Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Supreme Court of Nevada
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The Supreme Court answered in the affirmative a certified question from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada, holding that, even before the October 1, 2015 amendment to Nev. Rev. Stat. 116.31168, the statute incorporated Nev. Rev. Stat. 107.090’s requirement that a homeowner’s association (HOA) provide notices of default and/or sale to persons or entities holding subordinate interests, even when such persons or entities did not request notice.Respondent-Bank filed a complaint in the federal district court of Nevada, naming as defendants an HOA and the current owner of property that was sold at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale. Respondent requested that the foreclosure sale did not extinguish its deed of trust and alleged that the sale violated due process because Nev. Rev. Stat. Chapter 116 lacked any pre-deprivation notice requirements. The federal district court then filed its order certifying the question of law above. The Supreme Court held that section 107.090, which governs trustee sales under a deed of trust, mandates notice to those holding subordinate interests, and by requiring application of section 107.090 during the HOA foreclosure process, section 116.31168(1) required notice to be provided to all holders of subordinate security interests prior to a HOA foreclosure sale. View "SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC v. Bank of New York Mellon" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order awarding attorney fees and costs to Defendant on its counterclaim after the court determined Defendant to be the “prevailing party” following bifurcated trials, in which the parties settled as to damages on Plaintiff’s claims in an amount that exceeded Defendant’s damages judgment on its counterclaim.Specifically, the Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to aggregate the settlement recovery and damages award in this case because (1) there is no Nevada statute or court rule that requires the trial court to offset a damages judgment on one party’s counterclaim by the amount recovered by another party in settling its claim to determine which side is the prevailing party; and (2) the most reasonable interpretation of Nev. Rev. Stat. 18.010(2)(a) and 18.020(3) precludes the use of settlement recovery for this purpose. View "Northern Nevada Homes, LLC v. GL Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court in favor of Wynn Las Vegas, LLC in its breach of contract action to collect $1 million in unpaid casino markers from Appellant, holding that the district court erred when it precluded Appellant from testifying at trial by video conference from Italy and excluded evidence of his intoxication.The Supreme Court remanded this case for a new trial, holding (1) the district court abused its discretion under the Nevada Supreme Court Rules Part IX-B(B) when it summarily denied Appellant’s request to testify at trial via video conference and an interpreter; and (2) the district court abused its discretion when it applied an incorrect standard to exclude any evidence of intoxication. View "LaBarbera v. Wynn Las Vegas, LLC" on Justia Law

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The foreclosure sale in this case was not invalid due to a lack of notice.At issue was the competing interests of the purchase of property at a homeowners association (HOA) foreclosure sale and the beneficiary of a deed of trust on that property at the time of the sale. The district court determined that Respondent’s deed of trust survived the HOA foreclosure sale where the HOA failed to provide the statutorily required preforeclosure notice. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Respondent’s rights were not prejudiced by the HOA’s failure to provide the preforeclosure notice, the district court erred in holding that the defective notice allowed Respondent’s deed of trust to survive the foreclosure sale. View "West Sunset 2050 Trust v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC" on Justia Law

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The district court erred in awarding Respondent costs and attorney fees pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 116.3116(8) after Respondent successfully obtained a judgment quieting title against Appellant.After acquiring interest in a property pursuant to a homeowners’ association foreclosure sale Respondent filed an action to quiet title pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 30.010, claiming that the section 116.3116 foreclosure sale at which it acquired title extinguished all junior liens. The district court granted summary judgment for Respondent. Thereafter, Respondent requested costs and attorney fees pursuant to section 116.3116(8). The district court granted Respondent’s request on the basis that Respondent’s claims were brought under section 116.3116. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Respondent was not entitled to costs and attorney fees pursuant to section 116.3116(8) because Respondent’s action was not brought under section 116.3116. Rather, Respondent’s action was brought under Nev. Rev. Stat. 30.010 et seq., which authorizes actions to quiet title. View "Carrington Mortgage Holdings LLC v. R Ventures VIII, LLC" on Justia Law

