Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

High Maine, LLC, challenged the Town of Kittery's issuance of a marijuana retail store license and approval of a change of use and modified site plan for GTF Kittery 8, LLC, to operate a marijuana retail store in the Town’s C-2 zone. High Maine argued that the Town's actions violated local and state regulations, particularly concerning the proximity of the proposed store to a nursery school.The Superior Court (York County) dismissed High Maine's complaint for lack of standing, reasoning that High Maine, as a pre-applicant on the waiting list for a marijuana retail store license, did not suffer a particularized injury. The court concluded that High Maine's status as a prospective license-holder was unchanged by the Town's decisions, and thus, it was not directly affected.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and determined that High Maine had alleged a particularized injury sufficient to establish standing. The court noted that High Maine's opportunity to obtain the single license available in the C-2 zone was directly and negatively affected by the alleged defects in the licensing process. The court found that High Maine's complaint suggested that GTF Kittery 8 obtained an unfair advantage in the lottery by submitting multiple applications for the same building, which was within 1,000 feet of a school, in violation of state law.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court vacated the Superior Court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that High Maine's allegations were sufficient at the motion to dismiss stage to demonstrate its standing to challenge the Town's actions. View "High Maine, LLC v. Town of Kittery" on Justia Law

In 2001, Terry Olson, Steffen Olson, Kevin Olson, and their parents signed a "Family Agreement" regarding ownership of land in Renville County, North Dakota. The agreement stipulated that the land, owned by the three sons as co-tenants with their parents retaining a life estate, could not be sold or transferred without unanimous consent and prohibited partition actions. Following the termination of the parents' life estates, Terry Olson and Steffen Olson sought to partition the land due to family conflicts. Terry Olson initiated a lawsuit in 2022 to partition the property by sale. Kevin Olson opposed the sale, favoring physical partition instead.The District Court of Renville County appointed a referee to determine whether the property could be physically partitioned without great prejudice. The referee concluded that physical partition would result in smaller, less marketable tracts and recommended a sale. The district court accepted the referee's report and ordered the property to be sold, subsequently confirming the sale and distributing the proceeds among the co-owners. Kevin Olson appealed, arguing that the district court erred in ordering the partition by sale and in distributing the proceeds.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case and found that the district court had abused its discretion. The court noted that the referee's report was not properly introduced as evidence and that the district court's findings were conclusory, lacking sufficient evidence to support the determination of great prejudice. The Supreme Court emphasized that the burden of proving that physical partition would result in great prejudice lies with the party demanding the sale. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's orders for partition by sale, the award of costs and attorney's fees, and the distribution of proceeds from the sale. View "Olson v. Olson" on Justia Law

A general contractor, Tocci Building Corporation, and its affiliates were involved in a dispute with their insurers, including Admiral Insurance Company, over coverage under a commercial general liability (CGL) insurance policy. The issue was whether the CGL policy covered damage to non-defective parts of a construction project caused by a subcontractor's defective work on another part of the project. Tocci sought defense and indemnity coverage under the Admiral policy for a lawsuit filed by Toll JM EB Residential Urban Renewal LLC, which alleged various issues with Tocci's work on a residential construction project.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts concluded that Admiral had no duty to defend Tocci. The court found that the lawsuit did not allege "property damage" caused by an "occurrence" as required for coverage under the policy. The court reasoned that the damage alleged was within the scope of the project Tocci was hired to complete and thus did not qualify as "property damage." Additionally, the court held that faulty workmanship did not constitute an "accident" and therefore was not an "occurrence" under the policy.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision, but for different reasons. The appellate court focused on the policy's exclusions, particularly the "Damage to Property" exclusion (j)(6), which excludes coverage for property that must be restored, repaired, or replaced because the insured's work was incorrectly performed on it. The court concluded that this exclusion applied to the entire project since Tocci was the general contractor responsible for the entire construction. The court also noted that Tocci did not meet its burden of showing that any exceptions to the exclusion applied, such as the "products-completed operations hazard," because Tocci's work was not completed or abandoned. Thus, the appellate court held that Admiral had no duty to defend Tocci in the underlying lawsuit. View "Admiral Insurance Company v. Tocci Building Corporation" on Justia Law

