Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

J. Russell Tarason sought injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment declaring that he held an easement over a portion of Wesson Realty's property. The superior court concluded that Tarason did not hold an easement over a portion of Wesson Realty's property because the 1925 deed that created the easement conveyed only a life estate in a right-of-way that terminated upon the death of the original grantee. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that although the superior court erred in concluding that section 772 of the Short Form Deeds Act did not apply to this case, the court properly concluded that the language of the 1925 deed demonstrated a clear intention to create an easement in gross that terminated upon the death of the original grantee rather than to create an appurtenant easement.

Robert Stanton filed a complaint against Michael Strong alleging nuisance and trespass and requesting injunctive relief, declaratory judgment, and punitive damages. Stanton requested that the superior court permanently enjoin Strong from engaging in any act that obstructed Stanton's access to his property from any point along an easement over property owned by Strong. After a nonjury trial, the court issued a judgment finding for Stanton on his trespass claim and granting Stanton's request for a permanent injunction. Strong appealed the portion of the judgment granting the permanent injunction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the facts as found by the trial court supported the permanent injunction, and the court did not abuse its discretion in making its determination.

In this property dispute, Robert Spickler (Robert) filed claims for declaratory judgment and to quiet title, and Adah Ginn (Adah) filed a claim for adverse possession. After a jury made findings of fact, the superior court entered judgment awarding ownership of the property to Robert. The court declared that, between Adah's and Robert's competing deeds to the same property, Robert was the rightful owner of the property. The Supreme Court affirmed after reaffirming and applying Hill v. McNichol, a case issued more than a century ago, to the instant case, holding that the superior court did not err in concluding that Robert was the owner of the disputed property as against Adah.

Beginning in 2007, the City of Lewiston assessed stormwater fees on Robert Gladu's property, which contained a small shopping mall and parking lot, pursuant to the City's stormwater ordinance. The ordinance at issue created the Stormwater Management Utility and gave it the authority to assess and collect fees for stormwater management system and facilities. Gladu did not pay the fees, and in 2010, the City filed a civil complaint alleging that Gladu owed the City for unpaid stormwater fees. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. In his motion, Gladu argued that the stormwater assessment was a tax, not a fee, and that the Utility was not authorized to impose a tax. The superior court granted the City's motion and denied Gladu's motion and ordered that Gladu pay the delinquent stormwater fees, interest, attorney fees, collection costs, and a penalty. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) under the test set forth in Butler v. Supreme Judicial Court, the stormwater assessment is a fee and not a tax; and (2) the superior court did not err in awarding a civil penalty, attorney fees, and other costs.

The Land Use Regulation Commission (LURC) and Plum Creek Timberlands, LLC and Plum Creek Land Company (collectively, Plum Creek) appealed from a judgment entered in the business and consumer docket vacating LURC's approval of a rezoning petition and concept plan submitted by Plum Creek for land it owned in the Moosehead Lake region. LURC and Plum Creek contended that the court erred by concluding that LURC violated its procedural rules by failing to hold an additional evidentiary hearing on amendments to Plum Creek's petition. Forest Ecology Network, RESTORE: The North Woods, and the Natural Resources Council of Maine cross-appealed, arguing primarily that LURC erred in approving the petition because several aspects of the concept plan conflicted with statutory requirements. The Nature Conservancy and Forest Society of Maine intervened. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded for the entry of a judgment affirming LURC's decision, holding that LURC did not violate its procedural rules and did not otherwise err by approving the rezoning petition and concept plan.

This dispute centered around the status of Steele Road. The Fred D. Gay Revocable Trust claimed title by deed or by adverse possession to a triangular piece of property (the triangle) bordering Steele Road and to a fee interest in the road. The Dubes and Whitneys claimed title by deed to the triangle and a fee interest in the road. The Trust filed a complaint against the Dubes and Whitneys, alleging trespass and nuisance, among other claims. The Dubes and Whitneys counterclaimed. The superior court entered partial judgment finding (1) Steele Road was a public road classified as a town way that had not been abandoned by the public; (2) the Dubes and Whitneys held record title to the triangle; but (3) the Trust owned the triangle by adverse possession. It also determined that the Dube and Whitney counterclaims were moot and entered final judgment in favor of the Dubes and Whitneys on all remaining undecided claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court did not err by (1) concluding that the road was a town way and had not been abandoned; and (2) concluding that the Trust was the triangle's current owner by adverse possession.

Chuck Starbird submitted an application for a building permit for the construction of a home on a lot abutting a public easement portion of a road in the Town of Minot. The Town denied the application. The Board of Appeals ultimately granted Starbird's appeal, concluding that the parcel had a private right-of-way because the the term "right-of-way," as used in section 4-501.8 of the Town's Land Use Code, included a public easement. The superior court affirmed but remanded to the Board for further factual findings on whether Starbird's application met all of the factors listed in section 4-501.8(A)-(G). The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court but vacated the portion of the court's judgment remanding the matter, holding (1) the unique circumstances of the matter caused the interlocutory appeal to fall within the judicial economy exception to the final judgment rule; and (2) the Board did not err by granting Starbird's appeal of the denial of his application.

Christopher McCormick filed a complaint against Lawrence Crane alleging breach of warranty because the warranty deed by which Crane and his wife conveyed oceanfront property to McCormick inaccurately specified the location of an easement across the land. The superior court granted McCormick's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because the alleged confusion about the easement's boundaries did not disrupt McCormick's possessory rights in a way that constituted a functional eviction from a portion of his property, McCormick failed to state a claim for relief based on the breach of the covenant of warranty; and (2 )because the deed from the Cranes fully disclosed the existence of an easement that provided certain nearby parcels with ocean access, McCormick failed to state a claim for breach of the warranty of freedom from encumbrances.

The Town of Westport Island issued a building permit to George Richardson to build a single-family residence on his property. Abutting landowner Deirdre Dunlop filed a notice of appeal, and the Westport Island board of appeals (Board) affirmed the issuance of the permit. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the issuance of the building permit, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the Board's finding that Richardon's property met minimum lot-size requirement for construction of a residential dwelling; and (2) the Board correctly determined that Richardson's road lot could be included in his property's acreage calculation.

Robert Laux and Cynthia Moran-Laux (collectively Laux) appealed, and Ralph Harrington cross-appealed, from a judgment of the superior court declaring the continued existence and location of a road easement in favor of Harrington over Laux's property and awarding Harrington nominal damages for Laux's interference with the use of the easement. Laux asserted that a 1990 quitclaim deed given by Harrington's predecessor-in-title to Laux's predecessor-in-title extinguished the easement, or, alternatively, that construction on the site of its original entry point resulted in its abandonment. Harrington contended that the court erred in excluding certain evidence at trial, resulting in its miscalculation of his damages and failure to award punitive damages. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding, inter alia, that the superior court did not err in (1) finding that the 1990 quitclaim deed was not intended to release Harrington's easement over the land now owned by the Lauxes; (2) concluding that Harrington did not abandon his easement; (3) calculating damages; and (4) finding that Laux's conduct did not rise to the level of actual ill will or outrageousness required to award punitive damages.