Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

A company acquired a tax title to certain immovable property in St. Martin Parish, Louisiana, after the original owners failed to pay property taxes. Following the expiration of the redemptive period, the company mailed post-tax sale notice to the executrix of the former owner’s succession at the address listed in the succession proceedings. The company then filed a petition to quiet title, and the executrix was personally served. In response, she filed a reconventional demand seeking to annul the tax sale, alleging she had not received adequate pre-tax and post-tax sale notice. The City, which had previously held a small interest in the property, was also named as a third-party defendant.The 16th Judicial District Court sustained exceptions of prescription raised by the company and the City, dismissing the executrix’s claims as untimely. On appeal, the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal reversed, finding the reconventional demand was timely because it was filed within six months of service of the petition to quiet title, as required by La. R.S. 47:2266. The appellate court also held that the failure to provide pre-tax sale notice could render the tax sale absolutely null, and that the company and the City bore the burden of proving the reconventional demand was prescribed.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the case and held that, following the 2008 revision to Louisiana’s tax sale statutes, failure to provide pre-tax sale notice for tax sales occurring after January 1, 2009, no longer results in an absolute nullity. Instead, such defects are relative nullities, subject to specific prescriptive periods under La. R.S. 47:2287. The Court further held that a nullity action brought as a reconventional demand in a quiet title action must also comply with the six-month limitation in La. R.S. 47:2266. The Court affirmed the appellate ruling regarding prescription but reversed on the issue of absolute nullity, remanding for further proceedings. View "BELAIRE DEVELOPMENT & CONSTRUCTION, LLC VS. SUCCESSION OF SHELTON" on Justia Law

The dispute arose when a property owner obtained a building permit from a city and was required, under the city’s standard procedures, to submit a form containing financial information about subcontractors before the city would conduct necessary inspections and issue a certificate of occupancy. The property owner refused to provide the requested information, leading the city to withhold inspections. As a result, the property owner filed suit, seeking a declaratory judgment that the city lacked authority to require such information and requesting an order compelling the city to perform the inspections. The owner also sought damages for delays allegedly caused by the city’s refusal to inspect.After the property owner settled with the city’s building inspector, the case proceeded in the Baldwin Circuit Court. The jury was asked to decide both the declaratory judgment and damages claims, ultimately finding in favor of the property owner and awarding over $3.5 million in damages. The city appealed. The Supreme Court of Alabama, in a prior decision, held that the damages claim was barred by substantive immunity and reversed the damages award, but did not address the declaratory judgment claim, remanding the case for further proceedings.On remand, the Baldwin Circuit Court entered judgment for the property owner on the declaratory judgment claim but did not award damages. The city appealed again. The Supreme Court of Alabama held that, because the inspections had already been completed and all requested relief had been granted or resolved, no justiciable controversy remained. Therefore, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter a declaratory judgment. The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case for dismissal. View "City of Orange Beach v. Boles" on Justia Law

A Georgia limited-liability company owned and operated a hotel in Birmingham, Alabama, which was subject to a $10,710,000 loan secured by a mortgage, an assignment of leases and rents, and other collateral. The loan was eventually assigned to a bank acting as trustee for a mortgage trust. After the hotel owner allegedly defaulted on its loan obligations and mismanaged the property, the bank filed a complaint in the Jefferson Circuit Court seeking the appointment of a receiver to manage the hotel and ensure payment of operating expenses. The court appointed a receiver and issued orders outlining the receiver’s duties, including managing the hotel and paying its expenses.Following the appointment, disputes arose between the hotel owner, the receiver, and the bank regarding whether the receiver was required to pay expenses incurred before the receivership began (“pre-receivership claims”). The hotel owner sought to compel the receiver to pay these claims, while the receiver and the bank objected, arguing that such payments could harm the receivership estate and improperly prioritize unsecured creditors over the secured lender. The circuit court ultimately issued an order in July 2024 clarifying that the receiver was required to pay pre-receivership expenses, prompting the receiver to appeal.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed whether the July 2024 order was an appealable interlocutory injunction and whether the circuit court erred in requiring the receiver to pay pre-receivership claims without regard to creditor priority. The court held that the order was injunctive in nature and appealable. It further held that the circuit court exceeded its discretion by requiring the receiver to pay all pre-receivership claims unconditionally, as this could harm the receivership estate and the interests of priority creditors. The Supreme Court reversed the July 2024 order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Kolessar v. SJP Investment Partners, LLC" on Justia Law