Nicole Stone, a person with disabilities who uses a motorized wheelchair, resides in St. Johnsbury, Vermont. In 2020, her mother’s boyfriend, Johnathan Chase, built an outdoor structure to facilitate socially distanced meetings for Stone. A neighbor complained about the structure, leading the town zoning administrator to inform Chase that it violated setback requirements and to advise him to seek a variance. The Development Review Board (DRB) denied the variance request without discussing Stone’s disability-related needs. Stone did not appeal the decision but filed a discrimination complaint with the Vermont Human Rights Commission.The Commission investigated and found reasonable grounds to believe the Town of St. Johnsbury discriminated against Stone based on her disability. The Commission filed a complaint in the Civil Division of the Superior Court, seeking various forms of relief, including declaratory and injunctive relief, damages, and civil penalties. The Town moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that only the Environmental Division had jurisdiction over such claims. The Civil Division dismissed the complaint, concluding it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because ruling on the discrimination claim would constitute an impermissible collateral attack on the final zoning decision.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the Civil Division has jurisdiction over all Vermont Fair Housing and Public Accommodations Act (VFHPAA) claims. The Court held that the finality provisions of 24 V.S.A. § 4472 do not preclude the Commission from seeking remedies for discrimination that do not require reopening the final zoning decision. The Court also determined that the Commission is not an "interested person" under the statute and is therefore not bound by the exclusivity-of-remedy provisions. The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Vermont Human Rights Commission v. Town of St. Johnsbury" on Justia Law

PSK, LLC purchased a commercial property at a trustee's sale, which included a billboard. A dispute arose over the ownership of the billboard, leading PSK to file a quiet title action against Legacy Outdoor Advertising, LLC, claiming ownership of the billboard. Legacy counterclaimed, seeking a declaratory judgment that the billboard was its removable personal property.The district court found in favor of Legacy, determining that the billboard was not a fixture but removable personal property. The court noted that the Arents, the previous owners, had sold the billboard to USA Outdoor in 2010 and had entered into a lease agreement allowing USA Outdoor to remove the billboard upon lease termination. The court found that PSK had notice of the separate ownership of the billboard before purchasing the property, as evidenced by a sign on the billboard and testimony from the previous owners and a realtor.PSK appealed, arguing that the billboard was included in its purchase of the real estate and that it had no notice of Legacy's claim. The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's judgment. The court held that PSK failed to prove its ownership of the billboard and that the billboard was indeed Legacy's removable personal property. The court emphasized the importance of the Arents' intention to sell the billboard as personal property and the lease agreement's provision allowing for its removal. The court also found that PSK had constructive notice of the separate ownership due to the sign on the billboard and other circumstances that should have prompted further inquiry. View "PSK v. Legacy Outdoor Advertising" on Justia Law

Stage Stop, Inc. purchased a lot in the Rafter J Ranch Subdivision in Teton County, Wyoming, intending to convert an existing building into workforce housing apartments. The Rafter J Ranch Homeowner’s Association (HOA) sought a declaratory judgment that this proposed use violated the subdivision’s covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CCRs). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Stage Stop, determining that the proposed use was permitted under the CCRs, and the HOA appealed.The district court found that the CCRs allowed for "any commercial purpose" on Lot 333, which included Stage Stop’s proposed use of the building for workforce housing. The court reasoned that renting out apartments as a for-profit enterprise fell within the definition of a commercial purpose. The HOA argued that the CCRs, when read as a whole, intended to maintain the residential character of the subdivision and that the proposed use was inconsistent with this intent. The HOA also contended that Stage Stop should be judicially estopped from asserting that the CCRs permitted the proposed use because Stage Stop had previously indicated it would seek to amend the CCRs.The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the term "commercial" in the CCRs was clear and unambiguous and included the proposed use of the property for workforce housing. The court rejected the HOA’s argument that the CCRs, when read in their entirety, prohibited the proposed use, noting that the CCRs expressly allowed for "any commercial purpose" on Lot 333. The court also found that the Master Plan referenced by the HOA was inadmissible extrinsic evidence and that the argument related to the "local commercial" designation in the Plat Notes was not properly raised before the district court. Finally, the court concluded that judicial estoppel did not apply because the statements made by Stage Stop in a letter to the County Commissioners were not judicial declarations and did not involve the same issues or parties as the current case. View "Rafter J Ranch Homeowner's Association v. Stage Stop, Inc." on Justia Law

