Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

David Scott Taylor owns property near Pinnacle Mountain in Pulaski County, Arkansas, adjacent to land owned and developed by Rick Ferguson and several related entities. Ferguson’s property, which is being developed into the Paradise Valley subdivision, allegedly causes increased stormwater runoff that floods Taylor’s land. Taylor claims that the development’s clearing of vegetation, paving, and planned drainage ditch will exacerbate flooding, potentially increasing it by up to 400 percent. Taylor filed suit in Pulaski County Circuit Court, seeking damages and equitable relief to require Ferguson to construct a larger storm-water detention pond to mitigate the flooding.After Taylor filed his complaint, Ferguson moved to dismiss, arguing that the claims involved matters assigned to the exclusive original jurisdiction of the county court under article 7, section 28 of the Arkansas Constitution, specifically relating to county roads, internal improvement, and local concerns. Taylor amended his complaint to remove references to county roads and public nuisance, focusing solely on private flooding. The circuit court initially denied Ferguson’s motion but later reconsidered and dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, finding that the dispute fell within the county court’s exclusive original jurisdiction. Ferguson then nonsuited his counterclaim, and Taylor appealed.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the circuit court’s dismissal de novo. It held that Taylor’s claims do not involve county roads, internal improvement, or local concerns as those terms are used in article 7, section 28. The court found that the dispute is a private residential matter over flooding, not a public infrastructure or county regulatory issue, and thus falls within the jurisdiction of the circuit court. The Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed the circuit court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "TAYLOR V. FERGUSON" on Justia Law

Susan Boggs and Fouad Rachid reside in a home owned by Fouad, Inc., located in Olmsted Township near the Cleveland-Hopkins International Airport. Boggs alleges that increased air traffic and airport operations, particularly following a runway expansion project, have caused significant noise, vibrations, and emissions, rendering the property unsuitable for residential use and amounting to a governmental taking. Boggs declined Cleveland’s offer to purchase an avigation easement and subsequently filed a mandamus action against the City of Cleveland, seeking to compel the city to initiate appropriation proceedings to determine compensation for the alleged taking.The case was initially removed to federal court, where Boggs pursued administrative remedies with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), but her claims were rejected. After further federal litigation, the district court granted summary judgment to Cleveland on federal claims and remanded the state-law claims to the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas. In state court, both parties moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment to Cleveland, finding that Boggs lacked standing because Cleveland, as a municipality, lacked authority to appropriate property outside its boundaries. The Eighth District Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Boggs’s injury was not redressable since Cleveland could not be compelled to initiate appropriation proceedings for property outside its jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and reversed the judgment of the Eighth District Court of Appeals. The court held that under Article I, Section 19 of the Ohio Constitution, a landowner whose property has been taken by a foreign municipality has standing to pursue a mandamus action to force the municipality to institute appropriation proceedings for compensation, regardless of whether the property is located within the municipality’s boundaries. The case was remanded for further proceedings, including consideration of the statute-of-limitations issue. View "State ex rel. Boggs v. Cleveland" on Justia Law

A married couple, Carlos Del Amo and his wife, opened a joint checking account at TD Bank in Florida. The account’s signature card listed both their names and, in small print, stated that “joint accounts are owned as joint tenants with right of survivorship.” When Mr. Del Amo filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, he claimed the account as exempt property, arguing it was owned as a tenancy by the entirety—a form of ownership that protects the account from creditors of only one spouse under Florida law. Storey Mountain, a creditor, objected, contending that the account was not exempt because the signature card’s language created a joint tenancy with right of survivorship, not a tenancy by the entirety.The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida found the statutory language unclear as to what constitutes “otherwise specified in writing” under Florida Statutes § 655.79(1). Relying on the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Beal Bank, SSB v. Almand and Associates, the bankruptcy court held that, absent an express disclaimer of tenancy by the entirety on the signature card, the account was presumed to be held as a tenancy by the entirety. The court overruled Storey Mountain’s objection. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida affirmed, agreeing that the 2008 amendment to § 655.79(1) did not abrogate Beal Bank’s requirement for an express disclaimer.On further appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower courts. The Eleventh Circuit held that, under Florida law, a joint bank account held by a married couple is presumed to be a tenancy by the entirety unless there is an explicit written disclaimer of that form of ownership. The court found that the language on the signature card was insufficient to constitute such a disclaimer, and thus the account was exempt property in the bankruptcy proceedings. View "Storey Mountain v. Del Amo" on Justia Law

