Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

A seller owned a twelve-unit apartment complex and entered into a written contract to sell the property to a buyer for $1.3 million, with a closing date set on or before November 30, 2021. The contract contained a financing contingency requiring the buyer to provide written proof of financing or inability to obtain financing by November 26, 2021, stating that “time is of the essence.” After the buyer’s bank conditionally approved financing, but anticipated a delay in the appraisal, the buyer informed the seller and attempted to extend the financing deadline. While the seller did not sign proposed written extensions, both parties continued to communicate about closing logistics, including scheduling a closing in December. On December 3, the seller terminated the contract, expressing unwillingness to proceed with the sale.The Superior Court of Hillsborough County denied the seller’s motion for partial summary judgment, rejecting the argument that the buyer’s failure to meet the financing deadline constituted a breach entitling the seller to terminate. The court also denied the seller’s motions in limine to exclude evidence of oral communications and closing agent emails. After a jury trial, the jury found the buyer had not materially breached the contract, that the parties had agreed to extend the closing, and that the seller had materially breached. The trial court then awarded specific performance, ordering the sale to proceed.On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed. The court held that the seller’s conduct after the missed financing deadline raised a material factual dispute about whether the seller waived its right to declare a default. The court also found that the trial court properly admitted evidence of oral communications and that the longstanding presumption favoring specific performance in land sale contracts applied, even where the buyer was an investor. The trial court’s judgment was affirmed. View "J&C Properties v. Rayster Realty" on Justia Law

In 1953, C.C. Fay conveyed parcels of land to a third party, reserving “all the coal below the horizon of the No. 8 coal, if any under vein exists thereunder, and other minerals, with the right to mine and remove such coal or other minerals of any vein.” The current owner of the property, a fund, asserted that this reservation did not include rights to oil and gas beneath the parcels. The heirs and successors of Fay argued that the reservation did include those rights. The dispute centered on whether the original deed’s language was broad enough to cover oil and gas.The Harrison County Court of Common Pleas granted summary judgment to the fund, holding that the deed’s language was not broad enough to cover oil and gas rights. The heirs appealed to the Seventh District Court of Appeals, which found the reservation language ambiguous. The appellate court examined extrinsic evidence, including other deeds executed by Fay that specifically referenced oil and gas when intended. It concluded that Fay’s omission of the phrase “oil and gas” in the deed at issue showed he did not intend to reserve those rights, and it affirmed the trial court’s judgment.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and reached the same result but for a different reason. It held that the reservation clause in the deed was unambiguous when read as a whole. The Supreme Court found that the language, including references to “mine,” “mining,” and “vein,” indicated an intent to reserve only solid minerals such as coal, and not oil or gas. The court thus held that oil and gas were not included in the reservation and affirmed the judgment of the Seventh District Court of Appeals. View "Faith Ranch & Farms Fund, Inc. v. PNC Bank, Natl. Assn." on Justia Law

A 16-year-old passenger was injured when a car driven by her 16-year-old friend hydroplaned, crossed over the double yellow line, and went off the road down a hillside in San Rafael, California, on a rainy day. Both teenagers knew the road was wet, and the driver was speeding slightly above the posted limit as she entered a left curve. The driver attempted to correct the car’s path but lost control, resulting in the accident. Both had been warned by their parents about the restrictions of provisional licenses, and the driver was subsequently cited for violating license restrictions and making an unsafe turn.The injured passenger, through her guardian ad litem, filed suit in Marin County Superior Court against several parties, including the City of San Rafael, alleging a dangerous condition of public property due to lack of warning signs, absence of barriers, and failure to warn of slippery conditions. The City moved for summary judgment, arguing the conditions were open and obvious, and the trial court granted the motion, entering judgment for the City. The court found that the alleged dangerous condition was obvious—that the wet road and curve presented an apparent risk, and there was no duty to warn of such an open and obvious danger. The court also noted that the plaintiff’s later arguments regarding roadway defects were not pled in the operative complaint and could not be relied upon to defeat summary judgment.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, affirmed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court held that the risk posed by the road’s curve and wet conditions was open and obvious as a matter of law, and therefore, the City could not be held liable for failing to warn of these conditions or for the absence of a guardrail. The judgment in favor of the City was affirmed. View "Pagan v. City of San Rafael" on Justia Law

