Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

In this action, a real estate company that prepared due diligence reports for a developer in connection with the potential purchase of commercial properties alleged that a rival brokerage firm was unjustly enriched when it acquired the material from the developer and later obtained a commission on the ultimate sale of the properties. Supreme Court dismissed the unjust enrichment claim against the rival brokerage firm, and the appellate division affirmed. At issue before the Court of Appeals was whether a sufficient relationship existed between the two real estate firms to provide a basis for an unjust enrichment cause of action. Based on the allegations presented in the complaint, the Court of Appeals held that the relationship between the two parties was too attenuated and affirmed.

Nicole Tausend, the beneficiary of a trust together with her father, Ronald, commenced a N.Y.C.P.L.R. 78 proceeding against Ronald and the partnership (NJR) formed by Ronald for the purpose of acquiring and selling property. Nicole commenced the proceeding in order to obtain access to the partnership documents and an accounting of its finances. In response, NJR issued a demand for arbitration. Supreme Court ordered the parties to arbitration, and the appellate division affirmed. Nicole appeared in the arbitration and asserted several counterclaims, which lead to NJR's commencement of this court proceeding seeking to stay arbitration of the counterclaims on the basis of the expiration of the statute of limitations. Supreme Court granted the petition and stayed arbitration of the counterclaims. The appellate division modified by dismissing NJR's petition to stay arbitration of the counterclaims, reasoning that the partnership was precluded from obtaining a stay because it had initiated and participated in the arbitration. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that because NJR initiated and participated in the arbitration of issues stemming from the dispute, its timeliness challenge to the counterclaims must be decided by an arbitrator.

At issue here was national assets stolen by President Ferdinand Marcos. Victims of Marcos' human rights abuses ("Pimentel class") obtained a judgment against Marcos' estate and, in enforcing the judgment, sought to obtain assets also sought by the Republic of the Philippines and its commission organized to retrieve the assets (collectively, Republic). In dispute was the assets of Arelma, a Panamanian corporation, which were held in a brokerage account. The brokerage firm commenced an interpleader action in federal court. The district court awarded ownership of the Arelma assets to the Pimentel claimants. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that the assertion of sovereign immunity by the Republic required dismissal for lack of a required party. Petitioner then commenced this turnover proceeding seeking to execute the Pimental judgment against the Arelma account. Meanwhile, a Philippine court determined the assets had been forfeited to the Republic. PNB and Arelma moved to intervene, requesting dismissal. Supreme Court denied the motion. The appellate division reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the appellate division did not err in concluding that dismissal was required under N.Y.C.P.L.R. 1001, as the Republic was a necessary party but could not be subject to joinder in light of the assertion of sovereign immunity.

Plaintiff, owner of a New York City loft, brought an action in ejection against defendant because she occupied an apartment in the loft for which she had not paid any rent since 2003. The court held that the landlord had not complied with Multiple Dwelling Law 302 because the loft did not have a residential certificate of occupancy. The landlord had not received an extension of time to comply and thus could not maintain an ejectment action based on non-payment of rent.

This case involved Baygold's lease with MPH, the owner of the premises, for a ten-year term. Baygold, with the consent of MPH, thereafter subleased the premises to its affiliate, Monsey Park. Monsey Park, with MPH's permission, subsequently sub-leased the premises to a non-affiliate, Orzel. At issue was whether the Appellate Division erred in holding that the out-of-possession tenant, Baygold, was not entitled to equitable relief excusing its failure to timely exercise its option to renew a commercial lease with the landlord, MPH. The court concluded that the Appellate Division properly held that Baygold failed to meet the second prong of the J.N.A. Realty v Cross Bay Chelsea test where, among other things, Baygold nor any of its affiliates was a tenant in possession of the premises at the time of the failure to comply with the lease provision; nor can it be said that Baygold, having proffered from its sublease with Orzel since 1985 while having expended no monies or improvements, would incur a "substantial loss" should the lease not be renewed. Finally, the court rejected Baygold's assertion that it was entitled to equitable relief.

