Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves two sisters, Stacey Martin and Christine Lyon, who inherited their family residence as tenants in common after their father's death in 2019. Their mother lived on the property until her death in 2022, after which the sisters agreed to prepare the property for sale. They decided to restore the property, with Christine performing most of the labor. However, their relationship deteriorated, leading Stacey to file a complaint seeking partition of the property.The Superior Court, Windsor Unit, Civil Division, held a one-day bench trial and issued written findings. The court calculated the contributions each sister made towards the mortgage, taxes, insurance, utilities, and agreed-upon maintenance and improvements. It credited Christine for her labor but excluded her discretionary improvements due to lack of evidence of increased property value. The court concluded that Christine's share of the equity was $187,450 and ordered her to take assignment of the property by paying Stacey $92,550. If Christine chose not to take assignment, the property would be sold, and the proceeds divided.Christine appealed the denial of her request for prejudgment interest, arguing it should be awarded as of right under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 54(a) or as a matter of discretion. The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court held that prejudgment interest is not available for partition awards, as partition is an equitable remedy, not an action for damages. The court concluded that the credits for Christine's contributions were part of the equitable distribution of the property and did not qualify as damages, thus not triggering prejudgment interest. View "Martin v. Lyon" on Justia Law

Fitzgerald Fruit Farms, LLC leased land from Whitaker Farms, LLC for a peach orchard. After being locked out of the leased premises, Fitzgerald Farms sued Whitaker Farms for damages. A jury awarded compensatory damages to Fitzgerald Farms. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part but reversed the trial court’s ruling that Fitzgerald Farms could not seek punitive damages. On remand, a second jury awarded punitive damages to Fitzgerald Farms. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that statements made during a settlement negotiation by Whitaker Farms’s Chief Operating Officer to Fitzgerald Farms’s owner were properly admitted under OCGA § 24-4-408.The trial court initially ruled that Fitzgerald Farms could not seek punitive damages, but the Court of Appeals reversed this decision. On remand, the trial court conducted a second jury trial focused on punitive damages, where the jury awarded $500,000 in punitive damages to Fitzgerald Farms. Whitaker Farms appealed again, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting statements made during a settlement negotiation. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, stating that the statements were admissible to show Whitaker’s intent and state of mind.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and vacated the Court of Appeals’s judgment. The Supreme Court determined that the statements made during the settlement negotiation were inadmissible under OCGA § 24-4-408. The Court concluded that the statements were offered to prove Whitaker Farms’s liability for punitive damages, which is not permissible under the statute. The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals to determine whether the admission of the statements was harmful and if a new trial on punitive damages is required. View "Whitaker Farms, LLC v. Fitzgerald Fruit Farms, LLC" on Justia Law

A highway construction project in Johnson County, Indiana, required the widening of State Road 37 and the closure of an intersection at Fairview Road. The State initiated an eminent domain action to acquire a 0.632-acre strip of land from Franciscan Alliance, Inc., and the owners of easement rights over the strip, including The Market Place at State Road 37, LLC, and SCP 2010-C36-018, LLC, contested the action and sought damages due to changes in traffic flow from the intersection closure.The Johnson Superior Court appointed appraisers who valued the land and assessed damages. A jury trial followed, resulting in a verdict awarding $680,000 to Franciscan and $1,500,000 to SCP. The State appealed, arguing that damages for changes in traffic flow were not compensable. The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment, holding that the damages awarded were erroneous under existing caselaw on circuity of travel and traffic flow. Franciscan and SCP petitioned for transfer, which the Indiana Supreme Court granted.The Indiana Supreme Court reaffirmed the rule that when a road-improvement project leaves a property’s access points unchanged, a landowner cannot recover damages from changes in traffic flow, as these do not result from the taking of a property right. The Court held that the State’s construction project did not affect the owners’ access points to their properties, and thus, damages from the intersection closure were not compensable. The Court reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded for proceedings to determine the just compensation owed to Franciscan for the 0.632-acre strip of land. View "State v. Franciscan Alliance, Inc." on Justia Law