After the owners of a parcel of real property in Manchester, Kentucky, died, no one paid the property taxes, resulting in the issuance of multiple certificates of delinquency for unpaid taxes. Clay County sold the 2011 and 2012 tax liens to third parties: the 2011 lien was eventually assigned to Keith and Jessica Smith, and the 2012 lien was purchased by Apex Fund Services. The Smiths recorded their lien before Apex recorded its own. Both the Smiths and Apex sought to enforce their liens, and Apex initiated a foreclosure action in Clay Circuit Court, naming all lienholders and heirs as defendants. The property was ultimately sold at a master commissioner’s auction, with the Smiths purchasing it for $2,500.The Clay Circuit Court initially ruled that the Smiths’ lien had priority because it was recorded first, applying the “first in time, first in right” doctrine. The court allowed the Smiths to receive a credit against the purchase price for the amount owed to them under their lien, plus costs and attorney fees. Apex appealed, and the Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed, holding that all tax liens were of equal rank and that the proceeds from the sale should be distributed pro rata among all tax lienholders, including the county.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision. The Court held that, under Kentucky statutes, tax liens held by the state, county, city, or third-party purchasers are of equal rank and are not subject to the common law “first in time, first in right” rule. Instead, when the proceeds from a foreclosure sale are insufficient to pay all tax liens and associated costs, the proceeds must be distributed pro rata among all tax lienholders. The case was remanded for the circuit court to determine the amounts owed and to distribute the proceeds accordingly. View "SMITH V. APEX FUND SERVICES AS CUSTODIAN FOR CERES TAX RECEIVABLES, LLC" on Justia Law

An employee of a roofing subcontractor was severely injured after falling through an uncovered hole while working on a library roof replacement project. The general contractor had contracted with the property owner to perform the roof work and then subcontracted the roofing portion to the injured worker’s employer. The injured worker received workers’ compensation benefits from his direct employer and subsequently filed a negligence lawsuit against the general contractor, seeking damages for his injuries.In the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, the general contractor asserted statutory employer immunity under Pennsylvania’s Workers’ Compensation Act, arguing it was immune from tort liability as a statutory employer. The trial court struck the general contractor’s answer and new matter as untimely and granted the injured worker’s motion to preclude the statutory employer defense at trial. The case proceeded to a jury, which found the general contractor negligent and awarded $5 million to the plaintiff. The trial court denied the general contractor’s post-trial motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court vacated the trial court’s judgment and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of the general contractor. The Superior Court held that the general contractor was the injured worker’s statutory employer and thus immune from tort liability, finding all elements of the statutory employer test satisfied and that the defense was not waivable.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed whether to overrule prior precedent (Fonner and LeFlar) regarding statutory employer immunity and waiver, and whether the Superior Court properly applied the statutory employer test. The Supreme Court reaffirmed its prior holdings that a general contractor’s statutory employer immunity does not depend on actual payment of workers’ compensation benefits and that the defense is jurisdictional and not waivable. However, it found the Superior Court erred by exceeding its scope of review and remanded the case to the trial court to determine, after appropriate proceedings, whether the general contractor satisfied the disputed elements of the statutory employer test. View "Yoder v. McCarthy Const." on Justia Law

A homebuyer entered into an agreement to purchase a property in Titusville, Pennsylvania, and, before completing the purchase, orally contracted with a home inspector to perform an inspection. The inspector delivered a report that did not disclose any structural or foundational issues. Relying on this report, the buyer purchased the property. The following winter, a burst pipe led to the discovery of significant defects, including the absence of a proper foundation and improper ductwork, which had not been disclosed in the inspection report. The buyer filed suit against the inspector more than two years after the report was delivered, alleging violations of the Pennsylvania Home Inspection Law, breach of contract, and violations of the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law.The Court of Common Pleas of Crawford County overruled most of the inspector’s preliminary objections and denied a motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding ambiguity in the statute governing the time to bring actions arising from home inspection reports. The trial court reasoned that the statute could be interpreted as either a statute of limitations or a statute of repose and declined to grant judgment for the inspector. On appeal, the Superior Court reversed, holding that the statute in question was a statute of repose, not a statute of limitations, and that all of the buyer’s claims were time-barred because they were filed more than one year after the inspection report was delivered.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed whether the relevant statutory provision, 68 Pa.C.S. § 7512, is a statute of repose or a statute of limitations. The Court held that the statute is a statute of repose, barring any action to recover damages arising from a home inspection report if not commenced within one year of the report’s delivery, regardless of when the claim accrues. The Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. View "Gidor v. Mangus" on Justia Law

In February 2021, a contract for deed was executed between a property owner and a purchaser for two properties in Gladstone, North Dakota. The contract stipulated that the purchaser would receive title upon full and timely performance. The purchaser failed to make the required payments, prompting the owner to serve and publish a notice of cancellation in accordance with North Dakota law, which provided a six-month period to cure the default. The purchaser did not cure the default or file any affidavit asserting counterclaims or defenses during this period. After the cure period expired, the owner recorded a notice of cancellation and subsequently served the purchaser with a three-day notice of eviction when he remained in possession of the properties.The owner initiated separate eviction actions for each property in the District Court of Stark County, Southwest Judicial District. The court heard the matters together but did not consolidate them. After a hearing, the district court found that the owner had complied with statutory requirements for cancellation, that the purchaser had failed to cure the default, and that the purchaser was wrongfully retaining possession. The court excluded over 1,100 pages of evidence offered by the purchaser, finding it lacked foundation and was not relevant to the limited scope of an eviction action, which was solely to determine the right to possession. The court ordered the purchaser to vacate the properties.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the district court’s findings for clear error and its evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court held that service of process was proper, the exclusion of evidence was within the district court’s discretion, and the eviction was appropriate because the contract for deed had been canceled by operation of law. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment of eviction. View "Cache Private Capital Diversified Fund v. Braddock" on Justia Law

