Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

In 1951, the State issued two oil and gas leases covering land in Sublette County. One of these leases (the 505 Lease) covered 160 acres, and the other lease (the 529 Lease) covered 480 acres. The leases were later assigned to Continental Oil Company, and the assignor, Walter Davis, reserved a four percent overriding royalty interest in both leases. Davis’s mineral interests were later awarded to Robert Floyd. In 1979, after the 505 and 529 Leases terminated and the acreage was combined into a single parcel, the State granted Dr. Robert Ribbe Lease 79-0645, which covered all 640 acres. In 2011, Robert Floyd filed suit, arguing that Davis’s four percent overriding royal interest should have attached to the Ribbe Lease. The district court concluded that Appellants, QEP Energy Company and Wexpro Company, were liable for more than thirty million dollars in unpaid royalties. The district court denied Appellants’ motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Ribbe lease was not a renewal lease, substitute lease, or new lease issued in lieu of the 505 and 529 Leases, and therefore, the overriding royalty interest did not attach to the Ribbe Lease. View "Questar Exploration & Production Co. v. Rocky Mountain Resources, LLC" on Justia Law

Appellees, the purported owners of the “Jay Ranch,” brought an action against Appellant to establish a private road across Appellant’s property. While this suit was pending, Appellees were involved in litigation to determine the rightful ownership the Jay Ranch. The district court concluded that Appellees had satisfied the statutory threshold requirements to move forward with their private road claim and granted Appellees temporary access to the road across Appellant’s property. Thereafter, a decision was rendered against Appellees in the litigation to determine ownership of the Jay Ranch. The district court subsequently dismissed the present case for lack of prosecution. Appellant filed a motion for an award of attorney’s fees and a motion for an award of compensation for the temporary road access. The district court denied both motions. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant’s appeal, holding (1) Appellant’s post-judgment motion for attorney’s fees was not authorized under Wyo. R. Civ. P. 54; and (2) the district court did not have jurisdiction to consider Appellant’s motion for compensation. View "Edsall v. Moore" on Justia Law

Appellants, the owners of a tract of land in the Riva Ridge subdivision, submitted their plans to build a home and writer’s studio to the Riva Ridge Owners Association’s Site Committee. The Site Committee rejected the plans on the basis that some of Appellants’ home would be visible from some locations in other homes. Appellants filed a complaint against the Association and others (collectively, Appellees) alleging several causes of action. Appellants filed a separate complaint requesting a determination of the term “principal residence site” in the covenants. The district court granted summary judgment for Appellees on several issues. After a trial, the district court interpreted the phrase “principal residence site” in a way that required complete invisibility between the homes in the subdivision. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding that the district court (1) erred in its interpretation of the phrase “principal residence,” as the covenants only require that a principal residence be invisible only from a precise area of land on each tract; (2) erred in granting summary judgment on Appellants’ breach of contract and bad faith claims; and (3) properly determined that Appellants must seek permission from the Site Committee before planting any trees on their tract. View "Felix Felicis, LLC v. Riva Ridge Owners Ass’n" on Justia Law

Jason and Tracy Thornock (together, Plaintiffs), who owned a ranch in Lincoln County, filed a complaint against neighboring landowners (Defendants), alleging that their property was landlocked and requesting establishment of a private road. After a bench trial, the district court denied the complaint, concluding that Plaintiffs failed to establish the necessity for a private road because they did not prove that their property was landlocked or that their access was substantially inconvenient. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in finding that Plaintiffs failed to establish the need for a private road because the record showed that Plaintiffs had direct access to their property via a public road that provided convenient and reasonable access. View "Thornock v. Esterholdt" on Justia Law

Contractor Anderson Carpentry and Construction built a home for Shad and Trisha Bates. Anderson contracted with Century Lumber Center to purchase supplies and materials to build the Bates home. The Bates paid Anderson for materials used on the home, but those funds were applied to other accounts, and the account with Century on the Bates job became delinquent. Century filed a material lien against the Bates property and filed a complaint seeking to foreclose the lien against the property. The district court ultimately enforced the lien. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the lien was not timely filed as a matter of law. View "Bates v. Chicago Lumber Co. of Omaha" on Justia Law

