Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

A homeowner obtained a home equity line of credit (HELOC) secured by a deed of trust, subsequently defaulted, and faced nonjudicial foreclosure initiated by a party claiming to be the beneficiary. The loan servicer, acting on behalf of the claimed beneficiary, executed a declaration asserting that the beneficiary was the “holder” of the HELOC agreement, as required by Washington’s Deed of Trust Act (DTA) for nonjudicial foreclosure. The homeowner challenged the foreclosure in federal court, arguing that a HELOC is not a negotiable instrument and, therefore, the entity seeking foreclosure could not be its “holder” as contemplated by the DTA.In the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, the homeowner’s quiet title and some statutory claims were dismissed, but other claims were allowed to proceed. Recognizing that state law questions were central and unresolved, the district court certified two questions to the Supreme Court of the State of Washington: (1) whether a typical HELOC is a negotiable instrument under Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code, and (2) whether a party claiming to be a beneficiary can satisfy the DTA’s “holder” requirement by declaring it holds a HELOC agreement.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington held that a HELOC agreement, as described, is not a negotiable instrument because it does not contain an unconditional promise to pay a fixed amount of money. The court further held that under the DTA, “holder” means the holder of a negotiable instrument as defined by Article 3 of the UCC. Therefore, a party cannot fulfill the DTA’s proof-of-beneficiary requirement for nonjudicial foreclosure simply by declaring it is the holder of a nonnegotiable HELOC agreement. This does not preclude judicial remedies, but nonjudicial foreclosure is unavailable in such circumstances. View "Vargas v. RRA CP Opportunity Tr. 1" on Justia Law

This case concerns a group of landowners in Indiana who own property adjacent to former railroad corridors once operated by the Peru and Indianapolis Railroad Company (PIRC). The landowners asserted that they also hold fee simple title to the land underlying these corridors. They challenged the federal government's authorization of public recreational trail use on these corridors under the National Trails System Act Amendments of 1983, claiming that this action constituted a taking of their property without just compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment.The United States Court of Federal Claims reviewed the dispute. The main issue was whether PIRC’s interest in the rail corridors consisted merely of easements, rather than fee simple title. The Court of Federal Claims examined two sets of parcels: those associated with a 1907 Indiana Circuit Court quiet title judgment (the Manship Parcels) and those deriving from a lost 1849 instrument (the Vanlaningham Parcels). The Court of Federal Claims concluded that PIRC held only easements in both sets of parcels, meaning that when railroad operations ceased, full title reverted to the plaintiffs under Indiana law. Thus, the court found in favor of the landowners, holding that the government’s issuance of Notices of Interim Trail Use (NITUs) resulted in an uncompensated taking.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo. The Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court’s judgment, holding that the record demonstrated PIRC’s interests were limited to easements for both the Manship and Vanlaningham Parcels. The court concluded that, under Indiana law and the facts presented, the plaintiffs hold fee simple title to the corridor land, and the government’s actions constituted a taking for which just compensation is required. The judgment of the Court of Federal Claims was therefore affirmed. View "PRESSLY v. US " on Justia Law

The case involves a tenant, Ms. Craig, who uses a wheelchair and lived in an apartment managed and owned by the appellants. Her rent was paid through a D.C. housing voucher, but she was responsible for utilities and parking. The appellants sought to evict her after alleging she failed to pay these additional charges. At the eviction hearing in the Landlord and Tenant Branch (L&T) of the Superior Court, the appellants claimed to have served Ms. Craig through her brother, but the affidavit described her brother instead of Ms. Craig. Despite this, the L&T court found service sufficient and entered a default judgment against her, resulting in her eviction.After her eviction, Ms. Craig filed motions in the L&T court to vacate the default judgment and for emergency relief, but did not receive prompt action. She then filed a separate complaint and sought a preliminary injunction in the Civil Division of the Superior Court, arguing improper service and irreparable harm. The Civil Division granted a preliminary injunction restoring her to the apartment, pending the L&T court’s decision on her motion to vacate. Subsequently, the L&T court vacated the default judgment and dismissed the eviction action, and Ms. Craig was returned to her apartment.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals addressed whether the Civil Division could grant temporary injunctive relief from the L&T court’s default judgment while a motion to vacate was pending. The court held that, under limited circumstances where a litigant first seeks relief in the issuing court, a collateral court may grant temporary relief to prevent irreparable harm while awaiting the issuing court’s decision. The court affirmed the Civil Division’s preliminary injunction, holding that such temporary relief does not contravene Rule 60 or res judicata when properly limited. View "Bozzuto Management Co. v. Craig" on Justia Law

