Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The State of Montana filed a lawsuit to determine the ownership of riverbeds underlying certain segments of rivers within its borders. The dispute centered on whether the riverbeds were navigable at the time of Montana's statehood in 1889, which would determine whether Montana or the United States held title to the riverbeds. The segments in question included parts of the Missouri, Clark Fork, and Madison Rivers.The United States District Court for the District of Montana held a 10-day bench trial and found that only one segment, the Sun River to Black Eagle Falls Segment of the Missouri River, was navigable in fact at the time of statehood. The court quieted title to the United States for the riverbeds underlying four other segments, including the Big Belt Mountains Segment and the Big Falls to Belt Creek Segment of the Missouri River, the Eddy Segment of the Clark Fork River, and the Headwaters/West Yellowstone Basin Segment of the Madison River. The court's decision was based on the "navigability in fact" test, which requires that navigability be determined on a segment-by-segment basis, considering the physical characteristics of the river at the time of statehood.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court correctly applied the navigability in fact test as clarified in PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576 (2012). The court rejected Montana's argument that evidence of actual use alone establishes navigability and upheld the district court's findings that the four segments were not navigable. The Ninth Circuit also rejected the cross-appeal by Talen Montana, LLC and Northwestern Corporation, which argued that the district court should not have considered the navigability of the Sun River to Black Eagle Falls Segment. The court found that the district court's review was consistent with the Supreme Court's mandate in PPL.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine damages for the Sun River to Black Eagle Falls Segment. View "State v. Talen Montana, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2002 and 2009, the town of Pembroke recorded tax liens against property owned jointly by Brian E. Priest and his wife, Lisa C. Priest. The Priests paid the delinquent taxes, and the town discharged the liens through "municipal quitclaim deeds." After Brian died intestate, a dispute arose among his heirs regarding whether the tax liens had severed the joint tenancy, thus terminating Lisa's right of survivorship.The Penobscot County Probate Court denied Lisa's petition to reform the municipal quitclaim deeds to reflect that the property remained in joint tenancy. The court found no evidence of the transferor's intention at the time the deeds were drafted and dismissed the petition. The court did not address Lisa's alternative request for a declaration that the property was not an asset of the estate.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and concluded that the joint tenancy was not severed because the town never foreclosed on either tax lien mortgage. The court held that the municipal quitclaim deeds served only to discharge the liens and did not affect the joint tenancy. Consequently, Lisa's right of survivorship remained intact. The judgment of the Probate Court was vacated, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Estate of Priest" on Justia Law

Attorney Steven C. Kim took a lien against his client’s real property to secure his attorney fee. The trial court ordered Kim’s client to convey that property to fulfill a sales contract. Kim’s lien obstructed the sale, and the trial court expunged Kim’s lien. Kim’s client appealed, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, no one sought review in the Supreme Court, and the judgment became final in 2018. Three days later, Kim brought a new suit against the same buyer of the same property, seeking a declaration that his expunged lien was valid and the result in the earlier suit was wrong. The buyer successfully invoked issue preclusion, and Kim now appeals this new defeat.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted the buyer’s motion for judgment on the pleadings without leave to amend, reasoning that the doctrine of collateral estoppel barred Kim’s effort to relitigate the lien question. The court later also ruled for the buyer on its cross-complaint, and Kim alone appealed.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, affirmed the judgment. The court held that the earlier litigation precluded relitigation of the lien question. The lien issue was actually litigated and necessarily decided in the first suit, and Kim was in privity with his client Central Korean. The court found that Kim had a financial interest in the lien question and controlled the litigation in cooperation with his client. The court dismissed Kim’s new arguments about section 1908 of the Code of Civil Procedure as they were raised for the first time in his reply brief. The trial court’s analysis of issue preclusion was deemed correct, and the judgment was affirmed, awarding costs to the respondents. View "Kim v. New Life Oasis Church" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between homeowners in the Dairy Subdivision in Teton County, Wyoming. The appellants, Robert, Linda, and Anthony Schroth, along with Jackson Hole Winery, LLC, were enjoined by the district court from conducting certain commercial activities on their property, which the appellees, Robert and Viesia Kirk, claimed violated the subdivision's covenants. The covenants restrict the use of properties to single-family residential purposes and prohibit commercial activities, although they allow for certain home occupations and agricultural activities.The district court found that the activities of Jackson Hole Winery, which included wine production, sales, and hosting public tastings, were commercial and violated the covenants. The court also found that the appellants' claims of laches, arguing that the Kirks delayed unreasonably in enforcing their rights, were unfounded. The court issued a permanent injunction limiting the winery's activities to those initially approved by the subdivision's design committee in 2010.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Supreme Court agreed that the winery's expanded activities were commercial and violated the covenants. The court also upheld the district court's finding that the Kirks did not delay unreasonably in enforcing their rights, noting that the Kirks only became aware of the full extent of the winery's activities in 2020 and filed suit in 2022. The court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to grant the injunction, as the equities weighed in favor of enforcing the covenants to preserve the residential character of the subdivision. View "Schroth v. Kirk" on Justia Law

