Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

In 1996, Congress enacted the Helms-Burton Act to allow U.S. nationals to seek compensation for property confiscated by the Castro regime in Cuba. Odette Blanco de Fernandez and her siblings' heirs and estates alleged that Seaboard Marine trafficked in property confiscated from their family’s companies, Azucarera Mariel, S.A. and Maritima Mariel, S.A., by shipping goods to a container terminal on the west side of Mariel Bay. The district court granted summary judgment for Seaboard, concluding that Fernandez failed to present evidence that Seaboard trafficked in confiscated land.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida dismissed the claims of Fernandez’s siblings' heirs and estates, ruling they could not bring a claim under the Act because the siblings died after the statutory bar date of March 12, 1996. However, the court allowed Fernandez’s claims to proceed. The district court later granted summary judgment for Seaboard, holding that Fernandez did not provide sufficient evidence that Seaboard trafficked in confiscated property.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the siblings' heirs and estates' claims, citing the statutory bar date. The court also affirmed the summary judgment regarding Maritima’s 1955 concession, agreeing that it did not grant exclusive rights to exploit the entirety of Mariel Bay. However, the court reversed the summary judgment concerning Azucarera’s confiscated land, finding that Fernandez presented sufficient evidence that Seaboard’s commercial activities benefited from the confiscated property. The court held that a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Seaboard benefited from the confiscated land by using the terminal built on it. The case was affirmed in part and reversed in part, allowing Fernandez’s claim regarding Azucarera’s land to proceed. View "De Fernandez v. Seaboard Marine Ltd." on Justia Law

Sara Watts, an African American woman, sued her former homeowners’ association, Joggers Run Property Owners Association (HOA), alleging racial discrimination under the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and the Civil Rights Act. Watts claimed the HOA interfered with her property enjoyment through unwarranted citations, restricted access to amenities, and discriminatory treatment as a former HOA board member. She cited provisions from the FHA (42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(b), 3617) and the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982).The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida dismissed Watts' claims, ruling that the FHA did not cover discriminatory conduct occurring after the purchase of her home and that Watts failed to specify the contractual terms the HOA allegedly violated. The court found her allegations insufficient to support claims under the FHA and the Civil Rights Act.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Watts presented plausible claims under the FHA and the Civil Rights Act. It found that the FHA's language is broad and inclusive, prohibiting a wide range of discriminatory conduct related to housing. The court concluded that the HOA's actions, including restricted access to amenities and selective enforcement of rules, fell within the scope of the FHA. The court also determined that Watts sufficiently alleged intentional racial discrimination causing contractual injury under Section 1981 and that the HOA's actions violated her right to use property on an equal basis with White citizens under Section 1982.The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Watts v. Joggers Run Property Owners Association, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit seeking to move or extend the Brick-Kiln Dock to improve its accessibility. Plaintiffs argued that the deed by which plaintiffs conveyed the island property to the government and reserved the right to continue to use the dock permitted them to relocate the dock. Alternatively, plaintiffs contend that the Park Service's denial of permission to relocate or extend the dock was arbitrary and capricious. The court affirmed the district court's determination that, under the plain language of the deed, plaintiffs have no reserved right to unilaterally relocate or extend the dock. The court also concluded that the Park Service's denial of permission to relocate or extend the Dock was not arbitrary or capricious and did not exceed its authority. In this case, the Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. 1131(a), foreclosed relocation of the Dock, and the Park Service was authorized to regulate the marshlands. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "High Point, LLLP v. National Park Service" on Justia Law

Plaintiff purchased a luxury yacht from Seller, the yacht was manufactured by Horizon and its wholly-owned subsidiary Premier in Taiwan, Horizon and Premier are Taiwanese companies, and Seller is an independent U.S. corporation based in Florida. Plaintiff filed suit, alleging ten claims related to the purchase of the yacht. The district court entered summary judgment for defendants on all but two claims: the breach of express warranty claims against Horizon and Premier; entered summary judgment for Seller on its counterclaim to foreclose on the promissory note; and certified the judgment as a partial final judgment for interlocutory review. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the entry of summary judgment as to: (1) the fraudulent inducement claims against all three defendants (Count I); (2) the breach of implied warranty claims against all three defendants (Counts III, IV, and VII); and (3) the breach of express warranty claim against Seller, Horizon Yachts, Inc. (Count VIII). The court vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment as to Counts I, III, IV, VII, and VIII and remanded for trial; affirmed the grant of summary judgment as to the remaining claims; and reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment on defendants' counterclaim. View "Global Quest v. Horizon Yachts" on Justia Law

