Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The City of Ontario filed an eminent domain action to acquire properties owned by We Buy Houses Any Condition, LLC, located near the Ontario International Airport. The City argued that the properties did not conform to land use requirements and suffered from airport-related impacts and blight. The City held a public hearing and adopted a resolution of necessity to commence eminent domain proceedings, citing the mitigation of airport impacts and elimination of blight as public uses. However, the resolution did not describe any specific proposed project.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County granted summary judgment in favor of We Buy Houses, finding that the City had not articulated a proposed project as required to exercise its power of eminent domain. The court concluded that the City’s resolution of necessity was insufficient because it did not describe a specific project, which is necessary to determine public interest, necessity, and compatibility with the greatest public good and least private injury. The court also granted We Buy Houses’s request for attorney fees, making certain reductions to the requested amounts.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The appellate court held that the City failed to identify a proposed project with sufficient specificity in its resolution of necessity, as required by the Eminent Domain Law. The court found the City’s arguments unpersuasive and concluded that the trial court properly rejected the City’s effort to exercise eminent domain. Additionally, the appellate court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s award of attorney fees to We Buy Houses, affirming the fee award. View "City of Ontario v. We Buy Houses Any Condition" on Justia Law

In this case, the original plaintiff, Ora Eads, Jr., obtained legal title to a commercial property in Nashville but did not register the deed. Years later, the seller defaulted on a loan, and a creditor obtained a judgment lien against the property, which was eventually sold. The plaintiffs argued that Mr. Eads had adversely possessed the property during the intervening years, while the defendant, the subsequent purchaser, contended that Mr. Eads’s possession was not adverse.The Davidson County Chancery Court ruled in favor of the defendant, finding that Mr. Eads’s possession was not adverse due to the permissive nature of his relationship with the original owner, Mr. Whiteaker. The court noted that Mr. Whiteaker had acquiesced in Mr. Eads’s use of the property and that the deed, installment note, and other facts indicated a non-adverse relationship. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision, holding that Mr. Eads had acquired title to the property by common-law adverse possession, as his possession was not with the permission of anyone.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, reinstating the chancery court’s judgment. The Supreme Court held that adversity, for purposes of adverse possession, requires a conflict of title or a controversy about the right to possess the property. Since Mr. Eads had obtained legal title through a valid deed, albeit unregistered, there was no conflict of title or controversy regarding possession between him and Mr. Whiteaker. Therefore, Mr. Eads did not satisfy the requirements for statutory or common-law adverse possession. The court concluded that Mr. Eads’s possession was not adverse to Mr. Whiteaker, and any adversity to other parties did not last long enough to meet the statutory periods required for adverse possession. View "Mathes v. 99 Hermitage, LLC" on Justia Law

Robert Frisk owns property at 1196 Swan Hill Drive, Bigfork, Montana, and John and Lori Thomas own the neighboring property at 1194 Swan Hill Drive. The properties share a common driveway and a water well located on Frisk’s property. Disputes arose over the width of the easement for the driveway and access to the water well, leading Frisk to file a lawsuit seeking a declaration of an easement and an injunction against Thomas. Thomas counterclaimed for breach of contract regarding the water well agreement and trespass due to Frisk’s fence and house encroaching on their property.The Montana Eleventh Judicial District Court granted Frisk a prescriptive easement over 15 feet of the existing roadway and an equitable easement for the encroaching portion of Thomas’s property. The court dismissed Thomas’s breach of contract claims but affirmed his right to access the water well, imposing additional restrictions on this access due to the parties' animosity. Thomas appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and found that Montana law does not recognize the creation of an equitable easement. The court held that Frisk must remove his fence and gate from Thomas’s property but allowed the house to remain due to its de minimis encroachment. The court affirmed the additional restrictions on the water well agreement, finding them reasonable and consistent with the agreement’s terms. The decision was affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Frisk v. Thomas" on Justia Law

The case involves a water rights dispute on Indian Creek in Madison County, Montana. William Fraser claimed a senior stock use water right in Indian Creek, which Bradley Livestock, LC contested. Fraser's claim is based on historical use dating back to the late 1800s when his predecessor, William Tiernan, acquired ranchland and water rights in the Ruby Valley. The dispute arose when Fraser sought enforcement of his water right, and the Water Commissioner refused, leading Fraser to file a complaint.The Fifth Judicial District Court certified Fraser’s complaint to the Montana Water Court to resolve the water distribution controversy. The Water Court issued an order decreeing Fraser’s stock use claim as senior to Bradley’s irrigation rights in Indian Creek. Bradley appealed, arguing that the Water Court misinterpreted a 1905 District Court decree and that Fraser’s chain of title was broken, thus invalidating his claim.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court affirmed the Water Court’s decision, holding that Fraser has a valid stock use right with an April 20, 1866 priority date. The court found that the chain of title supporting Fraser’s claim was unbroken and that the Water Court correctly interpreted the historical evidence. The court also upheld the Water Court’s interpretation of the 1905 decree, which limited Fraser’s right to make a call on junior appropriators after July 15 unless he could show that curtailment would result in water reaching his property in beneficial amounts. The court concluded that this limitation only applies to appropriators addressed in the 1905 decree. View "Bradley Livestock v. Fraser" on Justia Law