Two young children, ages four and two, suffered severe injuries after falling from a second-floor bedroom window in their apartment, which had recently undergone renovations. The property owner and manager had replaced the window without installing a fall prevention device, despite the window’s low sill height and significant drop to the ground. The children, through their guardian ad litem, sued the owner and manager for negligence, alleging both general negligence and negligence per se based on an alleged violation of the California Building Standards Code, which requires fall prevention devices on certain windows.The Superior Court of California, County of Alameda, heard the case. Before trial, the defendants sought summary adjudication and moved in limine to exclude expert testimony regarding the Building Code, arguing that the property was exempt from current requirements due to compliance with the code at the time of original construction and the use of “like-for-like” materials during renovation. The trial court denied these pretrial motions but, after plaintiffs presented their case at trial, granted a nonsuit on both negligence theories, finding no duty under general negligence and that the code exemption applied to the negligence per se claim.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. It affirmed the trial court’s ruling on general negligence, holding that the harm was not sufficiently foreseeable to impose a duty on the landlord under the circumstances. However, it reversed the nonsuit on negligence per se, holding that the trial court misinterpreted the Building Code: a window is not an “original material” exempt from current safety requirements. The appellate court remanded the case for retrial on the negligence per se claim. View "Jimenez v. Hayes Apartment Homes, LLC" on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiff bank sought to foreclose on a residential property in Vermont after the defendant defaulted on a $365,000 loan originally issued by Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. The mortgage was assigned to the plaintiff, and the bank alleged it was the holder of the note. However, the copy of the note attached to the complaint was made out to the original lender and lacked any indorsement. Over the years, the case was delayed by mediation, bankruptcy, and various motions. At trial, the plaintiff produced the original note with an undated indorsement in blank, but could not establish when it became the holder of the note.The Vermont Superior Court, Windsor Unit, Civil Division, denied the plaintiff’s initial summary judgment motion, finding that the plaintiff had not established standing under the Uniform Commercial Code. A later summary judgment was vacated due to procedural errors. After a hearing, the court found the plaintiff was currently a holder of the note and that the defendant had defaulted, but concluded that the plaintiff failed to prove it had the right to enforce the note at the time the complaint was filed, as required by U.S. Bank National Ass’n v. Kimball. Judgment was entered for the defendant, and the plaintiff’s post-judgment motion to designate the judgment as without prejudice was denied.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision. The Court held that a foreclosure plaintiff must demonstrate standing by showing it had the right to enforce the note at the time the complaint was filed, declining to overrule or limit Kimball. The Court also declined to address whether the judgment should be designated as without prejudice, leaving preclusion consequences to future proceedings. View "The Bank of New York Mellon v. Quinn" on Justia Law

Michael Stoltze initiated a quiet-title action in November 2022 concerning a strip of land between his driveway and that of his neighbors, Grace and Macauley Stokes. The Stokeses filed a competing action, and both cases were consolidated. On February 24, 2024, the Iowa District Court for Polk County entered judgment quieting title in favor of the Stokeses. Although the Stokeses had requested attorney fees in their petition, the district court’s judgment did not address this issue. Thirty-one days after judgment—one day after the deadline to appeal—the Stokeses filed an application for statutory attorney fees.Stoltze opposed the application, arguing it was untimely and that the district court lacked jurisdiction to award attorney fees after the appeal period had expired. He also claimed he was prejudiced because he decided not to appeal, believing the Stokeses were no longer seeking attorney fees. After a contested hearing, the district court found that Iowa law does not impose a specific deadline for filing an application for statutory attorney fees and that the Stokeses had not unduly delayed their request. The court awarded the Stokeses $33,600 in attorney fees with interest.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the district court’s decision for correction of errors at law. It held that the district court retained jurisdiction to consider the application for attorney fees because such fees are a collateral matter, not subject to the same deadlines as motions to amend judgment. The Supreme Court found no error or abuse of discretion in the district court’s determination that the application was timely and that Stoltze’s claim of prejudice was unreasonable. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Stoltze v. Maher" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on the taxable valuation of two apartment complex parcels owned by the taxpayers in Sarpy County, Nebraska. For tax years 2020 and 2021, the Sarpy County Assessor set the values at $8,953,000 and $5,263,000, which the taxpayers believed were excessive. They protested these assessments to the Sarpy County Board of Equalization, providing evidence of actual rental income that was lower than market estimates. A referee for the Board recommended adopting the taxpayers’ lower valuations, and the Board accepted these recommendations, setting the values at $7,450,829 and $3,559,566.The Assessor appealed the Board’s decision to the Nebraska Tax Equalization and Review Commission (TERC). At the TERC hearing, both parties agreed on using the income approach for valuation but disagreed on whether to use actual or market-typical income figures. The Assessor relied on market data, while the Board’s referee used actual income figures verified against an online database. TERC found that the Board’s methodology was not a professionally accepted mass appraisal method and that the actual income figures were not shown to be consistent with market rates. TERC vacated and reversed the Board’s valuations, reinstating the Assessor’s original higher values.On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed TERC’s decision for errors on the record. The court held that TERC erred in finding the Board’s valuations unreasonable or arbitrary, as the Board’s referee had provided a reasonable basis for using actual income figures, verified against market data. The Supreme Court reversed TERC’s decision and remanded the case with directions to affirm the Board’s lower valuations for both parcels for the relevant tax years. View "Pinnacle Enters. v. Sarpy Cty. Bd. of Equal." on Justia Law

