Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves a historic Black burial ground in Montgomery County, Maryland, known as Moses Cemetery. The land, which contains the remains of many individuals, including formerly enslaved persons, was sold and developed into an apartment complex and parking lot in the 1960s. The development process desecrated the burial ground, and it is likely that human remains are still interred there. The current owner of the property is the Housing Opportunities Commission of Montgomery County (HOC). The plaintiffs, including descendants of those buried in Moses Cemetery and a local church, sought to challenge HOC's plan to sell the land to a developer.The Circuit Court for Montgomery County granted the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction to prevent the sale and later issued a writ of mandamus compelling HOC to file an action under Maryland's Business Regulation Article § 5-505 before selling the property. The court found that there was overwhelming evidence of the burial ground's existence and that many bodies likely remain on the property.The Appellate Court of Maryland reversed the circuit court's decision, holding that § 5-505 is an optional procedure for selling burial grounds and does not impose a mandatory duty on HOC to file an action before selling the land. The Appellate Court reasoned that the statute is designed to allow certain burial grounds to be sold free from claims but does not require this procedure to be followed in all cases.The Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the Appellate Court's judgment in part and reversed it in part. The Court held that the common law of burial places in Maryland provides an appropriate framework for disputes regarding burial grounds and that extraordinary relief in the form of a writ of mandamus was not appropriate. The Court remanded the case to the circuit court, allowing the plaintiffs to seek leave to amend their complaint to state a claim for relief based on an alleged violation of specific rights protected under the common law of burial places. The Court also held that § 5-505 does not abrogate the common law of burial places and provides an optional procedure for selling burial grounds. View "BETHESDA AFRICAN CEMETERY COALITION, v. HOUSING OPPORTUNITIES COMMISSION OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY" on Justia Law

American Environmental, Inc. (plaintiff) challenged the Burlington School District (defendant) over a contract awarded for the demolition and remediation of Burlington High School, which was closed due to toxic substances. The District sent a Request for Qualifications to fifteen contractors, including the plaintiff and the winning bidder, EnviroVantage. The plaintiff argued that EnviroVantage did not meet the prequalification criteria and that the contract should have been awarded to them.The Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division, denied the plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction, citing potential financial harm to the District and public interest. The court later granted summary judgment to the District, finding the case moot because the project was substantially complete. The court applied factors from Citineighbors Coalition of Historic Carnegie Hill ex rel. Kazickas v. New York City Landmarks Preservation Commission, determining that no effective relief could be granted due to the project's advanced stage.The Vermont Supreme Court took judicial notice of the project's completion, including demolition and soil remediation, based on public records and visual evidence. The court dismissed the appeal as moot, stating that no effective relief could be provided under Rule 75, which does not allow for damages. The court also rejected the plaintiff's argument that the case met the exception for issues capable of repetition yet evading review, noting the plaintiff's delay in seeking expedited relief and the lack of demonstrated probability of encountering the same situation again. View "American Environmental, Inc. v. Burlington School District" on Justia Law

William and Mary Fulton purchased a 32-acre property in Jericho, Vermont, in August 2021. The property was enrolled in the Agricultural and Managed Forest Land Use Value Appraisal Program (Current Use program) under a forest management plan that generally prohibited tree cutting. Before finalizing the purchase, the Fultons contacted the Department of Forests, Parks, and Recreation (FPR) and the Department of Taxes, Division of Property Valuation and Review (PVR) to inquire about converting the property to agricultural use. They were informed that any tree cutting in violation of the plan would lead to disenrollment from the program and tax penalties. Despite this, the Fultons cut trees on the property shortly after purchasing it.The Fultons did not file the required application to continue the property's enrollment in the Current Use program or submit a notice of withdrawal. In September 2021, the county forester received a complaint about the tree cutting and confirmed the violation. FPR issued an adverse-inspection report in December 2021, leading to the property's removal from the Current Use program and tax penalties. The Fultons appealed to the Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division, which granted summary judgment in favor of FPR, concluding that the property was still enrolled in the program at the time of the tree cutting and that the Fultons' actions constituted "development" under the program's rules.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The Court held that the property was not automatically disenrolled from the Current Use program when the Fultons failed to submit the required application and fee. Instead, disenrollment occurs only upon the Director of PVR's action. The Court also held that the Fultons' tree cutting did not fall under the statutory exemption for "development" because it was not related to the construction or alteration of a structure for farming, logging, forestry, or conservation purposes. Therefore, the Fultons' tree cutting violated the forest management plan, justifying the property's removal from the Current Use program. View "Fulton v. Department of Forests, Parks, and Recreation" on Justia Law