Naomi Bermudez, a tenant in a federally subsidized housing complex managed by Mercy Housing Management Group Inc., faced eviction after Mercy Housing alleged she violated her lease by having an unauthorized guest who stayed beyond the allowed period, repaired vehicles on the property, and harassed another resident. Bermudez denied these allegations and requested a jury trial to resolve the factual disputes.The Denver County Court denied Bermudez's request for a jury trial, stating that there is no constitutional right to a jury trial in civil matters in Colorado. Bermudez then filed a petition with the Supreme Court of Colorado, arguing that she was entitled to a jury trial under the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure and the statutory framework governing forcible entry and detainer (FED) actions.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and held that Bermudez is entitled to a jury trial on the factual disputes in the FED-possession action. The court found that the right to a jury trial in such cases is rooted in the statutory framework and the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically C.R.C.P. 338(a), which provides for a jury trial in actions for the recovery of specific real property. The court also determined that the FED statute and C.R.C.P. 338(a) are compatible and that the statutory right to a jury trial applies to factual disputes in FED-possession actions.The court acknowledged concerns about the potential burden on the county courts but concluded that the limited nature of the jury-trial right would not prove unworkable. The court reversed the county court's denial of Bermudez's jury demand, made absolute the order to show cause, and remanded the case with instructions for the county court to schedule a jury trial on the factual issues related to the possession dispute. View "Mercy Housing Management Group Inc. v. Bermudez" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to the County of Los Angeles's decision to ban new vineyards in the Santa Monica Mountains North Area. The area is a significant ecological and scenic resource, with most of its land designated as open space. In 2016, the County began updating the North Area Plan and Community Standards District, which included regulations for vineyards. Initially, the draft environmental impact report proposed stringent regulations but did not ban new vineyards. However, after public comments, the County Board of Supervisors decided to impose a total ban on new vineyards.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied the petition for a writ of mandate filed by John Gooden and the Malibu Coast Vintners and Grape Growers Alliance, Inc. The petitioners argued that the County violated the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) by not recirculating the environmental impact report after the vineyard ban was added and that the County failed to follow Government Code section 65857 by not referring the ban back to the Department of Regional Planning.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Two, affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the addition of the vineyard ban did not alter the nature or main features of the project described in the environmental impact report, thus not rendering the project description unstable. The court also found that the petitioners had waived any claim for recirculation. Additionally, the court assumed a procedural error under Government Code section 65857 but concluded that the petitioners failed to demonstrate that this error was prejudicial or that a different outcome was probable if the error had not occurred. View "Gooden v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Santa Rita Holdings, Inc. applied for a conditional use permit (CUP) from the County of Santa Barbara to cultivate cannabis on a 2.54-acre parcel owned by Kim Hughes. The only access to the parcel is through a private easement over land owned by JCCrandall, LLC. JCCrandall objected to the use of its easement for cannabis transportation. Despite the objection, the County granted the CUP, and the County’s Board of Supervisors upheld the decision, finding the road adequate for the project.JCCrandall petitioned for a writ of administrative mandate, challenging the County’s determination. JCCrandall argued that the use of the easement for cannabis activities was prohibited by the easement deed and federal law, required JCCrandall’s consent under state law, and violated County standards for private roads. The trial court denied the petition, applying the substantial evidence standard and finding the County’s decision supported by substantial evidence.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court erred in applying the substantial evidence standard instead of the independent judgment standard, as JCCrandall’s right to exclude unauthorized persons from its property is a fundamental vested right. The appellate court also found that under federal law, cannabis is illegal, and thus, the use of the easement for cannabis transportation exceeds the scope of the easement. The court concluded that the County’s reliance on Civil Code section 1550.5, subdivision (b) was misplaced, as it defies the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The judgment was reversed, and costs were awarded to JCCrandall. View "JCCrandall v. County of Santa Barbara" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over two adjacent properties, each containing a multi-unit apartment complex with on-site parking. The plaintiffs, Eli and Maha Batta, sought to establish easement rights for additional parking and trash dumpsters on a disputed area of the adjacent property owned by the defendant, Therese Hunt. The Battas purchased their property from Hunt in 1994 and claimed that their tenants had used the disputed area for parking and dumpsters since then. Hunt refused to sign a parking covenant in 2019, leading the Battas to file a lawsuit seeking to quiet title to an easement by grant, prescription, or irrevocable license, and for breach of contract.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County conducted a bench trial and ruled in favor of the Battas, finding they had established easement rights by oral grant, prescription, and implication. The court ordered that the easement would expire upon a bona fide sale of either property. Both parties appealed the decision. Hunt argued that the trial court erred in granting the easement rights, while the Battas contended that the court abused its discretion by ruling that the easement would expire upon a sale.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case and found that the trial court's findings were inconsistent. The trial court had found both that Hunt had granted an easement and that the Battas' use of the property was adverse, which are mutually exclusive conditions. The appellate court concluded that these inconsistent findings required reversal. Additionally, the appellate court found that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the Battas to amend their complaint to add a cause of action for an easement by implication without giving Hunt the opportunity to rebut the evidence. Consequently, the judgment was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Batta v. Hunt" on Justia Law

