Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

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A man sued his neighbors, claiming that an access road on their property caused flooding on his property. After settling with the neighbors and dismissing his claims with prejudice, he sued them again over continued flooding, alleging nuisance, trespass, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and breach of contract.The Superior Court of Alaska, Third Judicial District, granted summary judgment for the neighbors on the tort claims, citing res judicata, but allowed the breach of contract claim to proceed. After a bench trial, the court found the neighbors had breached the settlement agreement and awarded specific performance, consequential damages, and attorney’s fees, but denied punitive damages. The neighbors appealed the breach of contract ruling, and the man cross-appealed the dismissal of his tort claims and the denial of punitive damages.The Supreme Court of Alaska reversed the Superior Court’s ruling on the breach of contract claim, finding it was filed outside the three-year statute of limitations. The court held that the man was on inquiry notice of the breach when the driveway reconstruction was completed, as he observed defects at that time. The court affirmed the Superior Court’s decision that the tort claims were barred by res judicata, as they stemmed from the same transaction as the prior lawsuit. The court also upheld the denial of punitive damages, finding no evidence of egregious conduct by the neighbors.In summary, the Supreme Court of Alaska reversed the breach of contract ruling and associated awards, affirmed the dismissal of the tort claims under res judicata, and upheld the denial of punitive damages. View "Williams v. Strong" on Justia Law

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The case involves a dispute between two lakefront property owners, the McCavits and the Lachers, over a dock extension built by the McCavits. The Lachers claimed that the extension interfered with their riparian rights and constituted a private nuisance. The superior court agreed and ordered the removal of the dock extension. The McCavits appealed, leading to the articulation of a new rule of reasonableness to determine whether the dock unreasonably interfered with the neighbors' rights. The case was remanded for the superior court to apply this new rule, and the court again ruled in favor of the Lachers.Initially, the superior court found that the dock extension unreasonably interfered with the Lachers' riparian rights and constituted a private nuisance. The court ordered the removal of the dock extension and awarded attorney’s fees to the Lachers. The McCavits appealed, and the Alaska Supreme Court remanded the case for the superior court to apply a newly articulated rule of reasonableness. On remand, the superior court reaffirmed its earlier findings and again ruled in favor of the Lachers, ordering the removal of the dock extension and awarding attorney’s fees.The Alaska Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in applying the new rule of reasonableness or in finding that the dock constituted a private nuisance. However, the Supreme Court vacated the award of attorney’s fees and remanded for further consideration, noting that fees related to the litigation against the Alaska Department of Natural Resources (DNR) should not be charged to the McCavits. The main holding is that the superior court's application of the reasonableness rule and its finding of a private nuisance were upheld, but the attorney’s fees award was vacated and remanded for recalculation. View "McCavit v. Lacher" on Justia Law

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The case involves Montanans Against Irresponsible Densification, LLC (MAID), which challenged two laws passed by the 2023 Montana Legislature aimed at addressing affordable housing. Senate Bill 323 (SB 323) mandates that duplex housing be allowed in cities with at least 5,000 residents where single-family residences are permitted. Senate Bill 528 (SB 528) requires municipalities to allow at least one accessory dwelling unit on lots with single-family dwellings. MAID, consisting of homeowners from various cities, argued that these laws would negatively impact their property values and quality of life, and filed for declaratory and injunctive relief.The Eighteenth Judicial District Court in Gallatin County granted MAID a preliminary injunction, temporarily halting the implementation of the laws. The court found that MAID had standing and had demonstrated the likelihood of irreparable harm, success on the merits, and that the balance of equities and public interest favored the injunction. The court cited concerns about potential impacts on property values and neighborhood character, as well as constitutional issues related to public participation and equal protection.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and reversed the District Court's decision. The Supreme Court found that MAID did not meet the burden of demonstrating all four factors required for a preliminary injunction. Specifically, the court held that MAID's evidence of potential harm was speculative and did not show a likelihood of irreparable injury. The court also noted that the balance of equities and public interest did not favor the injunction, given the legislative intent to address the housing crisis. The Supreme Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Montanans Against Irresponsible Densification, LLC, v. State" on Justia Law

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Samuel J. Nelson appealed an order from the Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Gallatin County, which granted summary judgment in favor of Montana Rail Link, Inc. (MRL) and BNSF Railway Co. Nelson sought a prescriptive easement over a railroad right of way (ROW) granted under the Northern Pacific Railroad Company Land Grant Act of 1864. Nelson had been using a dirt road within the ROW to access his property since 1982. Despite MRL's awareness and multiple attempts to formalize Nelson's use through a lease, no agreement was reached, and MRL eventually blocked access, leading to Nelson's criminal trespass citation, which was later dismissed.The District Court ruled that a private party could not acquire a prescriptive easement over a railroad ROW granted under the 1864 Act, as these ROWs were for the exclusive use and control of the railroads, with the United States holding a reversionary interest. Nelson appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court's ruling. The Court held that the 1864 Act granted the railroad a limited fee with exclusive possession and control, subject to a reversionary interest by the United States. This exclusivity precludes private parties from acquiring any property interests, including prescriptive easements, within the ROW. The Court also noted that a private prescriptive easement would interfere with the railroad's operations and the federal government's reversionary interest. The Court concluded that Nelson could not obtain a prescriptive easement over the ROW, affirming the lower court's judgment in favor of MRL and BNSF. View "Nelson v. Montana Rail" on Justia Law

