Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

A company that owns and operates the only landfill in a particular town challenged a local law that required the landfill’s closure by a specified date. The law was enacted after community complaints regarding odors. When the law was first passed, the town’s attorney acknowledged that a State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA) review was required, but the Board adopted the law and related SEQRA documents without substantive discussion. After a subsequent law rescinded and then court action reinstated the original law, the landfill owner again brought a proceeding, claiming, among other things, that the Board failed to comply with SEQRA by not taking a “hard look” at environmental impacts.The Supreme Court initially dismissed the action on statute of limitations grounds, but the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, reversed that decision, holding the claim was timely. After the parties resolved all non-SEQRA claims, Supreme Court granted summary judgment to the landfill owner, finding it had standing and that the Board did not properly comply with SEQRA. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding the owner lacked standing because it had not shown it suffered or would suffer an environmental injury. The dissent argued that under Matter of Har Enterprises v Town of Brookhaven and Gernatt Asphalt Products v Town of Sardinia, property owners directly affected by a government action do not need to allege environmental harm to have standing under SEQRA.The New York Court of Appeals held that the landfill owner has standing to challenge the Board’s SEQRA compliance simply by virtue of owning property directly affected by the local law, following the holdings in Har Enterprises and Gernatt Asphalt Products. The Court further declined to review the statute of limitations argument at this stage, as that issue had already been resolved and was not properly before it. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case for further proceedings. View "Seneca Meadows, Inc. v. Town of Seneca Falls" on Justia Law

This dispute involves two parcels of undeveloped land in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, owned by a nonprofit conservation organization. The parcels abut land owned by two individuals who operate an excavation and topsoil business. The individuals claimed to have used the parcels exclusively for their business activities for over 40 years, including excavation, storage, and staging, and to have controlled access to the lots with locked gates. In 2018, they initiated a quiet title action to acquire title to the parcels by adverse possession. The record title owner, the conservation organization, contested the action, asserting the individuals were not in legal possession and presenting aerial photographs to show the land remained in its natural state.The Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County held an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the individuals satisfied the jurisdictional prerequisite of possession necessary for a quiet title action. The court found the individuals were in possession of at least a portion of both parcels, based largely on evidence of their use and control of access, and directed the record owner to file an ejectment action. The owner appealed, and the Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed, agreeing with the trial court’s finding that the individuals had demonstrated sufficient possession to proceed with the quiet title action.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed whether the presumption of possession by the record title holder could be overcome and whether a stricter standard for possession applied due to the parcels’ character as woodlands. The Court held that a record title owner’s presumption of possession may be rebutted by credible evidence of another party’s dominion and control over the property. The stricter standard for possession of woodlands is not relevant at this preliminary stage. The order compelling the record owner to file an ejectment action was affirmed. View "Duncan v. Chartiers Nature Conservancy, Aplt." on Justia Law

Two neighbors own adjacent properties in a subdivision, with one property benefiting from a road easement across the other’s land. The easement includes both a paved portion and a 244.5-foot gravel or dirt driveway segment. The defendant uses this gravel road for access. In an earlier lawsuit, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had entered the property to clear trees, perform excavation, and build a rock wall without permission. That suit was resolved by partial settlement and judgment. While the first case was still pending, the plaintiff filed a second suit seeking to stop the defendant from paving the gravel portion of the easement, arguing that paving was not necessary for reasonable use.The Superior Court of El Dorado County first denied the defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, rejecting arguments that the second complaint improperly split causes of action and was legally insufficient. The court found the new suit did not overlap with the first, as the threat to pave the easement arose after the initial complaint and involved distinct allegations. After a bench trial, the court determined that paving the driveway was not reasonably necessary for safe and convenient vehicular access, and issued an injunction prohibiting the defendant from paving.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. It affirmed the trial court’s rulings, holding that the second suit was not barred as an improper splitting of actions because it addressed a different episode and new factual circumstances. The court further held that the scope of an easement does not automatically include the right to pave; such improvements must be reasonably necessary for the convenient use of the easement, as determined by the facts. The appellate court found no error with the trial court’s application of the legal standard or its factual findings, and affirmed the judgment in favor of the plaintiff. View "Berstein v. Sebring" on Justia Law