Pennaco Energy Inc. acquired mineral leases beneath a surface estate owned by Brett Sorenson, Trustee of the Brett L. Sorenson Trust. A surface damage and use agreement between the parties granted Pennaco access to and use of the land for exploration and production of minerals, and, in return, required Pennaco to pay for the damage to and use of the surface estate, and to reclaim the land once operations ended. When Pennaco refused to perform its obligations under the contract, Soreson brought this lawsuit. The jury rendered a verdict finding that Sorenson suffered more than $1 million in damages. The district court entered judgment on the jury’s verdict and also awarded Sorenson costs and attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by (1) ruling that Pennaco remained liable under the surface damage and use agreement after assignment, and (2) using a 2.5 multiplier to enhance the lodestar amount in awarding attorney fees. View "Pennaco Energy, Inc. v. Sorenson" on Justia Law

Several individuals (collectively, “the Wimers”) filed a complaint against their neighbors (collectively, “the Cooks”) seeking an injunction prohibiting the Cooks from carrying out their plan of placing multiple single-family housing structures on a twenty-acre parcel of land, alleging that the Cooks’ plan for the property violated the neighborhood’s covenants. The Cooks counterclaimed and filed a third-party complaint against all of the landowners in the area seeking a declaration that the covenants had been abandoned due to various covenant violations. The district court determined that the covenants had not been abandoned and that the Cooks’ plan to develop the land did not violate the covenants. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) properly concluded that the covenants were not abandoned; and (2) erred in concluding that the Cooks’ plan did not violate the covenants, as the covenants prohibit multiple single-family dwellings on a parcel. View "Wimer v. Cook" on Justia Law

FIB filed a complaint against Dishman for judicial foreclosure. The district court granted FIB a partial summary judgment for the principal due, accrued interest, and most of FIB’s costs. The court later held a bench trial on FEB’s request for attorney fees and granted most of the requested fees and costs. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the district court erred by allowing FIB’s detailed attorney fee statement into evidence when FIB did not produce it until just before trial, but the error was harmless; (2) the district court abused its discretion by awarding fees associated with FIB’s efforts to withhold the detailed fee statement and by awarding fees incurred in unnecessary and unproductive work; and (3) in the interests of equity, the fees incurred by FIB after the summary judgment are reduced to account for FIB’s discovery violations. Remanded. View "Dishman v. First Interstate Bank" on Justia Law

First American Title Insurance Company issued title insurance policies to the predecessors of North Fork Land & Cattle, LLLP. When North Fork learned that Bunker Road, which crosses three of North Fork’s properties, was established as a county road, North Fork submitted notices of claims under the title insurance policies, asserting that First American failed to disclose to one of North Fork’s predecessors that Bunker Road burdened the properties and that it was damaged by the Bunker Road encumbrance. First American did not respond to North Fork’s claims, and North Fork filed suit against First American. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of First American, concluding that North Fork did not meet the definition of “insured” under the title insurance policies. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that North Fork is a covered insured under the terms of the title insurance policy. Remanded. View "N. Fork Land & Cattle, LLLP v. First Am. Title Ins. Co." on Justia Law

A road crosses the corner of a parcel of property owned by Boyd Van Fleet. A dispute arose between Van Fleet and Appellants concerning Appellants’ ownership and right to use that portion of the road in conjunction with bentonite mining operations. Appellants sued Van Fleet, asserting several claims, including prescriptive easement and adverse possession. Van Fleet counterclaimed for, inter alia, trespass/nuisance, damage to property, ejectment, and an injunction prohibiting Appellants from using the portion of the road on his property. The district court entered a judgment ruling generally in favor of Van Fleet. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in finding that Appellants failed to prove their claims for adverse possession and prescriptive easement and that Van Fleet owned the land where the road traversed his property free of any right for them to use it. View "Wyo-Ben, Inc., v. Van Fleet" on Justia Law