Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The case concerns a challenge to the validity of Measure C, a citizens’ initiative placed on the ballot by the City of San Diego for the March 2020 election. Measure C proposed an increase in the city’s transient occupancy tax, with revenues earmarked for homelessness programs, street repairs, and convention center improvements. The measure also authorized the City to issue bonds repaid from the new tax revenues. Measure C received 65.24 percent of the vote, and the city council subsequently passed resolutions declaring the measure approved and authorizing the issuance of related bonds.After the election, Alliance San Diego and other plaintiffs filed actions challenging the City’s resolution declaring Measure C had passed, arguing it was invalid. The City responded with a validation complaint seeking judicial confirmation of the validity of Measure C and the related bond resolutions. California Taxpayers Action Network (CTAN) and other opponents answered, contending that Measure C required a two-thirds vote and was not a bona fide citizens’ initiative. The Superior Court of San Diego County initially granted a motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that a two-thirds vote was required, and entered judgment against the City. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reversed and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether Measure C was a bona fide citizens’ initiative.On remand, the trial court conducted a bench trial and rejected CTAN’s arguments, finding that it had subject matter jurisdiction, the case was ripe, the special fund doctrine exempted the bonds from the two-thirds vote requirement, and Measure C was a bona fide citizens’ initiative requiring only a simple majority vote. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s judgment, holding that Measure C and the related bond resolutions were valid, and that the trial court properly excluded certain hearsay evidence. View "Alliance San Diego v. California Taxpayers Action Network" on Justia Law

A group of fourteen taxpayers, all out-of-state owners, operators, or lessees of multifamily housing developments in the City of Tuscaloosa, challenged a city ordinance that amended the business-license fee structure. The ordinance, effective April 2022, imposed a 3% business-license fee on rents received from student-oriented housing developments (SOHDs) with more than 200 bedrooms, while other rental properties remained subject to a 1% fee. The SOHD designation is determined by the city’s zoning officer based on a non-exhaustive list of characteristics and factors. The taxpayers alleged that the ordinance unfairly targeted out-of-state owners and was vague in its application.The taxpayers filed suit in the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court, seeking a declaration that the ordinance was invalid and a refund of taxes paid. They raised claims under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, the dormant Commerce Clause, and argued that the ordinance was essentially a zoning ordinance adopted without following statutory notice requirements. The trial court granted the City’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), finding the complaint insufficient to state a claim.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed whether the complaint alleged sufficient facts to survive dismissal. The court held that the taxpayers’ claims under the Equal Protection Clause, Due Process Clause (vagueness), and dormant Commerce Clause were sufficiently pleaded to withstand a motion to dismiss, as the allegations, if proven, could entitle the taxpayers to relief. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of the claim that the ordinance was a zoning ordinance subject to statutory notice requirements, finding the ordinance did not regulate property use in the manner of zoning laws. The case was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Campus Crest at Tuscaloosa LLC v. City of Tuscaloosa" on Justia Law

After the death of Gary Wayne Johnson, who died without a will in 2021, his sister, Zoa Ann Manners, opened his estate and filed a creditor’s claim. Her claim was based on a document titled “Article of Agreement,” which Gary had prepared, signed, and delivered to her in 2002. Zoa Ann argued that this document created a contractual obligation for Gary, and subsequently his estate, to distribute a one-fourth interest in certain real property (specifically, Lots 12 and 13 of Lenzi Farms Subdivision) to her and her sisters, in accordance with their parents’ wills. The document was notarized but never recorded, and its language referenced the parents’ testamentary intentions.The Chancery Court of Marshall County held a hearing on Zoa Ann’s claim. After considering her testimony and the document, the chancery court found that the Article of Agreement was ambiguous, lacked sufficient clarity to convey a present interest in land, and did not meet the requirements of a deed or a contract. The court denied her claim against the estate. Zoa Ann appealed, and the Mississippi Court of Appeals reversed the chancery court’s decision, holding that the Article of Agreement did constitute a valid deed conveying a vested future interest in the property, and remanded the case for further proceedings.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case on certiorari. It held that the Article of Agreement did not create a contractual obligation nor did it operate as a valid deed, as it failed to convey a present interest in the property and was testamentary in nature. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstated and affirmed the judgment of the Chancery Court of Marshall County, denying Zoa Ann’s claim. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Gary Wayne Johnson v. The Estate of Gary Wayne Johnson" on Justia Law

