Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves a worker, Jake Johnson, who was injured while working as an electrician on a construction project managed by CBRE and owned by Property Reserve, Inc. (PRI). Johnson was employed by PCF Electric, a subcontractor hired by Crew Builders, the general contractor for the project. Johnson filed a complaint against CBRE, PRI, Crew, and PCF for damages. CBRE and PRI moved for summary judgment based on the Privette doctrine, which generally protects entities that hire independent contractors from liability for injuries sustained by the employees of the independent contractor. The trial court denied the motion, finding a triable issue of fact as to when CBRE and PRI hired Crew for the project.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, disagreed with the trial court's decision. The appellate court found that a written contract was not required to invoke the Privette doctrine, and the undisputed facts established that CBRE and PRI delegated control over the tenant improvements to Crew prior to Johnson’s injury. The court also found that no exception to the Privette doctrine applied. The court concluded that because no triable issues of material fact precluded summary judgment, CBRE and PRI were entitled to relief. The court ordered the trial court to vacate its previous order and enter a new one granting summary judgment to CBRE and PRI. View "CBRE v. Superior Court of San Diego County" on Justia Law

A group of residents and a church, collectively referred to as the "Neighbors," sued Ghassan Korban, the Executive Director of the Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans (SWB), for damages caused to their properties during a drainage project. The Neighbors won a judgment for inverse condemnation, but the SWB did not pay. The Neighbors then filed a federal lawsuit, which was dismissed. They subsequently filed a state lawsuit seeking a writ of mandamus to compel payment of the judgment. The district court dismissed the case, but the appellate court reversed, finding that the payment of a judgment for inverse condemnation is a ministerial duty and can be enforced via a writ of mandamus.The Supreme Court of Louisiana affirmed the appellate court's decision. The court found that the federal lawsuit did not bar the state lawsuit under the doctrine of res judicata because the federal court would have declined to exercise jurisdiction over the state mandamus claim. The court also found that the Neighbors had stated a valid cause of action for a writ of mandamus. The court held that the payment of a judgment based on inverse condemnation under the Louisiana Constitution is a ministerial duty and can be enforced via a writ of mandamus. The court remanded the case to the district court to devise a plan for satisfying the judgment within a reasonable period of time. View "WATSON MEMORIAL SPIRITUAL TEMPLE OF CHRIST V. KORBAN" on Justia Law

The case involves Scott and Natalie Pinkham, who contracted with Three Peaks Homes, LLC, for the construction of a custom home. The construction did not go as planned and the contract was terminated before the home was completed. Three Peaks subsequently filed two $600,000 mechanics’ liens against the Pinkhams’ home. The Pinkhams then filed a complaint against David Plate, Rebeccah Jensen, Three Peaks, Rebel Crew Construction, LLC, and Legacy Management Enterprises, LLC, asserting several causes of action.The district court denied the Pinkhams’ motion for summary judgment. Later, the Pinkhams’ attorney, Lance Schuster, filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for Plate, Jensen, Three Peaks, and Legacy, which the court granted. The court ordered Appellants to appoint another attorney or appear in person within twenty-one days of service of the order, failing which, the court may enter default judgment against them. The court clerk served a copy of the withdrawal order on Appellants via first class mail.The Pinkhams moved for the entry of default and default judgment against Appellants and for dismissal of Appellants’ counterclaims with prejudice. The district court granted the Pinkhams’ motion without a hearing. Appellants later secured new counsel and filed a motion to set aside the default and default judgment under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1), (4), and (6). The district court denied Appellants’ motion.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court’s decision denying the motion to set aside the default and default judgment. The court held that the district court did not err in concluding that Appellants failed to demonstrate good cause to set aside the entry of default. The court also held that Appellants have failed to establish a right to relief under Rule 60(b). The court declined to award attorney fees on appeal. View "Pinkham v. Plate" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over a tax sale of a property in Jackson County, Mississippi. The property was owned by Deborah Hallford, who failed to pay property taxes in 2014, leading to the property being sold at a tax sale in 2015. Pierre Thoden, a resident of New York, purchased the property at the sale. Hallford failed to redeem the property within the redemption period, and Thoden later received title after he paid the delinquent taxes for 2015-18. After learning of the tax sale, Hallford filed a complaint to set aside the tax sale, claiming that due to a lack of proper notice, the sale was void. The chancery court found in Hallford’s favor and voided the tax sale based on insufficient notice.Thoden appealed the chancery court's decision, arguing that he was entitled to a statutory lien and reimbursement for appliances, costs, and expenses on the property. The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the chancery court’s finding that the tax sale was void but held that Thoden was entitled to a hearing to present proof of his damages. The case was remanded for a hearing to determine the amount Thoden was owed as damages.On remand, the chancery court found that Thoden was unjustly enriched by the rent he collected from tenants and that he could not keep money he collected on property where he was in the nature of a trespasser. The court also