This dispute arose from the use of easements on subdivided property in Yellowstone County, Montana. After a series of conveyances, Patti and Steve Schubert owned Tract 7B-2, which benefited from a 30-foot-wide access easement across neighboring Tract 7B-1, owned by Jeremy and Tynagh Toepp. The Schuberts installed a large electric gate, keypad, and package box within the easement, and engaged in activities such as removing vegetation and using heavy equipment, which the Toepps claimed damaged their property and overburdened the easement. The Schuberts also challenged the Toepps’ rights to use a shared well. The parties attempted to resolve their disputes through mediation, resulting in a signed Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), but disagreements persisted over the interpretation and scope of the settlement, particularly regarding the gate and the use of the easement.The Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, heard cross-motions to enforce the MOU. Sitting without a jury, the District Court found the MOU to be a binding agreement that implied the Schuberts’ encroaching gate could remain in place. The court limited the Schuberts’ use of the access easement to ingress and egress only, prohibited unnecessary removal of vegetation, and awarded attorney fees to the Toepps, finding the Schuberts had unreasonably multiplied the proceedings by insisting on additional terms not included in the MOU.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana reversed the District Court’s conclusion that the MOU allowed the encroaching gate to remain, holding that the MOU did not contemplate a gate easement and that the gate constituted an unlawful encroachment requiring removal. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s limitation of the easement to ingress and egress and its award of attorney fees to the Toepps, finding no abuse of discretion. The case was remanded for entry of judgment consistent with these holdings. View "Schubert v. Toepp" on Justia Law

A commercial landlord and tenant entered into a lease for office space, which was later amended to include a limited personal guaranty by an officer of the tenant. The guaranty, often referred to as a "good guy" guaranty, stated that the guarantor would be liable for the tenant’s monetary obligations under the lease up to the date the tenant and its affiliates had completely vacated and surrendered the premises, provided the landlord was given at least thirty days’ notice. The tenant stopped paying rent and utilities in 2020, notified the landlord of its intent to vacate, and surrendered the premises at the end of November 2020.The landlord sued both the tenant and the guarantor in the Supreme Court, New York County, seeking unpaid rent and expenses from before and after the surrender, as well as attorneys’ fees. The Supreme Court initially granted summary judgment to the landlord for pre-vacatur damages but denied summary judgment for post-vacatur damages pending further discovery. Upon reargument, the Supreme Court granted summary judgment for post-vacatur damages as well, holding both the tenant and guarantor jointly and severally liable. The Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed, reasoning that the guaranty required the landlord’s written acceptance of the surrender for the guarantor’s liability to end.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and reversed the lower courts’ decisions. The Court of Appeals held that, under the terms of the guaranty, the guarantor’s liability ended when the tenant vacated and surrendered the premises, and that liability was not conditioned on the landlord’s acceptance of the surrender. The court found that the language of the guaranty was clear and did not require the landlord’s written acceptance, and that interpreting it otherwise would render key provisions superfluous. The court denied the landlord’s motions for summary judgment on post-vacatur damages. View "1995 CAM LLC v. West Side Advisors, LLC" on Justia Law

In 1991, the predecessor to the plaintiffs conveyed land to the United States in a land exchange but retained certain water rights that could only be accessed through the conveyed property, now managed by the U.S. Forest Service. The conveyance documents did not mention these water rights or provide any right of access. Over the years, the plaintiffs and their predecessors sought permits from the Forest Service to access and develop the water rights, but the agency repeatedly expressed concerns about environmental impacts and indicated it had the authority to deny access. In 2010, the Forest Service formally opposed the plaintiffs’ efforts to maintain the water rights in state court, asserting it would not grant the necessary land use authorization.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims under the Quiet Title Act (QTA) and the Declaratory Judgment Act (DJA). The court found the QTA claim time-barred by the statute’s twelve-year limitations period, reasoning that the plaintiffs or their predecessors were on notice of the government’s adverse claim well before the suit was filed in 2022. The court also dismissed the DJA claim, holding it was essentially a quiet title claim subject to the same limitations period.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Tenth Circuit held that the QTA claim was untimely because, by 2006 at the latest, the Forest Service had asserted exclusive control sufficient to put the plaintiffs on notice of its adverse claim, causing the limitations period to expire before the suit was filed. The court also held that it lacked jurisdiction over two of the plaintiffs’ requests for declaratory relief and that the third, alleging a taking, was not ripe because the plaintiffs had not first sought compensation under the Tucker Act. View "Purgatory Recreation I v. United States" on Justia Law