In January 2017, Bruce Higgins, Rebekka Higgins, the Estate of Judy Devney, and John L. Devney sought a judgment to quiet title to mineral interests in Williams County and recover oil and gas proceeds. The defendants, Maynard Lund, Kjersti Eide, Don Eide, and Jennifer Eide, denied the allegations and counterclaimed for quiet title. XTO Energy, Inc., Continental Resources, Inc., and Whiting Petroleum, Corp. requested dismissal of the complaint.The District Court of Williams County held a bench trial in April 2018 to interpret a 1964 warranty deed. The court found that the deed reserved Milton Higgins' entire interest in the top parcel and quieted title accordingly, resulting in a 50/50 split of the partnership mineral acres between the successors of Milton Higgins and Howard Lund. The court awarded the plaintiffs $237,000 in royalty damages plus fees and costs. In 2021, the court granted summary judgment motions by the plaintiffs, determining that the 1952 royalty deed conveyed a floating royalty rather than a fixed royalty. Final judgment was entered in January 2024.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decisions. The court held that the 1964 warranty deed was ambiguous, allowing for extrinsic evidence to determine the parties' intent, and concluded that the reservation applied to both the top and bottom parcels. The court also found no valid stipulation regarding the interpretation of the 1952 royalty deed and determined that the deed conveyed a floating royalty. The court affirmed the district court's interpretation of the deeds and the division of the suspended oil and gas proceeds. View "Higgins v. Lund" on Justia Law

Matthew V. Herron filed a petition for writ of mandate against the San Diego Unified Port District and the Coronado Yacht Club, alleging that the lease of coastal public trust land to the private club violated the public trust doctrine, the San Diego Unified Port Act, the Public Resources Code, and the Port’s Master Plan. Herron claimed that the lease was executed without public notice or competitive bidding and requested the court to compel the Port District to comply with proper procedures and award the lease to a qualified applicant who would operate the property for public benefit.The Superior Court of San Diego County sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to interfere with the Port District’s discretionary decisions under a writ for traditional mandamus and that the time for filing a writ for administrative mandamus had expired. The court dismissed Herron’s petition with prejudice, leading to Herron’s appeal.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The appellate court held that Herron failed to establish a claim for traditional mandamus because the Port District’s decision to lease the land involved discretionary authority, not a ministerial duty. The court also found that Herron’s petition for administrative mandamus was untimely, as it was filed more than four years after the lease became final, exceeding the 90-day statutory limit. Consequently, the appellate court concluded that Herron was not entitled to relief under either theory and affirmed the dismissal of his petition. View "Herron v. San Diego Unified Port District" on Justia Law

Pamela Gleichman, a real estate developer, established four affordable housing developments in Pennsylvania as limited partnerships in the 1990s. Gleichman and her company, Gleichman & Co., Inc., served as the general partners, while Metropolitan and U.S.A. Institutional held limited partnership interests. In 2014, Gleichman’s daughter, Rosa Scarcelli, acquired Gleichman & Co. (renamed General Holdings, Inc.) through a foreclosure auction. In 2018, Metropolitan and U.S.A. Institutional transferred their limited partnership interests to Eight Penn Partners, L.P., without the consent of General Holdings.General Holdings and Preservation Holdings filed a complaint in the Superior Court against Eight Penn, Metropolitan, and U.S.A. Institutional, seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. The case was transferred to the Business and Consumer Docket. The court denied Eight Penn’s motion for summary judgment, finding ambiguity in the partnership agreements regarding General Holdings’ status as a general partner. After a trial, the court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, declaring that General Holdings remained a general partner with management rights and that the transfer of interests to Eight Penn was invalid without General Holdings’ consent.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s judgment. The court found that the partnership agreements required the consent of both general partners for a valid transfer of limited partner interests. The court concluded that the transfer of General Holdings’ controlling interest at a foreclosure auction did not require the limited partners’ consent. Therefore, General Holdings remained a general partner with management rights, and the transfer to Eight Penn was invalid. The court upheld the declaratory judgment and denied injunctive relief as unnecessary. View "General Holdings, Inc. v. Eight Penn Partners, L.P." on Justia Law

