Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries
Bray v. ID Dept of Juvenile Corrections
In 2019, Colby James Bray died while in the custody of the Idaho Department of Juvenile Corrections (IDJC). His parents, Jeffrey and Michelle Bray, acting as personal representatives of his estate, filed a wrongful death suit in federal court one day before the two-year statute of limitations expired. They later voluntarily dismissed the federal case and refiled in state court nearly three years after Colby's death. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the claims were time-barred by the two-year statute of limitations. The district court granted the motions and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.The Brays appealed, arguing that Idaho Code section 5-234 and 28 U.S.C. section 1367(d) tolled the statute of limitations. The district court had concluded that section 5-234 did not toll the time for filing the state complaint and that section 1367(d) did not apply to IDJC due to Eleventh Amendment immunity. The court also awarded costs and attorney fees to the defendants.The Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the district court's ruling that section 5-234 did not toll the statute of limitations. It also agreed that the claims against Meacham and the Individual Defendants were time-barred under section 1367(d) because the Brays did not file within 30 days after the federal court dismissed those claims. However, the court found that section 1367(d) did toll the time for filing the complaint against IDJC, but IDJC was immune from the claims under Idaho Code section 6-904B(5). The court upheld the district court's award of attorney fees and costs to the defendants and awarded attorney fees and costs on appeal to the respondents. View "Bray v. ID Dept of Juvenile Corrections" on Justia Law
ROE v. PATTERSON
Jane Roe, a student at Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, reported to President Paige Patterson that she had been sexually assaulted by a fellow student, John Doe. Patterson notified the police, and Doe was expelled for violating the campus firearms policy. Later, Patterson was removed from his position by the university's board, partly due to his handling of Roe's complaint. In response, a group of donors published a letter accusing Roe of lying about the assault and claiming the encounters were consensual. Roe sued Patterson and the university for defamation, alleging that Patterson's agent provided the defamatory content for the letter.The federal district court granted summary judgment in favor of Patterson, concluding that Colter, Patterson's chief of staff, had not acted as Patterson's agent in drafting the letter. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit found that there was a fact issue regarding Colter's agency and certified two questions to the Supreme Court of Texas.The Supreme Court of Texas held that a person who supplies defamatory material to another for publication can be liable if they intend or know that the material will be published. Additionally, a defamation plaintiff can survive summary judgment without identifying specific statements made by the defendant if the evidence is legally sufficient to support a finding that the defendant was the source of the defamatory content. The court emphasized that the plaintiff must show that the defendant was the source of the defamatory statements through direct or circumstantial evidence, but need not provide verbatim evidence of the underlying communication. The case was remanded to the Fifth Circuit for further proceedings consistent with these holdings. View "ROE v. PATTERSON" on Justia Law
Burton v. West Bend Mutual Insurance Company
Jessenia Burton, a student driver, was involved in a car accident during a drivers' education course on April 30, 2017. Burton and her parents sued several defendants, including West Bend Mutual Insurance Company, which provided coverage for the vehicles used in the course. Burton retained neuropsychologist Dr. Daniel Tranel, who conducted an evaluation and diagnosed her with a concussion, postconcussion syndrome, PTSD, and major depressive disorder. Dr. Tranel's report included summaries of psychological and neuropsychological tests administered to Burton.The Iowa District Court for Polk County granted West Bend's motion to compel the production of Dr. Tranel's psychological test material and test data. The court reasoned that since Burton made her mental condition an element of her claim, the information was discoverable under Iowa Code section 228.6(4)(a). The court ordered the information to be produced to West Bend and its attorneys, issuing a protective order to limit further disclosure.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The court held that Iowa Code section 228.9 explicitly prohibits the disclosure of psychological test material and test data in a judicial proceeding to anyone other than a licensed psychologist designated by the individual. The court emphasized that the statute's language is clear and unambiguous, and the only exception to this prohibition is disclosure to another licensed psychologist. The court concluded that the district court erred in granting the motion to compel and vacated the protective order. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this interpretation. View "Burton v. West Bend Mutual Insurance Company" on Justia Law
Johnson v. Antoniutti
Nancy Johnson and Domenico Zurini were involved in a motor vehicle accident in Omaha, Nebraska. Just before the 4-year statute of limitations expired, Johnson and her husband filed a negligence complaint against Zurini in the district court for Douglas County. After attempting to serve summons, they discovered that Zurini had died before the complaint was filed. They then had a special administrator appointed and moved to revive the action in the name of the special administrator. The district court initially granted the motion, and the Johnsons filed an amended complaint naming the special administrator as the defendant. The special administrator entered a voluntary appearance and then moved to vacate the order of revivor and dismiss the amended complaint, arguing that no viable action had been commenced within the statute of limitations. The district court agreed and dismissed the action as time barred.The Johnsons appealed, and the case was moved to the Nebraska Supreme Court's docket. The court reviewed whether the Johnsons properly commenced their negligence action within the applicable statute of limitations. The court noted that the original complaint, which named a deceased person as the sole defendant, was a legal nullity and did not validly commence an action under Nebraska law. The court also found that the amended complaint, which named the special administrator as the defendant, was filed after the limitations period expired and did not relate back to the original complaint under Nebraska's relation back statute.The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the original complaint was a legal nullity and did not commence an action. The amended complaint was time barred, and the relation back statute did not apply. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to vacate the order of revivor and substitution. View "Johnson v. Antoniutti" on Justia Law
