Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

A public entity contracted with a general contractor to construct a major rail line project. The general contractor, in turn, subcontracted a significant portion of the work to a subcontractor. As the project progressed, it experienced numerous delays and disruptions, which the subcontractor claimed increased its costs. After completing its performance, the subcontractor, relying on expert analysis of its additional costs, filed a verified statement of claim under the Colorado Public Works Act, asserting it was owed additional millions for labor, materials, and other costs, including those stemming from delay and disruption.Following the filing, the general contractor substituted a surety bond for the retained project funds and the subcontractor initiated litigation in Denver District Court. After a bench trial, the trial court found in favor of the subcontractor, concluding that its verified statement of claim was not excessive and that there was a reasonable possibility the claimed amount was due. The court awarded the subcontractor damages for delay, disruption, and unpaid funds. The general contractor appealed, contending the claim was excessive and should result in forfeiture of all rights to the claimed amount. The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed in relevant part, holding that the verified statement of claim was excessive as a matter of law and that the subcontractor forfeited all rights to the amount claimed. This disposition left certain issues raised by the subcontractor on cross-appeal unaddressed.The Supreme Court of Colorado granted review and held that, under the Public Works Act, disputed or unliquidated amounts—including delay and disruption damages—may be included in a verified statement of claim if they represent the specified categories of costs and the claim is not excessive under the statute. The court also held that filing an excessive claim results only in forfeiture of statutory remedies under the Act, not all legal remedies. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ralph L. Wadsworth Constr. Co. v. Reg'l Rail Partners" on Justia Law

The case involves two drainage districts in Pottawattamie County, Iowa, which undertook a reclassification process after proposing improvements to levees under their management. The reclassification determined how costs for the improvements would be apportioned among properties benefitting from the work. The Iowa Department of Transportation (IDOT) owns state highway land running through the districts, comprising less than 5% of the land but, under the reclassification, was assigned more than 75% of the costs. The method for assessing IDOT’s benefit relied largely on projected benefits to motorists, such as avoided delays from fewer road closures, rather than on direct benefits to the highway property or its owner.The boards of trustees for the districts approved the reclassification despite IDOT’s objections. IDOT then sought judicial review in the Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County, arguing that the assessment method violated Iowa Code section 307.45 and that assessments should be based on benefits to the property or its owner, not third-party users. The district court set aside the reclassifications, agreeing that section 307.45 applied and that the assessments were not conducted in a uniform manner as required by that statute. However, the district court did not limit the scope of “benefits” solely to those accruing to the property or its owner.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed the district court’s decision to set aside the reclassification but modified the reasoning. The court held that Iowa Code section 307.45 does not apply to drainage districts, as they are not cities, counties, or subdivisions thereof. The court further held that assessments against IDOT highway property must be based only on benefits to the property and its owner—the State—not on benefits to non-owner users such as motorists. The judgment was affirmed as modified. View "State of Iowa, ex rel. Iowa Department of Transportation v. Honey Creek Drainage District No. 6 Board of Trustees" on Justia Law

A dispute arose between neighbors in Illinois over a property line, with one party, Mr. Barker, seeking to quiet title to land upon which the Boettchers had built a garage. The Boettchers counterclaimed, asserting adverse possession and contesting the property’s boundaries. During this litigation, the Boettchers issued subpoenas to two employees of the United States Department of Agriculture for documents and testimony relating to farm acreage. The Department refused compliance, citing federal regulations, and when the Boettchers would not withdraw the subpoenas, the Department removed only the subpoena proceeding—not the entire case—to federal court under the federal officer removal statute.The Boettchers subsequently attempted to remove the entire state case to federal court, invoking both the general removal statute and federal question jurisdiction, arguing that federal law originally defined the disputed property lines. Mr. Barker moved to remand, arguing that the property dispute was governed by Illinois law. The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois retained jurisdiction over the subpoena proceeding but remanded the property dispute to state court. The court later granted summary judgment to the Department of Agriculture, quashing the subpoenas.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that it had jurisdiction to review the remand order under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), since federal officer jurisdiction was invoked. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, concluding that the Department’s removal of only the subpoena proceeding was proper under the statute, and that there was no independent federal jurisdiction over the property dispute. The court also held that the district court properly quashed the subpoenas, as neither the state nor federal court had jurisdiction to enforce them against federal employees under the circumstances. The judgment was affirmed. View "Barker v Boettcher" on Justia Law