In the first case, Kent County foreclosed on the homes of Matthew Schafer and Harry and Lilly Hucklebury for unpaid taxes. The properties were sold at auction in 2017, and the county retained the surplus proceeds beyond the owed taxes. Following the Michigan Supreme Court's 2020 decision in Rafaeli, LLC v Oakland Co, which held that retaining surplus proceeds from tax-foreclosure sales is an unconstitutional taking, the Schafer plaintiffs filed a lawsuit seeking those proceeds. The Kent Circuit Court denied the county's motion to dismiss, ruling that Rafaeli applied retroactively. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision.In the second case, the state of Michigan, acting as the foreclosing governmental unit (FGU) for Shiawassee County, foreclosed on property owned by Lynette Hathon and Amy Jo Denkins in 2018. The state retained the surplus proceeds from the sale. The Hathon plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit in the Court of Claims, which certified the class and denied the state's motion for summary disposition. After Rafaeli, the plaintiffs moved for summary disposition, and the state moved to revoke class certification. The Court of Claims granted the state's motion to revoke class certification but later recertified an amended class. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Court of Claims' decisions.The Michigan Supreme Court held that Rafaeli applies retroactively to claims not yet final as of July 17, 2020. The court also ruled that MCL 211.78t, which provides a procedure for processing claims under Rafaeli, applies retroactively, while the new two-year limitations period in MCL 211.78l applies prospectively. Claims that arose before December 22, 2020, but expired between that date and the court's decision must be allowed to proceed if filed within a reasonable time. The court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision in Schafer and remanded the case for further proceedings. In Hathon, the court vacated the Court of Appeals' judgment affirming class recertification and remanded the case to the Court of Claims for reconsideration. View "Schafer v. Kent County" on Justia Law

In September 2020, CloudKitchens applied for a zoning clearance from the City of Oakland to convert a wood shop into a commercial kitchen. The facility, measuring approximately 14,000 square feet, was classified as "Light Manufacturing" under the Oakland Municipal Code (OMC) because it involved food production exceeding 10,000 square feet. The City’s Planning Department issued the zoning clearance and a subsequent building permit for renovations. In April 2021, local neighborhood associations learned of the project and requested the City reconsider the zoning classification, arguing it was essentially a fast-food restaurant, which was not permitted in the zone. The Planning Department denied the request, maintaining the classification was correct.The neighborhood associations filed a formal complaint requesting a revocation review process, which the Planning Department also denied, stating the classification was consistent with similar uses and that there was no substantial evidence of a nuisance. An independent hearing officer affirmed this decision, noting that the Enforcement Regulations under chapter 17.152 were not intended to revisit zoning determinations. The hearing officer also found the classification as "Light Manufacturing" to be supported by sufficient evidence. The associations then petitioned for a writ of mandate in the Alameda County Superior Court, which was denied. The court held that chapter 17.152 did not provide a legal basis to challenge the prior zoning determination.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that chapter 17.152 of the OMC does not authorize challenges to zoning determinations, which are governed by chapter 17.132. The court found that the neighborhood associations' appeal was time-barred under the specific procedures outlined in chapter 17.132, which requires appeals to be filed within ten days of the Planning Department's decision. The court concluded that the Enforcement Regulations could not be used to challenge the initial zoning classification. View "San Pablo Ave Golden Gate Improvement Assn v. City Council Oakland" on Justia Law

Eric Bradley and Jacqueline Chuang filed a lawsuit in the Washtenaw Circuit Court against Linda Frye-Chaiken for breach of contract, specific performance, and promissory estoppel. The dispute arose from an agreement to sell a condominium in the Cayman Islands, which Frye-Chaiken later hesitated to complete following her mother's death. Frye-Chaiken claimed the contract was obtained through coercion or fraud and counterclaimed that her diminished capacity due to her mother's illness invalidated the agreement. The trial court granted summary disposition in favor of Bradley and Chuang, ordering specific performance of the contract and dismissing Frye-Chaiken's counterclaims.The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, supporting the summary disposition and the order for specific performance. Bradley and Chuang then sought sanctions, arguing that Frye-Chaiken's defenses and counterclaims were frivolous. Frye-Chaiken hired Barry Powers to represent her in the sanctions proceedings. The trial court awarded $16,714.27 in attorney fees to Bradley and Chuang, holding Frye-Chaiken, Powers, and her previous attorneys jointly and severally liable for the sanctions.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that under MCR 1.109(E) and MCL 600.2591, sanctions for frivolous filings should only be imposed on the attorney who signed the frivolous documents and the represented party. The court found that Powers did not sign any of the frivolous documents and was only involved in litigating the amount of sanctions. Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion by holding Powers jointly and severally liable for the sanctions. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Bradley v. Frye-Chaiken" on Justia Law