Doe v. Ferguson
Plaintiffs John and Jane Doe, on behalf of their minor children Janie Doe 1 and Janie Doe 2, alleged that Prosper Independent School District officials, Superintendent Holly Ferguson and former Transportation Director Annamarie Hamrick, failed to prevent school-bus-driver Frank Paniagua from sexually abusing their children. The abuse, which occurred during the 2021-22 school year, was captured on the bus’s video surveillance and reflected in GPS tracking data. Plaintiffs claimed that Ferguson and Hamrick had subjective knowledge of the abuse but failed to act.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas denied Ferguson and Hamrick's motions to dismiss based on qualified immunity, concluding that the complaint plausibly alleged that the defendants were aware of Paniagua’s inappropriate behavior and demonstrated deliberate indifference by failing to take necessary action to stop the abuse. The court allowed the claims under Title IX against Prosper ISD and claims under § 1983 against Paniagua’s estate to proceed, while dismissing the equal-protection and failure-to-train claims without prejudice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the interlocutory appeal concerning the denial of qualified immunity for the supervisory-liability claims under § 1983. The court held that the plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege that Ferguson and Hamrick had subjective knowledge of the abuse. The court emphasized that mere access to information, such as surveillance footage and GPS data, does not equate to subjective knowledge. Consequently, the court vacated the district court's denial of qualified immunity and granted qualified immunity to Ferguson and Hamrick for the supervisory-liability claims under § 1983. View "Doe v. Ferguson" on Justia Law
Geerdes v. Likness
On January 13, 2020, Denise Likness ran a red light and collided with Breyanna Geerdes' car at an intersection in Watertown, South Dakota. Likness admitted fault for the accident. Geerdes claimed the accident caused her physical injuries, including neck pain, headaches, and back pain, as well as anxiety and anger outbursts. She received treatment from a chiropractor and a clinic, and attended physical therapy sessions. Sixteen months after the accident, she reported pain again and was diagnosed with upper cervical instability and neck curvature. Evidence showed Geerdes had similar symptoms before the accident.The Circuit Court of the Third Judicial Circuit in Codington County, South Dakota, presided over the case. During the trial, Likness admitted fault but contested the extent of Geerdes' injuries and their connection to the accident. The jury found that Likness' negligence was not the legal cause of Geerdes' injuries. Geerdes filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that the causation issue should not have been submitted to the jury. The circuit court did not rule on the motion, resulting in its automatic denial under SDCL 15-6-59(b).The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. The court held that Likness' counsel's statements during the trial did not constitute judicial admissions of causation. The court concluded that the statements were made in the context of arguing the extent of damages and were not intended to relieve Geerdes of her burden to prove causation. The court affirmed the circuit court's decision, finding no abuse of discretion in denying the motion for a new trial. View "Geerdes v. Likness" on Justia Law
Walden v. Walden
Kristine Gail Walden and Shay Alan Walden were married in April 2016 and separated in June 2020. Kristine initiated divorce proceedings in September 2022. At the time of the trial in December 2023, Kristine was 54 and worked part-time, while Shay, 53, was self-employed. The district court heard testimony about their assets, debts, and the conduct leading to the breakdown of their marriage, including domestic violence by Shay that resulted in a permanent eye injury to Kristine. The court divided the marital property and debt, ordered Shay to pay spousal support of $1,000 per month for seven years, property payments totaling $43,587, and attorney’s fees of $8,350. Shay was also assigned a debt of $35,433.66 incurred after the divorce proceedings began.The district court awarded spousal support based on the Ruff-Fischer guidelines, considering the parties' ages, earning abilities, health, and financial circumstances. The court found Kristine had a monthly income of $2,400 and expenses of $6,400, while Shay had a gross monthly income of $12,500 and expenses of $5,017. The court concluded Kristine needed spousal support and Shay had the ability to pay without undue hardship. Shay’s argument that the court deviated from statutory limits for spousal support was dismissed as the applicable version of the statute was correctly applied.The court’s property and debt distribution was found to be equitable, considering the short-term nature of the marriage and the contributions of each party. Shay’s arguments against the distribution of the marital home’s equity and Kristine’s medical debt were rejected. The court’s decision to assign Shay the debt incurred after the divorce proceedings was also upheld.The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment, concluding that the court did not clearly err in its findings and that the award of attorney’s fees was justified based on Shay’s actions that increased the costs of the proceedings. View "Walden v. Walden" on Justia Law
