Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

This appeal stemmed from a dispute over the ownership of the land upon which a boardwalk and dock was constructed by the deceased. At issue was whether plaintiff estate established that its decedent acquired title to a certain parcel of land by adverse possession. The court held that the evidence that the deceased possessed, used, and controlled the disputed land for the 21 years prior to and including 1984 was sufficient to establish title by adverse possession and grant summary judgment in plaintiff estate's favor. The court need not determine whether it acquired title to the disputed property pursuant to the doctrine of practical location. Accordingly, the judgment should be reversed.

Verizon attached a box to a building that plaintiffs owned and used the box to transmit telephone communications to and from Verizon's customers in other buildings. Plaintiffs claimed that Verizon took their property without paying them just compensation and deceived them into believing that no compensation was owed. The court held that plaintiffs have stated a valid "inverse condemnation" claim for just compensation, and that the claim was not time-barred. However, their claim for an alleged violation of General Business Law 349 was barred by the statute of limitations, and their unjust enrichment claim was legally insufficient. The court also held that the courts below properly denied plaintiffs' motion for class certification.

This case arose when defendant, landlord, without giving notice to or receiving permission from plaintiff, entered the demised premises at issue and installed cross-bracing between two existing steel support columns on both of plaintiff's leased floors causing a change in the flow of patron foot traffic on the first floor and slight diminution of the second floor waiting area. At issue was whether a minimal and inconsequential retaking of space that had been leased to a commercial tenant constituted an actual partial eviction relieving the tenant from all obligation to pay rent. The court concluded, under the circumstances of the case, where such inference by a landlord was small and had no demonstrable effect on the tenant's use and enjoyment of the space, total rent abatement was not warranted.

The Helseths first learned of the underlying foreclosure action and a scheduled auction sale of the property at issue when they were informed by their real estate broker that potential buyers had inquired about the lot. As a result, they moved by order to show cause to stay the sale of the property but Supreme Court declined to sign a temporary restraining order, adjourning the matter to a date after the auction. Consequently, the Helseths appeared at the auction and submitted a winning bid, paying a deposit. However, they failed to remit the remaining balance and the County auctioned the property to another party. At issue was whether the County provided sufficient notice, in accord with constitutional due process, of the release option offered pursuant to Local Law No. 7 of County of Orange. The court concluded that the release option in this appeal was a discretionary, permissive remedy made available to the Helseths after the property was lawfully foreclosed and conveyance to the County did not establish or extend a property right entitled to due process protection as any property interests held by the Helseths were lawfully extinguished as of the expiration of their right to redemption and the entry of the judgment of foreclosure. Rather, the release was simply an option to repurchase property then-owned by the County. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, with costs, and that branch of respondents' motion, which was to allow them to pay back taxes and interest due for a release with respect to the property, denied.

This case concerned a dispute over ownership of Jacques Lipchitz's, the Russian-born cubist sculptor, bronze sculpture, "The Cry." Jacques' wife, Yulla, inherited the work of art after he died. Yulla subsequently entered into a relationship with Biond Fury and, from time to time, would make gifts to Fury of Jacques' works. Yulla's son, Mott, was the executor and a residuary beneficiary of one third of her estate. In July 2004, Mott claimed to have sold "The Cry" and three other sculptures in a package deal to Marlborough International Fine Art Establishment. On September 15, 2005, Fury sold his interest in "The Cry" to David Mirvish. The Surrogate's Court issued an order and subsequent to a settlement agreement, Mott argued in his motion that Mirvish's claim was untimely and he could not prove all elements of a gift. Mirvish countered Mott's motion and contended, inter alia, in his cross motion, that Yulla made a valid gift of the work to Fury. The court reversed the order of the Appellate Division and reinstated the Surrogate's Court's order granting Mirvish's cross motion and denying Mott's motion for summary judgment. The surrogate concluded that Yulla had made a valid inter vivos gift of the work to Fury, observing that the wording of the deed of gift was "in the past tense, i.e., 'I gave this sculpture "The Cry" to my good friend Biond Fury,'" which was not only "indicative of a past transfer," but also "clearly identifie[d] the intended object and [was] consistent with [Yulla's] long pattern of making gifts of similar items to her companion."

Plaintiffs sued defendants, claiming that Administrative Code of the City of New York 27-1031(b)(1) imposed absolute liability on defendants whose excavation work caused damage to adjoining property. The court held that, though formerly a state law and now a local ordinance, section 27-1031(b)(1) continued to embody the specific legislative policy that in New York City those who undertake excavation work, rather than those whose interest in neighboring land was harmed by it, should bear its costs. The court held that plaintiffs were entitled to summary judgment and held that the majority in the lower court erred in finding that the building's allegedly poor condition raised an issue of fact as to causation. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed.

This case arose when petitioner, owner of a residential apartment building, passed along the costs of a "major capital improvement" (MCI) to its tenants by filing an application with the DHCR once the work was completed. At issue was whether the DHCR was authorized to grant a MCI rent increase while at the same time permanently exempting particular apartments from the obligation to pay additional rent when circumstances warranted. The court held that DHCR had been granted such authority and, on this record, it was not arbitrary or capricious for DHCR to permanently exempt five apartments.

This case arose when defendant agreed in three separate contracts to sell three properties to plaintiffs. At issue was whether a buyer in a damages suit like this one must show that it was ready, willing, and able to close the transaction i.e., that but for the seller's repudiation, the transaction could and would have closed. The court held that in a case alleging that a seller has repudiated a contract to sell real property, the buyers must prove that they were ready, willing, and able to close the transaction. Here, the buyers did submit evidence of their financial condition, but that evidence was not conclusive of the issue. Therefore, whether the buyers were ready, willing, and able to close presented an issue of fact and the buyers' motion for summary judgment should have been denied. The court also held that the courts below erred in deciding as a matter of law that the seller repudiated the contracts by transferring the properties in question. The court held, however, that the courts below were correct in denying the seller's cross-motion for summary judgment.

This appeal arose out of an action commenced by the New York State Attorney General against defendants, seeking injunctive and monetary relief as well as civil penalties for violations of New York's Executive Law and Consumer Protection Act, Executive Law 63(12) and General Business Law 349, as well as the common law. The primary issue on appeal was whether federal law preempted these claims alleging fraud and violations of real estate appraisal independence rules. The court held that the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) governed the regulation of appraisal management companies and explicitly envisioned a cooperative effort between federal and state authorities to ensure that real estate appraisal reports comport with the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice (USPAP). The court perceived no basis to conclude that the Home Owners' Loan Act (HOLA) itself or federal regulations promulgated under HOLA preempted the Attorney General from asserting both common law and statutory state law claims against defendants pursuant to its authority under Executive Law 63(12)and General Business Law 349. Thus, defendants' motion to dismiss on the grounds of federal preemption was properly denied. The court also agreed with the Appellate Division that the Attorney General had adequately pleaded a cause of action under General Business Law 349 and that the statute provided him with standing. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division was affirmed.

This case involved a dispute over property that was sold by the City to the sponsor of an urban renewal project. The agreement between the City and the sponsor, called a Land Distribution Agreement, contained provisions designed to assure that, for at least 25 years, the land would be used for a Pathmark supermarket. At issue was whether Pathmark breached the Lease Assignment Contract, thus, giving plaintiff a right to terminate it. The court interpreted the contract to assign a lease of real property, and held that the risk that the City might not permit the assignment was one that the buyer agreed to take. That risk did not give the buyer an excuse for terminating the contract.