Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The California Coastal Act of 1976 (“the Act”) requires, among other things, a city to obtain approval from the Coastal Commission for any amendments to its coastal plan. Local coastal programs contain a land use plan and a local implementing program. A local implementing program consists of zoning ordinances, zoning maps, and other possible actions.The City of Manhattan Beach (“the City”) sent the plaintiff a notice of violation for operating a short-term rental. The plaintiff petitioned for a writ of mandate to prevent the City from enforcing its ban on short-term rentals. The trial court determined that the City’s original local implementing plan permitted short-term rentals. Thus, when the City enacted the prohibition on short-term rentals it needed to obtain approval from the Coastal Commission. The City appealed.The Second Appellate District affirmed. The City’s residential zoning ordinance prior to the modifications at issue did not distinguish between long-term and short-term rentals. The court held that the use of the term “residence” doesn’t affect the analysis because it does not apply some minimum length of occupancy. View "Keen v. City of Manhattan Beach" on Justia Law

A condominium owner sued her homeowners’ association alleging five causes of action, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief as to rules governing elections, voting, sales, and leasing. One cause of action fell to a demurrer, another to an anti-SLAPP motion to strike. The parties stipulated that three claims were mooted when the association amended its rules. Both sides moved for attorney fees as the prevailing party under the Davis-Sterling Act (Civ. Code 4000); the homeowner also sought fees as the successful party under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5.The court of appeal affirmed the denial of attorney fees to both sides. Artus has not shown any abuse of discretion in the trial court’s ruling that Artus was not a “successful party” and failed to show that her lawsuit resulted in a ‘significant benefit’ to the ‘general public or a large class of persons.’ “Her one real win,” requiring the association to incur greater effort in preparing its notice materials for proposed rules changes, is of questionable significance to most association members and will likely result in higher assessments. The association simply took unilateral action to avoid judicial rulings and ‘kicked the can down the road;’ View "Artus v. Gramercy Towers Condominium Association" on Justia Law

In 2011, Lafferty sought to develop 76 homes on a 31.7-acre Garaventa Hills site in Livermore. A 2012 draft environmental impact report recognized that any alterations to existing drainage patterns may affect the quantity, timing, and quality of precipitation needed to maintain a functioning ecosystem. There was considerable opposition to Lafferty’s proposal. Lafferty reduced the number of residential units to 47, eliminated a vehicular bridge over Altamont Creek, and preserved a large rock outcropping. The final environmental impact report (FEIR) was released in 2014. The planning commission recommended that the city reject Lafferty’s second proposal. The city council declined to certify the FEIR. In 2017, Lafferty proposed a smaller-scale project with 44 new residences. According to the reissued FEIR (RFEIR), the project would result in the permanent removal of 31.78 acres of grasslands with an additional 1.18 acres being temporarily disturbed for construction; various mitigation measures were proposed, including the acquisition of an 85-acre compensatory mitigation site. The city certified the RFEIR and approved the Project.Opponents filed suit under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (Pub. Resources Code 2100). The court of appeal reversed and remanded. Opponents raised a challenge to the adequacy of the RFEIR’s analysis of the “no project” alternative that is both preserved for appeal and meritorious. View "Save the Hill Group v. City of Livermore" on Justia Law

Appellants sought a petition for writ of mandate and/or injunctive relief compelling Caltrans to sell them the homes they are renting at the original price paid by Caltrans when it purchased the properties to make way for the 710 Freeway. Under the version of Government Code section 54237.9 effective at the time of the decision in the trial court, the trial court held that Caltrans was permitted to sell the homes at the original price paid by Caltrans adjusted for inflation. In July 2021, while this appeal was pending, the California Legislature amended section 54237.9 by adding a sentence precluding adjustment for inflation.Because this suit seeks a writ of mandamus and injunctive relief compelling Caltrans to sell the homes at a certain price, and thus prospective relief, the Court of Appeal concluded that California Supreme Court precedent establishes that it must apply the law current at the time of the decision in the Court of Appeal. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded to the trial court to apply the current version of section 54237.9. Finally, appellants' challenge to the trial court's evidentiary challenge as to Exhibit 7 is moot. View "Flores v. Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

In 1996, Schmier converted Berkley apartment units into condominiums. Berkeley ordinances then required that he record Affordable Housing Fee liens based on a formula. Schmier's lien agreements that provided, “Execution of this document shall not prejudice the right of the undersigned to challenge the validity of the Affordable Housing Fee. In the event that the Affordable Housing Fee is ... rescinded … this lien shall be void.” Schmier alleged that in 2008, Berkeley rescinded that ordinance. The new section includes a different formula. In 2019, Schmier advised Berkeley of the sale of the property. Berkeley requested an affordable housing fee of $147,202.66, calculated under the rescinded ordinance. Under the current ordinance, the fee would have been less than half of what was requested.The court of appeal reversed the dismissal of the suit, as barred by a 90-day statute of limitations (Subdivision Map Act, Gov. Code, 66499.37). Schmier did not challenge the requirement that he execute a lien agreement, nor did he challenge the adoption of the former ordinance, its alleged recission, or adoption of a new section; Schmier’s complaint is not subject to the Map Act’s limitations period. Even assuming the 90-day period applied, it could not have begun to run until Berkeley rejected Schmier’s assertion that the lien agreement was no longer operative when the city rescinded the former ordinance. The language of the lien agreements is ambiguous, rendering both asserted constructions arguably reasonable. View "Schmier v. City of Berkeley" on Justia Law