David Polkow rented a residential home from Frank Kahl under a written lease agreement that transitioned to a month-to-month basis after its initial term. In 2022, they signed a new three-year lease. Frank later transferred his interest in the property to the Frank J. Kahl Revocable Trust, with his son David Kahl managing the property as trustee after Frank's death. In January 2023, David Kahl filed an eviction action against Polkow, seeking possession of the property, damages for delinquent rent, and attorney fees.The Yellowstone County Justice Court awarded Kahl possession of the property and attorney fees but denied the request for delinquent rent. Kahl then sought additional damages for property damage, which led to a hearing where he claimed $128,644.07 in damages. The Justice Court awarded Kahl $58,753.73 in damages, plus interest and attorney fees, despite Polkow's objection that the amount exceeded the court's $15,000 jurisdictional limit. Polkow appealed to the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, which affirmed the Justice Court's decision, interpreting that the court had concurrent jurisdiction with the district court for landlord-tenant disputes.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and reversed the lower courts' decisions. The Supreme Court held that the Justice Court lacked jurisdiction to award damages exceeding the $15,000 limit imposed by § 3-10-301, MCA. The court clarified that the concurrent jurisdiction statutes did not override this limit. The case was remanded for the Justice Court to vacate the damages award and dismiss the claim for compensatory damages without prejudice, allowing Kahl to refile in District Court. The award of attorney fees and costs was affirmed. View "Kahl v. Polkow" on Justia Law

Vernon K. Stensvad, the plaintiff, owns a small cattle herd and entered into a Grazing Lease Contract with Newman Ayers Ranch, Inc. in July 2022. The contract stipulated that Stensvad would graze his cattle on Ayers Ranch's property for a fee, with higher winter rates to be determined. Stensvad paid the fees for July and August but later agreed orally to perform labor in exchange for reduced fees. Disputes arose over the quality of Stensvad's work and the amount owed. In October 2023, Ayers Ranch issued an agister’s lien for $78,662.50, seizing Stensvad’s herd. Stensvad sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the sale of his cattle under the lien.The Seventh Judicial District Court in Prairie County granted Stensvad’s application for a preliminary injunction, ordering the cattle to be moved to a third-party feed lot. Ayers Ranch appealed, arguing that the District Court failed to consider all four factors required for a preliminary injunction under Montana law and that a preliminary injunction was not an appropriate remedy for challenging an agister’s lien.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the District Court manifestly abused its discretion by not addressing all four factors of the preliminary injunction standard. The Supreme Court clarified that under the revised standard, a party must satisfy all four factors: likelihood of success on the merits, likelihood of irreparable harm, balance of equities, and public interest. The Court adopted the "serious questions" test from the Ninth Circuit, allowing for flexibility in evaluating these factors. The case was remanded for the District Court to make supplemental findings consistent with this standard. The Supreme Court also held that a preliminary injunction is an appropriate remedy to challenge an agister’s lien and that Stensvad did not have an adequate remedy at law. View "Stensvad v. Newman Ayers Ranch" on Justia Law

In August 2010, the Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University filed a suit to expropriate property in New Orleans for constructing an academic medical center. The property owners, Allen Bickham and others, were named as defendants. A default judgment was obtained in March 2011, setting compensation for the property. In October 2011, James Alderdice intervened, claiming a mortgage on the property and seeking damages for lack of notice and demolition of the building.The Orleans Civil District Court granted a peremptory exception of no right of action against Alderdice in March 2014, dismissing his intervention. The Court of Appeal reversed this decision in March 2015, allowing Alderdice to assert his rights as a mortgagee. Alderdice then moved for a status conference and later for a trial date. In March 2017, a joint motion to continue the trial without date was filed and granted. Subsequent motions were filed, including a motion to set for trial in March 2020. The Board moved to dismiss the intervention as abandoned in June 2023, arguing that no steps had been taken for over three years.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed whether the joint motion to continue trial without date constituted a "step" under Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 561, which would interrupt the abandonment period. The Court held that such a motion is not a step as it does not hasten the case towards judgment. However, the Court found that the joint motion reflected the parties' intent to advance the lawsuit, thus waiving the abandonment claim. Additionally, the Court noted that the abandonment period was suspended due to the Covid-19 emergency, and Alderdice's motion to set for trial in March 2020 interrupted the abandonment period. The Court affirmed the lower courts' rulings, denying the Board's motion to dismiss the case as abandoned. View "BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY AND AGRICULTURAL AND MECHANICAL COLLEGE VS. BICKHAM" on Justia Law