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Neither Nev. Rev. Stat. 361.227(2)(b) nor Nev. Rev. Stat. 361.227(5)(c) required the Washoe County Assessor to value fully developed but unsold condominium units as a single unit or to apply the discounted cash flow method to determine their full cash value.The State Board of Equalization found that the county assessor properly assessed each unsold condominium unit at issue based on its retail price. On appeal, Appellant argued that because the condominium building qualified as a subdivision, the unsold condominium units should have been valued together as a single unit and discounted to determine the net sellout or wholesale value to a single buyer. The district court upheld the State Board’s decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the State Board did not apply a fundamentally wrong principle in assessing the condominiums as individual units and utilizing the sales comparison method to ensure that the taxable value did not exceed the full cash value. View "Montage Marketing, LLC v. Washoe County ex rel. Washoe County Board of Equalization" on Justia Law

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Neither Nev. Rev. Stat. 361.227(2)(b) nor Nev. Rev. Stat. 361.227(5)(c) required the Washoe County Assessor to value fully developed but unsold condominium units as a single unit or to apply the discounted cash flow method to determine their full cash value.The State Board of Equalization found that the county assessor properly assessed each unsold condominium unit at issue based on its retail price. On appeal, Appellant argued that because the condominium building qualified as a subdivision, the unsold condominium units should have been valued together as a single unit and discounted to determine the net sellout or wholesale value to a single buyer. The district court upheld the State Board’s decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the State Board did not apply a fundamentally wrong principle in assessing the condominiums as individual units and utilizing the sales comparison method to ensure that the taxable value did not exceed the full cash value. View "Montage Marketing, LLC v. Washoe County ex rel. Washoe County Board of Equalization" on Justia Law

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In this quiet title action, the Supreme Court held (1) a regulated entity like the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) has standing to assert 12 U.S.C. 4617(j)(3) - the Federal Foreclosure Bar (the FFB) - in a quiet title action; (2) the FFB preempts Nev. Rev. Stat. 116.3116, which allows a homeowners’ association (HOA) foreclosure on a superpriority lien to extinguish a first deed of trust; and (3) the FFB invalidates any purported extinguishment of a regulated entity’s property interest while under the conservatorship of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) unless the FHFA affirmatively consents.The Morenos obtained a home loan secured by a deed of trust on Las Vegas Property. The deed of trust was assigned to Fannie Mae. When the Morenos failed to pay their HOA dues, Saticoy Bay LLC Series 9641 Christine View (Saticoy Bay) purchased the property at a HOA foreclosure sale. Saticoy Bay then brought suit against Fannie Mae to quiet title. Summary judgment was granted for Fannie Mae. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the FFB protected the deed of trust from extinguishment because Fannie Mae was under the FHFA’s conservatorship at the time of the foreclosure sale; and (2) absent the FHFA’s affirmative relinquishment, Saticoy Bay’s interest in the property was subject to Fannie Mae’s deed of trust. View "Saticoy Bay LLC Series 9641 Chrstine View v. Federal National Mortgage Ass’n" on Justia Law

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Due process requires junior water rights holders in the Diamond Valley Hydrographic Basin No. 153 (Diamond Valley) be given notice and an opportunity to participate in the district court’s consideration of the request of a vested, senior water rights holder to order the State Engineer to curtail junior water rights in Diamond Valley.Because water in Diamond Valley has been over-appropriated and pumped at a rate exceeding its perennial yield for more than four decades, groundwater levels in southern Diamond Valley have fallen over 100 feet. Sadler Ranch, which claims to be a vested, senior water rights holder in Diamond Valley, petitioned the district court to order the State Engineer to initiate curtailment proceedings regarding junior water rights in Diamond Valley. The Supreme Court granted this writ petition, holding that an upcoming show cause hearing may result in a court order to begin curtailment proceedings, resulting in possible deprivation of property rights. Therefore, due process required junior water rights holders in Diamond Valley to be given notice and an opportunity to be heard before the district court conducted the hearing. View "Eureka County v. Seventh Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

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The time limitations set forth in Nev. Rev. Stat. 107.080(5)-(6) do not apply to an action challenging a Nev. Rev. Stat. chapter 107 nonjudicial foreclosure where it is alleged that the deed of trust had been extinguished before the sale because such an action challenges the authority to conduct the sale, rather than the manner in which the foreclosure was conducted.Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiff’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations in section 107.080(5)-(6) because Plaintiff failed to file its complaint within ninety or 120 days of the deed-of-trust foreclosure sale. The district court granted the motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 107.080(5) only applies to actions challenging the procedural aspects of a nonjudicial deed-of-trust foreclosure sale; and (2) Plaintiff’s action for quiet title in this case was appropriately governed by Nev. Rev. Stat. 11.080, which provides for a five-year statute of limitations. View "Las Vegas Development Group, LLC" on Justia Law