Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Val and LaRee Westover appealed the district court’s judgment and denial of their request for writs of mandate and prohibition against Franklin County Assessor Jase Cundick. The dispute arose when the Westovers granted an easement to Rocky Mountain Power on property owned by the Westovers. Based on his office’s records, Cundick sent a letter to Rocky Mountain Power stating that the Westovers did not own the property in question. The Westovers sought a writ of mandate to require Cundick to retract the letter and a writ of prohibition to prevent him from sending such letters in the future. The district court denied the Westovers’ request for writs of mandate and prohibition after it concluded that there were other remedies available at law. On appeal, the Westovers argued the district court erred by failing to grant injunctive relief prohibiting Cundick from sending out letters concerning real estate transactions and property ownership. Although the Westovers’ complaint did not request that the district court grant injunctive relief, they argued that the district court erred because the Westovers were clearly entitled to injunctive relief under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(c). Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Westover v. Cundick" on Justia Law

Auto Alley, LLC, Calvin Visser, and Vicki Visser appealed a district court order granting a writ of possession and quieting title to certain real property in Douglas Visser. Douglas was awarded the property in his divorce from Vicki in 2005. A dispute subsequently arose and in February of 2014, the parties entered into a stipulation that resulted in Vicki being permitted to continue to occupy part of the property known as “Lot 2.” A stipulated judgment was entered which provided that Douglas would convey Lot 2 to Vicki if she completely performed a number of specific obligations within specified time frames. When Vicki failed to completely perform those obligations, Douglas brought the instant motion to enforce the judgment and the district court granted his motion. Vicki appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed and awarded Douglas attorney fees on appeal. View "Visser v. Auto Alley, LLC" on Justia Law

This case was an appeal of a judgment: (1) denying recovery on an alleged oral promise to grant the Plaintiffs a right of first refusal with respect to a parcel of real property they were leasing; (2) denying recovery on an alleged oral promise to purchase the Plaintiffs’ buildings that were located on that property; and (3) finding that the Plaintiffs were guilty of unlawful detainer. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. View "Nicholson v. Coeur d'Alene Placer Mining Corp" on Justia Law

In 2015, the Plaintiffs filed this action seeking to quiet title in a strip of land that was 34.56 feet wide and 314.70 feet long. They alleged that they had satisfied the requirements for acquiring title to the property by adverse possession, which were set forth in Idaho Code section 5-210. At the time that the Plaintiffs went into possession of the strip of property, the required time for occupying adversely possessed property was five years. In 2006, an amendment to Idaho Code section 5-210 increased the statutory time period for adverse possession to twenty years. When that amendment became effective, the Plaintiffs had possessed the strip of land for four years and eight months. Guild Mortgage Company held a promissory note that was secured by a deed of trust in the strip of land; Mortgage Electronic Systems, Inc., was the trustee on the deed of trust; and Terry Lankford was the owner of the strip of land (collectively, Defendants). Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the 2006 amendment to Idaho Code section 5-210 applied, so the Plaintiffs had not possessed the property for the required statutory period. The district court agreed, and entered a judgment dismissing the complaint. Plaintiffs timely appealed. Finding no reversible error in the district court's dismissal, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Schoorl v. Guild Mortgage Co" on Justia Law

Eric and Kathryn Bowen purchased property in Caldwell through a tax deed sale conducted by the Caldwell Irrigation Lateral District (CILD). G. Lance Salladay brought suit arguing that the sale was void because the property was part of the Estate of Roger Troutner (the Estate), and Salladay, as personal representative of the Estate, was entitled to notice of the sale and never received such notice. The district court ruled that Salladay was entitled to notice and since he had not received notice of the sale there was no final decision regarding issuance of the deed as required by Idaho Code section 43-719(2). The district court then remanded the case to CILD. On appeal, Bowens argued the district court erred in its determination that Salladay was entitled to notice and that even if Salladay was entitled to notice, his petition to the district court was untimely. The Supreme Court found that the district court erred in remanding the case back to CILD. The Court concluded CILD failed to provide written notice to the record owner of the property, so the tax deed was void ab initio. View "Salladay v. Bowen" on Justia Law

The Board of Equalization of Ada County (Ada County) appealed a district court’s ruling granting Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Society (Society) a charitable property tax exemption. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that Society was not a charitable organization under the factors announced in "Appeal of Sunny Ridge Manor, Inc.," (675 P.2d 813 (1984)). Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Society v. Bd of Equalization of Ada County" on Justia Law