Crystal Homestead Estates, LLC (CHE) owns a parcel of land known as Crystal Farm in Bannock County, Idaho. The owners of two adjacent parcels to the south are Matthew and Laura Schiffman, and Michael and Leslie Schiffman. CHE claimed that Crystal Farm was landlocked and could only be accessed by two unimproved roads crossing the Schiffmans’ parcels. CHE filed suit to quiet title to easements over these roads, asserting theories of implied easement by prior use, easement by necessity, and prescriptive easement. The Schiffmans disputed that Crystal Farm was landlocked, challenged the existence of any easement, and made counterclaims, including a third-party complaint against a prior owner for breach of title warranties.The District Court of the Sixth Judicial District granted summary judgment to CHE, quieting title to the easements based on implied easement by prior use. In doing so, the court struck the Schiffmans’ affidavits, relied on a declaration from a prior owner (Roger Johnson), and found the evidence of apparent continuous use sufficient. The court denied the Schiffmans’ motion for reconsideration, stating there was no new evidence or authority and no material factual dispute.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho found that the district court erred by striking admissible portions of the Schiffmans’ affidavits and by relying on portions of Johnson’s declaration that lacked proper foundation and personal knowledge. The Supreme Court further concluded that CHE did not establish, as a matter of law, the required element of apparent continuous use long enough before severance to support an implied easement by prior use. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment, reversed the grant of summary judgment, and remanded for further proceedings. The Schiffmans were awarded costs on appeal, but no attorney fees were granted. View "Crystal Homestead Estates v. That Piece of Property" on Justia Law

A non-governmental organization challenged a county planning department’s approval of a family transfer exemption that allowed a landowner to divide an 80-acre tract of land into eight parcels, gifting them to family members. The organization alleged that the planning department failed to provide public notice before approving the exemption, in violation of county subdivision regulations. The land division was discovered years after its approval, when one of the organization’s members was researching a neighboring tract. The organization contended that the lack of public notice denied its members an opportunity to comment on the exemption application, as required by the county’s regulations.The organization filed suit in the Montana Twenty-First Judicial District Court, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The county moved to dismiss, arguing that its regulations did not require public notice for exemption applications. The District Court granted the county’s motion, dismissing all claims, and specifically found that the county regulations did not mandate published notice for review of proposed subdivision exemptions.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It held that the plain language of the county’s regulations, which state that “the public shall be permitted to comment” on exemption applications, necessarily implies that public notice must be provided; otherwise, the right to comment would be meaningless. The court emphasized that although the regulations do not specify the manner of notice, adequate notice is required to effectuate public participation. The Supreme Court reversed the District Court’s dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. The holding was that the county’s subdivision regulations require the planning department to provide public notice of pending subdivision exemption applications to enable meaningful public comment. View "Sapphire v. Ravalli County" on Justia Law

Several landowners in Indiana, who acquired their properties subject to agreements made in 1959, sought to enroll their land in a federal conservation program. During the process, a title examination revealed that Trunkline Gas Company held easements over their properties, allowing it to construct and maintain pipelines. The landowners contended that Trunkline’s easement was limited to a fixed 66-foot corridor along the existing pipeline, which had been installed in 1960. Trunkline, however, asserted that the original agreements granted it rights to lay additional pipelines anywhere on the properties and to alter the route of the existing pipeline.The landowners filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, seeking a declaration that Trunkline’s easement was fixed and limited in scope. Trunkline counterclaimed, seeking confirmation of its broader, unexercised rights. The district court divided the litigation into two phases and, in both, granted partial summary judgment in Trunkline’s favor. The court concluded that the 1959 agreements created a floating or blanket easement, meaning the location for future pipelines was not fixed, and that Indiana law did not allow unexercised, future easement rights to be fixed to a defined location.On appeal, the landowners asked the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit to certify a question to the Indiana Supreme Court regarding the fixity of floating easements, or, alternatively, to reverse the district court. The Seventh Circuit declined to certify, finding Indiana law sufficiently clear that unexercised, future rights under a floating easement are not fixed. The court affirmed the district court’s summary judgment, holding that Trunkline’s unexercised easement rights remain unfixed under Indiana law. View "Close Armstrong, LLC v Trunkline Gas Company, LLC" on Justia Law

The dispute arose from a contract signed on May 12, 2021, under which Kindra Cooper agreed to purchase a house from Highland Rim Investments, LLC. Delays in closing led the parties to enter into three extensions, but the sale never concluded. Cooper then sued for specific performance, declaratory judgment, and damages, later amending her complaint to add additional defendants and claims, including various forms of misrepresentation and a request to pierce Highland Rim’s corporate veil. During litigation, certain claims were dismissed, and after a jury trial, the jury awarded Cooper compensatory and punitive damages against Highland Rim and Monique Dollone, but found for other defendants on the misrepresentation claims.The Madison Circuit Court entered judgment on the jury's verdict, awarded Cooper attorney fees, granted her motion to pierce the corporate veil as to one defendant, and later appointed a receiver over Highland Rim to preserve its fiscal health until the judgment was satisfied. The defendants moved for post-judgment relief, which was denied, and then appealed both the judgment and the receivership order.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the appeals. It found that the trial court erred by requiring the parties to strike the jury from a list of only 21 prospective jurors, rather than the 24 required by Alabama Rule of Civil Procedure 47(b). This procedural error mandated reversal. The Supreme Court of Alabama held that the trial court’s judgment in favor of Cooper and its order appointing a receiver over Highland Rim must be reversed. The cases were remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Highland Rim Investments, LLC v. Cooper" on Justia Law

