. More than six years after the field opened, the university sued CHA for breach of the indemnification provision.The Superior Court judge granted summary judgment in favor of CHA, relying on the tort statute of repose, which bars tort actions for damages arising from design defects in real property improvements six years after the improvement's opening. The judge concluded that the university's claim was barred by this statute. The university appealed the decision.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case. The court held that the tort statute of repose does not apply to the university's contract claim for indemnification. The court emphasized that the claim was based on an express contractual provision, not a tort duty imposed by law. The court distinguished between claims for breach of an implied warranty, which are barred by the statute of repose, and claims for breach of an express warranty or indemnification provision, which are not. The court reversed the Superior Court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Trustees of Boston University v. Clough, Harbour & Associates LLP" on Justia Law

The Orange County Transportation Authority (OCTA) awarded a contract to OC 405 Partners Joint Venture (OC 405) for improvements to Interstate 405. OC 405 then awarded subcontracting work to Golden State Boring & Pipe Jacking, Inc. (GSB). However, the parties disagreed on the scope of the subcontract work and did not execute a written subcontract. OC 405 subsequently contracted with another subcontractor, leading GSB to file a lawsuit seeking benefit of the bargain damages, claiming OC 405 did not comply with Public Contract Code section 4107’s substitution procedures.The Superior Court of Orange County granted summary judgment in favor of OC 405 and other defendants, holding that GSB was not entitled to the protections of section 4107 because it did not meet the requirements of section 4100 et seq. Specifically, GSB was not a "listed subcontractor" in the original bid, and its proposed work did not exceed one-half of 1 percent of the prime contractor’s total bid, a threshold requirement under section 4104.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court’s decision, concluding that section 4107’s substitution procedures did not apply to OC 405’s substitution of GSB. The court emphasized that the protections of section 4100 et seq. only apply to subcontractors whose proposed work exceeds the one-half of 1 percent threshold of the prime contractor’s total bid. Since GSB’s bid did not meet this threshold, it was not entitled to the protections under section 4107. The court also noted that the contractual provisions in the prime contract did not alter this statutory requirement. Thus, the judgment in favor of the defendants was affirmed. View "Golden State Boring & Pipe Jacking, Inc. v. Astaldi Construction" on Justia Law

A landlord argued that a case brought by the Los Angeles City Attorney to enforce California's Public Nuisance Law (PNL) violated Government Code section 53165.1, which bars local governments from penalizing tenants or landlords solely due to contact with law enforcement. The case involved a 116-unit apartment complex in North Hollywood, where the People alleged a gang-related public nuisance. The complaint sought abatement of the nuisance, a permanent injunction, and civil penalties.The Los Angeles County Superior Court granted a preliminary injunction requiring the defendants to implement several security measures, including proper lighting, video monitoring, and private security. The court also ordered criminal background checks on tenants. Defendants appealed, and a different panel of the Court of Appeal affirmed the preliminary injunction but directed the trial court to consider modifying it in light of section 53165.1. On remand, the trial court modified the injunction to remove the background check requirements but confirmed the validity of the rest of the injunction.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and held that enforcing the PNL is not prohibited by section 53165.1 because the PNL is a state law, not a local ordinance, rule, policy, program, or regulation. The court also determined that the action brought by the city attorney on behalf of the People of the State of California is not an action by a "local government" within the meaning of section 53165.1. Additionally, the court found that the preliminary injunction did not penalize tenants or landlords solely due to contact with law enforcement. The order was affirmed. View "People ex rel. Soto v. Group IX BP Properties" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over the ownership of a vacant lot. Renee Dominguez holds a recorded deed to the lot, but Magdalena Rios De Dominguez claims the deed is a forgery and asserts ownership through a previously recorded deed. The primary issue is the applicability of A.R.S. § 12-524, which sets a five-year statute of limitations for quiet title actions against a party with a recorded deed who has paid property taxes for the preceding five years.The Superior Court in Maricopa County granted summary judgment in favor of Renee, ruling that even if the deed was forged, the five-year statute of limitations barred Magdalena's claim, thus conferring full title to Renee. The court also ruled that quieting title for Renee barred Magdalena’s claim for damages under A.R.S. § 33-420. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Superior Court's decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the case and held that a "recorded deed" under § 12-524 includes any deed that is facially valid, even if it is forged. Since Renee's deed was facially valid and she met the other requirements of § 12-524, the five-year statute of limitations applied. However, the court also held that Magdalena had sufficiently preserved her arguments for equitable tolling and the discovery rule, which, if successful, could make her complaint timely under § 12-524. The court vacated parts of the Court of Appeals' opinion and remanded the case for consideration of these arguments.The Supreme Court affirmed the remainder of the Court of Appeals' opinion and denied both parties' requests for attorney fees, allowing them to re-urge their requests before the appropriate court after the remand. View "DOMINGUEZ v DOMINGUEZ" on Justia Law