A company, Remus Enterprises 1, LLC (Remus 2023), brought tort claims against an individual, Quinn Breece, alleging that Breece interfered with the attempted sale of a property located at 3308 16th Street, NE, Washington, D.C. Remus 2023 claimed to have purchased the property for investment and resale, and that Breece’s actions—including filing notices of lis pendens related to a separate ownership dispute—inhibited the sale. However, the complaint itself stated that a similarly named entity, Remus Enterprises, 1 LLC (Remus 2018), actually owned the property and that it had not been transferred to any other entity.In the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, Breece moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. Remus 2023 sought leave to amend but was denied, and the court dismissed the complaint, finding the claims insufficient. Meanwhile, in a related Superior Court case, a consent judgment was issued in Yoni Nasi v. Remus Enterprises, 1 LLC, et al., determining that Remus 2018, not Remus 2023, owned and contracted to sell the property. This judgment clarified that Remus 2023 held no ownership interest in the property. Remus 2023 appealed the dismissal.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the standing of Remus 2023 to bring the suit. The court concluded that the consent judgment in the Nasi case had preclusive effect and definitively established that Remus 2023 did not own the property. Because Remus 2023 was not injured in fact, it lacked standing and thus the Superior Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, holding that Remus 2023 had no standing to sue regarding the property, though it relied on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction rather than the original grounds for dismissal. View "Remus Enterprises 1, LLC v. Breece" on Justia Law

A county entered into a contract in the late 1970s with various firms for the construction of a new jail, which was completed in 1981. Decades later, during a renovation in 2021, a construction defect was discovered: the original roof was not properly attached to the masonry walls. The county paid for repairs and, in 2023, sued the original architect, the general contractor, and the masonry subcontractor for negligence, fraudulent misrepresentation or nondisclosure, and breach of contract. Each defendant raised the statute of repose in 42 Pa.C.S. § 5536 as a defense, arguing the claims were filed more than 12 years after completion of the jail.The Court of Common Pleas of Clearfield County sustained the defendants’ preliminary objections, finding the statute of repose applied because the jail was completed in 1981, and the defendants had performed the qualifying construction services. The court further held that the doctrine of nullum tempus occurrit regi, which sometimes allows government entities to avoid statutes of limitations, did not apply to the statute of repose. The county appealed.The Commonwealth Court affirmed, assuming for argument's sake that nullum tempus could apply to statutes of repose, but concluding the county failed to meet the requirements for invoking the doctrine because constructing the jail was not enforcing an obligation imposed by law.Upon further appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that nullum tempus cannot preclude the application of the Section 5536 statute of repose. The court concluded the statute of repose is a legislative judgment eliminating liability for construction professionals after 12 years, and its purpose cannot be undermined by the common law doctrine of nullum tempus. The Supreme Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court’s order upholding dismissal of the complaint. View "Clearfield County v. Transystems Corp." on Justia Law

A commercial tenant operating a beer and wine store in Maryland entered into a five-year lease requiring it to pay base rent as well as additional charges—including real estate taxes, water and sewer bills, late fees, HVAC replacement costs, and attorneys’ fees—that the lease defined as “Additional Rent.” The lease contained a clause by which the tenant waived its statutory right of redemption, meaning it could not prevent eviction by paying the overdue amounts after judgment. After the tenant fell behind on these additional charges but remained current on base rent, the landlord filed a summary ejectment action to repossess the premises.The District Court for Frederick County found the tenant liable for most of the claimed additional charges and, relying on the lease’s waiver clause, awarded the landlord possession with no right of redemption. On appeal, the Circuit Court for Frederick County vacated that judgment, holding that some attorneys’ fees were improperly included as unpaid rent and that the tenant lacked adequate notice of certain charges, making the redemption waiver unenforceable.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case. It held that in nonresidential leases, a waiver of the statutory right of redemption does not violate Maryland public policy and is enforceable unless a traditional contract defense applies. The court also clarified that the statutory pre-suit notice requirement in Real Property Article § 8-401(c)(1) applies only to residential tenancies and not to commercial ones. However, it held that a landlord may recover possession only for rent that is due and unpaid under the lease, and summary ejectment cannot be based on charges of which the tenant had no prior notice before suit was filed.The Supreme Court of Maryland vacated the judgment of the circuit court and remanded for recalculation of the rent due, instructing that only charges for which the tenant had received prior notice and the contractual time to pay could support possession. View "Kapneck 14-16 v. Breezy's Speakeasy" on Justia Law

