Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Salvador Rivas purchased a condominium unit with a mortgage loan from Flagstar Bank, secured by a deed of trust. Rivas fell behind on his condo association dues, leading the New Hampshire House Condominium Unit Owners Association (NHH) to foreclose on the unit in 2014. The foreclosure sale terms indicated the unit was sold subject to Flagstar’s first deed of trust of approximately $256,632. Advanced Financial Investments, LLC (AFI) bought the unit for $26,000, despite its tax-assessed value of $237,930. Flagstar later filed for judicial foreclosure, claiming its lien was extinguished by NHH’s foreclosure sale.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia dismissed Flagstar’s judicial foreclosure claim, reasoning that the lien was extinguished by the prior foreclosure sale. The court also dismissed Flagstar’s claims for declaratory relief, breach of fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment as time-barred, as they were raised for the first time in an amended complaint filed almost four years after the foreclosure sale.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The court agreed with Flagstar that its judicial foreclosure claim was improperly dismissed, as rebuttals to affirmative defenses are not subject to any statute of limitations. However, the court affirmed the trial court’s ruling on the alternative ground that appellees were entitled to summary judgment on the judicial foreclosure claim. The court held that the 2014 foreclosure sale was not unconscionable as a matter of law, given the legal uncertainty at the time regarding whether Flagstar’s lien would survive the sale.The court also rejected Flagstar’s remaining arguments, except for the unjust enrichment claim against AFI. The court found that this claim should not have been dismissed as time-barred and could not be resolved on summary judgment. The case was remanded for trial on the unjust enrichment claim against AFI, while the trial court’s judgment was otherwise affirmed. View "Flagstar Bank, FSB v. Advanced Financial Investments, LLC" on Justia Law

Three organizations, Inclusive Louisiana, Mount Triumph Baptist Church, and RISE St. James, sued St. James Parish, the Parish Council, and the Parish Planning Commission, alleging violations of their constitutional and statutory civil rights. They claimed that the Parish discriminated against them by directing hazardous industrial development towards majority-Black districts and Black churches, where their members and congregants live. They also argued that the Parish's actions desecrated and restricted access to cemeteries of their enslaved ancestors.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana dismissed all claims. It held that the plaintiffs lacked standing for some claims and that other claims were time-barred, as they were based on the Parish's 2014 Land Use Plan. The court also dismissed claims related to religious injuries, stating that the injuries were not traceable to the Parish's actions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court erred in dismissing the claims as time-barred, noting that the plaintiffs alleged ongoing discriminatory practices, not just a single incident. The court also found that the plaintiffs had standing to sue for property injuries and health-related injuries. Additionally, the court held that the plaintiffs had standing to pursue claims under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and the Louisiana Constitution, as their alleged injuries were traceable to the Parish's conduct.The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of the claims and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court emphasized that the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged ongoing discriminatory practices and injuries that were fairly traceable to the Parish's actions. View "Inclusive Louisiana v. St. James Parish" on Justia Law

