Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Christina Greenfield appealed an order designating her as a vexatious litigant under Idaho Court Administrative Rule 59(d). The order, issued by then Administrative District Judge Cynthia K.C. Meyer, prohibits Greenfield from filing any new pro se litigation in Idaho without court permission. Greenfield had filed a civil suit for damages in Kootenai County related to the sale of her home and her eviction, naming several defendants. During this lawsuit, the defendants moved to designate Greenfield as a vexatious litigant, which the ADJ granted.In the lower court, Greenfield had previously sued her neighbors and her former attorney, both cases resulting in adverse judgments against her. She also declared bankruptcy, leading to the sale of her home. Greenfield filed another lawsuit against the new owners of her home and others, which led to the motion to declare her a vexatious litigant. The ADJ found that Greenfield had maintained at least three pro se litigations in the past seven years that were decided adversely to her and issued a Prefiling Order. Greenfield responded to the proposed order, but the ADJ issued an Amended Prefiling Order, finalizing the vexatious litigant designation.The Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the ADJ’s decision. The Court held that the ADJ did not abuse her discretion in refusing to disqualify herself, as there was no evidence of personal bias. The Court also found that the ADJ followed the proper procedures under Idaho Court Administrative Rule 59, providing Greenfield with adequate notice and opportunity to respond. The Court concluded that Greenfield was afforded due process and that the ADJ’s findings were supported by sufficient evidence, confirming that Greenfield had maintained multiple litigations that were adversely determined against her. View "Greenfield v. Meyer" on Justia Law

Ohio House, LLC operates a sober-living facility in Costa Mesa, California, within a multiple-family residential (MFR) zone. The City of Costa Mesa notified Ohio House that it was subject to Ordinance 15-11, which mandates that group homes with over six residents in MFR zones obtain a conditional-use permit and meet a separation requirement. Ohio House's application for a permit was denied due to non-compliance with the separation requirement, and its request for a reasonable accommodation was also denied.The United States District Court for the Central District of California granted partial summary judgment to the City on Ohio House's disparate-impact claim and denied Ohio House's post-verdict motions. The jury found in favor of the City on Ohio House's remaining claims, including disparate treatment, discriminatory statements, interference with fair housing rights, and reasonable accommodation. The district court also ruled that Ohio House's claim under California Government Code § 65008 was time-barred.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's rulings. The court held that Ohio House failed to establish facial disparate treatment as a matter of law because the City's group-living regulations facially benefit disabled individuals. The court also affirmed the summary judgment for the City on the disparate-impact claim, agreeing that Ohio House did not prove a significant, adverse, and disproportionate effect on a protected group. The court upheld the jury's verdict on the discriminatory statements claim, finding no unlawful discriminatory statements by the City. The court also affirmed the denial of judgment as a matter of law on the interference claim, concluding that Ohio House failed to prove a causal link between its protected activity and the City's actions. Finally, the court affirmed the denial of judgment as a matter of law on the reasonable accommodation claim, agreeing that the requested accommodation was unreasonable as it would fundamentally alter the City's zoning scheme. The court also upheld the district court's ruling that Ohio House's § 65008 claim was time-barred. View "THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA" on Justia Law

JHVS Group, LLC and its members, Jasanjot Singh and Harshana Kaur, purchased a 66.4-acre pistachio orchard from Shawn Slate and Dina Slate for approximately $2.6 million. The Slates agreed to carry a loan for $1,889,600, and JHVS made a $700,000 down payment. The agreement included interest payments and additional payments tied to crop yields. JHVS alleged that the Slates and their brokers, Randy Hayer and SVN Executive Commercial Advisors, misrepresented critical information about water rights and crop values, leading to financial losses and a notice of default filed by the Slates.The Superior Court of Madera County issued a preliminary injunction to prevent the foreclosure sale of the property, based on JHVS's claims of fraud and misrepresentation. The court granted the injunction after the defendants failed to appear or respond to the motion. The order was intended to preserve JHVS's right to rescind the contract.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case and found that the trial court lacked fundamental jurisdiction over the Slates because they were never properly served with the summons and complaint. The appellate court determined that the preliminary injunction was void as to the Slates due to this lack of jurisdiction. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the trial court's order granting the preliminary injunction against the Slates and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The appellate court awarded costs to the Slates. View "JHVS Group, LLC v. Slate" on Justia Law