American Pride Properties, LLC ("APP") filed a lawsuit in the Jefferson Circuit Court against James R. Davis and William M. Pickard, seeking ejectment and damages for the loss of use of real property owned by APP. Pickard had initially shown interest in purchasing the property and was allowed to take possession for renovations before closing. However, the sale did not close as planned, and Pickard attempted to assign his rights to Davis, which led to confusion. Despite multiple extensions and addendums to the purchase agreement, the sale never closed, and APP considered the agreement canceled.The Jefferson Circuit Court held a bench trial and ruled in favor of APP on its ejectment claim, awarding possession of the property to APP and dismissing the counterclaims filed by Davis and Pickard. However, the court retained jurisdiction over APP's demand for damages related to the use and detention of the property. The court certified its judgment as final under Rule 54(b) of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, leading Davis and Pickard to appeal.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and determined that the Rule 54(b) certification was improper because the trial court had not resolved the issue of damages, which was part of the same claim for ejectment. The court emphasized that a claim is not fully adjudicated for Rule 54(b) purposes until all elements, including damages, are resolved. Consequently, the judgment was not final, and the Supreme Court of Alabama dismissed the appeals as premature due to lack of jurisdiction. View "Davis v. American Pride Properties, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between two condominium associations, Longview Hotel Condominium Association (Longview) and Pearl Inn Condominium Association (Pearl), over a strip of land used for parking. Longview owns a beachfront property with six units and an adjacent parking lot, while Pearl owns a nearby property with eight units. The contested area is a rectangular strip of land adjacent to Pearl's building, which has been used by Pearl's residents for parking for decades. Longview claims that Pearl's use of this land constitutes trespass, while Pearl asserts it has acquired the land through adverse possession.The Superior Court (York County) ruled in favor of Pearl, finding that Pearl had acquired the strip of land by adverse possession. The court determined that Pearl's use of the land was continuous, open, and notorious for the required twenty-year period. The court also directed Pearl to submit a proposed judgment with a specific metes-and-bounds description of the adversely possessed area. Longview appealed, arguing that the court erred in its determination of continuous use and in setting the boundaries of the land acquired by adverse possession.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's finding that Pearl had satisfied the elements of adverse possession, including continuous use. The court found sufficient evidence that Pearl's residents had used the disputed area for parking consistently over the years. However, the Supreme Judicial Court vacated the portion of the judgment concerning the boundaries of the adversely possessed land. The court found that the description provided by Pearl included areas not supported by evidence of actual or continuous use. The case was remanded for a revised metes-and-bounds description that accurately reflects the area used by Pearl's residents. View "Longview Hotel Condominium Association v. Pearl Inn" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the sale of real property owned by the estate of Mark Engelhardt. Yvonne Engelhart, the personal representative of the estate, sent a notice letter to interested parties, including the Ebels and Tom Gross, outlining the bidding process for the property. The Ebels submitted bids that complied with the notice letter's requirements, while Gross submitted bids that did not meet the specified conditions. Despite this, the estate's attorney initially declared the Ebels the winning bidders but later accepted Gross's bids after he questioned the process.The District Court of McIntosh County initially dismissed the Ebels' claims, concluding the contracts were invalid due to the statute of frauds. The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed this decision, stating the statute of frauds was not properly raised. On remand, the district court declared the contracts between the Ebels and the estate valid and ordered specific performance. The court dismissed the Ebels' tortious interference claims against Gross, finding his actions justified.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that valid contracts were formed between the Ebels and the estate when the estate's attorney declared them the winning bidders. The court found that Gross's bids did not comply with the notice letter's requirements and that he had actual notice of the Ebels' winning bids, disqualifying him as a good-faith purchaser. The court also upheld the dismissal of the Ebels' tortious interference claims, concluding Gross's actions were reasonable and justified under the circumstances. View "Ebel v. Engelhart" on Justia Law