Charter Oak Production Co., LLC paid to settle a property damage claim after a pipeline installed on its easement ruptured, causing a saltwater spill on the property of Jason and Melissa Mills. Charter Oak sought indemnity from JM Eagle, Inc., the manufacturer, and Rainmaker Sales, Inc., the distributor, alleging the pipe was defective. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of JM Eagle and Rainmaker, finding that Charter Oak lacked the necessary legal relationship to assert an indemnity claim and that the claim was barred by the economic loss rule.The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals, Division IV, reversed the district court's decision. It found that Charter Oak's non-delegable duty to the Millses created the legal relationship necessary to support an indemnity claim against JM Eagle and Rainmaker. Additionally, it held that Charter Oak's claim was not barred by the economic loss rule.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case. It held that Charter Oak's non-delegable duty as the dominant tenant of the easement established the legal relationship necessary to seek indemnity from JM Eagle and Rainmaker. The court also held that the economic loss rule did not bar Charter Oak's indemnity claim, as it sought reimbursement for damage to property other than the defective product itself. Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated the Court of Civil Appeals' decision, reversed the district court's order, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Mills v. J-M Mfg. Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Blossom Bell, a long-term public housing tenant, was held responsible for the criminal conduct of her guest, Daniel Lambert, who assaulted another tenant, Aaron George. Following the assault, Bell forbade Lambert from returning to her unit, and he never did. Despite this, the Oahu Eviction Board terminated Bell's rental agreement and evicted her.The Circuit Court of the First Circuit initially ruled that the Board applied the wrong legal authority and remanded the case for a new hearing. On remand, the parties agreed that the curability of Bell's violation would be governed by specific notification requirements in the rental agreement. The Board again ruled that Bell's violation was incurable and evicted her. Bell appealed, and the circuit court ruled that Bell had cured the violation by barring Lambert from the property, reversing the Board's eviction order and reinstating Bell's lease.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i reviewed the case. The court held that the Board erred, abused its discretion, and acted arbitrarily and capriciously in evicting Bell. The court noted that the Board did not properly consider all relevant factors, such as the degree of crime in the housing project, the seriousness of the offending action, and the extent to which Bell took reasonable steps to mitigate the offending action. The court agreed with the circuit court that Bell's violation was curable and that she had cured it by permanently barring Lambert from the property. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's final judgment reinstating Bell's lease. View "Bell v. Hawai'i Public Housing Authority" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Sara Roman, filed a complaint in Providence County Superior Court alleging she sustained injuries from slipping on untreated snow and ice at Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. Elementary School in Providence. She claimed negligence against the City of Providence and K. Scott Construction & Disposal, Inc., which had a contract with the city for snow removal.The Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of both defendants. The first hearing justice ruled in favor of the city, applying the Connecticut Rule, which states that a landlord or business invitor's duty to remove snow and ice arises only after the storm has ceased and a reasonable time has passed. The second hearing justice ruled in favor of K. Scott, determining that K. Scott did not owe a duty to the plaintiff because it was not authorized to begin snow removal until after the plaintiff's fall.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case. It vacated the judgment in favor of the city, finding that a question of material fact remained as to whether the plaintiff slipped on preexisting ice or freshly accumulated snow, which would affect the city's duty under the Connecticut Rule. The court affirmed the judgment in favor of K. Scott, holding that K. Scott did not owe a duty to the plaintiff at the time of the incident because it was not authorized to perform snow removal until after the plaintiff's fall. View "Roman v. The City of Providence" on Justia Law

Sara Watts, an African American woman, sued her former homeowners’ association, Joggers Run Property Owners Association (HOA), alleging racial discrimination under the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and the Civil Rights Act. Watts claimed the HOA interfered with her property enjoyment through unwarranted citations, restricted access to amenities, and discriminatory treatment as a former HOA board member. She cited provisions from the FHA (42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(b), 3617) and the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982).The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida dismissed Watts' claims, ruling that the FHA did not cover discriminatory conduct occurring after the purchase of her home and that Watts failed to specify the contractual terms the HOA allegedly violated. The court found her allegations insufficient to support claims under the FHA and the Civil Rights Act.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Watts presented plausible claims under the FHA and the Civil Rights Act. It found that the FHA's language is broad and inclusive, prohibiting a wide range of discriminatory conduct related to housing. The court concluded that the HOA's actions, including restricted access to amenities and selective enforcement of rules, fell within the scope of the FHA. The court also determined that Watts sufficiently alleged intentional racial discrimination causing contractual injury under Section 1981 and that the HOA's actions violated her right to use property on an equal basis with White citizens under Section 1982.The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Watts v. Joggers Run Property Owners Association, Inc." on Justia Law

