Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Appellees Gordon Tait and Michelle Janz plan to build a residence at the base of their property adjacent to Whitefish Lake. The proposed access to their home is a narrow dirt road that crosses both Appellees’ and Appellants’ lots, part of an express easement allowing all lot owners to use the road. Appellants challenged this use, arguing the easement was intended only for summer access to the lake, not for regular travel to a residence, and that their properties would be unduly burdened by the construction.The Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County, ruled in favor of Appellees, determining the easement’s language was specific and did not prohibit year-round use of the road. The court granted summary judgment to Appellees, leading to this appeal.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court examined the easement’s language and found it unambiguous regarding year-round use. The easement explicitly permitted motor vehicle traffic across a ten-foot right of way without seasonal limitations. The court noted that while the easement limited shared maintenance costs to summer use, it did not restrict the road’s use to summer months only. The court also found no basis to prohibit the use of the road for constructing a residence, as the easement did not limit the type of access provided.The court affirmed the District Court’s decision, holding that the easement allowed year-round use and did not restrict the road’s use to accessing only non-residential structures. Concerns about potential overburdening of the easement due to construction were deemed speculative and not ripe for adjudication. View "Archer v. Tait" on Justia Law

Donald Fleming filed a lawsuit against Caribou Creek Log Homes, Inc. and North Idaho Insulation, LLC, alleging that spray foam insulation installed by North Idaho Insulation caused significant structural damage to his residence in Montana. Fleming's claims included negligence, violations of residential construction defect statutes, the Montana Consumer Protection Act, and breach of warranties. North Idaho Insulation then filed a third-party complaint against Southwest Distributing Co. (Southwest), alleging that Southwest manufactured and sold the defective spray foam insulation and seeking indemnification and contribution.The Montana Nineteenth Judicial District Court denied Southwest's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, concluding that it had specific personal jurisdiction over Southwest under Montana Rule of Civil Procedure 4(b)(1). Southwest then petitioned the Montana Supreme Court for a writ of supervisory control, arguing that the District Court erred in its jurisdictional ruling.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that the District Court erred in concluding it had specific personal jurisdiction over Southwest. The Supreme Court found that Southwest did not transact business in Montana related to the claims and that the claims did not arise from Southwest's activities in Montana. Additionally, the Court held that the stream-of-commerce theory did not apply, as Southwest did not purposefully direct its activities toward Montana. Consequently, the Supreme Court granted the petition for a writ of supervisory control, reversed the District Court's order, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Southwest v. 19th Judicial Dist." on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over an unrecorded parking agreement related to an office building, hotel, and parking garage in downtown San Antonio. The agreement, executed in 2005, reserved parking spaces in the garage for the office building's occupants and was intended to run with the land. However, it was not recorded in the county's real property records. In 2006, HEI San Antonio Hotel, LP purchased the garage and hotel, financing the purchase through a loan from Merrill Lynch, which was aware of the parking agreement. In 2008, Cypress Real Estate Advisors, through its entity CRVI Crowne Plaza, purchased a note from Merrill Lynch but did not inquire about the parking agreement despite having access to relevant documents.The trial court ruled that the parking agreement was an enforceable easement and rejected the lender's and its affiliate's bona fide purchaser defenses. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth District of Texas agreed that the agreement was an easement but concluded that the lender took the loan without notice of the easement, thus sheltering its affiliate from enforcement.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and agreed with both lower courts that the parking agreement is an easement. However, it disagreed with the Court of Appeals regarding the notice issue. The Supreme Court concluded that both the lender and its affiliated owner had sufficient notice to remove any bona fide purchaser protection. Therefore, the easement was enforceable against the affiliated owner.The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "425 SOLEDAD, LTD. v. CRVI RIVERWALK HOSPITALITY, LLC" on Justia Law