A married couple purchased a residential property in Omaha, Nebraska, in 1988. Their lot bordered land owned by a company and its predecessor entities. After moving in, the couple began using and improving a portion of the neighboring company’s land—referred to as the Disputed Property. They cleared debris, treated weeds, planted grass, installed a fence (beyond their lot line), built a treehouse, and used the area for family activities. Over the years, they continued to maintain and landscape the Disputed Property, planting trees and a garden, and mowing it regularly. The couple had no permission from the legal owners for this use and believed the area was neglected and unmaintained by anyone else.In 2022, the couple and their family trust filed a lawsuit in the District Court for Douglas County to quiet title to the Disputed Property, claiming ownership by adverse possession. The defendant companies argued that the couple’s use had been permissive since 1997, citing letters sent to adjacent property owners offering permission for limited use until development began. The couple denied receiving any such letters. The district court found in favor of the couple and their trust, concluding that they had proven adverse possession for the statutory period of at least ten years.On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the facts and legal findings de novo. It determined that the couple’s use of the land was actual, continuous, exclusive, notorious, and adverse under a claim of ownership for the required period. The court found the couple’s testimony more credible regarding non-receipt of any permission letters. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order, quieting title to the Disputed Property in the couple’s trust. The main holding is that the couple acquired title to the Disputed Property by adverse possession. View "Goldie v. McNeil & Co. Builders" on Justia Law

The case concerns a dispute arising from a real estate transaction involving an 80-acre property in Livermore, California. Guinnane Construction Co., Inc. entered into a contract to purchase an interest in the property from the Petersons, after being assigned the DeLimas’ right of first refusal. Defendants, including Edmund Jin, his real estate agent Stephen Marc Chess, and Chess’s firm, interfered with this transaction by negotiating a purchase with the Petersons despite knowledge of the right of first refusal. The Petersons ultimately sold their interest to Jin, prompting Guinnane to file a successful specific performance action against the Petersons and the subsequent conveyance of the property interest to Guinnane.After prevailing in the specific performance action, Guinnane filed a new lawsuit in the Alameda County Superior Court against Jin, Chess, and Chess’s firm, seeking damages for inducement of breach of contract and intentional interference with contractual relations. Guinnane was awarded compensatory damages, including the attorney fees incurred in the specific performance action. Guinnane then sought to recover the attorney fees incurred in prosecuting this subsequent “tort of another” action against the defendants. The trial court, presided over by Judge Victoria Kolakowski, denied Guinnane’s motion for these additional fees.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed whether, under the tort of another doctrine, Guinnane could recover attorney fees incurred in the action against the tortfeasors themselves. The court held that such fees are not recoverable under the tort of another doctrine, as it allows recovery only for fees incurred in litigation with third parties necessitated by the defendant’s tort, not for fees incurred in suing the tortfeasor. The court affirmed the posttrial order denying Guinnane’s motion for these attorney fees. View "Guinnane Construction Co., Inc. v. Chess" on Justia Law

The case concerns the Department of Water Resources (DWR), a state agency with eminent domain authority, which sought entry onto private properties to perform environmental and geological studies as part of the planning for a potential water conveyance project in the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta. DWR initiated a series of petitions under California’s precondemnation entry statutes, which authorize entities with eminent domain power to access property for investigative activities before deciding whether to acquire the property for a public project.Previously, the San Joaquin County Superior Court coordinated the petitions and permitted DWR to conduct environmental studies under certain conditions but denied entry for geological testing, reasoning that such actions constituted a taking requiring a classic condemnation action. The California Court of Appeal initially agreed, but the California Supreme Court reversed in Property Reserve, Inc. v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 151, holding that the precondemnation entry statutes provide a constitutionally valid process for precondemnation activities, so long as landowners can obtain a jury trial on damages. Following this, the trial court approved DWR’s authority for both environmental and geological tests, and additional entry orders were issued for the Delta Conveyance Project.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed whether DWR was required to have an authorized and funded project under Water Code sections 250 and 11580 before undertaking precondemnation entry and testing. The court held that these requirements apply only to classic condemnation proceedings, not to precondemnation entry activities. The court affirmed that DWR need only possess general eminent domain authority to utilize the precondemnation entry process, regardless of whether the activities might constitute a taking. The trial court’s entry order was affirmed. View "Dept. of Water Resources Cases" on Justia Law