Charles R. Maples and Kathy S. Brown, owners of two condominium units, obtained a judgment against Compass Harbor Village Condominium Association and Compass Harbor Village, LLC for damages due to mismanagement. The judgment awarded Maples $134,900 and Brown $106,801, along with specific performance, declaratory relief, and attorney fees. The judgment prohibited the defendants from imposing special assessments to pay for the judgment. The judgment was affirmed in part by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, but specific performance and the Unfair Trade Practices Act claim were vacated.Maples and Brown recorded writs of execution, obtaining liens against the LLC's and Association's properties. However, the LLC's units were foreclosed by The First, N.A., extinguishing the liens. Maples and Brown then filed a new action in the Superior Court, seeking to enforce the judgment against the remaining seven units not owned by them or foreclosed upon. The case was transferred to the Business and Consumer Docket, where the court dismissed their claims.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and focused on whether the lower court erred in dismissing the claim to enforce the judgment lien against the seven units under the Maine Condominium Act, 33 M.R.S. § 1603-117. The court held that the proper procedure for enforcing such a lien requires a disclosure proceeding in the District Court, which has exclusive jurisdiction over such matters. The transfer to the Business and Consumer Docket did not cure the jurisdictional issue. Consequently, the court affirmed the dismissal of Maples and Brown’s claims, as the Superior Court and the Business and Consumer Docket lacked jurisdiction to issue the necessary turnover or sale orders under the disclosure statutes. View "Maples v. Compass Harbor Village Condominium Association" on Justia Law

Kimberly Deramos lived in an apartment complex owned by Anderson Communities. While returning from a walk with her Shih Tzu, Princess, they were attacked by a pit bull allegedly owned by a neighboring tenant. Princess died, and Deramos sustained injuries requiring surgery and counseling. Deramos sued Anderson Communities, claiming they negligently failed to maintain a safe environment for tenants.The Jefferson Circuit Court granted Anderson Communities' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, relying on the strict liability dog-bite rule in Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 258.235(4). The court concluded that Anderson Communities was not an "owner" under KRS 258.095(5) and thus could not be held strictly liable. Deramos did not cite this statute in her complaint but instead alleged general negligence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, agreeing that Anderson Communities was not an "owner" under the statute and did not address Deramos's negligence claim.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and reversed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that the strict liability dog-bite statute was inapplicable to Deramos's negligence claim. The court emphasized that negligence and strict liability are distinct legal concepts, and Deramos's complaint sufficiently alleged negligence. The court concluded that the circuit court erred in dismissing the negligence claim based on strict liability principles. The case was remanded to the Jefferson Circuit Court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Deramos v. Anderson Communities, Inc." on Justia Law

Vernon Holland was fatally injured by a rewinder machine at his workplace. Robert Cearley, Jr., representing Holland’s estate, filed a wrongful death lawsuit against Bobst Group North America, Inc. (Bobst NA), the company responsible for delivering and installing the rewinder. The lawsuit sought damages based on several tort claims.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas granted summary judgment in favor of Bobst NA. The court ruled that Arkansas’s statute of repose, which limits the time frame for bringing claims related to construction or design defects, barred Cearley’s claims. Cearley appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court examined whether Bobst NA was protected under Arkansas Code § 16-56-112(b)(1), which is a statute of repose for claims arising from personal injury or wrongful death caused by construction defects. The court concluded that Bobst NA’s involvement in the delivery, installation, integration, and commissioning of the rewinder constituted the construction of an improvement to real property. The court also determined that the rewinder was an improvement to real property because it was affixed to the plant, furthered the purpose of the realty, and was designed for long-term use.As the lawsuit was filed more than four years after the installation of the rewinder, the court held that the claims were barred by the statute of repose. Consequently, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of Bobst NA. View "Cearley v. Bobst Group North America Inc." on Justia Law