Casey and Janae Ruppert entered into a contract to purchase ranch property from Judith Merrill. Before closing, Merrill indicated she would not proceed with the sale. The Rupperts filed a complaint seeking specific performance and damages. The district court found Merrill breached the contract and denied her affirmative defenses. It awarded the Rupperts damages and attorneys’ fees but declined to order specific performance. The Rupperts appealed the denial of specific performance, and Merrill cross-appealed the attorneys’ fees award.The District Court of Laramie County found Merrill breached the contract but declined to order specific performance, citing Merrill’s personal circumstances and misunderstandings about the contract. It awarded the Rupperts $22,342 in damages and granted their motion for attorneys’ fees without explanation, awarding $55,258.50 in fees and $3,082.60 in costs.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and found the district court abused its discretion by denying specific performance. The court noted the district court’s findings contradicted its decision, as it found the contract valid, the price reasonable, and no undue influence or unconscionability. The Supreme Court held that specific performance was the appropriate remedy given the circumstances and the equities involved.Regarding attorneys’ fees, the Supreme Court agreed with both parties that the district court erred by awarding fees without explanation. The Supreme Court independently assessed the reasonableness of the fees, concluding that the rates charged were excessive for the local market. It reduced the hourly rate to $250, resulting in a total fee award of $28,425.00, plus the previously awarded costs of $3,082.60.The Wyoming Supreme Court reversed the district court’s orders denying specific performance and awarding attorneys’ fees, remanding the case for entry of an order consistent with its opinion. View "Merrill v. Ruppert" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between a property owner and a city regarding the validity of a lien placed on the property. The property, an apartment building, was destroyed by arson, leading to the displacement of its tenants. The city incurred costs relocating the tenants and placed a lien on the property to recover these expenses under the Uniform Relocation Assistance Act (URAA).The trial court ruled in favor of the property owner, determining that the lien was invalid because the displacement was caused by a third party's arson, not by the city's enforcement of its building code. The court allowed the property owner to challenge the lien using an affirmative defense provided by the URAA, which is typically available only in civil actions brought by a municipality to recover relocation expenses.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case and reversed the trial court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the tenants were "displaced persons" under the URAA because their displacement was a direct result of the city's enforcement of its building code, regardless of the arson being the initial cause. The court further held that the affirmative defense provided by the URAA, which allows a landlord to argue that the displacement was not due to their violation of housing codes, is only available in civil actions brought by the municipality and cannot be used to challenge a lien in an application to discharge it.The Supreme Court directed the trial court to deny the property owner's application to discharge the city's lien, thereby upholding the city's right to recover its relocation expenses through the lien. View "PPC Realty, LLC v. Hartford" on Justia Law

Parker Water and Sanitation District, a Colorado special district, applied for six permits to construct wells to withdraw nontributary groundwater from the Denver Basin aquifers. The State Engineer approved the applications and issued the permits, including an allowed average annual withdrawal rate and, for the first time, an explicit condition limiting the total volume of groundwater that could be withdrawn over the life of the permits. Parker challenged this condition, arguing that the State Engineer lacked the authority to impose such a limit.The Water Division One court found in favor of the State Engineer, concluding that section 37-90-137, C.R.S. (2024), and the Statewide Nontributary Ground Water Rules unambiguously set forth a total volumetric limit on the amount of nontributary Denver Basin groundwater a permittee may withdraw. The court determined that the statute and rules require a total volumetric limit equal to the quantity of nontributary groundwater underlying the land owned by the applicant, as determined by the State Engineer at the time the well permit is issued.The Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed the water court's decision, holding that section 37-90-137 unambiguously imposes a total volumetric limit on nontributary groundwater withdrawals over the lifetime of a well permit. The court also held that this limit applies to well permits issued under both the current statute and the earlier version enacted through Senate Bill 213. Additionally, the court concluded that the Statewide Nontributary Ground Water Rules unambiguously impose a total volumetric limit and that the State Engineer has the authority to include such a limit in well permits. The court further held that water court decrees determining use rights for nontributary Denver Basin groundwater set forth a total volumetric limit on withdrawals unless an underlying decree explicitly provides otherwise. Finally, the court found that the water court did not abuse its discretion in staying discovery. View "Parker Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Rein" on Justia Law

Kenneth and Kathy Zangara defaulted on a $2.3 million loan secured by a mortgage on their home. Bank of America (BOA), the original lender, filed a foreclosure action in 2011, which was dismissed in 2013 for lack of prosecution. BOA later sold the note to LSF9 Master Participation Trust (the Trust). The Trust filed a foreclosure action in 2018, which was dismissed for lack of standing. The Trust then filed a second foreclosure action, invoking New Mexico’s six-month savings statute.The district court dismissed the Trust’s second foreclosure action, interpreting the savings statute as inapplicable because the initial foreclosure was deemed a "nullity." The Trust appealed, and the New Mexico Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the Trust, concluding that a dismissal for lack of standing does not fall within the negligence in prosecution exception to the savings statute.The New Mexico Supreme Court reviewed the case and clarified the meaning of "negligence in its prosecution" under the savings statute. The Court held that this phrase is equivalent to a dismissal for failure to prosecute. The Court rejected previous interpretations that extended the negligence in prosecution exception to other circumstances. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision that the Trust’s first foreclosure action’s dismissal for lack of standing did not constitute negligence in prosecution, allowing the Trust to benefit from the savings statute. The Court overruled prior cases that were inconsistent with this interpretation. View "Zangara v. LSF9 Master Participation Trust" on Justia Law