Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff purchased a rural property in Santa Cruz County, which was accessed via a private road crossing his neighbor's property. A dispute arose when the neighbor claimed an easement over the road, leading to increased traffic due to marijuana cultivation. The neighbor filed two lawsuits asserting an easement, both of which were dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff then sued to quiet title, and the neighbor cross-complained, asserting an easement based on a 1971 deed. The trial court ruled in favor of the neighbor, finding an express easement, a decision affirmed on appeal.Plaintiff funded his defense using retirement savings after Chicago Title Insurance Company, his title insurer, denied his tender for defense, citing policy exclusions. Plaintiff sued Chicago Title for breach of contract and bad faith. The trial court found Chicago Title had a duty to defend from the initial tender but rejected Plaintiff's bad faith claim and request for punitive damages. The court awarded damages for the diminution in property value but denied damages for periods outside the litigation.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, found that Chicago Title acted in bad faith by failing to defend Plaintiff despite the potential for coverage indicated by the 1971 deed. The court reversed the trial court's judgment on the bad faith claim and remanded for a determination of damages resulting from the breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The court affirmed the trial court's denial of punitive damages and its award of prejudgment interest on the additional diminution in value. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's findings. View "Bartel v. Chicago Title Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Old Golden Oaks LLC applied for an encroachment permit and a grading permit from Amador County for a housing development project. The county deemed the applications incomplete and requested additional information. Old Golden Oaks filed a petition for writ of mandate, arguing that the county violated the Permit Streamlining Act by requesting information not specified in the submittal checklists for the permits.The Superior Court of Amador County sustained the county’s demurrer without leave to amend, finding that the encroachment permit checklist allowed the county to request additional information and that the county had statutory authority to seek information necessary for compliance with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court agreed with Old Golden Oaks that the catch-all provision in the county’s encroachment permit submittal checklist violated the Permit Streamlining Act because it did not specify in detail the required information. However, the court found that the county could condition the completeness of the grading permit application on additional environmental information because the grading permit checklist informed Old Golden Oaks that the project must comply with CEQA. The court reversed the trial court’s judgment regarding the encroachment permit but affirmed the judgment regarding the grading permit. Each party was ordered to bear its own costs on appeal. View "Old Golden Oaks v. County of Amador" on Justia Law

William Elam and his relatives, the Earlys, are in a dispute over the ownership of a set of Norman Rockwell drawings given to their grandfather, Stephen T. Early, by the artist in 1943. Elam claims sole ownership, while the Earlys assert they are part-owners. The drawings were allegedly gifted to Elam's mother, Helen, by her father upon her college graduation in 1949, but there is no documentary evidence of this gift. The drawings remained in the family home until 1956, then moved with Grandmother Early to a new house, and eventually to Helen's house in 1960. Helen later loaned the drawings to the White House in 1978.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted summary judgment in favor of Elam, finding that his possession of the drawings created a presumption of ownership under Virginia law, which the Earlys failed to rebut. The court determined that Helen had actual possession of the drawings from 1960 to 1978, and the Earlys' evidence, including hearsay testimony, was insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the presumption of ownership applied due to Helen's possession and that the Earlys did not provide sufficient evidence to establish superior title. The court also upheld the dismissal of the Earlys' common law counterclaims for conversion, detinue, and breach of bailment, as well as their conspiracy claim, as these claims could not survive without establishing superior title to the drawings. View "Elam v. Early" on Justia Law