Kenneth Hahn, who owns a non-participating royalty interest (NPRI) in a mineral estate leased by ConocoPhillips, disputed the amount of royalty owed to him. Hahn's NPRI was initially set at a fixed 1/8 share of production. The case centered on whether this share was reduced when Hahn ratified a subsequent lease by the mineral estate owner, which included its own royalty term, or when he signed a stipulation and cross-conveyance agreeing to accept a different royalty.The trial court denied Hahn's motion for partial summary judgment and granted the Gipses' motion, declaring that Hahn's NPRI was a floating fraction of the landowner's royalty. Hahn appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Hahn's NPRI was a fixed 1/8 share and that the stipulation could not alter this interest. The case was remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the trial court again ruled in favor of ConocoPhillips, declaring that Hahn's ratification of the lease subjected his NPRI to the lease's royalty provision. Hahn appealed again.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and agreed with the Court of Appeals that Hahn's ratification of the lease did not reduce his NPRI from a fixed to a floating fraction. However, the Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals regarding the stipulation and cross-conveyance. The Court held that the stipulation did effectively reduce Hahn's NPRI by conveying part of it to the mineral fee owner. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment in part and rendered judgment that ConocoPhillips correctly calculated Hahn's share of proceeds from the production on the pooled unit. View "CONOCOPHILLIPS COMPANY v. HAHN" on Justia Law

The plaintiff filed a complaint in the Land Court regarding a property in Duxbury, claiming ownership following a foreclosure sale. The defendants, who had executed a mortgage in favor of the plaintiff's predecessor, refused to vacate the property. The Land Court judge ruled in favor of the plaintiff, declaring them the lawful owner. The defendants appealed this decision.Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a summary process complaint in the Housing Court to gain possession of the property and requested use and occupancy payments from the defendants during the litigation. The Housing Court judge granted this request but stayed the proceedings pending the appeal of the Land Court judgment. The defendants sought interlocutory relief from a single justice of the Appeals Court, who vacated the Housing Court's order, stating that the Housing Court judge had not determined ownership.The plaintiff renewed their motion in the Housing Court, which was again granted, with the judge explicitly relying on the Land Court's judgment under the doctrine of res judicata. The defendants again sought relief from the single justice, who vacated the order, arguing that the Housing Court judge's reliance on the appealed Land Court judgment was improper. The plaintiff was granted leave to appeal to a full panel of the Appeals Court, and the Supreme Judicial Court transferred the case on its own motion.The Supreme Judicial Court held that a judge hearing a summary process action for possession may rely on a final judgment of the Land Court regarding ownership, even if an appeal is pending. The court confirmed that the Land Court's judgment had preclusive effect, allowing the Housing Court judge to order interim use and occupancy payments. The order of the single justice was reversed, and the defendants' petition for relief was denied. View "TJR Services LLC v. Hutchinson" on Justia Law

In 2020, Bryce D. Hovannisian and Lindsay E. Hovannisian purchased several tax-defaulted properties at a tax sale from the City of Fresno. Prior to the sale, the City had recorded special assessments for nuisance abatement costs and unpaid penalties against these properties. After the purchase, the County of Fresno issued tax bills to the appellants, which included these special assessments. The appellants sought to pay only the portion of the tax bills excluding the special assessments, arguing that the tax sale should have removed these liens. The County rejected their partial payments, leading the appellants to sue the City and the County to quiet title to the properties.The Superior Court of Fresno County sustained three separate demurrers filed by the City and the County, asserting that Revenue and Taxation Code section 4807 barred the suit as it impeded tax collection. The court granted leave to amend after the first two demurrers but denied it after the third. The court found that the appellants were required to pay the taxes and then seek a refund, rather than challenging the assessments prepayment.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's ruling. The appellate court held that the special assessments were collected at the same time and in the same manner as county taxes, thus falling under the definition of "taxes" in section 4801. Consequently, section 4807 barred the appellants' prepayment suit. The court also found that the appellants had an adequate remedy at law through a refund action, which precluded them from seeking equitable relief. The judgment of the lower court was affirmed, and the appellants were directed to pay the taxes and seek a refund if necessary. View "Hovannisian v. City of Fresno" on Justia Law

Craig Baugh acquired a 20-acre tract of land in 1983 and another adjoining 20-acre tract in 1993, both located in a remote, forested area in Flathead County, Montana. In 2006, Baugh consolidated and subdivided the 40-acre aggregate into two new 20-acre tracts (Tract 1 and Tract 2) by certificate of survey (COS), which included a 20-foot wide access and utility easement on an existing road. Baugh sold Tract 2 to Florian Skyland in 2019, who later sold it to H2S2, LLC. H2S2 planned to develop a 32-unit short-term "glamping" business on Tract 2, which Baugh opposed, leading to a lawsuit.The District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, Flathead County, initially denied Baugh's request for a preliminary injunction but later granted summary judgment in his favor. The court concluded that H2S2's planned commercial use of the easement would exceed the intended scope of the easement, which was meant for single-family residential use. The court permanently enjoined H2S2's planned use and awarded Baugh prevailing party attorney fees, deeming H2S2's counterclaims for damages as frivolous.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's summary judgment that H2S2's proposed commercial use exceeded the authorized scope of the express easement. The court held that the easement's intended use was limited to single-family residential purposes, and H2S2's planned commercial use would significantly exceed this scope. However, the Supreme Court reversed the District Court's award of attorney fees to Baugh, concluding that the central issue was a bona fide dispute on the merits of the permissible use and scope of the easement, and thus, H2S2's counterclaims were not frivolous. The case was remanded for entry of a corresponding final judgment. View "Baugh v. H2S2, LLC" on Justia Law