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American Building Innovation LP (ABI) was hired by Balfour Beatty Construction, LLC (Balfour Beatty) as a subcontractor for a school construction project. ABI had a workers’ compensation insurance policy when it began work, but the policy was canceled due to ABI’s refusal to pay outstanding premiums from a previous policy. This cancellation led to the automatic suspension of ABI’s contractor’s license. Despite knowing it was unlicensed and uninsured, ABI continued working on the project.The Superior Court of Orange County found that ABI was not duly licensed at all times during the performance of its work, as required by California law. ABI’s license was suspended because it failed to maintain workers’ compensation insurance. ABI later settled its premium dispute and had the policy retroactively reinstated, but the court found this retroactive reinstatement meaningless because it occurred long after the statute of limitations for any workers’ compensation claims had expired. The court ruled that ABI could not maintain its action to recover compensation for its work due to its lack of proper licensure.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the lower court’s judgment. The court held that ABI was not entitled to retroactive reinstatement of its license because the failure to maintain workers’ compensation insurance was not due to circumstances beyond ABI’s control. ABI’s decision not to pay the premiums and its false representations to the Contractors’ State License Board were within its control. Consequently, ABI was barred from bringing or maintaining the action under section 7031 of the Business and Professions Code. The court also affirmed the award of attorney fees to Balfour Beatty under the subcontract’s prevailing party attorney fee provision. View "American Building Innovations v. Balfour Beatty Construction" on Justia Law

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Austin and Regena Joy owned property in Anchorage and leased it to Randy Hahn for his firewood business, Best Split Firewood, LLC (BSF). The lease included a purchase option for BSF to buy the property at a specified price and terms. Hahn signed the agreement, adding "Best Split Firewood" as the occupant, but Regena did not sign. Hahn later sought to exercise the purchase option, but the Joys refused, doubting the option's enforceability and Hahn's financial capability.Hahn filed a complaint in the Alaska Superior Court seeking a declaratory judgment to enforce the purchase option. The Joys denied the enforceability of the option and moved for summary judgment, arguing BSF could not enforce the option. Hahn opposed and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, asserting the agreement was valid and enforceable. The Superior Court granted Hahn's motion, finding the agreement contained essential terms for a purchase option and that there was a meeting of the minds. The court also provided gap fillers for missing details and ordered specific performance, directing the Joys to sell the property to BSF.The Alaska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's decisions. The Supreme Court held that the agreement contained all essential terms for an enforceable purchase option and that BSF could exercise the option as Hahn's assignee, given Hahn's personal guarantee of BSF's obligations. The court also found that Hahn did not waive the purchase option by rejecting the Joys' offer, which contained errors and differed from the original agreement. Finally, the court rejected the Joys' unclean hands defense, finding no evidence of wrongdoing by Hahn related to the case. The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's grant of summary judgment and order of specific performance. View "Joy v. Hahn" on Justia Law

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A group of landowners (the Andersons) sued their neighbors (the Wilsons) over a property dispute involving access to remote parcels near a lake. The Andersons argued that a public easement existed over the Wilsons' property, providing access from a highway to their properties. They claimed this easement was established by patent, subdivision agreement, prescription, and under Revised Statute 2477 (RS 2477). The Wilsons contended that any access was permissive and private. The dispute arose after the Wilsons blocked access due to perceived excessive use by unauthorized individuals.The Superior Court of Alaska, Third Judicial District, held a 12-day bench trial. The court found in favor of the Wilsons, concluding that no public easement existed. It determined that the Andersons had only a private easement over the Wilsons' property. The court also awarded the Wilsons 75% of their attorney’s fees, finding them to be the prevailing party. The Andersons appealed both the easement determination and the attorney’s fee award.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case. It affirmed the Superior Court's decision that no public easement existed, agreeing that the Andersons had not provided clear and convincing evidence of public use before the land was withdrawn from the public domain. The court also upheld the finding that no easement by implication, necessity, or estoppel existed. However, the Supreme Court vacated the attorney’s fee award and remanded it for further consideration. It found that the billing records were insufficiently detailed and included fees unrelated to the litigation. The court also noted that the hourly rates charged by the Wilsons' attorney were significantly higher than those customarily charged in the locality, requiring further examination of their reasonableness. View "Anderson v. Wilson" on Justia Law

