Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Several landowners in Walton County, Florida, owned beachfront properties that were affected by a county ordinance enacted during the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic. In March and April 2020, the county first closed public beaches, then issued a new ordinance that closed all beaches—public and private—making it a criminal offense for anyone, including private owners, to access or use their own beachfront property. The ordinance was enforced by law enforcement officers who entered private property, excluded owners, and threatened arrest for violations. The ordinance remained in effect for about a month, after which it expired and was not renewed.The landowners filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida, raising several claims, including a Takings Clause claim under the Fifth Amendment, and seeking both damages and prospective relief. The district court dismissed the claims for prospective relief as moot, finding the ordinance had expired and was unlikely to recur. On the merits, the district court granted summary judgment to the county on all damages claims, holding that the ordinance was not a per se physical taking but rather a use restriction, and that the government’s actions during a public health emergency were entitled to deference.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the dismissal of the claims for prospective relief, agreeing that the ordinance’s expiration rendered those claims moot. However, the court reversed the district court’s judgment on the Takings Clause claim, holding that the ordinance constituted a per se physical taking because it barred owners from their property and allowed government officials to physically occupy and control access. The court remanded for a determination of just compensation, holding that no public emergency, including COVID-19, creates an exception to the Takings Clause. View "Alford v. Walton County" on Justia Law

New South Media Group, LLC, along with other plaintiffs, sought to construct four types of signs—flags, artwork, political messages, and event notices—on private property in Rainbow City, Alabama. The city denied their permit applications, determining that the proposed signs were billboards, which are prohibited under Section 214 of the city’s sign ordinance. The plaintiffs believed their signs qualified for exemptions under Section 213, but the city’s definition of “billboard” encompassed their proposed signs. After receiving the denial, New South requested variances, which were also denied by the city’s zoning board.Following these denials, New South appealed in state court and brought federal and state constitutional challenges, which were dismissed in state court and then refiled in federal court. In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, New South alleged that several city sign regulations violated the First Amendment and the Alabama Constitution by imposing content-based restrictions, lacking time limits for permit decisions, and granting unbridled discretion to city officials. The district court granted summary judgment to Rainbow City, finding that New South lacked standing because the injury—the denial of the applications—was caused by the unchallenged billboard prohibition, not the provisions New South contested.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The Eleventh Circuit held that New South lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the non-billboard regulations because the injury was not traceable to those provisions and a favorable decision would not redress the harm caused by the billboard prohibition. The court affirmed the district court’s order granting summary judgment to Rainbow City and dismissing the case without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. View "New South Media Group, LLC v. City of Rainbow City" on Justia Law

A married couple, Carlos Del Amo and his wife, opened a joint checking account at TD Bank in Florida. The account’s signature card listed both their names and, in small print, stated that “joint accounts are owned as joint tenants with right of survivorship.” When Mr. Del Amo filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, he claimed the account as exempt property, arguing it was owned as a tenancy by the entirety—a form of ownership that protects the account from creditors of only one spouse under Florida law. Storey Mountain, a creditor, objected, contending that the account was not exempt because the signature card’s language created a joint tenancy with right of survivorship, not a tenancy by the entirety.The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida found the statutory language unclear as to what constitutes “otherwise specified in writing” under Florida Statutes § 655.79(1). Relying on the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Beal Bank, SSB v. Almand and Associates, the bankruptcy court held that, absent an express disclaimer of tenancy by the entirety on the signature card, the account was presumed to be held as a tenancy by the entirety. The court overruled Storey Mountain’s objection. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida affirmed, agreeing that the 2008 amendment to § 655.79(1) did not abrogate Beal Bank’s requirement for an express disclaimer.On further appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower courts. The Eleventh Circuit held that, under Florida law, a joint bank account held by a married couple is presumed to be a tenancy by the entirety unless there is an explicit written disclaimer of that form of ownership. The court found that the language on the signature card was insufficient to constitute such a disclaimer, and thus the account was exempt property in the bankruptcy proceedings. View "Storey Mountain v. Del Amo" on Justia Law

