Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The plaintiffs, including a state commission and two tenants, alleged that the owner and management of an apartment complex discriminated against them by refusing to allow two emotional support dogs, despite a general no-pet policy. The tenants had previously lived at another complex that allowed both dogs as emotional support animals. Upon applying to the new complex, they provided documentation for the accommodation, but the defendants only approved one dog and requested further justification for the second. After the tenants objected to the additional requests, the defendants cancelled their lease and refunded their payments. The tenants subsequently found other housing.The Superior Court found for the plaintiffs, holding that the defendants had discriminated against the tenants by constructively denying their request for a reasonable accommodation, in violation of Connecticut's fair housing law. The court determined that the tenants had established the required elements for a failure-to-accommodate claim, specifically finding that one plaintiff was “regarded as” having a mental disability by the defendants.The defendants appealed to the Connecticut Appellate Court, which reversed the trial court’s judgment. The Appellate Court found that, although the plaintiff was regarded as having a disability, there was insufficient proof that the second dog was necessary for equal use and enjoyment of the dwelling. The Appellate Court also interpreted the trial court’s findings as implicitly determining that the plaintiff had a "record of" a disability.On further appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the reversal of the trial court’s judgment but vacated portions of the Appellate Court’s decision that addressed whether there was a “record of” disability and the legal standard for “necessity” of an accommodation. The Connecticut Supreme Court held that, because the trial court only found the plaintiff was "regarded as" having a disability, she was not entitled to a reasonable accommodation. View "Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities ex rel. Pizzoferrato v. Mansions, LLC" on Justia Law

A renewable energy developer spent several years and millions of dollars planning a large wind turbine project across numerous parcels in Worth County, Iowa. The developer did not select a turbine model or finalize the number and placement of turbines, nor did it apply for or secure any county permits for the construction or operation of the turbines. The only permits obtained related to meteorological towers. While the developer’s preliminary activities were extensive, they did not include actual construction of any turbines. At the time, part of the county was zoned, but most was unzoned and did not require permits for such projects.Public opinion shifted against wind energy development, leading to the election of new county supervisors. In response, the Worth County Board of Supervisors imposed a temporary moratorium on commercial wind energy systems while drafting new regulations. Eventually, the Board enacted an ordinance imposing setbacks, maximum turbine heights, noise limits, and shadow flicker restrictions. Rather than seeking waivers or adapting the project to the new rules, the developer filed suit, arguing it had vested rights under the prior regulatory framework and that the county acted in bad faith. After a bench trial, the Iowa District Court for Worth County ruled for the developer, finding both vested rights and bad faith.The Supreme Court of Iowa reviewed the case de novo and reversed the district court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that, under Iowa law, the vested rights doctrine applies only where a developer has obtained a permit or formal governmental approval for the project. Since the developer had not applied for or received such approval for the turbines, no vested rights existed. The court further found no evidence of illegality or improper purpose in the county’s actions, rejecting the bad faith claim. The court remanded the case for further proceedings on any remaining claims. View "Worthwhile Wind, LLC v. Worth County Board of Supervisors" on Justia Law

NC Enterprises, L.L.C. maintained and landscaped two parcels of land in Tallmadge, Ohio, adjacent to its own property, for many years. Although Norfolk Southern Railway Company held title to these parcels, NC Enterprises regularly hired contractors to mow, weed, fertilize, trim, and otherwise care for the land from shortly after acquiring its own property in 1997 through 2021. In September 2000, NC Enterprises erected a fence on the parcels, and later, in 2011, installed drainage pipes. NC Enterprises believed it owned the parcels until Norfolk Southern posted for-sale signs in 2021. Norfolk Southern paid property taxes on the parcels throughout the relevant period.After Norfolk Southern refuted NC Enterprises’ claim of adverse possession in 2020, NC Enterprises filed suit in the Summit County Court of Common Pleas, seeking a declaratory judgment of adverse possession, quiet title, and damages for unjust enrichment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of NC Enterprises on the adverse possession claim, finding that it had proven, by clear and convincing evidence, exclusive, open, notorious, continuous, and adverse use for at least 21 years. Norfolk Southern appealed, and the Ninth District Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that NC Enterprises’ landscaping and maintenance, combined with other acts, sufficed to establish adverse possession.The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the judgment of the Ninth District Court of Appeals. The court held that NC Enterprises failed to prove that its use of the parcels was open and notorious for the required 21-year period. Specifically, the court concluded that ordinary lawn maintenance, such as mowing and trimming, is not sufficiently obvious or apparent to put the title owner on notice of adverse possession. As a result, summary judgment in favor of NC Enterprises was improper, and the case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "NC Ents., L.L.C. v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co." on Justia Law