Landowners Stephen and Sharon Wille Padnos appealed two Environmental Division decisions that granted summary judgment to landowner Jason Struthers. The court ruled that the City of Essex Junction could not regulate Struthers' duck-raising and cannabis-cultivation operations. The court found that the duck-raising operation was exempt from municipal regulation under 24 V.S.A. § 4413(d)(1)(A) as it constituted a commercial farming operation subject to the Required Agricultural Practices (RAPs) Rule. Additionally, the court concluded that the City could not enforce its zoning regulations on Struthers' cannabis-cultivation operations under 7 V.S.A. § 869(f)(2).The City’s zoning regulations do not permit agricultural, farming, or cannabis-cultivation establishments in the Residential-1 Zoning District. The City’s zoning officer initially declined to enforce these regulations against Struthers. The City’s Development Review Board (DRB) reversed the zoning officer’s decision regarding the duck-raising operation but upheld it for the cannabis-cultivation operation. The Environmental Division later granted summary judgment in favor of Struthers in both cases, concluding that the City could not regulate the duck-raising and cannabis-cultivation operations.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that neither 24 V.S.A. § 4413(d)(1)(A) nor 7 V.S.A. § 869(f)(2) exempts Struthers' operations from all municipal regulation. The court clarified that § 4413(d)(1)(A) prohibits municipal regulation of the specific agricultural practices required by the RAPs Rule, not all farming activities subject to the RAPs Rule. Similarly, § 869(f)(2) prevents municipal regulation of licensed outdoor cannabis cultivators only concerning the water-quality standards established by the RAPs Rule, not all aspects of cannabis cultivation. Consequently, the Vermont Supreme Court reversed the Environmental Division’s decisions and remanded the cases for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "In re 8 Taft Street DRB & NOV Appeals" on Justia Law

In 1908, the Bradford County Commissioners sold an unseated tract of land, known as the Haines Warrant, to Calvin H. McCauley, Jr. at a tax sale. Over a century later, the Pennsylvania Game Commission, a successor in interest to McCauley, initiated litigation to determine ownership of various tracts of land in central Pennsylvania. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals asked the Pennsylvania Supreme Court whether the 1908 tax sale constituted a title wash, thereby divesting the owners of the Haines Warrant’s subsurface estate of their interest.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania found that McCauley was acting as an agent for Central Pennsylvania Lumber Company (CPLC) when he purchased the Haines Warrant at the tax sale. The District Court determined that CPLC had a duty to pay the delinquent 1907 taxes, which led to the 1908 tax sale, and thus was barred under the Powell Rule from purchasing more than its prior interest in the Haines Warrant’s surface estate. The court concluded that McCauley’s purchase acted only as a redemption of CPLC’s prior surface interest, leaving the Proctor heirs’ interest in the subsurface estate intact.The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the 1908 tax sale did not constitute a title wash. The Court determined that owners of unseated land had a duty to pay taxes levied on their property, and McCauley’s purchase, as an agent of CPLC, operated merely as a payment of the taxes owed, not as a title wash. Therefore, the purchase did not divest the Proctor heirs of their interest in the Haines Warrant’s subsurface estate. The Court answered the certified question in the negative, affirming that the Proctor heirs retained their subsurface rights. View "Commonwealth v. Proctor" on Justia Law

A contractor, Flintco, LLC, entered into a subcontract with Total Installation Management Specialists, Inc. (Total) for flooring work on a construction project at Oklahoma State University. Total was required to secure a performance bond from Oklahoma Surety Company (OSC). Flintco later supplemented Total's workforce due to delays and performance issues but did not notify OSC until five weeks after taking over the work.The Tulsa County District Court ruled in favor of Flintco, awarding damages against Total and OSC. OSC appealed, arguing that Flintco failed to meet the performance bond's conditions requiring a declaration of default and reasonable notice before assuming control of the work. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the district court's judgment, finding that the notice requirement was a mandatory condition precedent, and Flintco's failure to provide timely notice relieved OSC of liability.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case and agreed with the Court of Civil Appeals. The court held that the performance bond's notice requirement constituted a mandatory condition precedent. Flintco's failure to provide timely notice to OSC so it could exercise its performance options under the bond relieved OSC from liability. The court vacated the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion, reversed the district court's judgment, and remanded the case with instructions to enter judgment consistent with this decision. The trial court's judgments against Total were not affected by this decision. View "Flintco, LLC v Total Installation Management Specialists, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between a railroad company and La Plata County over land use changes made by the railroad at its Rockwood Station. The railroad made several modifications to accommodate increased passenger traffic, including enlarging a parking lot and adding portable toilets and tents. The County claimed these changes violated its land use code and demanded compliance or corrective action.The railroad initially sought a declaratory judgment and an injunction in La Plata County District Court, arguing that the County lacked jurisdiction over its operations. While this case was pending, the County petitioned the Colorado Public Utilities Commission (PUC) for a declaratory ruling that the changes required compliance with the County's land use code. The PUC accepted the petition, and an administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that the changes constituted "extensions, betterments, or additions" under the relevant statute, thus requiring compliance with the County's code. The PUC upheld the ALJ's decision, and the district court affirmed the PUC's ruling.The Colorado Supreme Court reviewed the case and addressed several issues raised by the railroad. The court concluded that the PUC had jurisdiction to interpret the relevant land use statute, the County had standing to petition the PUC, and the PUC did not violate the railroad's due process rights. The court also found that the PUC's determination that the changes constituted "extensions, betterments, or additions" was just and reasonable and supported by the evidence. Consequently, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment upholding the PUC's decision. View "Am. Heritage Ry.s v. Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm'n" on Justia Law