Timothy Hale and Sonja Ringen constructed a storage building on their commercially zoned property in Laramie without first obtaining a building permit. When the City of Laramie discovered the construction, it issued a stop work order and a cease-and-desist letter. Despite these notices, Hale and Ringen continued building and subsequently applied for a permit, which the City denied due to deficiencies in the application. After further unsuccessful permit attempts and ongoing disputes over the City’s requirements—including requests for disassembly of the structure—the City sought and obtained a permanent injunction from the District Court of Albany County, restricting use of the building until permitting was complete and compliance was achieved.The District Court of Albany County conducted a bench trial in May 2022 and granted the City’s request for a permanent injunction. The court outlined a process for inspections, identification of code violations, and corrective actions, but continued conflict between the parties hindered progress. Multiple rounds of correspondence, inspections, and motions ensued, with the City insisting on structural disassembly and Hale/Ringen providing documentation to support their position. Hale and Ringen eventually moved to vacate the injunction, arguing it was no longer equitable given their efforts and the City’s refusal to issue a permit. The district court denied their motion, citing only the parties’ lack of agreement, and provided no substantive analysis of the evidence.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Wyoming determined that the district court abused its discretion by failing to consider the evidence and arguments presented before denying the motion to vacate or modify the injunction. The Supreme Court held that a court must exercise discretion and decide motions on their merits, rather than requiring agreement between adversarial parties. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order and remanded the case for full consideration of Hale/Ringen’s motion in light of all relevant facts and equities. View "Hale v. City of Laramie" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs owned approximately 94 acres of land in Wake County, North Carolina, with about 9.93 acres affected by the North Carolina Department of Transportation's (DOT) recording of a transportation corridor map on August 6, 1996. Under the now-repealed Transportation Corridor Official Map Act, this recording imposed significant restrictions on the plaintiffs’ rights to improve, develop, and subdivide that portion of their property. These restrictions lasted for nearly twenty years, ending only when the General Assembly rescinded all Map Act corridors on July 11, 2016, following the Supreme Court's decision in Kirby v. North Carolina Department of Transportation, which held that such restrictions constituted a taking requiring just compensation.After the rescission, the plaintiffs filed an inverse condemnation action in Wake County Superior Court, seeking compensation for the restrictions imposed from 1996 to 2016. The Superior Court found that DOT had effected a temporary taking under the Map Act and determined just compensation should be measured by the fair rental value of the property during the period of restriction. On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the finding that the taking was temporary due to the legislative rescission, but reversed the measure of damages, directing that compensation be based on diminution in value during the period the restrictions were in effect.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and held that Map Act corridor recordings cause indefinite takings of fundamental property rights at the time of recording, and legislative rescission does not retroactively transform an indefinite taking into a temporary one for purposes of calculating just compensation. The Court ruled that the proper measure of damages is the difference between the fair market value of the property immediately before and immediately after the corridor map recording, considering all relevant factors, including the indefinite nature of the restrictions and any effect of reduced ad valorem taxes. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this holding. View "Mata v. N.C. Dep't of Transp" on Justia Law

A flea market operator in Durham, North Carolina, received a notice of violation (NOV) from the city's planning department following a field inspection. The NOV stated that the market had failed to comply with an approved site plan, referencing the city’s Unified Development Ordinance (UDO), and warned of possible civil penalties unless corrective action was taken within thirty days. The NOV included copies of photographs and a copy of the site plan but did not specifically identify which aspects of the property were in violation or the specific corrective measures required.The market appealed the NOV to the City’s Board of Adjustment (BOA). At the quasi-judicial hearing, city staff explained that the NOV was intentionally broad because there were several violations, and listing each one would allow the market to fix only some issues. One BOA member expressed concern that the NOV’s lack of specificity failed to inform the market of the exact violations or needed corrections. Despite this, the BOA voted to deny the market’s appeal. The market then appealed to the Superior Court, Durham County, arguing that the NOV was too vague and did not comply with ordinance requirements. The superior court affirmed the BOA’s decision and ordered the market to come into compliance within thirty-six months. The market further appealed, and the North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed, finding the NOV sufficient under the UDO.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the appeal and held that the NOV did not comply with the city’s ordinance because it failed to provide a description of the specific violations as required by UDO § 15.2.1.C. The court concluded that property owners must receive enough detail to understand the alleged violations and what corrective action is required. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded with instructions for the city to dismiss the NOV. View "Durham Green Flea Market v. City of Durham" on Justia Law

A developer challenged the legality of “recreation fees” imposed by a municipality on builders of new subdivisions. The developer argued that the town’s fees, charged in lieu of dedicating land for public recreation, either exceeded statutory limits or were unconstitutional because they were not proportionate to each development’s impact. The developer further alleged that the municipality did not use the fees as required, instead commingling them with general funds and failing to create or improve public recreation areas near the developments.In the Superior Court of Wake County, the developer pursued a putative class action seeking declaratory relief and a refund of all such fees paid since November 2017. The Superior Court certified a class including all payers of the recreation fees, finding several common legal questions appropriate for resolution on a class-wide basis. These included whether the fees violated statutory requirements, whether their calculation was legally proper, whether their use complied with statutory mandates, and whether they were constitutionally proportionate. The municipality appealed directly to the Supreme Court of North Carolina, arguing that individualized factual inquiries predominated over common issues and that a class action was not the superior method of adjudication.The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that the class as certified did not satisfy the predominance requirement for class actions. The Court explained that several claims—such as whether fees exceeded fair market value or were roughly proportional—would require individualized, fact-intensive determinations for each class member, resulting in mini-trials that would overwhelm the common legal issues. Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s class certification order and remanded for further proceedings, instructing the lower court to reconsider class certification in light of these findings. View "Empire Contractors Inc. v. Town of Apex" on Justia Law