In December 2020, Raymond Felts' wife was struck and injured by a motor vehicle while walking across North Main Street in Rochester within a painted crosswalk that lacked warning signs or signals. She later died from her injuries. Felts, individually and as executor of his wife's estate, filed a lawsuit in January 2022, alleging negligence and violation of RSA 231:90-:92 by the City of Rochester for failing to design, monitor, and maintain the crosswalk safely, including the absence of warning signs or signals. The City moved to dismiss the claims, arguing limited liability under RSA 231:92 for injuries arising from the construction, maintenance, or repair of public highways.The Superior Court partially granted and denied the City's motion to dismiss. The court ruled that "highway" under RSA 231:92 includes crosswalks but not pedestrian warning signs or signals, thus dismissing the negligence claim related to the crosswalk itself but allowing the claim regarding the City's failure to install warning signs or signals to proceed. The City moved for reconsideration, which was denied, leading to this interlocutory appeal.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case de novo, focusing on statutory interpretation. The court concluded that "highways" under RSA 231:92 includes pedestrian warning signs, crossing signals, and other traffic controls. The court reasoned that the statutory language and legislative intent support a broad interpretation of "highways" to include these elements, which are integral to the safe use of public roads. Consequently, the court vacated the trial court's ruling that RSA 231:92 does not apply to the plaintiff's claim regarding the City's failure to install pedestrian warning signs and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Felts v. City of Rochester" on Justia Law

The plaintiff sought to foreclose two municipal tax liens for the grand lists of 2012 and 2013 on real property owned by the defendant. The city of Bridgeport had purportedly assigned the tax liens to the plaintiff’s predecessor, which then allegedly assigned its interest to the plaintiff. The defendant filed an answer and several special defenses, including a claim that the Bridgeport City Council had not validly assigned the liens. The trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as to liability, concluding there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding the validity of the assignments. Subsequently, the trial court rendered a judgment of foreclosure by sale.The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The defendant then appealed to the Connecticut Supreme Court, arguing that the plaintiff did not provide sufficient proof that the city council had made a resolution to assign the tax liens to the plaintiff.The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Court’s decision, holding that the plaintiff had met its burden of establishing the validity of the assignments. The court found that the plaintiff submitted certified copies of the city council’s meeting agendas and minutes, which showed that the council had authorized the assignments. The court also noted that the defendant failed to present any evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding the validity of the assignments. The court clarified that the plaintiff bore the burden of proving standing and had satisfied this burden, while the defendant’s mere assertions were insufficient to defeat summary judgment. The court also addressed procedural irregularities but concluded that the defendant had waived any related claims by not objecting. View "Cazenovia Creek Funding I, LLC v. White Eagle Society of Brotherly Help, Inc." on Justia Law

