Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The City of Helena appealed a decision by the Shelby Circuit Court that allowed the Pelham Board of Education (PBE) to acquire, develop, and use a piece of real property within Helena's corporate limits for an athletic field and parking lot to serve Pelham High School students. The property, purchased by the PBE in 2021, is adjacent to Pelham High School but located within Helena. Helena argued that the PBE lacked the authority to construct and operate school facilities outside Pelham's corporate limits and that the project violated Helena's zoning ordinance.The Shelby Circuit Court ruled in favor of the PBE, stating that city zoning ordinances do not apply to governmental functions performed by a government body. The court found that the PBE's construction of the athletic field was a governmental function related to public education, which is exempt from local zoning regulations. Helena appealed, arguing that the PBE's actions were not authorized under Alabama Code § 16-11-9 and that the project did not comply with Helena's zoning ordinance.The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the circuit court's decision. The court held that § 16-11-9 does not restrict a city board of education's powers to the geographic boundaries of the city it serves. The court also concluded that the PBE's construction and operation of the athletic field constituted a governmental function related to public education, which is exempt from municipal zoning ordinances. Therefore, Helena's zoning ordinance could not be enforced against the PBE's project. The court affirmed the circuit court's order, allowing the PBE to proceed with the development and use of the property. View "City of Helena v. Pelham Board of Education" on Justia Law

Citizens of a town submitted a document they claimed was a petition for a referendum to reverse a zoning ordinance that reclassified certain properties. The document contained 1,051 signatures but did not mention the ordinance number or request a referendum. The town's Board of Commissioners reviewed the document and determined it did not meet the requirements of the town's charter for a valid petition for referendum. The citizens then refiled the document with a cover page referencing the ordinance and requesting a referendum, but the signature pages remained unchanged.The Circuit Court for Harford County ruled that the Commissioners' determination was invalid because they did not first verify the signatures and did not act by ordinance or resolution. The court ordered the town to verify the signatures and proceed with the referendum process if the signatures were valid.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and held that the Commissioners correctly determined the document did not meet the charter's requirements. The court found that the charter did not require the Commissioners to verify signatures before determining the petition's validity. The court also held that the Commissioners were authorized to make their determination by a verbal motion, which was memorialized in the meeting minutes, and did not need to adopt an ordinance or resolution.The Supreme Court of Maryland vacated the Circuit Court's judgment and remanded the case for entry of a declaratory judgment consistent with its opinion, affirming that the citizens were not entitled to a writ of mandamus or permanent injunctive relief. View "Town of Bel Air v. Bodt" on Justia Law

Lynn and Tanya Heiser filed a lawsuit to quiet title to a 0.90-acre tract of land in McKenzie County, North Dakota, which they claimed through adverse possession and acquiescence. The disputed land is adjacent to their property and separated from Nevin and Laura Dahl's property by County Road 34. The Heisers and their predecessors had used the land for various purposes, including building structures, parking equipment, and general maintenance, since the 1960s.The District Court of McKenzie County ruled in favor of the Heisers, finding that they had established title to the disputed land through adverse possession and acquiescence. The court found that the Heisers and their predecessors had used the land continuously and openly for over 20 years, meeting the requirements for adverse possession. The court also concluded that County Road 34 served as a natural boundary, which the parties had mutually recognized as the property line.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the District Court's findings were insufficient to support the conclusion that the Heisers had adversely possessed the entire disputed tract. The Supreme Court noted that the District Court had improperly relied on the transfer of property ownership to establish hostile use and had not adequately determined the 20-year period of adverse possession. Additionally, the court found that the evidence did not support the conclusion that the entire disputed land was improved or enclosed.The Supreme Court reversed the District Court's judgment and remanded the case for further findings on the extent of the Heisers' adverse possession. The court also held that the District Court erred in finding that County Road 34 was the boundary line by acquiescence, as there was no mutual recognition of the boundary by both parties. View "Heiser v. Dahl" on Justia Law