In 2023, the Florida Legislature enacted Senate Bill 264, which, among other provisions, imposed restrictions on real property transactions involving persons domiciled in China who are not U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents. The law included three key requirements: a purchase restriction barring certain Chinese domiciliaries from acquiring Florida real estate, a registration requirement mandating such individuals to register their existing property interests, and an affidavit requirement obligating all purchasers of Florida real estate to attest compliance with the law. Four Chinese citizens residing in Florida on various nonimmigrant visas and a real estate brokerage firm serving Chinese-speaking clients challenged these provisions, alleging violations of the Equal Protection Clause, the Fair Housing Act, the Due Process Clause, and federal preemption.The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida against several state officials responsible for enforcing SB 264. They sought a preliminary injunction to halt enforcement of the purchase restriction, registration requirement, and affidavit requirement. The district court found that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge all three provisions but denied the preliminary injunction, concluding that the plaintiffs were not substantially likely to succeed on the merits of their claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision. The Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the purchase restriction because none had shown an imminent injury from that provision. However, at least one plaintiff had standing to challenge the registration and affidavit requirements. The court affirmed the denial of the preliminary injunction as to the registration and affidavit requirements, finding no substantial likelihood of success on the merits of the constitutional, statutory, or preemption claims. The court reversed and remanded the denial of the preliminary injunction as to the purchase restriction, instructing the district court to deny it without prejudice for lack of standing. View "Shen v. Commissioner, Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services" on Justia Law

Casa Express Corp. obtained a $40 million judgment in the Southern District of New York against the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela for unpaid bonds and a global note. After Venezuela failed to pay, Casa sought to enforce the judgment in Florida by targeting eight Miami properties owned by corporate entities allegedly controlled by Raul Gorrin Belisario. Casa claimed that Gorrin, through a bribery and currency-exchange scheme involving Venezuelan officials, used misappropriated Venezuelan funds to purchase these properties, and argued that the properties should be subject to a constructive trust in favor of Venezuela.Casa registered the New York judgment in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida and initiated supplementary proceedings under Florida law, seeking to execute the judgment against the properties. Casa impleaded Gorrin, several individuals, and six corporate entities as third-party defendants. The defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing, among other things, that the district court lacked ancillary jurisdiction over Casa’s claims. The magistrate judge recommended dismissal for lack of ancillary jurisdiction, and the district court adopted this recommendation, also finding a lack of personal jurisdiction over Gorrin. Casa appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court lacked ancillary jurisdiction over Casa’s supplementary proceedings. The court reasoned that Casa’s action sought to impose liability on third parties not previously found liable for the New York judgment and was based on new facts and legal theories unrelated to the original breach of contract claims against Venezuela. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s jurisdictional ruling, vacated its alternative merits rulings, and remanded with instructions to dismiss the case without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Casa Express Corp v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela" on Justia Law

Edward T. Saadi, a licensed attorney proceeding pro se, obtained a $90,000 judgment against Pierre Maroun and Maroun’s International, LLC (MILLC) following a jury verdict in a federal defamation suit. Despite the judgment, Saadi was unable to collect payment for nine years. In 2018, Saadi discovered information suggesting Maroun had transferred $250,000 from his personal account to MILLC, allegedly to evade the judgment. Saadi claimed these funds were used to purchase a condominium titled to MILLC but used as Maroun’s residence, and to pay Maroun’s personal expenses. Saadi initiated proceedings supplementary under Florida law, seeking to void the transfer and recover assets.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida allowed Saadi to file an impleader complaint against Maroun and MILLC, asserting claims for fraudulent transfer and actual and constructive fraud under Florida statutes. Saadi also sought sanctions when MILLC failed to produce a representative for deposition, but the district court denied the motion, finding the individual was not a managing agent of MILLC. Ultimately, the district court granted summary judgment for Maroun and MILLC, ruling that Saadi’s claims were time-barred under Florida’s statutes of repose and limitations, and that tolling provisions did not apply. The court also found that the remedies Saadi sought were unavailable under the relevant statutes.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s rulings. Finding that several dispositive questions of Florida law lacked controlling precedent and were subject to conflicting interpretations by Florida’s intermediate appellate courts, the Eleventh Circuit certified five questions to the Florida Supreme Court. The court deferred its decision pending the Florida Supreme Court’s response to the certified questions. View "Saadi v. Maroun" on Justia Law

A business operating a strip club featuring nude dancing and alcohol sales entered into a settlement agreement with DeKalb County, Georgia, in 2001, which was later amended in 2007. The amended agreement granted the club non-conforming status, allowing it to continue its business model for fifteen years, with the possibility of renewal, and required annual licensing fees. In 2013, the City of Chamblee annexed the area containing the club and subsequently adopted ordinances restricting adult entertainment establishments, including bans on alcohol sales, stricter food sales requirements for alcohol licenses, and earlier closing times. The City initially issued alcohol licenses to the club but later denied renewal, citing failure to meet new requirements and the club’s status as an adult establishment.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia dismissed some of the club’s claims for lack of standing and granted summary judgment to the City on the remaining claims. The district court found that the club lacked standing to challenge certain ordinances as it was not an alcohol licensee, and that the City’s ordinances regulating adult entertainment and alcohol sales were constitutional under the secondary-effects doctrine, applying intermediate scrutiny. The court also determined there was no valid contract between the club and the City, rejecting the Contract Clause claims, and found no equal protection violation, as the club failed to identify a similarly situated comparator.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. The Eleventh Circuit held that the club lacked standing for equitable relief due to its permanent closure, but had standing for damages for a limited period. The court upheld the application of intermediate scrutiny to the ordinances, found no impairment of contract, and agreed that the club failed to establish an equal protection violation. The district court’s judgment in favor of the City was affirmed. View "WBY, Inc. v. City of Chamblee, Georgia" on Justia Law