This appeal stemmed from a dispute over the ownership of the land upon which a boardwalk and dock was constructed by the deceased. At issue was whether plaintiff estate established that its decedent acquired title to a certain parcel of land by adverse possession. The court held that the evidence that the deceased possessed, used, and controlled the disputed land for the 21 years prior to and including 1984 was sufficient to establish title by adverse possession and grant summary judgment in plaintiff estate's favor. The court need not determine whether it acquired title to the disputed property pursuant to the doctrine of practical location. Accordingly, the judgment should be reversed.

Verizon attached a box to a building that plaintiffs owned and used the box to transmit telephone communications to and from Verizon's customers in other buildings. Plaintiffs claimed that Verizon took their property without paying them just compensation and deceived them into believing that no compensation was owed. The court held that plaintiffs have stated a valid "inverse condemnation" claim for just compensation, and that the claim was not time-barred. However, their claim for an alleged violation of General Business Law 349 was barred by the statute of limitations, and their unjust enrichment claim was legally insufficient. The court also held that the courts below properly denied plaintiffs' motion for class certification.

This case arose when defendant, landlord, without giving notice to or receiving permission from plaintiff, entered the demised premises at issue and installed cross-bracing between two existing steel support columns on both of plaintiff's leased floors causing a change in the flow of patron foot traffic on the first floor and slight diminution of the second floor waiting area. At issue was whether a minimal and inconsequential retaking of space that had been leased to a commercial tenant constituted an actual partial eviction relieving the tenant from all obligation to pay rent. The court concluded, under the circumstances of the case, where such inference by a landlord was small and had no demonstrable effect on the tenant's use and enjoyment of the space, total rent abatement was not warranted.

The Helseths first learned of the underlying foreclosure action and a scheduled auction sale of the property at issue when they were informed by their real estate broker that potential buyers had inquired about the lot. As a result, they moved by order to show cause to stay the sale of the property but Supreme Court declined to sign a temporary restraining order, adjourning the matter to a date after the auction. Consequently, the Helseths appeared at the auction and submitted a winning bid, paying a deposit. However, they failed to remit the remaining balance and the County auctioned the property to another party. At issue was whether the County provided sufficient notice, in accord with constitutional due process, of the release option offered pursuant to Local Law No. 7 of County of Orange. The court concluded that the release option in this appeal was a discretionary, permissive remedy made available to the Helseths after the property was lawfully foreclosed and conveyance to the County did not establish or extend a property right entitled to due process protection as any property interests held by the Helseths were lawfully extinguished as of the expiration of their right to redemption and the entry of the judgment of foreclosure. Rather, the release was simply an option to repurchase property then-owned by the County. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, with costs, and that branch of respondents' motion, which was to allow them to pay back taxes and interest due for a release with respect to the property, denied.

This case concerned a dispute over ownership of Jacques Lipchitz's, the Russian-born cubist sculptor, bronze sculpture, "The Cry." Jacques' wife, Yulla, inherited the work of art after he died. Yulla subsequently entered into a relationship with Biond Fury and, from time to time, would make gifts to Fury of Jacques' works. Yulla's son, Mott, was the executor and a residuary beneficiary of one third of her estate. In July 2004, Mott claimed to have sold "The Cry" and three other sculptures in a package deal to Marlborough International Fine Art Establishment. On September 15, 2005, Fury sold his interest in "The Cry" to David Mirvish. The Surrogate's Court issued an order and subsequent to a settlement agreement, Mott argued in his motion that Mirvish's claim was untimely and he could not prove all elements of a gift. Mirvish countered Mott's motion and contended, inter alia, in his cross motion, that Yulla made a valid gift of the work to Fury. The court reversed the order of the Appellate Division and reinstated the Surrogate's Court's order granting Mirvish's cross motion and denying Mott's motion for summary judgment. The surrogate concluded that Yulla had made a valid inter vivos gift of the work to Fury, observing that the wording of the deed of gift was "in the past tense, i.e., 'I gave this sculpture "The Cry" to my good friend Biond Fury,'" which was not only "indicative of a past transfer," but also "clearly identifie[d] the intended object and [was] consistent with [Yulla's] long pattern of making gifts of similar items to her companion."