Ann Tierney Smith owned real property in West Virginia but failed to pay the assessed real estate taxes for 2016. As a result, the Mercer County Sheriff sold a tax lien on the property to Ed Boer. Boer sought a tax deed and provided the West Virginia State Auditor’s Office with a list of individuals to be notified about the right to redeem the property, including Smith. However, Boer did not include Smith’s current mailing address, which was available in county records. Notices sent by mail were returned as undeliverable, and attempts at personal service were unsuccessful, leading to notices being posted at the property and other addresses. After the redemption deadline passed, G. Russell Rollyson, Jr., an employee of the State Auditor’s Office, issued a tax deed to Boer. Smith learned of the deed in late 2020.Smith, and later her estate representatives, sued Rollyson and Boer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging deprivation of property without due process. The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia granted summary judgment to Rollyson, finding him entitled to qualified immunity. The court determined that while Rollyson could have directed Boer to search county records for Smith’s address after the mailed notices were returned, the duty to do so was not clearly established at the time. The estate representatives appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment and qualified immunity rulings de novo. The Fourth Circuit held that it was not clearly established on April 1, 2019, that Rollyson was required to have Boer search county records anew for Smith’s address after the mailed notices were returned. The court found that existing precedent did not prescribe a specific follow-up measure and that Rollyson’s actions did not violate clearly established law. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Ann deWet v. G. Russell Rollyson, Jr." on Justia Law

The dispute centers on the extension of a grading and grubbing permit issued by the Director of the Department of Public Works, County of Maui, to Maui Lani Partners for excavation work at a residential development site containing ancestral Hawaiian burial sites. In March 2018, an unincorporated association and its members challenged the validity of the permit extension, alleging violations of state and county laws requiring consultation with the State Historic Preservation Division and arguing that the Director exceeded his authority in granting the extension without good cause.The Circuit Court of the Second Circuit granted motions to dismiss the complaint on all counts without prejudice, finding no regulatory or statutory authority requiring consultation with the State Historic Preservation Division for permit extensions and that the Director acted within his discretionary authority. The court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and later denied their HRCP Rule 60(b)(6) motion for reconsideration, concluding that the plaintiffs had not presented new law or argument. The plaintiffs appealed to the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA), which affirmed the circuit court’s denial of costs and the motion for reconsideration but held that the notice of appeal was untimely because the Rule 60(b) motion was not filed within ten days of judgment and thus did not toll the appeal deadline.The Supreme Court of Hawaiʻi reviewed the case and held that a motion for reconsideration filed under HRCP Rule 60(b) is a “tolling motion” under HRAP Rule 4(a)(3) if filed within a reasonable time and before the appeal deadline, thereby extending the time to file a notice of appeal. The court also held that the ICA did not err in affirming the circuit court’s denial of the Rule 60(b)(6) motion for reconsideration. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment in part and remanded for further proceedings. View "Kakanilua v. Director of the Department of Public Works" on Justia Law

Frank and Shirlynne Apecella purchased property in Hamilton, Montana, in 2020, which historically received irrigation water from the Decker Ditch, originating at Roaring Lion Creek and running through their neighbor Lillian Overman’s property. After moving in, the Apecellas discovered they were not receiving water through the ditch and, upon investigation, learned that Overman’s husband had filled in the ditch and posted a “no trespassing” sign. The Apecellas own a water right in Roaring Lion Creek, and the disputed ditch segment runs from a bifurcation point on Overman’s property to the boundary with the Apecella property. The Apecellas sought a declaratory judgment affirming their ditch easement and alleged Overman interfered with their easement rights.The Montana Twenty-First Judicial District Court held a bench trial and found that the Apecellas had established both an implied and a prescriptive easement for the ditch in question, and that Overman had interfered with their easement by filling in the ditch. The court rejected Overman’s defenses of abandonment and reverse adverse possession, finding insufficient evidence that the Apecellas or their predecessors had abandoned the easement or that Overman had extinguished it through adverse use. The court permanently enjoined Overman from further interference and awarded the Apecellas attorney fees as the prevailing party under Montana law.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court’s judgment. It held that Overman failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence either abandonment or reverse adverse possession of the Apecellas’ irrigation ditch easement. The Court also held that the Apecellas were the prevailing party under § 70-17-112(5), MCA, and were entitled to reasonable costs and attorney fees. The District Court’s orders were affirmed in all respects. View "Apecella v. Overman" on Justia Law

Several homeowners initiated a lawsuit against an individual, alleging conversion, trespass, outrage, reformation of restrictive covenants, quiet title, and seeking injunctive relief to prevent interference with their use of common areas in a real estate development. The defendant retained counsel and filed a timely answer. However, when the homeowners moved for summary judgment, the defendant’s attorney failed to respond or inform his client about the motion. The district court granted summary judgment for the homeowners, awarding substantial actual and punitive damages, as well as attorney’s fees, far exceeding the amount requested in the motion.After more than 30 days had passed since judgment, the defendant moved to vacate the judgment in the District Court of Cherokee County, Oklahoma, arguing that unavoidable casualty or misfortune, fraud, and irregularity had prevented him from defending the action. The district court held an evidentiary hearing and denied the motion to vacate. The defendant appealed, and the Court of Civil Appeals, Division III, affirmed the district court’s decision, finding that the defendant had not properly pled a valid defense and that his attorney’s negligence was imputed to him.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case on certiorari. It held that the attorney’s abandonment of the case without the client’s knowledge, combined with a breakdown in office procedures and lack of communication, constituted unavoidable casualty or misfortune under Oklahoma law. The court further found that the district court’s award of damages and attorney’s fees without a hearing or proper evidentiary support violated the defendant’s due process rights. The Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals, reversed the district court’s judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings. It also vacated the appellate attorney fee award previously granted to the homeowners. View "Bjorkman v. Noble" on Justia Law