After purchasing a home with wooded acreage in Santa Cruz, the buyers discovered issues they believed the sellers had failed to disclose, including matters related to the septic system, property condition, and logging operations. The real estate transaction was governed by a standard form agreement that required the parties to attempt mediation before resorting to litigation or arbitration, and provided that the prevailing party in any dispute would be entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees, except as limited by the mediation provision.Following the sale, the buyers sued the sellers for breach of contract and fraud. The sellers filed a cross-complaint. After a three-day bench trial in the Santa Cruz County Superior Court, the court found in favor of the sellers on all claims and on their cross-complaint, determining that the sellers were the prevailing parties and entitled to recover attorney fees and costs, with the amount to be determined in post-trial proceedings. The sellers then moved for attorney fees and costs. The trial court denied the motion for attorney fees, concluding that the sellers’ initial refusal to mediate the dispute, as required by the contract, barred them from recovering attorney fees, even though they later expressed willingness to mediate before the buyers filed suit. The court also denied the motion for costs without prejudice due to procedural deficiencies.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, held that the trial court’s initial statement regarding entitlement to attorney fees was interlocutory and not a final judgment on the issue. The appellate court further held that the sellers’ initial refusal to mediate did not automatically preclude them from recovering attorney fees if they later agreed to mediate before litigation commenced. The court reversed the postjudgment order denying attorney fees and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether the sellers effectively retracted their refusal to mediate before the lawsuit was filed. The denial of costs was affirmed due to the sellers’ failure to file a proper costs memorandum. View "Evleshin v. Meyer" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendants executed a promissory note in 2006 for a $28,000 loan from Sovereign Bank, secured by a second mortgage on their property in Smithfield, Rhode Island. The mortgage named Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) as mortgagee, acting as nominee for the lender and its successors. After a series of assignments, the mortgage was ultimately assigned to the plaintiff. It is undisputed that the original promissory note was lost and that the plaintiff never possessed it. The plaintiff filed a complaint in Providence County Superior Court seeking to foreclose on the property after the defendants defaulted on the loan.The defendants responded by arguing that, under Rhode Island law and relevant precedent, only the party that lost the promissory note could enforce it, and that the plaintiff’s lack of possession of the note precluded foreclosure. The plaintiff moved for summary judgment, asserting that as the assigned mortgagee, it was entitled to foreclose despite not possessing the note. The Superior Court, referencing prior Rhode Island Supreme Court decisions, found no genuine issue of material fact regarding the default and concluded that the mortgagee need not hold the note to foreclose. The court granted summary judgment for the plaintiff, dismissed the defendants’ counterclaims, and authorized foreclosure, subject to further court order.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the Superior Court’s order. The Court held that under Rhode Island law, a mortgagee with the power of sale may foreclose on a property even if it does not possess the promissory note, so long as it is the properly assigned mortgagee. The Court rejected the defendants’ arguments based on statutory provisions regarding lost notes, reaffirming that possession of the note is not required for foreclosure by the mortgagee. View "Porch Swing Holdings LLC v. Mallory" on Justia Law

A group of landowners in Summit County, Utah, challenged a proposed ballot measure to incorporate a new municipality called West Hills. The sponsor of the incorporation, Derek Anderson, had modified the proposed boundaries after the statutory deadline for landowners to request exclusion from the new municipality had passed. As a result, certain landowners whose properties were added late were unable to seek exclusion, even though similarly situated landowners had previously been allowed to do so.The landowners filed suit in the Third District Court, Silver Summit, arguing that the Municipal Incorporation Code, as applied, violated the Uniform Operation of Laws Clause of the Utah Constitution. The district court granted summary judgment for the landowners, finding the code unconstitutional as applied and invalidating the certification of the West Hills ballot measure. The court determined that the plaintiffs were “specified landowners” who would have been entitled to exclusion if their properties had been added earlier, and that the legislature’s interest in certainty did not justify the disparate treatment.The sponsor then filed an emergency petition for extraordinary relief with the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, seeking to overturn the district court’s order before the upcoming election. The Utah Supreme Court, after expedited briefing and oral argument, denied the petition for extraordinary relief. The court held that, under the unique circumstances, it would not exercise its discretion to issue a writ due to the potential disruption and confusion in the election process, including the risk of voter suppression and interference with electioneering efforts. The denial was without prejudice to the sponsor’s ability to pursue an appeal or interlocutory review of the district court’s order. View "Anderson v. Bates" on Justia Law