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The case involves a historic Black burial ground in Montgomery County, Maryland, known as Moses Cemetery. The land, which contains the remains of many individuals, including formerly enslaved persons, was sold and developed into an apartment complex and parking lot in the 1960s. The development process desecrated the burial ground, and it is likely that human remains are still interred there. The current owner of the property is the Housing Opportunities Commission of Montgomery County (HOC). The plaintiffs, including descendants of those buried in Moses Cemetery and a local church, sought to challenge HOC's plan to sell the land to a developer.The Circuit Court for Montgomery County granted the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction to prevent the sale and later issued a writ of mandamus compelling HOC to file an action under Maryland's Business Regulation Article § 5-505 before selling the property. The court found that there was overwhelming evidence of the burial ground's existence and that many bodies likely remain on the property.The Appellate Court of Maryland reversed the circuit court's decision, holding that § 5-505 is an optional procedure for selling burial grounds and does not impose a mandatory duty on HOC to file an action before selling the land. The Appellate Court reasoned that the statute is designed to allow certain burial grounds to be sold free from claims but does not require this procedure to be followed in all cases.The Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the Appellate Court's judgment in part and reversed it in part. The Court held that the common law of burial places in Maryland provides an appropriate framework for disputes regarding burial grounds and that extraordinary relief in the form of a writ of mandamus was not appropriate. The Court remanded the case to the circuit court, allowing the plaintiffs to seek leave to amend their complaint to state a claim for relief based on an alleged violation of specific rights protected under the common law of burial places. The Court also held that § 5-505 does not abrogate the common law of burial places and provides an optional procedure for selling burial grounds. View "BETHESDA AFRICAN CEMETERY COALITION, v. HOUSING OPPORTUNITIES COMMISSION OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY" on Justia Law

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American Environmental, Inc. (plaintiff) challenged the Burlington School District (defendant) over a contract awarded for the demolition and remediation of Burlington High School, which was closed due to toxic substances. The District sent a Request for Qualifications to fifteen contractors, including the plaintiff and the winning bidder, EnviroVantage. The plaintiff argued that EnviroVantage did not meet the prequalification criteria and that the contract should have been awarded to them.The Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division, denied the plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction, citing potential financial harm to the District and public interest. The court later granted summary judgment to the District, finding the case moot because the project was substantially complete. The court applied factors from Citineighbors Coalition of Historic Carnegie Hill ex rel. Kazickas v. New York City Landmarks Preservation Commission, determining that no effective relief could be granted due to the project's advanced stage.The Vermont Supreme Court took judicial notice of the project's completion, including demolition and soil remediation, based on public records and visual evidence. The court dismissed the appeal as moot, stating that no effective relief could be provided under Rule 75, which does not allow for damages. The court also rejected the plaintiff's argument that the case met the exception for issues capable of repetition yet evading review, noting the plaintiff's delay in seeking expedited relief and the lack of demonstrated probability of encountering the same situation again. View "American Environmental, Inc. v. Burlington School District" on Justia Law

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William and Mary Fulton purchased a 32-acre property in Jericho, Vermont, in August 2021. The property was enrolled in the Agricultural and Managed Forest Land Use Value Appraisal Program (Current Use program) under a forest management plan that generally prohibited tree cutting. Before finalizing the purchase, the Fultons contacted the Department of Forests, Parks, and Recreation (FPR) and the Department of Taxes, Division of Property Valuation and Review (PVR) to inquire about converting the property to agricultural use. They were informed that any tree cutting in violation of the plan would lead to disenrollment from the program and tax penalties. Despite this, the Fultons cut trees on the property shortly after purchasing it.The Fultons did not file the required application to continue the property's enrollment in the Current Use program or submit a notice of withdrawal. In September 2021, the county forester received a complaint about the tree cutting and confirmed the violation. FPR issued an adverse-inspection report in December 2021, leading to the property's removal from the Current Use program and tax penalties. The Fultons appealed to the Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division, which granted summary judgment in favor of FPR, concluding that the property was still enrolled in the program at the time of the tree cutting and that the Fultons' actions constituted "development" under the program's rules.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The Court held that the property was not automatically disenrolled from the Current Use program when the Fultons failed to submit the required application and fee. Instead, disenrollment occurs only upon the Director of PVR's action. The Court also held that the Fultons' tree cutting did not fall under the statutory exemption for "development" because it was not related to the construction or alteration of a structure for farming, logging, forestry, or conservation purposes. Therefore, the Fultons' tree cutting violated the forest management plan, justifying the property's removal from the Current Use program. View "Fulton v. Department of Forests, Parks, and Recreation" on Justia Law