A condominium unit was owned by Diane Marchetti, who did not reside in the unit but allowed her daughter, Caroline Thibeault, and Thibeault’s son to occupy it. The condominium’s association initiated a foreclosure action against Marchetti alleging she was in default for failing to pay assessments, fines, and fees—some of which related to Thibeault’s alleged commercial use of the unit. Thibeault’s son has a disability, and both Thibeault and Marchetti asserted that the association had failed to provide reasonable accommodation under federal and state disability laws.After the foreclosure action commenced in the Sagadahoc County Superior Court, Marchetti filed an answer and raised several defenses, including alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Maine Human Rights Act. Thibeault, who was not a party to the action, then moved to intervene, claiming both a direct interest in the property and statutory civil rights at stake. She sought intervention as of right or, alternatively, permissive intervention, arguing her interests were not adequately represented and that her defenses raised common questions of law and fact with the main action. The Superior Court denied her motion to intervene on both grounds, finding her interest insufficient and noting that her mother’s defenses already encompassed her concerns.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the order denying intervention. The court held that Thibeault did not satisfy the criteria for intervention as of right under Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) because she lacked a direct, legally protectable interest in the foreclosure action, her ability to protect her interests would not be impaired by denial, and her interests were adequately represented by Marchetti. The court also found no abuse of discretion in denying permissive intervention under Rule 24(b) because Thibeault’s participation would be duplicative and cause undue delay. The order denying intervention was affirmed. View "Oak Hill Condominiums v. Marchetti" on Justia Law

A seller owned a twelve-unit apartment complex and entered into a written contract to sell the property to a buyer for $1.3 million, with a closing date set on or before November 30, 2021. The contract contained a financing contingency requiring the buyer to provide written proof of financing or inability to obtain financing by November 26, 2021, stating that “time is of the essence.” After the buyer’s bank conditionally approved financing, but anticipated a delay in the appraisal, the buyer informed the seller and attempted to extend the financing deadline. While the seller did not sign proposed written extensions, both parties continued to communicate about closing logistics, including scheduling a closing in December. On December 3, the seller terminated the contract, expressing unwillingness to proceed with the sale.The Superior Court of Hillsborough County denied the seller’s motion for partial summary judgment, rejecting the argument that the buyer’s failure to meet the financing deadline constituted a breach entitling the seller to terminate. The court also denied the seller’s motions in limine to exclude evidence of oral communications and closing agent emails. After a jury trial, the jury found the buyer had not materially breached the contract, that the parties had agreed to extend the closing, and that the seller had materially breached. The trial court then awarded specific performance, ordering the sale to proceed.On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed. The court held that the seller’s conduct after the missed financing deadline raised a material factual dispute about whether the seller waived its right to declare a default. The court also found that the trial court properly admitted evidence of oral communications and that the longstanding presumption favoring specific performance in land sale contracts applied, even where the buyer was an investor. The trial court’s judgment was affirmed. View "J&C Properties v. Rayster Realty" on Justia Law

In 1953, C.C. Fay conveyed parcels of land to a third party, reserving “all the coal below the horizon of the No. 8 coal, if any under vein exists thereunder, and other minerals, with the right to mine and remove such coal or other minerals of any vein.” The current owner of the property, a fund, asserted that this reservation did not include rights to oil and gas beneath the parcels. The heirs and successors of Fay argued that the reservation did include those rights. The dispute centered on whether the original deed’s language was broad enough to cover oil and gas.The Harrison County Court of Common Pleas granted summary judgment to the fund, holding that the deed’s language was not broad enough to cover oil and gas rights. The heirs appealed to the Seventh District Court of Appeals, which found the reservation language ambiguous. The appellate court examined extrinsic evidence, including other deeds executed by Fay that specifically referenced oil and gas when intended. It concluded that Fay’s omission of the phrase “oil and gas” in the deed at issue showed he did not intend to reserve those rights, and it affirmed the trial court’s judgment.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and reached the same result but for a different reason. It held that the reservation clause in the deed was unambiguous when read as a whole. The Supreme Court found that the language, including references to “mine,” “mining,” and “vein,” indicated an intent to reserve only solid minerals such as coal, and not oil or gas. The court thus held that oil and gas were not included in the reservation and affirmed the judgment of the Seventh District Court of Appeals. View "Faith Ranch & Farms Fund, Inc. v. PNC Bank, Natl. Assn." on Justia Law

A 16-year-old passenger was injured when a car driven by her 16-year-old friend hydroplaned, crossed over the double yellow line, and went off the road down a hillside in San Rafael, California, on a rainy day. Both teenagers knew the road was wet, and the driver was speeding slightly above the posted limit as she entered a left curve. The driver attempted to correct the car’s path but lost control, resulting in the accident. Both had been warned by their parents about the restrictions of provisional licenses, and the driver was subsequently cited for violating license restrictions and making an unsafe turn.The injured passenger, through her guardian ad litem, filed suit in Marin County Superior Court against several parties, including the City of San Rafael, alleging a dangerous condition of public property due to lack of warning signs, absence of barriers, and failure to warn of slippery conditions. The City moved for summary judgment, arguing the conditions were open and obvious, and the trial court granted the motion, entering judgment for the City. The court found that the alleged dangerous condition was obvious—that the wet road and curve presented an apparent risk, and there was no duty to warn of such an open and obvious danger. The court also noted that the plaintiff’s later arguments regarding roadway defects were not pled in the operative complaint and could not be relied upon to defeat summary judgment.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, affirmed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court held that the risk posed by the road’s curve and wet conditions was open and obvious as a matter of law, and therefore, the City could not be held liable for failing to warn of these conditions or for the absence of a guardrail. The judgment in favor of the City was affirmed. View "Pagan v. City of San Rafael" on Justia Law