A property owner sought permission from San Luis Obispo County to construct single-family homes on several lots in Los Osos, an already developed coastal community. The County granted the permit, concluding the homes were an appropriate use under local zoning. However, the California Coastal Commission appealed the County’s decision to itself and denied the permit, asserting that it had appellate jurisdiction because the proposed development was situated in a sensitive coastal resource area (SCRA) under the County’s local coastal program (LCP), and because the site was designated for more than one principal permitted use.After the Commission's denial, the property owner filed a petition for a writ of administrative mandate in San Luis Obispo County Superior Court, contending the Commission lacked appellate jurisdiction on both grounds. The superior court sided with the Commission on the SCRA issue but rejected the Commission’s alternative jurisdictional basis. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal affirmed, holding the Commission properly exercised appellate jurisdiction based on the SCRA designation and did not address the alternative argument.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case and clarified several important principles. It held that courts must exercise independent judgment—not deferential review—when determining the Commission’s appellate jurisdiction if the matter turns on legal interpretation of an LCP. The court further held that, where the Commission and a local government offer conflicting interpretations of an LCP, judicial deference to either is unwarranted when no interpretive advantage is clearly established. Examining the LCP, the court found that the proposed development was not in an SCRA as designated by the LCP. It also ruled the Commission does not have appellate jurisdiction solely because a site has multiple principal permitted uses; jurisdiction arises only if the proposed use is not among those principal permitted. The judgment of the Court of Appeal was reversed. View "Shear Development Co. v. Cal. Coastal Com." on Justia Law

The plaintiff acquired property in Exeter, Rhode Island, in 1997 and later sought to develop a solar farm on it. To proceed, he needed legal access from a public road. A town map suggested such access via an extension of Estate Drive, but in reality, no road existed there—only undeveloped woods, which the town considered a “paper street.” The plaintiff attempted to clear and gravel the area without town approval, prompting the town to block access and send a cease-and-desist letter. The planning board denied his development application, and the zoning board affirmed. The plaintiff then filed multiple lawsuits, including one seeking a declaration that the disputed area was a public road, and later, claims for due process violations and, after losing on the road status issue, for adverse possession and related theories regarding ownership and access.The Superior Court first denied the town’s motion for judgment on the pleadings in the due process case and then denied the town’s motion to dismiss the adverse possession case. The trial justice reasoned that res judicata and collateral estoppel did not apply because, in her view, the facts and legal theories in the new cases were different from the previously litigated issues, such as whether the area was a public road. She further concluded that the town had acquiesced to separate lawsuits and that Davis was not barred from asserting inconsistent or alternative claims in later litigation.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed both cases on certiorari. The Court held that res judicata barred the plaintiff’s claims because all arose from the same set of facts concerning access to the disputed area and could have been raised in the initial litigation. The Court further concluded that collateral estoppel and judicial estoppel also precluded the plaintiff’s adverse possession and related claims, as key factual issues had already been determined. The Court quashed the Superior Court’s orders and remanded for dismissal of both cases. View "Davis v. Wood Estates, Inc." on Justia Law

A California company repurposed decommissioned military bunkers in South Dakota as survival shelters, offering them for sale or long-term lease. In 2020, an individual entered into a 99-year lease with the company for one of these bunkers, paying $35,000 upfront. The lease agreement incorporated a set of community rules, which the company reserved the right to modify with 30 days’ written notice. In 2021, the company amended the rules to expressly prohibit the brandishing of firearms except in designated areas. In 2023, the lessee was alleged to have brandished a firearm during an altercation, prompting the company to issue notices to vacate and, ultimately, to file a forcible entry and detainer action when the lessee secured the bunker but refused to return possession.The Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit in Fall River County granted summary judgment in favor of the lessee. The court reasoned that the lease was illusory because the company could unilaterally modify the rules at any time, leaving the lessee with no recourse. The court concluded that this rendered the entire lease void and unenforceable, thereby preventing the company from evicting the lessee under the lease.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reversed the circuit court’s summary judgment order. The Supreme Court held that the lease agreement was supported by valid consideration and was not illusory merely because the company retained the right to modify community rules, as such modifications were constrained by requirements of reasonableness and good faith. The Court ruled that the ability to modify rules, when exercised subject to notice and implied duties of good faith and fair dealing, does not make the underlying contract unenforceable. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Vivos Xpoint v. Sindorf" on Justia Law

Two business partners were traveling on Interstate 65 in Kentucky when their rental car hydroplaned during a heavy rainstorm, resulting in a crash that killed one partner and seriously injured the other. The decedent’s widow, on behalf of herself, her children, and her husband’s estate, along with the surviving partner, brought suit against the engineering firms responsible for the design of a highway-widening project completed years earlier. The plaintiffs alleged that the engineers negligently designed the widened highway, causing increased water pooling and a greater risk of hydroplaning in the area where the accident occurred.The Fayette Circuit Court granted summary judgment for the engineers, holding that they were immune from suit as contractors for a governmental entity and that the claims were preempted by federal law because the design complied with required state and federal standards. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that contractors do not automatically share the immunity of the state, that government approval of the design did not insulate the engineers from potential liability for negligent design, and that the state negligence and wrongful death claims were not preempted by federal law.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the Court of Appeals. It held that private engineering firms hired by a state agency are not entitled to the Commonwealth’s sovereign or derivative immunity simply by virtue of their contract. The court also found that summary judgment was inappropriate on the ground of the engineers’ work being “mandated” by the government because there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the design was required or whether the engineers exercised independent judgment. Finally, the court held that Kentucky’s negligence and wrongful death claims were not preempted by federal law, as the state claims did not impose standards more stringent than those required by federal regulations. View "HMB PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS, INC. V. IVES" on Justia Law