L. L. v. Newell Brands, Inc.
The plaintiffs sought to recover damages from the defendants for alleged violations of the Connecticut Product Liability Act (CPLA) after their minor child, L.L., was severely injured. The injury occurred when a Graco car seat, placed on a kitchen counter next to an electric range stove, caught fire. The plaintiffs claimed that the car seat and stove were defectively designed or manufactured. As a result of the fire, L.L. suffered severe burns and injuries. The plaintiffs, including L.L.'s parents, also sought damages for loss of filial consortium, alleging that they lost the society, care, and companionship of their daughter due to her injuries.The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut reviewed the case and certified a question to the Connecticut Supreme Court, asking whether Connecticut law recognizes a parent's claim for loss of filial consortium when a minor child suffers severe but nonfatal injuries due to a defendant's tortious conduct. The District Court had previously denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the loss of consortium claims without prejudice.The Connecticut Supreme Court concluded that Connecticut law does not recognize a cause of action for loss of filial consortium. The court reasoned that the justifications for recognizing loss of spousal and parental consortium claims, which are based on mutual dependence and reliance, do not apply to the parent-child relationship in the same way. The court emphasized that the emotional distress experienced by a parent due to a child's severe injury is distinct from the relational loss addressed by loss of consortium claims. The court found the reasoning of jurisdictions that distinguish between parental and filial consortium more persuasive and declined to expand the scope of liability to include loss of filial consortium. View "L. L. v. Newell Brands, Inc." on Justia Law
Franco v Richland Refrigerated Solutions, LLC
Felix Franco, a commercial truck driver, was asleep in his parked semi-trailer truck when it was hit by another truck driven by an employee of Richland Refrigerated Solutions, LLC. Franco claimed that the accident caused a back injury that necessitated surgery, while Richland acknowledged the accident but disputed the cause of Franco's injury. Franco had a history of degenerative back problems and had experienced back pain before the accident. The case went to trial, and a jury found in favor of Richland.The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin handled the initial trial. Franco sought to admit medical illustrations as evidence, but the court only allowed two as demonstrative exhibits. The court provided jury instructions and a special verdict form, focusing on whether the accident caused Franco's injury. The jury ultimately ruled in favor of Richland, and Franco's post-trial motions were denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's rulings, including the denial of Franco's motions for judgment as a matter of law and a new trial. The appellate court found that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the accident did not cause Franco's injury. The court also upheld the jury instructions and special verdict form, stating they accurately reflected Wisconsin law. Additionally, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to exclude two of Franco's medical illustrations. The judgment of the district court was affirmed in all respects. View "Franco v Richland Refrigerated Solutions, LLC" on Justia Law
Calvary Temple Church of Evansville, Inc. v. Kirsch
Gerard A. Kirsch, a member of Calvary Temple Church of Evansville, Inc., was injured while building a storage barn on the church's property. Kirsch fell from a ladder and sustained a severe arm injury. He sued the church, alleging negligence for failing to provide safe equipment and proper supervision.The Vanderburgh Superior Court denied the church's motion for summary judgment, which argued that Indiana Code section 34-31-7-2 limited the church's liability. The court held that a jury must decide if the church breached any duty to Kirsch. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed, interpreting the statute narrowly to apply only to parts of the premises used primarily for worship services, thus allowing Kirsch's claim to proceed.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that the term "premises" in Indiana Code section 34-31-7-2 includes the entire parcel of land owned by the church, not just the areas used primarily for worship services. Since the church's entire property is used primarily for worship services, the statute applies, limiting the church's liability to warning of hidden dangers and refraining from intentional harm. Kirsch admitted the church breached neither duty, leading the court to grant summary judgment in favor of the church. View "Calvary Temple Church of Evansville, Inc. v. Kirsch" on Justia Law