found that Thoden was entitled to the amount he paid in taxes, plus interest. However, the court denied Thoden’s claim to reimbursement for his repairs on, improvements to, and maintenance of the property. Thoden appealed these findings.The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed in part and reversed and rendered in part. The court held that Thoden was entitled to a refund of his purchase price and interest on that price, and that he was not entitled to reimbursement of the cost of repairs, improvements, and maintenance. The court also held that Hallford was entitled to a $4,500 set-off. However, the court reversed the chancery court's determination that Thoden was not entitled to the taxes he paid on the property for 2015-18, and awarded Thoden $2,231.06. View "Thoden v. Hallford" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between the Estate of Ke Zhengguang and Stephany Yu, concerning the enforcement of an arbitral award issued in Hong Kong. The award was the result of a business dispute involving real estate in China. The arbitration panel ordered Yu and her two sisters to pay the Estate and Xu Hongbiao a sum of money for the losses they sustained. After Yu paid Xu his share, the Estate sought to collect the remaining half from Yu, a U.S. citizen residing in Maryland.Yu challenged the enforcement of the award in the District Court of Maryland, arguing that the court was an inconvenient forum, that necessary parties were not included in the proceedings, and that enforcing the award would violate Chinese currency control laws, thereby violating U.S. policy favoring international comity. She also argued that the judgment should be in Renminbi (RMB), as provided in the arbitral award, not in U.S. dollars. The district court rejected all of Yu's arguments and confirmed the award under the New York Convention, entering judgment in favor of the Estate against Yu in a total amount of $3.6 million.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found none of Yu's arguments persuasive and held that the district court was correct in confirming and enforcing the arbitral award. The court also held that the district court did not err in entering the judgment in U.S. dollars, as it was within its discretion to do so. View "In re Estate of Ke Zhengguang v. Yu" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas as Trustee Rali 2006QA5 (Deutsche Bank), the holder of the first deed of trust, and SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC (SFR), the purchaser of a property at a homeowners’ association (HOA) lien foreclosure sale. The dispute centers around whether the homeowner's partial payments to the HOA satisfied the superpriority lien, which would mean that the HOA foreclosure did not extinguish the first deed of trust.The district court initially granted summary judgment in favor of Deutsche Bank, finding that the homeowner's pre-foreclosure payments satisfied the superpriority lien. However, on appeal, the Supreme Court of Nevada vacated and remanded the case, instructing the district court to consider the analysis in the then recently decided case 9352 Cranesbill Trust v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. On remand, the district court ruled in favor of SFR, concluding that a portion of the superpriority lien remained unsatisfied, so the HOA foreclosure extinguished Deutsche Bank’s deed of trust.The Supreme Court of Nevada disagreed with the district court's conclusion. The court held that, unless expressly authorized by the homeowner, the HOA may not allocate a payment in a way that results in a forfeiture of the first deed of trust holder’s interest and deprives the homeowner of the security on the homeowner’s mortgage. Applying this principle to the case at hand, the court found that the homeowner's partial payments to the HOA satisfied the HOA’s superpriority lien, so the foreclosure did not extinguish Deutsche Bank’s first deed of trust. Therefore, SFR took possession of the property subject to the deed of trust. The court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded for entry of judgment for Deutsche Bank consistent with this opinion. View "Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas v. SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a transaction between the Redevelopment Agency of the City of Sparks (RDA) and a developer. The RDA transferred property to the developer for the construction of an apartment project. In exchange, the developer agreed to maintain free public parking on the property for the next 50 years. The Labor Commissioner considered this transaction as the RDA providing a "financial incentive" worth more than $100,000 to the developer, thus requiring the developer to pay prevailing wages on the project. The Labor Commissioner assessed a penalty against the RDA for not requiring the developer to pay prevailing wages.The Labor Commissioner's decision was upheld by the district court, which led to the RDA's appeal. The RDA argued that the Labor Commissioner had neither the expertise nor the statutory authority to address a dispute arising under Nevada’s Community Redevelopment Law over the valuation of interests in real property. The RDA also contended that the Labor Commissioner's interpretation of the law was incorrect.The Supreme Court of Nevada reversed the lower court's decision. The court found that the Labor Commissioner's interpretation of the law was incorrect and expanded its reach. The court held that the statute does not reference "future compensation," nor does it equate its receipt with a redevelopment agency giving a developer "financial incentives [worth] more than $100,000." The court concluded that the Labor Commissioner's decision that the RDA provided a financial incentive exceeding $100,000 to the developer lacked substantial evidence and must be reversed. The case was remanded to the district court with instructions to grant the RDA’s petition for judicial review. View "The Redevelopment Agency of the City of Sparks v. Nevada Labor Commissioner" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over water rights between James Whittaker and Whittaker Two Dot Ranch LLC (collectively "Whittaker") and Bruce and Glenda McConnell. The McConnells