ND Energy Services, LLC, entered into a temporary layflat easement agreement with Kathleen Stroh, granting it the exclusive right to transfer freshwater via aboveground layflat hoses on Stroh's property. Lime Rock Resources III-A, L.P., and Herman Energy Services, LLC, subsequently placed layflat hoses on the same property to transport water for fracking operations. ND Energy sued Lime Rock for tortious interference with contract and willful trespass, seeking a permanent injunction.The District Court of Dunn County granted summary judgment in favor of Lime Rock, dismissing ND Energy's claims. The court found that the oil and gas leases, which Lime Rock had acquired, provided Lime Rock the right to use the property for oil and gas production, including the installation of layflat hoses. The court also concluded that ND Energy had notice of Lime Rock's rights due to a recorded memorandum of a surface use agreement and that Lime Rock's actions were justified.The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the leases granted Lime Rock the right to use layflat hoses on the property, as this use was necessary for oil and gas production. The court also determined that ND Energy was not a good-faith purchaser of the layflat easement because it had constructive notice of the surface use agreement through the recorded memorandum. Consequently, ND Energy's claims for tortious interference and a permanent injunction were dismissed, as Lime Rock's actions were justified under the leases. View "ND Energy Services, LLC v. Lime Rock Resources III-A" on Justia Law

On December 29, 2015, Timothy Morales, a pedestrian, was struck by a vehicle driven by Ruby Junewal while walking along a roadway within the Weatherford distribution facility in Williston, North Dakota. Morales alleged that Weatherford U.S., L.P. was negligent in maintaining the premises, specifically citing inadequate lighting, lack of road signs, and absence of sidewalks. Morales filed a lawsuit in 2019 against Weatherford, Junewal, and Junewal’s employer, Wilhoit Properties, Inc., asserting claims of negligence and premises liability.The District Court of Williams County granted summary judgment in favor of Weatherford, concluding that Weatherford did not owe Morales a duty of care. The court dismissed all claims against Weatherford and the other defendants. Morales appealed the decision, arguing that the district court erred in its judgment.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the danger posed by vehicles on the roadway was open and obvious, and therefore, Weatherford owed no duty of care to Morales. The court noted that Morales was aware of the dangers of walking on the roadway and that the conditions were such that a reasonable person would have recognized the risks. The court also rejected Morales's argument that Weatherford should have anticipated the harm despite the obvious danger, concluding that the distraction exception did not apply as Morales's distraction was self-created. The judgment dismissing all claims with prejudice was affirmed. View "Morales v. Weatherford U.S." on Justia Law

Benjamin Nordquist appealed a judgment dismissing his petition for a writ of mandamus. The case involves a dispute over the recording of a quitclaim deed for a portion of land in Witzig’s Fifth Subdivision, Stutsman County, North Dakota. Diane and Duane Witzig originally owned the land, which was platted into three lots in 2014. Diane Witzig later conveyed these lots to Gannon Van Gilder and Levi Hintz. In 2022, Diane Witzig provided a quitclaim deed to Nordquist for a portion of the subdivision depicted as 6th Street SW on the plat map. Nordquist attempted to record this deed, but the Stutsman County Recorder refused, citing discrepancies in the property description and forwarded it to the Auditor.The District Court of Stutsman County denied Nordquist’s petition for a writ of mandamus, concluding that the quitclaim deed changed the current property description and thus required a certificate of transfer from the Auditor. The court also noted that the Auditor had discretion to request the land be replatted due to the irregularities in the property description and previous conveyances.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court agreed with the lower court that the quitclaim deed changed the current property description, necessitating a certificate of transfer from the Auditor. However, the Supreme Court found that the district court improperly determined that the 2018 and 2021 deeds conveyed the north 60 feet of Witzig’s Fifth Subdivision. The Supreme Court held that property ownership should be determined in a separate proceeding involving all relevant parties. The court affirmed the denial of Nordquist’s petition for a writ of mandamus, concluding that Nordquist had not demonstrated a clear legal right to compel the Auditor to issue the certificate of transfer. View "Nordquist v. Alonge" on Justia Law

The Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Commission (Commission), a bi-state entity created by an interstate compact between New Jersey and Pennsylvania, sought to replace the I-95 Scudder Falls Bridge. The Commission decided to use a Project Labor Agreement (PLA) for the project, which required contractors to hire at least 75% of their workforce from specified local unions. George Harms Construction Company, Inc. (Harms), which had a collective bargaining agreement with a different union, challenged the PLA, arguing it was unlawful because it excluded their union.The trial court denied Harms' request for a preliminary injunction and dismissed Harms' counterclaims, ruling that New Jersey’s competitive bidding laws did not apply to the Commission. However, it also dismissed the Commission’s complaint, stating the lawsuit was not properly authorized by the Commission as a whole. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal of the Commission’s complaint but reversed the dismissal of certain counterclaims, concluding that the Commission lacked authority to use a PLA because New Jersey and Pennsylvania did not have complementary or parallel laws on PLAs.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the Appellate Division’s judgment. It held that the plain language of the Compact authorizes the Commission to require the use of a PLA in a publicly bid construction project. The Court found that the Commission’s broad powers under the Compact include the authority to use PLAs, even though the Compact does not explicitly mention them. The Court also determined that the Appellate Division erred in looking beyond the Compact to state laws that do not mention the Commission. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Commission v. George Harms Construction Co., Inc." on Justia Law