James and David Hart were involved in a real estate transaction with Millennial Development Partners, LLC, from 2016 to 2022. The Harts filed a complaint in September 2021 seeking a declaratory judgment that future purchases would be unenforceable. The district court set a trial date for July 12, 2022, with a backup date of October 11, 2022, and required discovery to be completed sixty days before trial. Millennial answered the complaint on June 7, 2022, asserting eleven affirmative defenses and counterclaimed for declaratory relief. The Harts' counsel requested a trial continuance due to an undisclosed conflict of interest with previous counsel. The district court continued the trial to October and ordered the Harts to file a motion and brief establishing good cause to amend the scheduling order. The Harts failed to comply with this order.The district court of the Sixth Judicial District of Idaho struck the Harts' pleadings and dismissed the case without prejudice as a sanction for failing to follow the court’s scheduling order. Millennial moved for attorney fees, which the district court awarded on two grounds: as a sanction for disobeying the scheduling order and under Idaho Code section 12-121, finding the Harts pursued the case unreasonably. The district court calculated the award considering Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(3) factors and awarded Millennial $9,592.46 in attorney fees and costs. The Harts moved to reconsider, arguing the district court incorrectly applied Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 37(d)(3) and prematurely applied Idaho Code section 12-121. The district court clarified its sanction under Rule 16(e) and upheld the award.The Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in sanctioning the Harts under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 16(e) and awarding attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-121. The court also affirmed the calculation of attorney fees and awarded Millennial attorney fees on appeal under Idaho Code section 12-120(3). View "Petersen v. Millennial Development Partners, LLC" on Justia Law

Fell Holdings LLC and Stanyan Holdings LLC, misdescribed as California limited liability companies instead of Delaware limited liability companies, filed unlawful detainer proceedings against Fell Street Automotive Clinic, Stanyan Street Automotive Clinic, and Laurence Nasey. Nasey had lost ownership of two properties in San Francisco during a nonjudicial foreclosure but continued operating his businesses through a leaseback arrangement with the new owners, memorialized in a settlement agreement. The agreement allowed Nasey to repurchase the properties, with stipulated judgments against him if he failed to do so.The trial court entered judgments in favor of Fell Holdings and Stanyan Holdings, which were later enforced. Appellants moved to vacate these judgments, arguing that the misdescription of the plaintiffs' corporate status deprived the court of jurisdiction, rendering all judicial actions void. The trial court denied the vacatur motions.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the misdescription of the plaintiffs' corporate status did not automatically void the judgments. Instead, the issue was whether the discrepancy could be cured by amendment under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (a)(1). The court reversed the trial court's orders denying the vacatur motions and remanded the case, directing the trial court to vacate the judgments and enforcement orders without prejudice. The trial court was instructed to consider any motions by the plaintiffs to amend their complaints to correct the misdescription and to address appellants' arguments regarding the release of Nasey's $202,500 earnest money deposit. The parties were to bear their own costs on appeal. View "1215 Fell SF Owner LLC v. Fell Street Automotive Clinic" on Justia Law

NCO Financial Systems, Inc. (NCO) entered into a lease agreement with Montgomery Park, LLC (Montgomery Park) for over 100,000 square feet of office space in Baltimore, Maryland. The lease allowed NCO to terminate early after eight years if certain conditions were met. NCO attempted to terminate early, but Montgomery Park claimed the conditions were not satisfied. NCO vacated the premises and stopped paying rent, leading Montgomery Park to send a default notice. NCO then filed a lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment that it had properly terminated the lease and that the rent was based on misrepresented square footage.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland found in favor of Montgomery Park after a bench trial, awarding it $9,854,566.95 plus ongoing interest. The court also set a schedule for determining Montgomery Park’s claim for costs, fees, and expenses. Montgomery Park filed a motion seeking approximately $3.8 million for these costs, which NCO opposed on several grounds, including the lack of a proper demand for payment and the inclusion of fees for defending against NCO’s initial suit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that Montgomery Park made a valid demand for payment when it filed its motion for costs, fees, and expenses on August 24, 2022. The court held that default interest should run only from the date of this demand, not from when the costs were incurred, and remanded the case to recalculate the interest. The court affirmed the district court’s award of costs, fees, and expenses, including those incurred in defending against NCO’s claims and expert witness fees, finding no abuse of discretion or error in the district court’s decisions.The Fourth Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded with instructions to recalculate the default interest. View "NCO Financial Systems, Inc. v. Montgomery Park, LLC" on Justia Law