Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

This case involved a dispute between a surface owner and a timber estate owner. In the first appeal, the Supreme Court reversed a judgment on the pleadings in favor of the surface owner and remanded for proceedings to examine the facts and circumstances surrounding the timber estate owner's predecessor in interest's (Union Pacific) reservations of timber in deeds from the early 1900s in order to determine the parties' intent with regard to the duration of the timber estates. The district granted judgment in favor of the surface owner, concluding (1) Union Pacific intended to reserve only those trees in existence at the time of the grant and of sufficient size to be suitable for use in construction, and (2) Union Pacific's timber reservations had expired. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly ruled, on the evidence before it, that Union Pacific intended its reservation of timber to include only trees of a suitable size which existed on the subject properties at the time of the deeds; and (2) the evidence presented at trial clearly established that such timber no longer existed on the properties.

Morrow Global (Morrow) filed suit against a Uinta County school district (District) and Windjammer Communications (Windjammer) that (1) sought a declaration that Morrow was a co-owner with the District of a conduit located under an interstate; (2) sought an order permanently enjoining the District from interfering with Morrow's use of the conduit; and (3) asserted that Windjammer had been unjustly enriched by using the conduit without paying for it. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the District and Windjammer (Defendants) after treating Defendants' motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment, concluding that Morrow had failed to present any facts showing that it was an owner of the conduit and entitled to the relief sought. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the circumstances, the district court improperly granted summary judgment when the parties had no opportunity to present evidence and argument on the issue of Morrow's ownership.

Rex and Vickie Lewis and Brad and Brenda Carnahan owned property in a subdivision. The Lewises filed a complaint seeking a declaration that the Carnahans did not have authority to block their use of a public easement to access their property and an injunction requiring the Carnahans to remove a fence they erected across the easement. The Carnahans responded by seeking to have title to the easement quieted in them. The district court entered judgment in favor of the Lewises, holding (1) neither the statute of limitations nor laches barred the Lewises' declaratory judgment action; and (2) the easement remained dedicated to public use, meaning the Lewises had the right to use the easement and the Carnahans did not have the right to obstruct their use. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly concluded (1) the Lewises had standing to bring their claim for declaratory relief; (2) the Lewises' claims were not barred by the statute of limitations or the equitable doctrine of Laches; and (3) an affidavit recorded in 1994 was not effective to vacate the public easement.

Majorie Bedessem, as trustee of her revocable trust, filed a complaint against David and Susan Cunningham, seeking enforcement of an easement across the Cunningham property to access the Bedessem property. Bedessem claimed an implied access easement or, in the alternative, access pursuant to the restrictive covenants applicable to both properties. The district court granting Cunninghams' summary judgment motion after finding no evidence of an implied easement and that the restrictive covenants authorized only the Architectural Control Committee to sue for enforcement of the covenants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err when it ruled that Bedessem did not have standing to enforce a restrictive covenant against Cunninghams, as the covenants granted the Architectural Control Committee the sole right to enforce the covenants.

Landlord leased commercial real property to Tenant. Landlord granted Tenant permission to renovate the property on the condition that Tenant would pay for the renovations. Tenant thereafter contracted with Contractor to perform the work. When Tenant defaulted on its payments to Contractor, Contractor filed a lien against Landlord's property. Contractor thereafter filed a complaint against Landlord and Tenant, asserting various claims and seeking to foreclose on its lien. The district court granted Landlord's motion for summary judgment, concluding that, pursuant to Wyoming's lien statutes, a valid mechanic's lien did not exist because Landlord did not agree to pay for the renovations to the property and that Tenant was not acting as Landlord's agent in contracting for the improvements. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly interpreted Wyo. Stat. Ann. 29-2-105(a)(ii) to require a finding of agency between the landlord and tenant before a mechanic's lien may attach to the landlord's property for work performed at the tenant's behest; and (2) in this case, that relationship did not exist.

Appellant, Whitney Holding Corporation, challenged a decision of the district court quieting title in a certain mineral estate in favor of Appellees, Clarence and Peggy Terry. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in concluding that the parties intended, and the limited warranty deed conveying the property from Whitney to the Terrys reflected, that Whitney did not reserve a mineral interest in the property; (2) the district court properly determined that the deed was ambiguous and did not err in considering extrinsic evidence to interpret the deed; and (3) the Terrys' quiet title action was not barred by the statute of limitations.

In 2008, the Teton County Commission approved a parcel boundary adjustment application regarding certain real property located in Teton County. Appellees, several individuals, sought judicial review of the Commission's decision. In 2008 and 2009, respectively, Appellants, Mark Menolascino and William Hirshberg, purchased the property. Neither sought to intervene in the judicial review proceedings. In 2011, the reviewing district court reversed the Commission's decision. The parties to the original administrative proceedings declined to appeal the ruling. Appellants, however, filed a notice of appeal. They contemporaneously filed a motion to intervene in the district court proceedings for the sole purpose of pursuing the appeal therefrom. The district court denied their motion to intervene, a decision which Appellants also appealed. The Supreme Court consolidated the appeals and (1) affirmed the district court's denial of Appellants' request to interview in the judicial review proceedings; and (2) dismissed Appellants' appeal of the final order of the district court for lack of standing because of Appellants' status as nonparties.

Decedent executed a pour-over will and a revocable inter vivos trust for the intended purpose of disinheriting her surviving Spouse, and thereby effectively destroying his elective share as to the property transferred to the trust. This appeal involved two consolidated cases. The district court granted summary judgment against Spouse in both matters, concluding (1) in the probate matter, the property transferred and held in the trust was not subject to the elective share; and (2) in the related civil action in which Spouse sought $125,000 from the trust as a creditor for work performed during the marriage on a building owned by Decedent and transferred to the trust, the claim was time barred. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly granted summary judgment in the probate matter because the property transferred to the Trust was never legally the property of Decedent's estate, and therefore, there was no legal basis for making the property a part of Decedent's estate for purposes of the elective share; and (2) the district court properly found that the failure of Spouse to file his civil complaint against the Estate deprived the court of jurisdiction.

Ralph and Wayne Platt were two brothers who, together with their siblings, inherited a ranch. Ralph and Wayne jointly owned and operated one half of the ranch, which they placed in the Platt Ranch Trust. After a dispute, Ralph and some siblings (Appellants) filed suit against Wayne and other siblings (Appellees), asserting a breach of trustee's duties and seeking a partition of the ranch. The district court found that Appellants were entitled to part of the estate and appointed three commissioners to make a partition of the property. The district court affirmed the partition of the estate as recommended by the commissioners with two exceptions. Appellants subsequently filed a motion to alter or amend judgment and/or motion for new partition, arguing that the district court did not have the authority to modify the partition recommended by the commissioners. The court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that under the circumstances of this case, the district court was authorized as a matter of law to unilaterally modify the partition made by the commissioners in order to obviate the parties' objections to the report.

When Daniel Gallagher, who purchased property west of land owned by J&T Properties, discovered he did not have access to a nearby public road, Gallagher petitioned the Board of County Commissioners for a private road across J&T's property. The county commissioners concluded that Gallagher had no legally enforceable access and certified the case to district court. The district court granted Gallagher a private road across J&T's property. J&T appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding (1) the district court correctly interpreted the law as allowing the condemnation of a private road even though it did not connect directly with a public road and properly refused to require Gallagher to join the owners of land over which he already had easements; and (2) the issue of whether the district court erred by denying J&T reimbursement for the costs of securing and presenting the appraisal used in determining its damages was not properly presented to the district court or the Supreme Court, and therefore, the Court refused to consider the issue.