The City of Ontario filed an eminent domain action to acquire properties owned by We Buy Houses Any Condition, LLC, located near the Ontario International Airport. The City argued that the properties did not conform to land use requirements and suffered from airport-related impacts and blight. The City held a public hearing and adopted a resolution of necessity to commence eminent domain proceedings, citing the mitigation of airport impacts and elimination of blight as public uses. However, the resolution did not describe any specific proposed project.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County granted summary judgment in favor of We Buy Houses, finding that the City had not articulated a proposed project as required to exercise its power of eminent domain. The court concluded that the City’s resolution of necessity was insufficient because it did not describe a specific project, which is necessary to determine public interest, necessity, and compatibility with the greatest public good and least private injury. The court also granted We Buy Houses’s request for attorney fees, making certain reductions to the requested amounts.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The appellate court held that the City failed to identify a proposed project with sufficient specificity in its resolution of necessity, as required by the Eminent Domain Law. The court found the City’s arguments unpersuasive and concluded that the trial court properly rejected the City’s effort to exercise eminent domain. Additionally, the appellate court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s award of attorney fees to We Buy Houses, affirming the fee award. View "City of Ontario v. We Buy Houses Any Condition" on Justia Law

In this case, the original plaintiff, Ora Eads, Jr., obtained legal title to a commercial property in Nashville but did not register the deed. Years later, the seller defaulted on a loan, and a creditor obtained a judgment lien against the property, which was eventually sold. The plaintiffs argued that Mr. Eads had adversely possessed the property during the intervening years, while the defendant, the subsequent purchaser, contended that Mr. Eads’s possession was not adverse.The Davidson County Chancery Court ruled in favor of the defendant, finding that Mr. Eads’s possession was not adverse due to the permissive nature of his relationship with the original owner, Mr. Whiteaker. The court noted that Mr. Whiteaker had acquiesced in Mr. Eads’s use of the property and that the deed, installment note, and other facts indicated a non-adverse relationship. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision, holding that Mr. Eads had acquired title to the property by common-law adverse possession, as his possession was not with the permission of anyone.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, reinstating the chancery court’s judgment. The Supreme Court held that adversity, for purposes of adverse possession, requires a conflict of title or a controversy about the right to possess the property. Since Mr. Eads had obtained legal title through a valid deed, albeit unregistered, there was no conflict of title or controversy regarding possession between him and Mr. Whiteaker. Therefore, Mr. Eads did not satisfy the requirements for statutory or common-law adverse possession. The court concluded that Mr. Eads’s possession was not adverse to Mr. Whiteaker, and any adversity to other parties did not last long enough to meet the statutory periods required for adverse possession. View "Mathes v. 99 Hermitage, LLC" on Justia Law

Robert Frisk owns property at 1196 Swan Hill Drive, Bigfork, Montana, and John and Lori Thomas own the neighboring property at 1194 Swan Hill Drive. The properties share a common driveway and a water well located on Frisk’s property. Disputes arose over the width of the easement for the driveway and access to the water well, leading Frisk to file a lawsuit seeking a declaration of an easement and an injunction against Thomas. Thomas counterclaimed for breach of contract regarding the water well agreement and trespass due to Frisk’s fence and house encroaching on their property.The Montana Eleventh Judicial District Court granted Frisk a prescriptive easement over 15 feet of the existing roadway and an equitable easement for the encroaching portion of Thomas’s property. The court dismissed Thomas’s breach of contract claims but affirmed his right to access the water well, imposing additional restrictions on this access due to the parties' animosity. Thomas appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and found that Montana law does not recognize the creation of an equitable easement. The court held that Frisk must remove his fence and gate from Thomas’s property but allowed the house to remain due to its de minimis encroachment. The court affirmed the additional restrictions on the water well agreement, finding them reasonable and consistent with the agreement’s terms. The decision was affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Frisk v. Thomas" on Justia Law