Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Daniel Cook, an independent contractor, was injured when he fell from an exposed, unguarded ledge while installing cabinetry in a second-story bathroom at a residential construction site owned by SMG Construction Services. Cook had previously observed the absence of a guardrail on the ledge and acknowledged this hazard in his deposition. At the time of the accident, he was moving backward toward the ledge while working. Cook sued SMG, alleging that the company failed to maintain a safe premises, which led to his injuries.The Superior Court granted summary judgment to SMG, finding that Cook had actual knowledge of the hazard and failed to exercise ordinary care for his own safety. The court concluded that Cook’s knowledge of the exposed ledge was equal to SMG’s, and therefore, SMG owed him no duty to warn or protect against the risk. On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Georgia reversed, holding that although Cook knew of the ledge, there was evidence that conditions at the site affected his ability to perceive the exact location and risk posed by the ledge. The appellate court found a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Cook’s knowledge of the hazard was equal to or greater than SMG’s.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and determined that the Court of Appeals had conflated actual and constructive knowledge, erroneously applying standards relevant to constructive knowledge. The Supreme Court held that Cook’s own testimony established his actual knowledge of the specific hazard—the unguarded ledge—that caused his injury. The Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings to address the remaining elements of SMG’s affirmative defenses in light of Cook’s actual knowledge of the hazard. View "SMG CONSTRUCTION SERVICES, LLC v. COOK" on Justia Law

A property owner and developer challenged a city’s adopted housing element, which is a required component of a local general plan in California that must identify how the city will accommodate its share of regional housing needs, including for lower-income households. The city, a charter city, used a “residential overlay” zoning approach, superimposing new residential development rights over existing commercial and industrial zones, to identify sites for affordable housing. Some of these sites were nonvacant, including parking lots serving shopping centers and a site leased to a grocery store with contractual restrictions. The developer argued that the city’s approach did not comply with state law because it did not ensure that the identified sites would realistically be developed for lower-income housing.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied the developer’s petition for writ of mandate and entered judgment for the city. The trial court found that the city’s housing element constituted a “major change in allowable land use” under the city charter, but held that state housing law preempted the charter’s voter approval requirement. The court also found the city’s use of overlay zoning and its identification of nonvacant sites to be permissible under the Housing Element Law.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reversed. The appellate court held that the city’s use of a residential overlay did not comply with Government Code section 65583.2(h)(2) because the overlay allowed development of identified sites without requiring any residential component, thus failing to meet the mandatory minimum density and residential use requirements. The court also found that the city failed to provide substantial evidence that one of the nonvacant sites, occupied by a grocery store with restrictive lease terms, was realistically available for redevelopment. The judgment was reversed and the case remanded with directions to issue a writ of mandate compelling the city to revise its housing element in compliance with state law. View "New Commune DTLA LLC v. City Redondo Beach" on Justia Law

A lessor and two lessees entered into a lease with an option to purchase a residential property in Calhoun County, Alabama. The agreement required the lessees to make monthly rent payments, annual payments, and an initial deposit, with certain payments to be credited toward the purchase price if the option was exercised. Disputes arose near the end of the lease term regarding the timeliness of the lessees’ payments and whether the lessees had complied with all contractual requirements, including providing written notice of their intent to purchase.The Calhoun Circuit Court conducted a bench trial and found that a valid lease-to-purchase contract existed, that the lessees had complied with its terms, and that the lessor still owed a mortgage on the property. The court ordered that all funds held by the parties be paid to the lessor to reduce the mortgage principal, required the lessor to satisfy the mortgage and convey clear title to the lessees by a specified date, and assigned responsibility for property taxes to the lessees. The lessor’s postjudgment motion, which challenged the findings regarding compliance and payment timeliness, was denied.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the trial court’s factual findings under the ore tenus standard, deferring to the trial court’s credibility determinations unless clearly erroneous. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s finding that the lessees had not breached the lease, concluding that the lessor’s actions had contributed to any payment delays. However, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s judgment to the extent it credited monthly rent payments toward the purchase price, holding that only the initial deposit and annual payments should be applied, as the contract unambiguously required. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this holding. View "McCain v. Sneed" on Justia Law