The dispute arose from a contract in which a company specializing in vehicle emissions testing equipment agreed to supply and install its products in a facility being constructed by a general contractor for a state agency. After receiving substantial payments, the equipment supplier sought additional compensation through arbitration. The general contractor defended by arguing that the supplier was not properly licensed as required by California’s Contractors State Licensing Law (CSLL), and thus could not recover payment. The supplier then initiated a lawsuit seeking a judicial declaration that it was exempt from the CSLL’s licensing requirements because its equipment did not become a “fixed part of the structure,” referencing an exemption in the law.The Superior Court of Riverside County reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment. The general contractor argued the exemption did not apply because the equipment became permanently affixed to the building, and the supplier had performed work before obtaining a license. The supplier contended its products were portable and not intended to be permanent fixtures, and that it acted as an equipment installer exempt under the law. The superior court granted summary judgment for the general contractor, finding that the evidence showed the equipment did become a fixed part of the structure and thus the supplier needed a contractor’s license.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, found the lower court erred by deciding as a matter of law that the exemption did not apply. The appellate court held that whether the equipment became a fixed part of the structure is a factual question, not one suitable for summary judgment on the record before it. Because there was conflicting evidence—including expert declarations—on this issue, the trial court should have permitted the factual dispute to be resolved by a trier of fact. The appellate court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "AVL Test Systems v. Hensel Phelps Construction" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between an Arizona municipal corporation and a water conservation district, both of which are public entities. In 2002, the two parties entered into a long-term agreement for the sale and delivery of water, with specific provisions regarding termination. In 2018, the water district notified the city that it considered the agreement terminated and ceased performance, while the city maintained that the contract remained valid and that the district’s actions constituted breach and anticipatory breach. Over the subsequent years, the city repeatedly requested water delivery under the agreement, and the district consistently refused, reiterating its position that the agreement was no longer in effect. In 2022, after further unsuccessful attempts to enforce the contract, the city formally notified the district of a breach and then initiated legal action seeking specific performance and declaratory relief.The Superior Court in Maricopa County denied the district’s motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment in favor of the city. The court found the city’s claims were subject to the one-year limitation period under A.R.S. § 12-821 but concluded the claims were timely because each refusal to deliver water constituted a new breach. The court also declared the agreement valid and enforceable. The district appealed, and the Arizona Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the statute of limitations in § 12-821 applied to the city’s claims and thus barred them.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the effect of § 12-821 on the common law nullum tempus doctrine, which exempts the state from statutes of limitation when acting as plaintiff. The Court held that § 12-821 does not expressly abrogate the nullum tempus doctrine for lawsuits between public entities and that the one-year limitation does not apply in such cases. Accordingly, the Court vacated the court of appeals’ opinion, reversed the superior court’s judgment as to timeliness, and remanded with instructions to grant summary judgment for the city, declaring the agreement valid and enforceable. View "CHANDLER v. ROOSEVELT" on Justia Law

A federally certified organization dedicated to providing comprehensive health and social services to elderly individuals, primarily those eligible for Medicaid, relocated its operations to East Providence and sought a property tax exemption for its new location. The organization asserted that nearly all its participants are low-income elderly and claimed eligibility for exemption under a state statute that provides tax-exempt status for property used for the aid or support of the aged poor, among other categories. After purchasing the property, the organization applied for the exemption, arguing that the statutory language supported its claim. The local tax assessor denied the application, finding that the organization was not one of the specifically enumerated entities—such as a library or a nonprofit hospital—under the statute, and that its mission was not limited to supporting only the aged poor.The organization appealed this denial to the East Providence Tax Board of Assessment Review, which affirmed the assessor’s decision. Subsequently, the organization brought the case to the Providence County Superior Court, where both parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The Superior Court found the statute ambiguous and, applying principles of statutory construction, concluded that the exemption applied only to the specific types of entities listed in the statute, all of which must use their property exclusively for the designated purposes. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the tax assessor.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed the statutory language and agreed that it was ambiguous but held that, under Rhode Island law, tax exemption statutes must be strictly construed in favor of taxation. Consequently, any ambiguity must be resolved against the taxpayer. The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment in favor of the tax assessor. View "Pace Organization of Rhode Island v. Frew" on Justia Law

A Maine resident was stopped while driving a pickup truck registered to a Montana limited liability company, not to himself personally. The officer confirmed that the company, Brandon McCoy, LLC, was active and properly registered in Montana, and that all of the resident’s vehicles were registered to that company. The officer had previously informed the resident that, as a Maine resident, he would need to register his vehicles in Maine. After observing a non-functioning taillight, the officer stopped the resident, confirmed his Maine residency, and issued him a summons for evasion of registration fees and excise taxes under Maine law, specifically 29-A M.R.S. § 514.The matter was first heard in the Maine District Court in Biddeford. At the hearing, both the officer and the resident testified. The District Court found that the resident had been twice warned about a registration requirement and adjudicated him responsible for the infraction, imposing the statutory minimum fine. The resident appealed this judgment.The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine reviewed the case and examined the statutory language. The Court determined that liability under section 514 attaches only to the “owner” of the vehicle, defined as the person holding title or having the exclusive right to use the vehicle for at least thirty days. The evidence indicated that the Montana LLC, not the resident, held title to the pickup, and there was no evidence that the resident had an exclusive right to its use for thirty days or more. The Court held that the resident was not required to register the vehicle under Maine law and could not be found in violation of section 514. The judgment against the resident was vacated, and the case was remanded for entry of judgment in his favor. View "State of Maine v. McCoy" on Justia Law