Appellants appealed the district court's denial of their motion for summary judgment and the grant of summary judgment in favor of the Board of the Local Improvement District No. 1101 and the Ada County Board of Commissioners (the Boards) in a case regarding assessments levied on properties within the Sage Acres Local Improvement District. Appellants also appealed the district court’s award of attorney fees to the Boards. Ada County Ordinance No. 780 established the Ada County Local Improvement District No. 1101, known as Sage Acres Local Improvement District (LID). The ordinance was adopted in 2011. The purpose of the LID was to construct a water delivery system for residential and irrigation use by properties within the Sage Acres Subdivision (Sage Acres) in Boise. water system was completed in 2014. Appellants challenged the creation of the LID and Ada County Ordinance No. 809, which confirmed the assessments levied on properties affected by the LID. In 2013, Appellants filed a Notice of Appeal from Assessments; the district court set the matter for trial in 2014, and ordered the parties to mediate no later than 90 days prior to trial. Prior to mediation, the Boards moved for summary judgment, arguing that Appellants’ claims were not legally or factually supported. Finding no reversible error in the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Boards, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Hoffman v. Bd of Local Improvement Dist No. 1101" on Justia Law

Appellant Leo Gilbride contended that the district court erred by refusing his request for attorney’s fees. The underlying dispute arose out of a sale of real property between Respondent David Kosmann and Gilbride, which was executed with the alleged understanding that Gilbride would re-convey the property back to Kosmann at a later time. After purchasing the property, with down payment funds provided by Kosmann, Gilbride refused to re-convey the property to Kosmann. Accordingly, Kosmann filed a complaint against Gilbride alleging, inter alia, unjust enrichment and demanding specific performance of Gilbride’s promise to re-convey the property. The district court dismissed the specific enforcement claim, awarded Kosmann $30,990 based on his unjust enrichment claim, and denied both parties’ claims for attorney’s fees. Finding no reversible error in the district court's order, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. View "Kosmann v. Gilbride" on Justia Law

Appellant Antranick Harrentsian alleged that the district court erred in its enforcement of a constructive trust. Respondents, Gennieve and Frank Hill were the parents of Sarah Correa, who was Appellant's ex-girlfriend. In 2008, Appellant entrusted Correa with $400,000. In 2009, Correa loaned $101,500 of the $400,000 to Respondents. Respondents used the funds to purchase a house in Boise. Thereafter, Respondents spent nearly $40,000 of their own money to improve the Property. Also in 2009, Appellant sued Correa in California. The California lawsuit resulted in the creation of a constructive trust on the $400,000. Appellant filed this lawsuit in an effort to recover the Property, which was acquired by Respondents with money subject to the constructive trust. The district court found that Respondents were not aware that the money they received from Correa was wrongfully obtained. Accordingly, the district court ordered that title to the Property be transferred to Appellant, but that Respondents were entitled to an equitable lien against the Property for $33,689 for the improvements they made. The district court provided Appellant with 180 days to satisfy the lien. Appellant appealed that judgment, but finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. View "Harrentsian v. Hill" on Justia Law

NeYada, Inc., a Nevada corporation, appealed a district court’s order granting summary judgment to Respondent Marian Hoke, and declaring a lease (the “Lease”) and an option to purchase (the “Option”) between the parties invalid and unenforceable. In November 2014, Hoke executed the Lease and Option with NeYada for the transfer of an interest in real property located in Canyon County, Idaho. A mere two months later, Hoke filed suit seeking to invalidate the Lease and the Option alleging, inter alia, that neither document complied with the statute of frauds. Both parties moved for summary judgment on that issue. The district court held that the Lease and Option (together, the “Contract”) were invalid and unenforceable because neither complied with the statute of frauds. Further, the district court held that the doctrine of part performance did not require the enforcement of the otherwise invalid Contract. The Supreme Court vacated the district court's holding, finding that the district court erred by failing to specifically enforce the Contract via the doctrine of part performance. At the time this lawsuit was initiated, NeYada’s performance was essentially complete. At oral argument, Hoke’s counsel admitted that NeYada took actual possession of the Property, and there was “probably nothing” more NeYada could have done. "Such an admission undercut Hoke’s argument against the application of the doctrine of part performance. All that remained to be done was to make monthly payments and to convey title." View "Hoke v. NeYada, Inc." on Justia Law