After a property owner defaulted on a note secured by a deed of trust, he filed for bankruptcy in 2008, and his debt was discharged in 2009. He made no further payments on the 20-year obligation. In 2018, the interest in the deed of trust was transferred to a new entity, which initiated nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings. The property owner responded by filing a quiet title action and moved for summary judgment, arguing that the six-year statute of limitations to enforce the note and foreclose on the deed of trust began running upon the bankruptcy discharge. The trial court agreed, granted summary judgment, and quieted title in favor of the property owner.The new beneficiary appealed to the Washington Court of Appeals, Division One, which affirmed the trial court’s decision in an unpublished opinion. The beneficiary’s motions for reconsideration and petitions for review to the Washington Supreme Court were denied. Shortly after, Division One issued a published opinion in Copper Creek (Marysville) Homeowners Association v. Kurtz, which expressly disagreed with the earlier decision in this case, creating a split within the division. The beneficiary then sought relief from the quiet title judgment in the trial court under CR 60(b)(11), arguing that the divisional split and subsequent legal developments justified reopening the case. The trial court denied the motion, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington held that the trial court abused its discretion by applying the wrong legal standard under CR 60(b)(11). The Supreme Court determined that the combination of legal errors, the prompt actions of the beneficiary, and the divisional split constituted extraordinary circumstances justifying relief from judgment. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court to vacate the quiet title judgment and for further proceedings. View "Luv v. W. Coast Servicing, Inc." on Justia Law

A federally recognized Indian tribe purchased a parcel of nonreservation land in Washington State using state and federal conservation grant funds, with the purpose of protecting salmon habitat and preserving tribal treaty fishing rights. The land was designated for conservation and was not part of any reservation. A neighboring landowner, a Washington corporation, claimed that it and its predecessors had acquired title to a strip of this land through adverse possession, based on decades of exclusive use and maintenance of a boundary fence. The corporation filed a quiet title action in Snohomish County Superior Court against both the tribe and the county, seeking to establish its ownership of the disputed strip.The Snohomish County Superior Court dismissed the action with prejudice, finding that the tribe was protected by sovereign immunity and could not be sued without its consent or an act of Congress. The corporation sought direct review by the Washington Supreme Court, which transferred the case to the Washington Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, holding that tribal sovereign immunity is not subject to a common law immovable property exception unless Congress or the tribe itself clearly waives immunity. The court also noted that prior Washington cases allowing in rem jurisdiction over tribally owned nonreservation land were no longer good law in light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Lundgren, 584 U.S. 554 (2018).The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case and held that state courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over adverse possession claims involving nonreservation land owned by tribes, unless there is a clear waiver of immunity by the tribe or Congress. The court further held that the common law immovable property exception does not apply to tribal sovereign immunity. The decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed. View "Flying T Ranch, Inc. v. Stillaguamish Tribe of Indians" on Justia Law

A billboard company sought to erect a sign in a Michigan township, but its application was denied because the proposed billboard did not comply with local height and size restrictions. Instead of appealing the denial or seeking a variance, the company filed a federal lawsuit challenging the township’s sign ordinance on First Amendment grounds, including claims that the ordinance imposed content-based restrictions, constituted an unconstitutional prior restraint, and was unconstitutionally vague. The company did not challenge the height and size restrictions themselves. The township’s ordinance only allowed billboards in certain industrial zones adjacent to interstate freeways, but, according to the company, no such zones existed in the township.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted summary judgment to the township, finding the company lacked standing because its alleged injuries were not caused by the challenged provisions and would not be redressed by a favorable decision. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the company failed to meet the requirements for standing on any of its claims.Subsequently, the company filed a new lawsuit in the same district court, again alleging that the ordinance was a prior restraint on speech. The district court dismissed the suit, holding that res judicata (claim preclusion) barred the action. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that issue preclusion, not claim preclusion, applied. The court concluded that issue preclusion barred the company from relitigating its prior-restraint claim based on its earlier application, but did not bar claims based on new facts—specifically, the company’s allegation that it was self-censoring and not applying for any billboards due to the ordinance’s discretionary variance process. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings on the new factual allegations. View "Outdoor One Communications LLC v. Charter Twp. of Canton, Mich." on Justia Law

The petitioners own a home on nearly four acres of land in a gated community in Crown Point, Indiana. For the 2019 tax year, the Lake County Assessor classified one acre of their property as a “homestead” and taxed it at one percent of its assessed value, while the remaining 2.981 acres were taxed as non-residential property at a higher rate. The owners did not dispute the total assessed value but argued that the statutory one-acre limit for the homestead tax cap was unconstitutional as applied to them, claiming that their entire parcel constituted “curtilage” under the Indiana Constitution and should be subject to the lower tax rate.After the Lake County Property Tax Assessment Board of Appeals rejected their claim, the Indiana Board of Tax Review affirmed, stating it lacked authority to declare a statute unconstitutional and was bound by the one-acre limit. The petitioners appealed to the Indiana Tax Court, which reversed the Board’s decision. The Tax Court held that the Constitution does not permit a fixed one-acre limitation for the homestead tax cap and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether the excess acreage was used as part of the principal place of residence.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the Tax Court’s decision de novo. It held that, even if the Constitution does not impose a size limit on curtilage, the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence that their excess land was used as curtilage. Therefore, they did not meet their burden to prove the statute unconstitutional as applied to them. The Supreme Court reversed the Tax Court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to affirm the Board’s determination in favor of the Assessor. View "Sawlani v. Lake County Assessor" on Justia Law