The plaintiff owned a large tract of land in Cumberland County, North Carolina. In 1992 and 2006, the North Carolina Department of Transportation (NCDOT) filed official corridor maps under the Map Act, which imposed restrictions on portions of the plaintiff’s property, limiting development and affecting value. In 2002 and 2010, NCDOT initiated two direct condemnation actions to acquire parts of the plaintiff’s land—some of which overlapped with the previously restricted areas—resulting in two settlements and consent judgments. After the 2010 settlement, 28.041 acres of the plaintiff’s property remained subject to Map Act restrictions until the maps were repealed in 2016.Following the repeal and a 2016 North Carolina Supreme Court decision in Kirby v. North Carolina Department of Transportation, which held that Map Act restrictions constituted a taking, the plaintiff filed an inverse condemnation action in Cumberland County Superior Court in 2018. The plaintiff sought compensation specifically for the Map Act restrictions not addressed in prior settlements. The Superior Court dismissed some claims but allowed the action to proceed for the remaining 28.041 acres. The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the plaintiff’s claims regarding the Map Act restrictions were not barred and could proceed as an independent interest not covered by the earlier condemnation actions.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed the Court of Appeals. It held that, under North Carolina’s eminent domain statutes, the plaintiff was required to raise claims related to the Map Act restrictions as part of the answer in NCDOT’s 2010 direct condemnation action, since those restrictions were pertinent to determining just compensation for the partial taking. Because the plaintiff failed to do so, he could not pursue a separate inverse condemnation claim for those restrictions under N.C.G.S. § 136-111. The Court’s disposition was to reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. View "Sanders v. N.C. Dep't of Transp" on Justia Law

Jay and Kendall Nygard, who have had a long history of disputes with the City of Orono regarding property matters, became involved in a conflict when Jay replaced their driveway without obtaining a permit as required by city code. Throughout the permitting process and subsequent communications with the City, Kendall was copied on email exchanges but did not perform the driveway work herself. After efforts by city officials to secure compliance failed, both Jay and Kendall were referred for prosecution for violating the permit requirement. However, a state court later dismissed the charge against Kendall, finding that the ordinance required only the person actually performing the work to obtain the permit, and Jay, not Kendall, had done the work.Following this dismissal, Kendall and Jay brought federal claims against the City, including a malicious prosecution claim. The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota dismissed all claims, but on appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit allowed Kendall’s malicious prosecution claim to proceed, finding her complaint sufficiently alleged the City lacked probable cause. On remand, the district court declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction. Kendall then filed a new malicious prosecution claim based on diversity jurisdiction, but the district court again granted summary judgment to the City, concluding Kendall could not prove the City acted with malicious intent.Reviewing the case de novo, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. The court held that Kendall failed to offer evidence that the City knowingly and willfully instituted a groundless prosecution against her, as required to establish malicious intent under Minnesota law. The court found that, even if probable cause was lacking, there was no evidence of malice, and that any deficiency in probable cause was not so blatant as to permit an inference of malicious intent. The judgment in favor of the City was therefore affirmed. View "Nygard v. City of Orono" on Justia Law

Pedro Castaneda died in a traffic accident at an intersection on State Highway 249 that was under construction. At the time, the intersection’s traffic lights were installed but not yet operational, and there was a dispute about whether they were properly covered to indicate their status. Castaneda’s family sued the contractors involved in the project, SpawGlass Civil Construction, Inc. and Third Coast Services, LLC, alleging that negligence in the construction and installation of the traffic signals contributed to the fatal accident. The construction project was governed by an agreement between the Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT) and Montgomery County, with the County responsible for the project’s design and construction, but with TxDOT retaining authority over the adjacent frontage roads and final approval of plans.The trial court denied the contractors’ motions for summary judgment that sought dismissal under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 97.002, which grants immunity to contractors under certain conditions. The contractors appealed. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that Section 97.002 applies only to contractors who are in direct contractual privity with TxDOT, and since neither contractor had a direct contract with TxDOT, they could not invoke the statute’s protection.The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the court of appeals. It held that Section 97.002 does not require direct contractual privity with TxDOT for a contractor to qualify for statutory immunity. The court determined that, based on the summary judgment record, SpawGlass and Third Coast performed work "for" TxDOT within the meaning of the statute, as their activities directly related to frontage roads that TxDOT would own and maintain. The court remanded the case to the court of appeals to determine whether the contractors met the remaining requirements of Section 97.002. View "THIRD COAST SERVICES, LLC v. CASTANEDA" on Justia Law