A dispute arose over the 2016 property tax assessment for a hotel located at Kansas City International Airport. Grady Hotel Investments, LLC purchased the hotel improvements but not the land, which remained owned by the City of Kansas City. As the City is exempt from property taxes, Grady was taxed only on its possessory interest in the hotel improvements. The Platte County assessor valued the property at over $11 million, which was raised to more than $13 million by the Platte County Board of Equalization. On appeal, a State Tax Commission (STC) hearing officer reduced the value, and the full STC ultimately valued it at $0, using a method applicable to leaseholds. The assessor challenged this, and the circuit court found the STC’s valuation method inapplicable, determining Grady owned the improvements rather than holding a leasehold.The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s conclusion that Grady held an ownership interest, not a mere leasehold, and remanded the case for a new valuation. On remand, the STC valued the property at over $6 million. The assessor and Park Hill School District appealed, raising constitutional challenges to the valuation statute, section 137.115.1, arguing it violated provisions of the Missouri Constitution related to due process, tax exemptions, uniformity, and special privileges.The Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed the case. It held that Park Hill School District lacked standing to challenge the assessment, as its interest in potential funding loss did not confer standing to contest another’s property valuation. The assessor also lacked standing to assert claims under due process and special privilege provisions because, as a political actor, he was not protected by those constitutional rights. However, the assessor did have standing to challenge the statute under the tax exemption and uniformity provisions. The court held that section 137.115.1 neither creates an unconstitutional tax exemption nor violates the uniformity clause. The circuit court’s judgment was affirmed. View "Cox vs. Grady Hotel Investments, LLC" on Justia Law

Several New Mexico landowners, holding title to non-navigable streambeds, asserted that they once had the right to exclude the public from walking or wading in these streambeds. They alleged that a recent decision by the New Mexico Supreme Court eliminated this right, amounting to a judicial taking without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The relevant background includes longstanding provisions in New Mexico law declaring all natural waters in the state to be public, subsequent proclamations and statutes requiring permission to access private streambeds, and a 2022 New Mexico Supreme Court decision which clarified that the public had a right to walk and wade in the beds of public water crossing private land, so long as such use was reasonably necessary and minimally invasive.The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico dismissed the landowners’ complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court found that the plaintiffs lacked standing because their injuries were not traceable to enforcement by the named state officials, but rather to the New Mexico Supreme Court's decision. The district court also concluded that the claims were barred by sovereign immunity, reasoning that any relief would require payments from the state treasury.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the landowners did have standing, as they faced a credible threat of enforcement by the state officials, and their injuries were traceable to those officials and redressable through prospective relief. The Tenth Circuit also determined that sovereign immunity did not bar the claims and that no abstention or jurisdictional doctrine prevented adjudication.Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal on alternative grounds, holding that the landowners failed to state a claim for a Fifth Amendment taking. The court concluded that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated an established property right to exclude the public from the streambeds, but rather that the New Mexico Supreme Court had merely clarified the scope of the public’s preexisting easement. View "Sanchez v. Torrez" on Justia Law

Three neighbors who own properties in a Wells subdivision hold easement rights over a ten-foot-wide right-of-way that crosses the property of another couple, the Linds, to access the Webhannet River. One neighbor’s deed includes the easement, while another’s does not, but the trial court determined both benefit from an implied easement and Maine's “paper streets” statutes. In 2023, the Linds installed a split-rail fence along the center of the right-of-way and constructed a driveway partly within it. The neighbors, who use the easement to carry items such as kayaks to the river, claimed that the fence and parked vehicles unreasonably interfered with their easement rights.The neighbors filed suit in the York County Superior Court, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The court required joinder of another abutting property owner, then considered cross-motions for summary judgment. It concluded that while the Linds’ parking vehicles in the right-of-way did materially impair pedestrian access and thus interfered with the easement, the split-rail fence did not, as the neighbors could still access the river. The court denied the neighbors’ request for summary judgment and granted the Linds’ in part, resulting in a final judgment after dismissal of another claim.On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the summary judgment ruling de novo. The court held that the fence, by splitting the right-of-way and reducing practical access to half its width, unreasonably interfered with the neighbors’ easement rights as a matter of law, even if some access remained. It distinguished prior precedent involving minor obstructions and reaffirmed that easement holders are entitled to use the full described width for the easement’s purposes. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings on injunctive relief. View "Lytle v. Lind" on Justia Law