Amy Hadley’s home in South Bend, Indiana, was significantly damaged when law enforcement officers executed a search warrant in pursuit of a murder suspect they believed was inside her residence. The officers, acting on information that the suspect had accessed his Facebook account from Hadley’s IP address, obtained a warrant and forcefully entered the home, causing extensive property damage, including the use of tear gas and destruction of personal items. Hadley, who had no connection to the suspect, was denied compensation by both the City of South Bend and St. Joseph County for the $16,000 in damages.After her request for compensation was denied, Hadley filed suit in Indiana state court, seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of her Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, specifically invoking the Takings Clause. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that Seventh Circuit precedent, particularly Johnson v. Manitowoc County, foreclosed her claim. The district court agreed and dismissed the complaint, finding that the Takings Clause did not entitle her to compensation for property damage resulting from the execution of a lawful search warrant.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that, under its precedent in Johnson v. Manitowoc County, the Fifth Amendment does not require the government to compensate property owners for damage caused by law enforcement executing a valid search warrant. The court declined to overrule Johnson and found that Hadley’s arguments did not warrant revisiting the established rule. View "Hadley v. City of South Bend" on Justia Law

A proposed residential development in downtown Livermore, California, was the subject of a dispute between a community group and the city. The city had entered into agreements with a developer, Eden Housing, to build affordable workforce housing and, as part of a 2022 resolution, authorized the construction and improvement of a new public park, Veterans Park. Move Eden Housing, a local group, sought to challenge this resolution through a referendum, arguing that the city’s approval of the park was a legislative act subject to voter review.The Alameda County Superior Court initially denied Move Eden’s petition for a writ of mandate, finding the city’s resolution to be administrative and not subject to referendum. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reversed, holding that the park approval was a legislative act and ordered the city to process the referendum petition. In response, the city repealed the 2022 resolution and enacted a new 2024 resolution that reaffirmed the development agreement but omitted the Veterans Park provisions.Move Eden then argued that the city’s adoption of the 2024 resolution violated California Elections Code section 9241, which prohibits reenactment of a repealed ordinance for one year. The trial court agreed and granted Move Eden’s motion to compel compliance with the writ of mandate.On further appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reversed the trial court’s order. The appellate court held that section 9241 did not prohibit the city from adopting the 2024 resolution because it involved only administrative acts implementing prior legislative determinations not challengeable by referendum. The court clarified that the referendum power and section 9241’s restrictions apply only to legislative acts, not administrative actions. The matter was remanded with instructions to deny Move Eden’s motion. View "Move Eden Housing v. City of Livermore" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs in this case are homeowners and rental-property supervisors in New Orleans who challenged the City’s regulations governing short-term rentals (STRs), defined as lodging offered for less than thirty days. The City’s regulatory scheme requires permits for both owners and operators of STRs, restricts eligibility to “natural persons,” mandates that operators reside at the property, and imposes specific advertising requirements. The regulations were enacted in response to concerns about neighborhood disruption and loss of affordable housing attributed to the proliferation of STRs. Plaintiffs argued that these regulations violated various constitutional provisions, including the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, the First Amendment, and the dormant Commerce Clause.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana granted summary judgment largely in favor of the City, upholding the constitutionality of most aspects of the STR regulations. The district court found that the City had authority under state law to regulate STRs and rejected the plaintiffs’ due process and equal protection claims, except for one provision not at issue on appeal. The court also upheld the advertising restrictions and the operator residency requirement, interpreting the latter as not requiring permanent residency.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The Fifth Circuit held that the City’s prohibition on business entities obtaining owner or operator permits violated the Equal Protection Clause, as the distinction was arbitrary and not rationally related to a legitimate government interest. The court also found that the requirement that each STR advertisement list only one dwelling unit violated the First Amendment. However, the court upheld the City’s authority to regulate STRs, the due process analysis, most advertising restrictions, and interpreted the operator residency requirement as not violating the dormant Commerce Clause. View "Hignell-Stark v. City of New Orleans" on Justia Law