The case involves the valuation of a bitcoin mining property owned by Michael Oken, who had invested millions in infrastructure upgrades to support bitcoin mining. The property, located in College Park, Georgia, included a Power Sales Agreement with the city for low-cost electricity, which was crucial for the mining operation. After Oken's death in 2019, his businesses filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, and the property was sold along with an adjacent data center for $4.9 million. The deeds indicated a $2.45 million value for each property based on transfer taxes. Two creditors, Thomas Switch Holding and Bay Point Capital, sought to recover on liens against the property.The bankruptcy court held a bench trial to determine the property's value. Switch's appraiser, Michael Easterwood, valued the property at $830,000 using the cost approach, considering the infrastructure improvements. Bay Point's appraiser, Jeff Miller, valued it at $48,000 using the sales comparison approach, comparing it to other light industrial properties. The bankruptcy court adopted Easterwood's valuation, finding the property to be a special purpose property with bitcoin mining as its highest and best use. The court valued the property at over $700,000, awarding the full escrow amount to Switch.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The appellate court upheld the bankruptcy court's findings, agreeing that the property was a special purpose property with bitcoin mining as its highest and best use. The court also affirmed the use of the cost approach for valuation and found no clear error in considering the tax stamp value as supporting evidence. The judgment of the lower courts was affirmed. View "In re: VIRTUAL CITADEL, INC." on Justia Law

Renee Vasko challenged her property tax assessment on two grounds: the revocation of her homestead classification and the assessed value of her property. In 2018, McLeod County sent a homestead application to Vasko’s property address, which was returned as undeliverable. The County learned from the City of Lester Prairie that there had been no measurable water use at the property since 2016. Consequently, the County revoked the homestead classification effective January 2, 2019, and assessed the property at $110,100.Vasko filed a petition in the Minnesota Tax Court, disputing the revocation of the homestead classification and the property’s assessed value. She presented evidence, including mail addressed to the property, utility records, and testimony, to establish occupancy and use of the property. Vasko also compared her property’s valuation to five other properties in the City to argue that her home was overvalued. The Tax Court found that Vasko did not occupy and use the property as a homestead in 2019 and upheld the County’s valuation, concluding that Vasko did not provide sufficient evidence to rebut the presumptive validity of the County’s assessment.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Tax Court’s decision. The Court held that the Tax Court correctly placed the burden of proof on Vasko to show that the revocation of the homestead classification was unlawful and that the assessed value was incorrect. The Supreme Court found no clear error in the Tax Court’s findings that Vasko did not occupy and use the property as a homestead and that she failed to provide substantial evidence to challenge the County’s valuation. The decision of the Tax Court was affirmed. View "Vasko vs. County of McLeod" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the distribution of compensation following an eminent domain action by the Department of Transportation (DOT) against Bloomsbury Estates, LLC (the Developer) and Bloomsbury Estates Condominium Homeowners Association, Inc. (the Association). The DOT took a portion of the property, which included development rights held by the Developer under a condominium declaration. The Developer and the Association disagreed on how to apportion the compensation for the taking.In the Superior Court of Wake County, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Developer, distributing the majority of the compensation to the Developer based on the valuation of development rights. The Association argued that unresolved issues in separate litigation regarding the validity of the development rights should affect the distribution. The trial court, however, concluded that the validity of the development rights had been settled in a separate action and was not subject to relitigation in the eminent domain proceeding.The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, holding that the unresolved issues in the separate litigation were material to the distribution of the compensation and that a jury should determine the credibility of the appraisers' valuations.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and held that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment. The Supreme Court concluded that all issues related to the title and interests in the property had been resolved in the N.C.G.S. § 136-108 hearing, and the trial court properly used the appraisals to determine the distribution of the compensation. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, affirming the trial court's distribution of the compensation. View "Department of Transportation v. Bloomsbury Estates, LLC" on Justia Law

Alison Arter purchased land from Stephen and Sharon Burt in Orange County, which included a home and a horse farm. The Burts retained ownership of an adjacent property. In 2020, a developer sought to subdivide the Burts' property to build homes, planning a road along the property line next to Arter's land. Arter argued that a thirty-foot buffer was required between the road and her property based on the zoning ordinances. The Orange County Planning & Inspections Department disagreed, stating no buffer was needed as both properties were zoned "R-1" residential.Arter appealed to the Orange County Board of Adjustment, which upheld the department's decision. She then sought judicial review in Superior Court, which also affirmed the decision. Arter appealed to the Court of Appeals, where a divided panel ruled. The majority held that the zoning ordinances required buffers only between different zoning districts, not within the same district, thus affirming the lower court's decision. The dissent argued that the accompanying table suggested buffers were required based on land use, necessitating further fact-finding.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case. The Court held that the text of the zoning ordinance, which required buffers based on zoning districts, controlled over any conflicting information in the accompanying table. Since both properties were zoned "R-1," no buffer was required. The Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, agreeing that the zoning ordinances were unambiguous and did not mandate a buffer between the properties. View "Arter v. Orange County" on Justia Law