Fitness International, LLC ("Fitness") entered into a lease agreement with City Center Ventures, LLC ("City Center") for a property in Hopkins, Minnesota, where Fitness operated a health club. Due to executive orders during the COVID-19 pandemic, Fitness was mandated to close its business for approximately 3.5 months in 2020. Fitness sought to recover the rent paid during these closure periods, arguing that the doctrine of frustration of purpose excused its obligation to pay rent during the mandatory closure.The Hennepin County District Court granted summary judgment in favor of City Center, concluding that Fitness's obligation to pay rent was not excused. The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed, noting that Fitness cited no binding authority allowing the doctrine of frustration of purpose to establish a breach-of-contract claim. The court of appeals also determined that the mandatory COVID-19 closures did not prohibit all permitted uses of the property, thus not substantially frustrating the lease's purpose.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case to consider the doctrine of frustration of purpose. The court recognized that the Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 265 and 269 provide appropriate frameworks for analyzing claims of permanent and temporary frustration of purpose, respectively. However, the court did not decide whether the doctrine could be used affirmatively for a breach-of-contract claim. Instead, it concluded that even if Fitness could pursue such a claim, the obligation to pay rent was only suspended, not discharged, during the temporary frustration. Since Fitness did not establish that paying rent after the closure would be materially more burdensome, the court affirmed the lower courts' decisions, denying Fitness's claim for rent recovery.The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals, holding that Fitness's obligation to pay rent was merely suspended during the temporary frustration and not discharged. View "Fitness International, LLC v. City Center Ventures, LLC" on Justia Law

David Hepfl and Jodine Meadowcroft had a complex romantic history, including two marriages and divorces. After their second divorce, they reconciled in 2016 and decided to build a cabin on Meadowcroft's property, which she had retained as nonmarital property. Hepfl paid for the construction and furnishing of the cabin, as well as additional structures like a dock and outhouse. Their relationship ended again in October 2020, and Meadowcroft obtained an Order for Protection (OFP) against Hepfl. Hepfl then filed a civil action alleging unjust enrichment to recover the cabin and its associated fixtures and furnishings or reasonable payment.The district court ruled in favor of Hepfl, concluding that Meadowcroft would be unjustly enriched if she retained the cabin and its associated items without compensating Hepfl. The court found that Hepfl had no intention of gifting the cabin to Meadowcroft and that his contributions were made with the expectation of shared use. Meadowcroft's motion for amended findings was denied, and she was ordered to pay Hepfl for the construction costs and return or compensate for the additional items.The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, agreeing that Meadowcroft's retention of the cabin would result in unjust enrichment. The court noted that Hepfl's contributions were made with the expectation of shared use and that Meadowcroft's actions induced him to make these expenditures.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that Hepfl did not need to show that Meadowcroft engaged in morally wrongful conduct to succeed in his unjust enrichment claim. Instead, it was sufficient that Meadowcroft's retention of the cabin and its associated items would be inequitable under the circumstances. The court emphasized that unjust enrichment claims between former partners in a cohabitating, marriage-like relationship should focus on the equities of the situation rather than the conduct of the parties. View "Hepfl v. Meadowcroft" on Justia Law

American Warrior, Inc. owned an oil and gas lease on a 177-acre tract in Finney County, Kansas. In 2020, Huber Sand, Inc. acquired surface rights to the same tract and applied for a conditional use permit to operate a sand and gravel quarry. The Finney County Board of Zoning Appeals approved the permit with conditions after public meetings and consideration of community feedback.The Finney District Court upheld the permit's issuance, ruling that the County properly delegated the authority to issue conditional use permits to the Zoning Board. American Warrior appealed, arguing that the local procedure conflicted with state law, specifically K.S.A. 12-757, which outlines procedures for amending zoning regulations. The Kansas Court of Appeals reversed the district court, holding that the County's procedure conflicted with state law, relying on precedents from Crumbaker v. Hunt Midwest Mining, Inc. and Manly v. City of Shawnee.The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that Finney County's zoning regulations did not conflict with state law. The Court found that K.S.A. 12-757 applies only to amendments of zoning regulations and not to the issuance of conditional use permits. The Court also determined that the County's regulations, which allow the Zoning Board to issue conditional use permits, were valid under K.S.A. 12-755 and K.S.A. 12-759. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and affirmed the district court's judgment, upholding the validity of the conditional use permit issued to Huber Sand, Inc. View "American Warrior, Inc. v. Board of Finney County Comm'rs" on Justia Law