Ronald E. Byers owes the United States for unpaid income taxes, interest, and penalties. The government filed a suit to enforce its federal tax liens through the judicial sale of Ronald’s home, which he solely owns but shares with his wife, Deanna L. Byers. The Byerses agreed to the sale but argued that Deanna is entitled to half of the proceeds because the property is their marital homestead. The district court granted the government’s motion for summary judgment, ruling that Deanna lacked a property interest in the home and was not entitled to any sale proceeds.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota found that Deanna did not have a property interest in the home under Minnesota law, which only provides a contingent interest that vests upon the owner's death. The court concluded that Deanna’s interest did not rise to the level of a property right requiring compensation under federal law. The court ordered that Ronald is liable for the tax debt, the government’s liens are valid, and the property can be sold with proceeds applied to Ronald’s tax liabilities.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that Minnesota’s homestead laws do not provide Deanna with a vested property interest in the home that would entitle her to compensation from the sale proceeds. The court distinguished this case from United States v. Rodgers, noting that Minnesota law does not afford the same level of property rights to a non-owner spouse as Texas law does. Therefore, the court upheld the summary judgment in favor of the government, allowing the sale of the property to satisfy Ronald’s tax debt. View "United States v. Byers" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, E&I Global Energy Services, Inc. and E&C Global, LLC, sued Liberty Mutual Insurance Company for breach of contract and tort claims related to a construction project. The United States, through the Western Area Power Administration (WAPA), contracted with Isolux to build a substation, and Liberty issued performance and payment bonds for Isolux. After Isolux was terminated, Liberty hired E&C as the completion contractor, but E&I performed the work. Plaintiffs claimed Liberty failed to pay for the work completed.The United States District Court for the District of South Dakota granted summary judgment for Liberty on the unjust enrichment claim and ruled in Liberty's favor on all other claims after a bench trial. The court denied Plaintiffs' untimely request for a jury trial, excluded an expert witness report filed after the deadline, found no evidence of an assignment of rights between E&C and E&I, and ruled against Plaintiffs on their fraud, deceit, and negligent misrepresentation claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the jury trial request, as Plaintiffs failed to timely file the motion and did not justify the delay. The exclusion of the expert report was also upheld, as the district court properly applied the relevant factors and found the late report was neither substantially justified nor harmless. The court affirmed the district court's finding that there was no valid assignment of rights from E&C to E&I, meaning Liberty's promise to pay was to E&C, not E&I. The court also upheld the findings that Liberty did not have the intent to deceive or induce reliance, and that Bruce did not reasonably rely on Mattingly's statements. Finally, the court declined to address the unjust enrichment claim as Plaintiffs did not raise the argument below. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's rulings in their entirety. View "E&I Global Energy Services v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law

A county board of supervisors approved a nonprofit entity’s application to rezone a parcel of land in rural Polk County. Another nonprofit entity and several nearby landowners filed a lawsuit challenging the rezoning decision. The plaintiffs argued that the rezoning violated the county’s comprehensive land use plan, zoning ordinances, and constituted illegal spot zoning. The board of supervisors moved to dismiss the lawsuit, claiming the plaintiffs lacked standing and were subject to heightened pleading requirements under Iowa’s Municipal Tort Claims Act.The Iowa District Court for Polk County granted the motion to dismiss, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to establish standing and were subject to the Act’s heightened pleading requirements. The court found that the individual plaintiffs did not adequately allege their proximity to the rezoned property or their personal concerns, and that the nonprofit organization did not sufficiently allege that its members had a specific and personal interest in the rezoning. The court also ruled that the plaintiffs could not amend their petition due to the Act’s requirements.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that the heightened pleading requirements and penalties under Iowa Code § 670.4A(3) did not apply because the plaintiffs were not seeking monetary damages. The court found that the individual plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged standing based on their proximity to the rezoned property and the nature of the proposed changes. However, the court concluded that the nonprofit organization had not established standing but should be allowed to amend its petition. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "1000 Friends of Iowa v. Polk County Board of Supervisors" on Justia Law

Sara Pearl Fahrmann filed a complaint against the City of Orange Beach and D.R. Horton, Inc., alleging that the City failed to ensure that Horton's construction of the Cypress Village subdivision complied with the City's zoning ordinance and the approved Planned Unit Development (PUD). Fahrmann claimed that this failure led to inadequate parking, which obstructed emergency services and delayed treatment for her husband, resulting in his death. She asserted wrongful-death claims based on wantonness and negligence.The Baldwin Circuit Court denied the City's motion for summary judgment, which argued that the City was entitled to substantive immunity from Fahrmann's claims. The City then petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to grant its motion for summary judgment.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and held that the City was immune from Fahrmann's wrongful-death claim alleging wantonness under § 11-47-190, Ala. Code 1975, which limits municipal liability to injuries caused by neglect, carelessness, or unskillfulness, and does not include wanton conduct. The Court also held that the City was entitled to substantive immunity from the negligence claim, as the City's failure to enforce its zoning ordinance did not create a legal duty to individual plaintiffs. The Court granted the City's petition and issued a writ of mandamus directing the circuit court to grant summary judgment in favor of the City. View "Ex parte City of Orange Beach" on Justia Law