Mable Hrynchuk named Bryan Kenton as the sole beneficiary of her estate, which included her residential property. After her death, the homeowner’s association foreclosed on the property and sold it to Saticoy Bay LLC Series 3580 Lost Hills. Kenton, through his attorney-in-fact, Foreclosure Recovery Services, sought to redeem the property as a successor in interest. Saticoy Bay refused, asserting that Kenton was not the successor in interest and had no rights of redemption under Nevada law.The Eighth Judicial District Court of Clark County granted summary judgment in favor of Foreclosure Recovery Services, holding that Kenton was the successor in interest and had the right to redeem the property. Saticoy Bay appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that a will beneficiary is immediately vested with a beneficial interest in devised property upon the testator’s death and is therefore the testator’s successor in interest for the purposes of NRS 116.31166. The court concluded that Kenton, as the sole beneficiary of Hrynchuk’s will, was her successor in interest and had the right to redeem the property. The court also determined that Foreclosure Recovery Services provided all necessary documentation to Saticoy Bay to establish its right to act on behalf of Kenton in redeeming the property. View "Saticoy Bay LLC Series 3580 Lost Hills v. Foreclosure Recovery Services, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendants discovered that a parcel of land near their property was seemingly omitted from the plaintiff's deed. They arranged for the heirs of a previous owner to deed that parcel to them without confirming the heirs' ownership or consulting the plaintiff, who used the parcel. After recording their deed, defendants informed the plaintiff that they owned the parcel and asked her to remove her belongings. The plaintiff sued for deed reformation and slander of title.The Superior Court, Windham Unit, Civil Division, granted the plaintiff's claim for deed reformation on summary judgment and concluded that Mr. Kolodziej slandered the plaintiff's title after a bench trial. Defendants appealed the decision.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decisions. The court held that the plaintiff had a transferrable ownership interest capable of disparagement, as the reformed deed related back to the original deed. The court found that the defendants published a false statement by recording a deed that falsely claimed ownership of the disputed parcel. The court also concluded that Mr. Kolodziej acted with malice by recklessly disregarding the plaintiff's potential claim to the property. Finally, the court determined that the plaintiff's legal expenses incurred in clearing the cloud on her title constituted special damages necessary to sustain her slander-of-title claim. The court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment on the deed reformation and the ruling on the slander-of-title claim, including the award of attorney's fees to the plaintiff. View "Massucco v. Kolodziej" on Justia Law

In 2001, Alphonse Fletcher, Jr. acquired property associated with two apartment units in a residential cooperative corporation controlled by The Dakota, Inc. In 2008, JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. approved a loan to Fletcher, secured by his rights in the property. Fletcher, Chase, and The Dakota entered into an agreement recognizing The Dakota's priority to proceeds from any sale or subletting of Fletcher's apartments. In 2011, Fletcher sued The Dakota for racial discrimination, and The Dakota counterclaimed for legal fees and costs based on Fletcher's proprietary lease.The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to The Dakota in the Fletcher action and awarded attorneys' fees and costs. While this action was pending, Kasowitz, Benson, Torres & Friedman, LLP initiated a CPLR 5225 proceeding against Chase, The Dakota, and Fletcher to seize and sell Fletcher's apartments to satisfy a judgment for unpaid legal fees. The Dakota claimed a superior interest in Fletcher's property based on the fee judgment, while Chase argued that The Dakota's lien was not superior and that the lease provision authorizing attorneys' fees was either inapplicable or unconscionable.The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to The Dakota, and the Appellate Division affirmed, stating that Chase's contentions were an impermissible collateral attack on The Dakota's judgment. Chase moved for leave to appeal and to intervene and vacate the judgment in the Fletcher action. The Supreme Court denied Chase's motion, but the Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.The New York Court of Appeals held that Chase, as a nonparty to the original action, was not barred from challenging the fee award in a separate proceeding. The court concluded that Chase was not required to intervene in the Fletcher action to protect its interests and that doing so would violate Chase's due process rights. The order of the Appellate Division was reversed, and the matter was remitted for further proceedings. View "Matter of Kasowitz, Benson, Torres & Friedman, LLP v JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiff's multi-unit apartment building in Staten Island was damaged by fire on August 4, 2014. At the time, she had an insurance policy with Tower Insurance Company of New York, which required any legal action to be brought within two years of the damage and stipulated that replacement costs would only be paid if repairs were made as soon as reasonably possible. Restoration was completed in July 2020, and her claim was denied on September 1, 2020. Plaintiff filed a lawsuit on August 4, 2020, seeking full replacement value and coverage for lost business income, alleging that Tower/AmTrust's bad faith conduct delayed the restoration process.The Supreme Court granted the Tower/AmTrust defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint, citing the policy's two-year suit limitation provision. The court found that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that she attempted to repair the property within the two-year period or took any action to protect her rights as the limitation period expired. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal, holding that the plaintiff did not allege that she reasonably attempted to repair the property within the two-year period but was unable to do so. Consequently, the claims against the broker defendants were also dismissed as the plaintiff's failure to recover was due to her own actions.The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's order. The court held that the plaintiff did not raise an issue as to whether the suit limitation provision was unreasonable under the circumstances. The plaintiff's allegations were deemed conclusory and lacked specific details about the extent of the damage or efforts to complete repairs within the two-year period. The court concluded that the Tower/AmTrust defendants' motion to dismiss was properly granted, and the claims against the broker defendants were also correctly dismissed. View "Farage v Associated Insurance Management Corp." on Justia Law

