Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

After the owner of a construction project defaulted on its obligations to various creditors, mortgage holder Pinnacle Bank foreclosed on the real property securing its mortgage. Junior mortgage holder American National Bank (ANB) and construction lienholder Michael's Construction, Inc. (Michael's) both sought payment from the surplus funds resulting from the foreclosure proceeding. The district court declared that ANB's mortgage was superior to Michael's lien, but denied ANB's request for contractual interest from the date of foreclosure through the date of final judgment. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court's order regarding the priority of liens; but (2) reversed the order regarding interest, holding that the district court did not have the discretion to limit ANB's recovery by denying it interest at the contractual rate from the time of foreclosure through final judgment. Remanded to determine the amount of interest due ANB under the promissory note for that time period.

John and Minerva Sutherland entered into a mining lease granting Meridian Granite Company the right to conduct mining operations on the Sutherlands' property. A dispute developed between the Sutherlands and Meridian regarding the Sutherlands' obligation to pay taxes relating to the mineral production. The dispute led to litigation. The district court granted Meridian's motion for summary judgment, ruling that the Sutherlands were obligated to pay the disputed taxes. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in allowing Meridian to deduct ad valorem and severance taxes from payments to the Sutherlands when such tax payments were not required by the State, as the Sutherlands and Meridian agreed in the mining lease that the Sutherlands would pay the taxes.

This case concerned a petition for the establishment of a private road filed by Merlin and Lori Zowada. In the first appeal, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the district court for further remand to the county board of county commissioners (the Commission) to make adequate findings of fact on specific issues. While the case was pending before the Court, the legislature amended Wyo. Stat. Ann. 24-9-101, which governs the procedure used when petitioning for the establishment of a private road. On remand, the Commission and its hearing officer chose to apply the statute as amended in 2008 and 2009, although the case had originally proceeded under the statute as it existed in 2005. Mullinax filed a petition for writ of review, arguing that the 2005 version of the statute should apply to the proceedings. The district court denied the petition. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the hearing officer's decision to apply the statute as it existed in 2009 was in error, as, while the amendments to the statute were procedural in nature, the general rule against retroactive application of the amendment applied. Remanded.

This case involved a dispute between a surface owner and a timber estate owner. In the first appeal, the Supreme Court reversed a judgment on the pleadings in favor of the surface owner and remanded for proceedings to examine the facts and circumstances surrounding the timber estate owner's predecessor in interest's (Union Pacific) reservations of timber in deeds from the early 1900s in order to determine the parties' intent with regard to the duration of the timber estates. The district granted judgment in favor of the surface owner, concluding (1) Union Pacific intended to reserve only those trees in existence at the time of the grant and of sufficient size to be suitable for use in construction, and (2) Union Pacific's timber reservations had expired. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly ruled, on the evidence before it, that Union Pacific intended its reservation of timber to include only trees of a suitable size which existed on the subject properties at the time of the deeds; and (2) the evidence presented at trial clearly established that such timber no longer existed on the properties.

Morrow Global (Morrow) filed suit against a Uinta County school district (District) and Windjammer Communications (Windjammer) that (1) sought a declaration that Morrow was a co-owner with the District of a conduit located under an interstate; (2) sought an order permanently enjoining the District from interfering with Morrow's use of the conduit; and (3) asserted that Windjammer had been unjustly enriched by using the conduit without paying for it. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the District and Windjammer (Defendants) after treating Defendants' motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment, concluding that Morrow had failed to present any facts showing that it was an owner of the conduit and entitled to the relief sought. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the circumstances, the district court improperly granted summary judgment when the parties had no opportunity to present evidence and argument on the issue of Morrow's ownership.

Rex and Vickie Lewis and Brad and Brenda Carnahan owned property in a subdivision. The Lewises filed a complaint seeking a declaration that the Carnahans did not have authority to block their use of a public easement to access their property and an injunction requiring the Carnahans to remove a fence they erected across the easement. The Carnahans responded by seeking to have title to the easement quieted in them. The district court entered judgment in favor of the Lewises, holding (1) neither the statute of limitations nor laches barred the Lewises' declaratory judgment action; and (2) the easement remained dedicated to public use, meaning the Lewises had the right to use the easement and the Carnahans did not have the right to obstruct their use. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly concluded (1) the Lewises had standing to bring their claim for declaratory relief; (2) the Lewises' claims were not barred by the statute of limitations or the equitable doctrine of Laches; and (3) an affidavit recorded in 1994 was not effective to vacate the public easement.

Majorie Bedessem, as trustee of her revocable trust, filed a complaint against David and Susan Cunningham, seeking enforcement of an easement across the Cunningham property to access the Bedessem property. Bedessem claimed an implied access easement or, in the alternative, access pursuant to the restrictive covenants applicable to both properties. The district court granting Cunninghams' summary judgment motion after finding no evidence of an implied easement and that the restrictive covenants authorized only the Architectural Control Committee to sue for enforcement of the covenants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err when it ruled that Bedessem did not have standing to enforce a restrictive covenant against Cunninghams, as the covenants granted the Architectural Control Committee the sole right to enforce the covenants.

Landlord leased commercial real property to Tenant. Landlord granted Tenant permission to renovate the property on the condition that Tenant would pay for the renovations. Tenant thereafter contracted with Contractor to perform the work. When Tenant defaulted on its payments to Contractor, Contractor filed a lien against Landlord's property. Contractor thereafter filed a complaint against Landlord and Tenant, asserting various claims and seeking to foreclose on its lien. The district court granted Landlord's motion for summary judgment, concluding that, pursuant to Wyoming's lien statutes, a valid mechanic's lien did not exist because Landlord did not agree to pay for the renovations to the property and that Tenant was not acting as Landlord's agent in contracting for the improvements. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly interpreted Wyo. Stat. Ann. 29-2-105(a)(ii) to require a finding of agency between the landlord and tenant before a mechanic's lien may attach to the landlord's property for work performed at the tenant's behest; and (2) in this case, that relationship did not exist.

Appellant, Whitney Holding Corporation, challenged a decision of the district court quieting title in a certain mineral estate in favor of Appellees, Clarence and Peggy Terry. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in concluding that the parties intended, and the limited warranty deed conveying the property from Whitney to the Terrys reflected, that Whitney did not reserve a mineral interest in the property; (2) the district court properly determined that the deed was ambiguous and did not err in considering extrinsic evidence to interpret the deed; and (3) the Terrys' quiet title action was not barred by the statute of limitations.

In 2008, the Teton County Commission approved a parcel boundary adjustment application regarding certain real property located in Teton County. Appellees, several individuals, sought judicial review of the Commission's decision. In 2008 and 2009, respectively, Appellants, Mark Menolascino and William Hirshberg, purchased the property. Neither sought to intervene in the judicial review proceedings. In 2011, the reviewing district court reversed the Commission's decision. The parties to the original administrative proceedings declined to appeal the ruling. Appellants, however, filed a notice of appeal. They contemporaneously filed a motion to intervene in the district court proceedings for the sole purpose of pursuing the appeal therefrom. The district court denied their motion to intervene, a decision which Appellants also appealed. The Supreme Court consolidated the appeals and (1) affirmed the district court's denial of Appellants' request to interview in the judicial review proceedings; and (2) dismissed Appellants' appeal of the final order of the district court for lack of standing because of Appellants' status as nonparties.