A dispute arose after a rare vehicle, originally owned by a Wisconsin man, was stolen and shipped to Europe. Richard Mueller inherited the vehicle and sold part of his interest to Joseph Ford. Years later, TL90108 LLC (“TL”) purchased the vehicle overseas and, upon attempting to register it in the United States, was notified that Ford and Mueller were the owners of record. Ford and Mueller sued TL in Wisconsin state court for a declaratory judgment and replevin. The trial court dismissed the case on statute-of-repose grounds, but the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed, and the Wisconsin Supreme Court granted review. While the appeal was pending, Ford filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy but did not list TL as a creditor or provide it with formal notice of the bankruptcy proceedings or relevant deadlines.The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida set a deadline under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4007(c) for creditors to file complaints objecting to the discharge of debts. TL did not file a complaint before this deadline, as it was unaware of the relevant facts supporting a fraud claim until later discovery in the Wisconsin litigation. After learning of Ford’s alleged fraud, TL moved to extend the deadline and file a complaint under 11 U.S.C. § 523(c), arguing for equitable tolling and asserting a due process violation due to inadequate notice. The bankruptcy court denied the motion, relying on the Eleventh Circuit’s precedent in In re Alton, which held that equitable tolling does not apply to Rule 4007(c) deadlines.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision. The court held that its prior decision in In re Alton remains binding and precludes equitable tolling of Rule 4007(c)’s deadline, even in light of subsequent Supreme Court decisions. The court also held that TL’s actual notice of the bankruptcy proceeding satisfied due process, and thus, the deadline could not be extended on that basis. View "TL90108 LLC v. Ford" on Justia Law

In 1996, Congress enacted the Helms-Burton Act to allow U.S. nationals to seek compensation for property confiscated by the Castro regime in Cuba. Odette Blanco de Fernandez and her siblings' heirs and estates alleged that Seaboard Marine trafficked in property confiscated from their family’s companies, Azucarera Mariel, S.A. and Maritima Mariel, S.A., by shipping goods to a container terminal on the west side of Mariel Bay. The district court granted summary judgment for Seaboard, concluding that Fernandez failed to present evidence that Seaboard trafficked in confiscated land.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida dismissed the claims of Fernandez’s siblings' heirs and estates, ruling they could not bring a claim under the Act because the siblings died after the statutory bar date of March 12, 1996. However, the court allowed Fernandez’s claims to proceed. The district court later granted summary judgment for Seaboard, holding that Fernandez did not provide sufficient evidence that Seaboard trafficked in confiscated property.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the siblings' heirs and estates' claims, citing the statutory bar date. The court also affirmed the summary judgment regarding Maritima’s 1955 concession, agreeing that it did not grant exclusive rights to exploit the entirety of Mariel Bay. However, the court reversed the summary judgment concerning Azucarera’s confiscated land, finding that Fernandez presented sufficient evidence that Seaboard’s commercial activities benefited from the confiscated property. The court held that a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Seaboard benefited from the confiscated land by using the terminal built on it. The case was affirmed in part and reversed in part, allowing Fernandez’s claim regarding Azucarera’s land to proceed. View "De Fernandez v. Seaboard Marine Ltd." on Justia Law

Sara Watts, an African American woman, sued her former homeowners’ association, Joggers Run Property Owners Association (HOA), alleging racial discrimination under the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and the Civil Rights Act. Watts claimed the HOA interfered with her property enjoyment through unwarranted citations, restricted access to amenities, and discriminatory treatment as a former HOA board member. She cited provisions from the FHA (42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(b), 3617) and the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982).The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida dismissed Watts' claims, ruling that the FHA did not cover discriminatory conduct occurring after the purchase of her home and that Watts failed to specify the contractual terms the HOA allegedly violated. The court found her allegations insufficient to support claims under the FHA and the Civil Rights Act.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Watts presented plausible claims under the FHA and the Civil Rights Act. It found that the FHA's language is broad and inclusive, prohibiting a wide range of discriminatory conduct related to housing. The court concluded that the HOA's actions, including restricted access to amenities and selective enforcement of rules, fell within the scope of the FHA. The court also determined that Watts sufficiently alleged intentional racial discrimination causing contractual injury under Section 1981 and that the HOA's actions violated her right to use property on an equal basis with White citizens under Section 1982.The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Watts v. Joggers Run Property Owners Association, Inc." on Justia Law