The case involves improvements made by Robin and Phyllis Gelinas to their condominium unit, which expanded into the limited common area. Plaintiffs Anthony and Rosemarie Moda and Anthony and Olga Alba sued the defendants, Fernwood at Winnipesaukee Condominium Association and the Gelinases, seeking a declaratory judgment, costs and attorney’s fees, and a permanent injunction. The plaintiffs appealed, and the defendants cross-appealed, a decision of the Superior Court granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants.The Superior Court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, denied the plaintiffs' cross-motion, and denied the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration. The court also awarded attorney’s fees to the defendants. The plaintiffs challenged the trial court’s conclusion that provisions of the Fernwood declaration of condominium waived the requirements of RSA 356-B:19, I concerning the assignment and reassignment of limited common area.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and determined that the trial court erred in its interpretation. The court found that the Fernwood declaration did not expressly provide a waiver from the requirement of RSA 356-B:19, I. The court concluded that the Gelinases' expansion into the limited common area required compliance with RSA 356-B:19, I, which necessitates the consent of all adversely affected unit owners. The court also disagreed with the trial court's finding that all unit owners were adversely affected as a matter of law.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire vacated the trial court’s grant of summary judgment and the award of attorney’s fees to the defendants, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Moda v. Fernwood at Winnipesaukee Condo. Ass'n" on Justia Law

Gordon Clark, acting on his own behalf and as the executor of his late wife’s estate, filed a lawsuit against Wells Fargo, Santander Bank, and other defendants, alleging various tort claims and violations of federal law related to the foreclosure of his wife’s home. The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut ordered Clark to obtain outside counsel to represent the estate, as it had other beneficiaries and creditors besides Clark.The district court reviewed the probate records and concluded that Clark, a pro se litigant, could not represent the estate due to the presence of other beneficiaries and creditors, including Santander Bank. The court directed Clark to retain counsel for the estate by a specific date, failing which his claims on behalf of the estate would be dismissed. Clark’s motion for reconsideration was granted, but the court adhered to its decision. Clark’s second motion for reconsideration was denied, leading him to appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that it had jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine to review the district court’s rulings denying an estate representative’s motion to proceed pro se. The standard of review for such decisions was determined to be de novo, as they involve the application of law to the facts of a given dispute. Applying de novo review, the court concluded that the district court did not err in denying Clark’s motion to proceed pro se, as the estate had other beneficiaries and creditors. Consequently, the Second Circuit affirmed the orders of the district court. View "Clark v. Santander Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Several landowners owned a tract of land near the intersection of a highway and Interstate 35. The Iowa Department of Transportation (DOT) planned to modernize the interchange and condemned a strip of the landowners' property. The landowners anticipated being able to install a commercial entrance to the highway based on prior discussions with the DOT. However, the DOT's formal notice of condemnation indicated that all rights of direct access to the highway would be taken. The landowners filed actions challenging the condemnation after being informed that commercial access would not be allowed.The Iowa District Court for Story County dismissed the landowners' actions as untimely, citing the thirty-day deadline for challenging the exercise of eminent domain authority under Iowa Code section 6A.24(1). The landowners also delayed filing their notice of appeal in the district court, which was filed fifty-seven days after the dismissal order, although it was served on the DOT within twenty-two days.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the delay in filing the notice of appeal was not fatal, as the thirty-five days from service to actual filing was deemed a reasonable time under Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.101(4). However, the court found that the landowners' challenge to the condemnation was untimely under Iowa Code section 6A.24(1), which requires actions to be commenced within thirty days after service of notice of assessment. The court held that this statute is the exclusive method for challenging the exercise of eminent domain authority and does not allow for exceptions or the application of a discovery rule. Consequently, the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the landowners' case. View "Brendeland v. Iowa Department of Transportation" on Justia Law