The Town of Firestone applied for conditional groundwater rights and an augmentation plan to support its growing water needs. The application included five well fields, but Firestone did not provide specific well locations for three of these fields, instead proposing to use the water court's retained jurisdiction to provide more specific details later. St. Vrain Sanitation District opposed the application, arguing that Firestone's lack of specific well locations made its depletion calculations unreliable and that relying on retained jurisdiction to prove non-injury later was legally impermissible.The District Court for Water Division 1 partially granted St. Vrain's motion to dismiss, finding that Firestone's evidence was insufficient to establish that the proposed well fields would not injure senior water rights holders. The court dismissed without prejudice the claims for the three well fields with unspecified locations and declined to retain jurisdiction, as it could not make a threshold finding of non-injury. The court also allowed St. Vrain to contest the non-injury issue at trial, despite a prior conditional stipulation.The Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed the water court's decision, holding that the water court correctly evaluated the application on a case-by-case basis and did not create a new bright-line rule requiring completed wells for conditional groundwater rights. The court also upheld the water court's refusal to retain jurisdiction without a non-injury finding and found no abuse of discretion in allowing St. Vrain to contest the non-injury issue. The Supreme Court concluded that the water court's factual findings were supported by the trial record and were not clearly erroneous. View "Town of Firestone v. BCL Colo., LP" on Justia Law

The case involves Billings County and its commissioners, who appealed a district court's decision to grant a preliminary injunction preventing them from entering the property of Sandra Short, David Short, Donald Short, and Sarah Sarbacker. The dispute centers on the County's attempt to use eminent domain to construct a bridge over the Little Missouri River, known as the Little Missouri River Crossing (LMRC). The Shorts had previously settled a lawsuit with the County in 2021, where the County agreed not to pursue eminent domain for the LMRC project. Despite this, a newly elected Board of Commissioners decided to proceed with the project in 2023, leading the Shorts to file a new lawsuit.The United States District Court for the District of North Dakota granted a preliminary injunction in favor of the Shorts, finding that they were likely to succeed on their breach-of-contract claim based on the Settlement Agreement. The court refrained from deciding on the validity of the Settlement Agreement, leaving that issue for the state court to address. The district court also stayed its proceedings, pending the outcome of the state court case, and denied the County's motion to dismiss without prejudice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and vacated the preliminary injunction. The appellate court held that the County could not lawfully contract away its power of eminent domain, as it is an essential attribute of sovereignty. The court concluded that the Settlement Agreement was contrary to law and that the Shorts were not likely to succeed on their breach-of-contract claim. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Short v. Billings County" on Justia Law

Rick Holloway and John Hoskin entered into a Commercial Sales Agreement to purchase the UXU Resort Ranch from Hidden Creek Outfitters, LLC. The sale included a special use permit from the U.S.D.A. Forest Service, which required a bridge inspection and load test before transfer. Due to the inspection's delay, the parties postponed closing and placed $200,000 in escrow for bridge-related expenses. After inspections, Park County Title released the escrow funds to Hidden Creek without H&H's consent, despite unresolved bridge issues.The District Court of Park County found that Hidden Creek and H&H each breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and Park County Title breached the escrow agreement by releasing funds without H&H's approval. However, the court determined H&H failed to prove actual damages with sufficient certainty, awarding only nominal damages. The court also denied attorney’s fees to all parties.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's findings. The court held that H&H did not prove actual damages because the inspections did not conclusively identify necessary or required repairs. The court also upheld the denial of attorney’s fees, finding no abuse of discretion, as both parties bore some fault in the litigation. The Supreme Court denied any attorney’s fees associated with the appeal. View "Holloway v. Hidden Creek Outfitters, LLC" on Justia Law