Property owners (Appellants) paid nearly $12 million in transfer taxes, penalties, and interest based on a 2014 merger that changed their parent companies. Both before and after the merger, Appellants directly owned two properties; only indirect ownership changed. They sought a refund of the sums paid under the San Francisco Business and Tax Regulations Code (SFBTRC).The court of appeal affirmed the dismissal of the suit, rejecting arguments that the tax exceeded San Francisco's authority under Revenue and Taxation Code section 11911 because it uses a higher tax rate and an expanded tax base. San Francisco, as a charter city and a “city and county,” is not bound by the limitations of section 11911. The purported failure to comply with notice and hearing requirements does not entitle Appellants to a refund. At the time of the merger, SFBTRC was triggered as to Appellants’ real property by the transfer of ownership interests in Appellants’ parent entity, consistent with Revenue and Taxation Code section 64(c)(1). SFBTRC 1108 applied due to the termination of Appellants’ parent, a partnership. Appellants are not entitled to a refund based on their argument that San Francisco assessed the wrong entities View "CIM Urban REIT 211 Main Street (SF), L.P. v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

The Coalition filed suit to enjoin a renovation and expansion project under the federal Fair Housing Act (FHA) and California's Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code, section 12900 et seq.). The Court of Appeal held, in light of Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. (2015) 576 U.S. 519, that a disparate impact claim based on a gentrification theory is not cognizable under the Fair Housing Act. In the published portion of the opinion, the court affirmed the dismissal of the Coalition's gentrification-based claims under the FHA and FEHA. View "Crenshaw Subway Coalition v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

In a dispute over ownership of two parcels of real property between Som, her husband, Joshua, and Joshua's mother, Sharon, the trial court ruled in favor of Sharon. The court of appeal concluded that the trial court abused its discretion when it amended Sharon's complaint to include a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty and erroneously determined that conditional delivery of the deed was valid. The court reversed the judgment on the claims for slander of title, quiet title, declaratory relief, and cancellation of deeds. The court concluded that the trial court's findings and orders interfered with issues under the jurisdiction of the family law court; the trial court did not err when it admitted impeachment evidence about Som's financial circumstances in 2009 and did not deprive Som of a fair trial by cutting off her trial time unexpectedly.The court of appeal subsequently modified its opinion to read: the judgment quieting title to the properties in favor of Sharon is reversed with directions to enter a new judgment quieting title to the properties in favor of Joshua, per the July 29, 2010 deed and the July 18, 2011 deed. The judgment is also reversed as to the causes of action for slander of title, declaratory relief, and cancellation of deeds. View "McMillin v. Eare" on Justia Law

The California Coastal Act of 1976 (Pub. Resources Code 30000) requires a coastal development permit (CDP) for any “development” resulting in a change in the intensity of use of, or access to, land or water in a coastal zone. In December 2018, Los Angeles adopted the Home-Sharing Ordinance, imposing restrictions on short-term vacation rentals, with mechanisms to enforce those restrictions. Objectors sought to enjoin enforcement of the Ordinance in the Venice coastal zone until the city obtains a CDP, claiming the Ordinance constituted a “development” requiring a CDP.The trial court denied relief, finding the petition time-barred by the 90-day statute of limitations in Government Code section 65009, and that the Ordinance does not create a change in intensity of use and, therefore, is not a “development” requiring a CDP. The court of appeal affirmed, agreeing that the 90-day statute of limitations applies, rather than the three-year statute of limitations in Code of Civil Procedure section 338(a). The court did not address whether the Ordinance constitutes a “development” subject to the CDP requirements of the Coastal Act. View "Coastal Act Protectors v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Before a creditor with a money judgment may force the sale of a debtor's dwelling to satisfy that judgment, the creditor must, in addition to other procedures, obtain a court order authorizing the sale. To obtain that court order, the creditor must file an application that includes, among other things, a statement of the amount of any liens or encumbrances on the dwelling.The Court of Appeal held that this requires the creditor to list liens on the property for unpaid real property taxes, even though those liens need not be recorded because they come into being by operation of law. In this case, the trial court properly denied the creditor's application as deficient, because the creditor's application did not list the delinquent property taxes against the debtor's dwelling and went so far as to represent, under oath, that "there are no actual or purported liens or encumbrances" on the property. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's denial of the creditor's application as deficient. View "Meyer v. Sheh" on Justia Law