Crystal Homestead Estates, LLC (CHE) owns a parcel of land known as Crystal Farm in Bannock County, Idaho. The owners of two adjacent parcels to the south are Matthew and Laura Schiffman, and Michael and Leslie Schiffman. CHE claimed that Crystal Farm was landlocked and could only be accessed by two unimproved roads crossing the Schiffmans’ parcels. CHE filed suit to quiet title to easements over these roads, asserting theories of implied easement by prior use, easement by necessity, and prescriptive easement. The Schiffmans disputed that Crystal Farm was landlocked, challenged the existence of any easement, and made counterclaims, including a third-party complaint against a prior owner for breach of title warranties.The District Court of the Sixth Judicial District granted summary judgment to CHE, quieting title to the easements based on implied easement by prior use. In doing so, the court struck the Schiffmans’ affidavits, relied on a declaration from a prior owner (Roger Johnson), and found the evidence of apparent continuous use sufficient. The court denied the Schiffmans’ motion for reconsideration, stating there was no new evidence or authority and no material factual dispute.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho found that the district court erred by striking admissible portions of the Schiffmans’ affidavits and by relying on portions of Johnson’s declaration that lacked proper foundation and personal knowledge. The Supreme Court further concluded that CHE did not establish, as a matter of law, the required element of apparent continuous use long enough before severance to support an implied easement by prior use. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment, reversed the grant of summary judgment, and remanded for further proceedings. The Schiffmans were awarded costs on appeal, but no attorney fees were granted. View "Crystal Homestead Estates v. That Piece of Property" on Justia Law

A non-governmental organization challenged a county planning department’s approval of a family transfer exemption that allowed a landowner to divide an 80-acre tract of land into eight parcels, gifting them to family members. The organization alleged that the planning department failed to provide public notice before approving the exemption, in violation of county subdivision regulations. The land division was discovered years after its approval, when one of the organization’s members was researching a neighboring tract. The organization contended that the lack of public notice denied its members an opportunity to comment on the exemption application, as required by the county’s regulations.The organization filed suit in the Montana Twenty-First Judicial District Court, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The county moved to dismiss, arguing that its regulations did not require public notice for exemption applications. The District Court granted the county’s motion, dismissing all claims, and specifically found that the county regulations did not mandate published notice for review of proposed subdivision exemptions.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It held that the plain language of the county’s regulations, which state that “the public shall be permitted to comment” on exemption applications, necessarily implies that public notice must be provided; otherwise, the right to comment would be meaningless. The court emphasized that although the regulations do not specify the manner of notice, adequate notice is required to effectuate public participation. The Supreme Court reversed the District Court’s dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. The holding was that the county’s subdivision regulations require the planning department to provide public notice of pending subdivision exemption applications to enable meaningful public comment. View "Sapphire v. Ravalli County" on Justia Law

Several landowners in Indiana, who acquired their properties subject to agreements made in 1959, sought to enroll their land in a federal conservation program. During the process, a title examination revealed that Trunkline Gas Company held easements over their properties, allowing it to construct and maintain pipelines. The landowners contended that Trunkline’s easement was limited to a fixed 66-foot corridor along the existing pipeline, which had been installed in 1960. Trunkline, however, asserted that the original agreements granted it rights to lay additional pipelines anywhere on the properties and to alter the route of the existing pipeline.The landowners filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, seeking a declaration that Trunkline’s easement was fixed and limited in scope. Trunkline counterclaimed, seeking confirmation of its broader, unexercised rights. The district court divided the litigation into two phases and, in both, granted partial summary judgment in Trunkline’s favor. The court concluded that the 1959 agreements created a floating or blanket easement, meaning the location for future pipelines was not fixed, and that Indiana law did not allow unexercised, future easement rights to be fixed to a defined location.On appeal, the landowners asked the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit to certify a question to the Indiana Supreme Court regarding the fixity of floating easements, or, alternatively, to reverse the district court. The Seventh Circuit declined to certify, finding Indiana law sufficiently clear that unexercised, future rights under a floating easement are not fixed. The court affirmed the district court’s summary judgment, holding that Trunkline’s unexercised easement rights remain unfixed under Indiana law. View "Close Armstrong, LLC v Trunkline Gas Company, LLC" on Justia Law