In 2009, the SEC initiated the Nadel action following the collapse of a Ponzi scheme perpetrated by Arthur Nadel. In 2010, the district court entered an order establishing a claims administration process by which potential claimants could file proof of their claims against the receivership. Wells Fargo submitted a Proof of Claim as to its loan that secured one receivership property within the set claim bar date, but did not submit a Proof of Claim detailing its secured interest in the other two receivership properties. In 2012, Wells Fargo submitted a motion seeking a determination that the filing of Proofs of Claim was unnecessary to preserve its security interests in, and claims against, collateral in the Receiver's possession. In the alternative, Wells Fargo sought leave to file belated claims. The district court granted the Receiver's motion seeking a determination that Wells Fargo's failure to submit Proofs of Claim for the loans secured by two properties extinguished its interests in those properties, and the release of the proceeds from the sale of one of the properties for which Wells Fargo did not file a Proof of Claim. Determining that Wells Fargo's appeal was timely, the court concluded that the district court erred when it terminated Wells Fargo's security interest in the properties at issue. The court found bankruptcy law was both analogous and instructive here. The court reasoned that, in the bankruptcy context, a secured creditor’s lien remains intact through the bankruptcy, regardless of whether the creditor files a proof of claim. In this case, the court concluded that Wells Fargo's security interests remained intact as to the two properties for which it did not file a Proof of Claim in the district court. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "SEC v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against defendants, alleging that the five letters sent to them between May 16 and December 13, 2013 violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq., and/or the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act (FCCPA), Fla. Stat. 559.55 et seq. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. The court concluded, however, that the district court erred in concluding that the HOA fine at issue is not a debt for FCCPA purposes and granting summary judgment on that basis. The court did not decide whether under Florida law Marbella could be vicariously liable for the FCCPA violations of its agent because the district court failed to apply Florida law in the first instance. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Affinity, vacated the grant of summary judgment to Marbella, and remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "Agrelo v. The Meloni Law Firm" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a marine salvor, filed this action in rem against the Blacksheep, seeking a salvage award for services he provided to the yacht. The district court entered judgment against plaintiff, finding that he failed to show that his services were necessary to the rescue of the Blacksheep. The court concluded, however, that a claim for a salvage award does not require such a showing. In this case, the district court's findings and some facts from the record could support the conclusion that plaintiff's action contributed to saving the Blacksheep where he deployed his high-capacity dewatering pump; dove below the ship where he successfully pushed the propeller shaft twelve inches closer to its intended position; and applied packing material to prevent further flooding. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Girard v. M/V "Blacksheep"" on Justia Law

Under Regulation X, 12 C.F. R. part 1024, which implements the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. 2601 et seq., a loan servicer’s duty to evaluate a borrower’s loss mitigation application is triggered only when the borrower submits the application more than 37 days before the foreclosure sale. At issue is whether Ocwen, a loan servicer, had a duty to evaluate an application for loss mitigation options submitted by the Borrowers when, at the time the application was submitted, a foreclosure sale of the Borrowers’ property was scheduled to occur in two days. The court concluded that Regulation X requires the court to measure the timeliness of the Borrowers’ application using the date the foreclosure sale was scheduled to occur when they submitted their complete application. Because the Borrowers’ application was untimely, the court agreed with the district court that Ocwen had no duty to evaluate the Borrowers’ loss mitigation application. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Ocwen on the Borrowers’ claim seeking to hold Ocwen liable for failing to evaluate their loss mitigation application. The court also affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment with respect to the Borrowers’ claim based on Ocwen’s inadequate response to their notice of error. The court agreed with the district court that to survive summary judgment the Borrowers had to present evidence that they suffered actual damages or were entitled to statutory damages and that they failed to do so. View "Lage v. Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC" on Justia Law

New York law required CitiMortgage to file within 30 days a certificate of discharge with the county clerk to record that plaintiff had satisfied his mortgage. N.Y. Real Prop. Law 275; N.Y. Real Prop. Acts. Law 1921. When CitiMortgage failed to record the satisfaction of the mortgage until more than 90 days after the date of satisfaction, plaintiff filed a putative class action against CitiMortgage. The district court dismissed plaintiff's complaint. The court agreed with CitiMortgage that plaintiff lacks standing to maintain this action. The court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because plaintiff has not alleged that CitiMortgage's violation of New York law caused or could cause him any harm. View "Nicklaw v. CitiMortgage, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a retired bank manager, filed suit against Nationstar under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. 2601 et seq., a consumer-protection statute geared toward mortgagors. Plaintiff claimed that her mortgage payment incorrectly increased after Nationstar began servicing the loan. The district court granted Nationstar's motion to dismiss. The court concluded that plaintiff has plausibly alleged that Nationstar did not offer a written explanation stating the reason or reasons for its determination, in violation of section 2605(e)(2)(B) and 12 C.F.R. 1024.35(e)(1)(i)(B); that this failure indicated Nationstar's investigation was unreasonable; and that Nationstar’s unreasonable investigation prevented it from discovering and appropriately correcting the account error. The court concluded that the district court improperly elevated Nationstar's allegations over those of plaintiff at the motion-to-dismiss stage, and that plaintiff adequately pleaded damages. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Renfroe v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC" on Justia Law