A county in Georgia revised a zoning ordinance to increase the maximum allowable dwelling size in a historic district on Sapelo Island. Some residents opposed this change and, relying on the Georgia Constitution’s Home Rule Provision, petitioned for a referendum to repeal the ordinance. The county probate court found the petition valid and scheduled a special election. Before the order was entered, the county filed suit in superior court to stop the referendum, arguing that zoning ordinances are not subject to the Home Rule Provision’s referendum process.The Superior Court of McIntosh County agreed with the county, holding that the ordinance was adopted under the Constitution’s Zoning Provision, not the Home Rule Provision, and thus was not subject to repeal by referendum. The court issued a writ of prohibition against the probate judge to halt the referendum. However, the superior court also granted an injunction, at the request of the residents, preventing enforcement of the revised ordinance while the appeal was pending.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed whether the Home Rule Provision’s referendum process applies to county zoning ordinances. The court held that, under the 1983 Georgia Constitution, the legislative power to enact zoning ordinances derives from the Home Rule Provision, and nothing in the Constitution excludes zoning ordinances from the referendum process. Therefore, the superior court erred in stopping the referendum and issuing a writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed those portions of the superior court’s order. However, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s injunction against enforcement of the ordinance, finding the county failed to show error in the record regarding the injunction. View "Bailey v. McIntosh County" on Justia Law

Doug Ridley and Sherry Shen owned a condominium unit in a Santa Clara complex managed by a homeowners’ association (HOA). In April 2018, flooding occurred in the crawlspace beneath their unit, which was a common area under the HOA’s control. Initial investigations suggested the water originated from an undestroyed well, but the HOA delayed meaningful repairs for over 19 months, during which the unit suffered extensive damage, including mold and termite infestation. The HOA repeatedly ignored expert recommendations and shifted its position, ultimately failing to properly investigate or remediate the source of the water and related damage.The homeowners filed suit in the Santa Clara County Superior Court against the HOA and its president, Steve Moritz, alleging breach of the covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CCRs), negligence, nuisance, and other claims. After a lengthy bench trial, the court found in favor of the homeowners on all claims, awarded damages for restoration, lost rent, and emotional distress, and issued an injunction requiring the HOA to complete specified repairs and compensate the homeowners until the work was finished. The court also found the HOA’s conduct grossly negligent and awarded punitive damages.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. It affirmed the trial court’s finding that the HOA breached its duties under the CCRs by failing to reasonably investigate and timely repair the common area damage. The appellate court held that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s findings, rejected the HOA’s defenses under the business judgment rule, rule of judicial deference, and the CCRs’ exculpatory clause, and concluded the HOA’s conduct constituted gross negligence. The injunction order was affirmed, and the homeowners were awarded costs on appeal. View "Ridley v. Rancho Palma Grande Homeowners Assn." on Justia Law

A tenant entered into a lease for an apartment in Minneapolis that was subsidized under the Section 8 project-based voucher program, with the local public housing authority paying most or all of the rent directly to the landlord. After the tenant fell behind on utility payments, her electricity was disconnected, and she and her boyfriend broke into the building’s utility closet to restore power, inadvertently affecting other units. The landlord learned of this breach but continued to accept three months of rental payments from the public housing authority on the tenant’s behalf. Later, the landlord filed an eviction action based on the tenant’s breach of the lease.The Hennepin County District Court dismissed the tenant’s counterclaim regarding the utility shutoff and, following the Minnesota Court of Appeals’ decision in Westminster Corp. v. Anderson, held that the common law doctrine of waiver by acceptance of rent did not apply to rental payments made by a public housing agency. The district court found the tenant had materially breached the lease and did not address her retaliation defense. The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s rulings on the waiver and breach issues but remanded for consideration of the retaliation defense.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed only the waiver issue. It overruled Westminster, holding that the common law rule—whereby a landlord who accepts rent with knowledge of a tenant’s breach waives the right to evict for that breach—applies equally to private and publicly subsidized tenancies. The court clarified that whether a landlord has accepted rent for purposes of this doctrine is a factual question, to be determined by the totality of the circumstances, including the landlord’s conduct after payment. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hook & Ladder Apartments, L.P. v. Nalewaja" on Justia Law