own seven water rights associated with their property adjacent to Lee Creek, which they historically diverted from two points: the Upper Diversion and the Lower Diversion. However, after a 2014 enforcement action by the Idaho Department of Water Resources (IDWR), the McConnells lost their ability to divert water via the Lower Diversion because they failed to claim it in the Snake River Basin Adjudication (SRBA). The McConnells subsequently filed an application to add the Lower Diversion as an authorized point of diversion to their seven water rights. Whittaker, the McConnells’ upstream neighbor, protested the application, fearing that the additional diversion point would injure his junior water rights.The IDWR hearing officer approved the McConnells’ application, determining that the transfer would not injure Whittaker’s water rights. The officer used the historic confluence of Stroud Creek and Porcupine Creek, located upstream of the Upper Diversion, for the injury analysis. Whittaker appealed to the Director of IDWR, who affirmed the hearing officer's decision. Whittaker then sought judicial review from the district court.The district court reversed the Director's decision, holding that the modern confluence, located downstream of the Upper Diversion, should be used for the injury analysis. The court found that the West Springs Ditch, which diverts water from Stroud Creek through Whittaker’s property, was an alteration of the stream flow and not an unauthorized diversion. The court concluded that approving the McConnells’ application would injure Whittaker’s water rights and held that the application could be approved subject to a condition subordinating the use of the McConnells’ Lower Diversion to Whittaker’s water right. The McConnells appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho.The Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision. The court held that the West Springs Ditch is a diversion, not an alteration, of Stroud Creek. The court also found that the West Springs Ditch is an unauthorized diversion because it was not claimed as a point of diversion in the SRBA. Therefore, the court concluded that the Director of IDWR correctly used the historic confluence for the injury analysis. The court held that the district court erred in using the modern confluence for the injury analysis and reversed the district court’s decision. View "Whittaker v. Idaho Department of Water Resources" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute over the ownership of five parcels of land in Aurora County, South Dakota. The plaintiff, Edward Mohnen, initiated a quiet title action to determine the ownership of these parcels, which were titled in his father's name after his father died intestate in 1969. The defendants included the estate of Edward's late brother, John Mohnen, and the John J. Mohnen Trust. John's Estate counterclaimed, asserting that it held a complete fee interest in all the disputed parcels through adverse possession and also asserted the affirmative defense of laches.The Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit in Aurora County, South Dakota, rejected both the laches defense and adverse possession theory. It determined ownership for the five tracts at issue, applying intestacy laws to evidence concerning the current state of record title.Upon review, the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reversed the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the lower court erred in its interpretation of the adverse possession claim under South Dakota Codified Laws (SDCL) 15-3-15. The Supreme Court clarified that SDCL 15-3-15 requires only proof of “(1) claim and color of title made in good faith, (2) ten successive years in possession, and (3) payment of all taxes legally assessed.” The court found that John's Estate met these requirements and thus, reversed the lower court's decision denying John’s Estate’s adverse possession claim under SDCL 15-3-15. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "Mohnen v. Estate of Mohnen" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over a real estate and construction contract. The plaintiffs, Myles Davis and Janelle Dahl, sued their homebuilder, Blast Properties, Inc., and Tyler Bosier, alleging breach of contract, fraud, and violations of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. The plaintiffs sought to amend their complaint to include a prayer for relief seeking punitive damages. The U.S. District Court granted the plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint, but certified a question to the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho due to inconsistencies in the interpretation of Idaho Code section 6-1604(2), which prohibits claimants from including a prayer for relief seeking punitive damages in their initial pleading.The U.S. District Court asked the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho to determine the proper means a trial court must apply when considering a motion to amend a pleading to include a prayer for relief seeking punitive damages pursuant to Idaho Code section 6-1604(2). The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho rephrased the question to clarify the obligations of a trial court under Idaho Code section 6-1604(2) when ruling upon a motion to amend a complaint or counterclaim to include a prayer for relief seeking punitive damages.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho held that section 6-1604(2) requires the trial court to conduct a careful examination of the evidence submitted by the moving party in support of its motion to amend and the arguments made to determine whether there is a "reasonable probability" that the evidence submitted is: (1) admissible at trial; and (2) "sufficient" to support an award of punitive damages. The word "sufficient" means that the claim giving rise to the request for punitive damages must be legally cognizable and the evidence presented must be substantial. The court clarified that the clear and convincing evidentiary standard is the standard for a jury, not the trial court when it is ruling on a motion to amend a pleading to include a prayer for relief seeking punitive damages. View "Davis v. Blast" on Justia Law