Eric Woolard and Breonna Hall, residents of Greenhouse Condominiums, were involved in a physical altercation with their neighbors, Eric Smith and Stacy Thorne, in December 2019. Smith and Thorne sued Woolard, Hall, and Regent Real Estate Services, Inc. (Regent), the management company, for negligence and other claims. Woolard and Hall filed a cross-complaint against Regent and Greenhouse Community Association (Greenhouse), alleging negligence and other claims, asserting that Regent and Greenhouse failed to address ongoing harassment by neighbors, which led to the altercation.The Superior Court of Orange County granted summary judgment in favor of Regent and Greenhouse, finding no duty of care owed by them to intervene in the neighbor dispute or prevent the altercation. Woolard and Hall's motions to disqualify the trial judge were denied, and they did not seek writ review of these rulings.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the summary judgment, agreeing that Regent and Greenhouse had no duty to intervene in the neighbor dispute or prevent the altercation. The court found that Woolard and Hall failed to establish a legal duty of care breached by Regent and Greenhouse. Additionally, the court noted that claims of housing discrimination were not supported by evidence and were not properly raised as a separate cause of action. The court also held that the disqualification motions were not reviewable on appeal. The judgment in favor of Regent and Greenhouse was affirmed, and they were entitled to their costs on appeal. View "Woolard v. Regent Real Estate Services" on Justia Law

Curtis Park Group, LLC (Curtis Park) encountered a significant issue during the construction of a new development called S*Park, which included five buildings supported by a single concrete slab. The slab began to sag due to construction defects, and Curtis Park hired a consultant to determine the cause and necessary repairs. The repairs cost $2,857,157.78, which were fronted by the general contractor, Milender White, as per their agreement. Curtis Park had a builder’s risk insurance policy with Allied World Specialty Insurance Company (Allied World) but did not include Milender White or subcontractors as named insureds.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado reviewed the case, where Curtis Park sued Allied World for breach of contract and bad faith after Allied World denied coverage for the repair costs. The district court ruled that Curtis Park could seek coverage for the repair costs even though Milender White had absorbed these costs. The jury found in favor of Curtis Park on the breach-of-contract and statutory bad-faith claims but not on the common-law bad-faith claim. Allied World’s motions for a new trial and judgment as a matter of law were denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court erred in interpreting the insurance policy to allow Curtis Park to recover repair costs it had not paid and had no obligation to pay. The policy explicitly limited recovery to the amount the named insured (Curtis Park) actually spent on repairs. The Tenth Circuit reversed the jury’s verdict and remanded for a new trial, instructing that Curtis Park cannot recover the costs of repair that it did not pay. The court also vacated the remainder of the judgment and remanded for a new trial on all other issues. View "Curtis Park Group v. Allied World Specialty Insurance Company" on Justia Law

An entity that owns and holds a loan agreement, including its note and the beneficiary interest in the security instrument, sought to foreclose on a property after borrowers failed to make required payments on the note. The entity entered a judgment for non-judicial foreclosure.The district court denied the borrowers’ motion for an extension of time, adopted the magistrate judge’s report recommending summary judgment against the borrowers, entered a declaratory judgment, and denied the borrowers’ motion for an altered judgment, which was styled as a motion for a new trial. The borrowers challenged the district court’s orders, alleging abuse of discretion and plain error.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for an extension of time or the motion for a new trial. However, the appellate court found that the district court erred in determining that the entity did not manifest an unequivocal intent to abandon acceleration. The appellate court held that the notice sent by the entity unequivocally manifested an intent to abandon acceleration, as it expressly withdrew, canceled, and abandoned any prior demands or notices of acceleration.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decisions in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The court directed the district court to address whether the lender must seek a new order authorizing foreclosure following the abandonment of acceleration. View "US Bank Trust National v. Walden" on Justia Law